|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 630 Records
-
2000 (8) TMI 1038 - WEST BENGAL STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
Consumer - Meaning of ... ... ... ... ..... inant availed of the services of Vaisya Bank for making payment of prices of shares of Global Trust. So, we think that the complainant is a consumer he can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to get appropriate relief. 3. Now the main prayer of the complainant is to get back the amount which he has paid to Vaisya Bank. We think that the complainant is within his right to get back the amount and the Vaisya Bank is required to pay Rs. 5,000 to the complainant together with interest at the rate 12 per cent from the date on which the cheque was encashed by it to the date of payment. In this view of the matter, we think that the appeal should succeed in part. There should be a direction upon Vaisya Bank to make payment of Rs. 5,000 to the complainant together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of encashment of the cheque till payment is made. The payment as aforesaid is to be made within a month from this date. With this observation, the appeal be disposed of.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1036 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Suspension of legal proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... Rs. 10,80,101.40. Even according to the statement of the defendant, it is a sick company and for a rehabilitation scheme, they have approached the appropriate authority and this scheme has not yet been framed. When the defendant-company is a sick company, they are not entitled to get back the amount as a matter of right. When the defendant takes advantage of the SICA, the same equally applies to the defendant also and he is also not entitled to get back the amount. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is entitled to get back the amount till the proceedings in the BIFR come to an end. Under the circumstances, I am of the view that the amount can be deposited in a nationalised bank under fixed deposit till the disposal of the BIFR proceedings. 11. For the reasons stated above, the application fails and is dismissed. The Registry is directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,80,101.40 in Indian Bank, Alwarpet Branch, under fixed deposit for a period of two years. The suit is stayed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1035 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... otted against one equity share of Rs. 10 held by a shareholder of transferor-company) and the transferee-company shall increase its authorised capital accordingly after completing the requisite formalities and paying the requisite fee on the increased authorised capital as per Schedule X of the Companies Act and 5.The transferee-company (present petitioner) within thirty days from the date of this order cause a certified copy of this order to be delivered to the Registrar of Companies for registration and on such certified copy being so delivered, the transferor-company shall be dissolved and the Registrar of Companies shall place all the documents relating to the transferor-company, and registered with him on the file kept by him in relation to the transferee-company and files relating to the said two companies shall be consolidated accordingly and 6.Any person interested shall be at liberty to apply to this Court in the above matter for any directions that may be necessary.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1034 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up - Avoidance of attachment, executions, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... to urge that disposition of property after commencement of winding up is void unless approved by Court. There can be no quarrel with this proposition but the point of the matter is that the ownership of the property must be shown as vesting in the company. Unless it is shown that the company was the owner of the property, the sale cannot be declared to be void. On an analytic scrutiny of the present controversy in an adjudicatory manner, this Court finds that the property whereagainst the respondent No. 1-U.P.F.C. proceeded under section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act and sold the same had not been transferred to the company (In Liquidation) and was not, therefore, owned by it. Resultantly, the official liquidator cannot lay any claim thereagainst. The application made by the official liquidator is liable to be dismissed. 10. In view of the above discussion, application made by the official liquidator is found to be devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1032 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... ed against one equity share of Rs. 10 held by a shareholder of transferor-company) and the transferee-company shall increase its authorised capital, accordingly, after completing the requisite formalities and paying the requisite fee on the increased authorised capital as per Schedule X of the Companies Act and 5.The transferor-company (present petitioner) within thirty days from the date of this order cause a certified copy of this order to be delivered to the Registrar of Companies for registration and on such certified copy being so delivered, the transferor-company shall be dissolved and the Registrar of Companies shall place all the documents relating to the transferor-company, and registered with him on the file kept by him in relation to the transferee-company and files relating to the said two companies shall be consolidated accordingly and 6.Any person interested shall be at liberty to apply to this Court in the above matter for any directions that may be necessary.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1030 - DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
Deficiency in service ... ... ... ... ..... in appeal before us, have controverted the estimation of loss, as stated by the appellant. 10. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we hold that the impugned order, passed by the learned District Forum, cannot sustain the test of judicial scrutiny and the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the District Forum and allow the appeal of the appellant with the directions to the respondents to pay to the appellant Rs. 6,900 with interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum till payment for the pecuniary loss sustained by the appellant in the present transaction. The appellant is also entitled to the costs of present proceedings. The same are fixed at Rs. 2,500. The respondents are directed to comply with the above directions within 60 days of the receipt of this order. The liability of all the respondents will be joint and several. 11. The present appeal is disposed of in above terms. Appeal allowed with costs.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1022 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... olling and managing the company holding amongst themselves about 80 per cent share capital and each of them had equal right of participation in management. When an irreconcilable dispute and differences with lack of faith and probity came to the fore between the two groups, it was most reasonable, far from being unfair or prejudicial to the company or the body of shareholders as a whole, to order the division of assets. 