|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 628 Records
-
2000 (8) TMI 1085
... ...