61. I have discussed above all the arguments and contentions raised at the bar and my conclusion is that the impugned orders dated 30-11-1999 and 12-1-2000 passed by the CLB under challenge in the two appeals are perfectly justified having regard to facts and circumstances of the case and the same also have the support of law. They cannot at all be flawed on any ground whatsoever. 62. To sum up, both the appeals are found to be devoid of merit. Resultantly, both the appeal Nos. 2 of 2000 and 3 of 2000 are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1021 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Appellate Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... r. They want to delay the main case by involving the Bank in a fresh trial on the basis of the counter claims. The petitioners are abusing the process of the Court. 15. The result of the above discussion is that we find no merit in the contention of the petitioners that they should be allowed to raise counter claims against the Bank in the OA. 16. The other point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as noticed earlier, is that the Appellate Tribunal was wrong in holding that the appeal filed by the present petitioners before it against the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not maintainable in view of order dated 25-7-2000 dismissing CM (Main) 414 of 2000. So far as this aspect is concerned, it need not detain us because after having observed that the appeal was not maintainable, the Tribunal has in fact considered the case on merits and made observations in the concluding part of the order. 17. This petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1013 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondents were justified in holding that hire- purchase transactions entered into by the appellants were liable to imposition of sales tax on the consolidated proceeds?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Coming to the definition of the expression "sale price" if we substitute the defined meaning of the word "sale" occurring in section 2(g) into the said section 2(h), it would in effect read as follows:
"Sale price means the amount payable to a dealer as consideration for transfer of goods on hire-purchase". The word "sale" occurring in section 2(h) must have the meaning ascribed to it as in section 2(g). When the word "sale" includes transfer of goods on hire-purchase, then whatever is the amount which is paid/payable to the dealer on such a transfer would be included within the meaning of the expression "sale price" in section 2(h). This being so, the sales tax authorities in the present cases were justified in including in the turnover of the appellants the hire charges as provided for in the hire-purchase agreements.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1006 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Audit - Appointment/removal of auditors ... ... ... ... ..... ue course. This plea does not inspire any confidence. 10. I find merit in the contention of the respondents that the statutory auditors had lost the confidence of the management. This is also apparent from the chequered history of the litigation that had ensued between the petitioners or by their associates at their behest. Year after year in the reports, the statutory auditors did not raise any objection but kept on making/repeating the observation with regard to the matter being under investigation and had finally in their report of 11-2-1998 accepted the recommendation. The petitioners raised this objection belatedly on 11-11-1998 after they had fallen foul with management and with a view to resist the action for their removal. 11. In these circumstances, I find that the impugned order passed was fully justified and in accordance with law. No ground is made out for interference in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1005 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Reference to Board, Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... shall be open to it to take into consideration subsequent events, if any, and decide whether the operating agency already operating is to be operative further or any variation in terms of the appointment of the operating agency is necessary. We make it clear we have not expressed any opinion on merits. Parties shall be free to move BIFR for protection of assets and if it is satisfied that there is in reality disposal of assets to defraud creditors, appropriate orders, can be passed in accordance with law and in the proper perspective. 7. To avoid unnecessary delay, let the parties appear before the BIFR on 12-9-2000 so that necessary orders can be passed by it. In the meantime, orders passed by the BIFR are stayed. Fresh orders, it goes without saying, has to be passed. 8. In view of our order setting aside the orders passed by the BIFR and the AAIFR, the provisions of section 22 of the Act, so far as they are applicable, would apply. Petition stands disposed of accordingly.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1003 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Suspension of legal proceedings, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... e record of the case was also with the BIFR until 16-9-1999. However, the petitioner instead of approaching the BIFR has rushed to this court for the relief which could be granted to him by the BIFR itself. Under the circumstances, I am clearly of the view that the petition is not maintainable. 8. It is, however, noted that this court by its order dated 2-4-1999 has granted interim writ to the petitioner extending the said order dated 25-1-1999 of the BIFR firstly, for a period of one month, and then until further orders. Keeping in view this interim order of the court, I deem it proper that while dismissing the petition, the petitioner may be granted 10 (ten) days to approach the BIFR and seek appropriate orders therefrom. 9. Accordingly, I dismiss the petition, but direct that the interim order passed by this court on 24-9-1999 shall remain in force for a further period of 10 days to enable the petitioner to seek his remedy before the BIFR. Certified copy within three days.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1001 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an advocate has lien on the files entrusted to him by the client?
Held that:- It is true that an advocate is competent to settle the terms of his engagement and his fee by private agreement with his client but it is equally true that if such fee is not paid, he has no right to retain the case papers and other documents belonging to his client. Like any other citizen, an advocate has a right to recover the fee or other amounts, payable to him by the litigant by way of legal proceedings but subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by law or the rules made in that behalf.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1000 - SUPREME COURT
What is the nature of the order that is passed by the Chief Justice or his nominee in exercise of power under sub-section (6) of section 11?
Even if said order is held to be administrative in nature what is the remedy open to the person concerned if his request for appointment of an Arbitrator is turned down by the learned Chief Justice or his nominee, for some reason or other?
Held that:- The nature of the function performed by the Chief Justice being essentially to aid the Constitution of the Arbitration Tribunal immediately and the Legislature having consciously chosen to confer the power on the Chief Justice and not a Court, it is apparent that the order passed by the Chief Justice or his nominee is an administrative order. This being the position even an order refusing to appoint an arbitrator will not be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution. Needless to mention such an order refusing to appoint an arbitrator after deciding the contentious issues would be an act of non-performance of duty and in view of what has been stated earlier the concerned authority could be directed by mandamus to perform its duty.
We fail to understand how a petition under article 32, at all is entertainable against the order of the learned Chief Justice, refusing to appoint an arbitrator under section 11 of the 1996 Act. This petition under article 32, accordingly stands dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 997 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Reference - Powers of Board to make suitable order, ... ... ... ... ..... or the appellant presented an application for withdrawal of the appeal. From an analysis of PPL rsquo s account for FY 98, we have come to the conclusion that the accounts are falsified and fabricated to claim sickness by surreptitious and fraudulent and absolutely improbable transactions claiming destruction of drugs worth Rs. 50.43 crores. After arguing and exposing the fraud and falsification and fabrication of the accounts of PPL, it is not open to the appellant to come up with a request for withdrawal of appeal. The application for withdrawal of appeal is rejected. We find no infirmity in the conclusion recorded in the said order. The decision in Raisa Sultana rsquo s case (supra) has no application to the facts of the case as it was rendered conceptually in different situation and background. Though several other points have been taken in the writ petition they were not urged at the hearing. The Writ petition is without any merit and deserves dismissal, which we direct.
-
2000 (8) TMI 993 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the nominee specified in the National Savings Certificate, on the death of its holder, becomes entitled to the sum due under the certificate to the exclusion of all other persons/
Whether the amount of the certificate can be retained by him for the benefit of the legal heirs of the deceased - is the sole question required to be adjudicated by us in this appeal by special leave?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. The law laid down holds the field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under section 6 read with section 7 who in turn is liable to return the amount to those, in whose favour law creates beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 8.
Thus this appeal is allowed with a direction that the succession certificates shall be issued in favour of the respondents in respect of debts detailed in Annexures A and B to the application filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane, subject to their payment of necessary court fees and estate duty certificates.
-
2000 (8) TMI 988 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Deposits not to be accepted in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... not having achieved the desired result of protecting large number of depositors from unincorporated financial institutions which would suddenly mushroom overnight and then vanish without a trace, but taking with it depositors money, left the RBI with no alternative but to prohibit such unincorporated entities from conducting financial business which was more than akin to banking. The restrictions imposed against acceptance of deposits by unincorporated bodies carrying on financial activity or the business of deposit acceptance or lending in any manner are in the larger interest of general public vis-a-vis few persons accepting such deposits. The need for such restrictions had become acute and imperative in view of large scale mismanagement of public funds by such unincorporated bodies. Accordingly, we hold that the provisions of section 45S of the Act are valid. 5. In view of the above, these writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
-
2000 (8) TMI 986 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 29 can override provisions of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 529 and section 529A?
Whether the Corporation can exercise its rights under above section 29 ignoring a pari passu charge of the workmen?
Held that: Appeal dismissed. It was not at all necessary for the Financial Corporation to approach this Court for permission to stay outside the winding up proceedings.
-
2000 (8) TMI 981 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Appeal - Period of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... usly that is the starting point when the order can be said to have been issued by the BIFR to the petitioner. Therefore, the starting point has to be the date on which the certified copy was handed over i.e. 9-9-1998. If that is to be taken to be the starting point, appeal is within permissible extended time limit. The view of the AAIFR that appeal was barred by limitation is not correct. 7. Accordingly, we remit the matter back to the AAIFR to consider the question of admitting the appeal on condonation of delay, and pass appropriate orders. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. It is open to the respondent(s) to press the stand before the AAIFR, so far as the merits are concerned, as well as the question of condonation of delay. It is open to the parties to place such materials as are considered relevant by them for the purpose of adjudication of the dispute by the AAIFR. Writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above.
-
2000 (8) TMI 979 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Company Law Board - Power to order repayment of deposits ... ... ... ... ..... the exercise of extraordinary power. One such restriction is, availability of effective, efficacious alternative remedy. Indeed, a proceeding for a writ of prohibition is not entertained if the party aggrieved has ample remedy by way of appeal against the order or judgment of the inferior Court. In some of the cases before this Court, PCML has already filed appeals and in some cases appeals have not been filed. Where appeals are filed, there is further remedy of revision to National Commission. Therefore, it is a case where the existence of alternative remedy operates as a bar for exercise of jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks AIR 1999 SC 22. Therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in these writ petitions. 51. Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. 52. For all the above reasons and the findings recorded on the various points, all the writ petitions are dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000 in each case.
............
|
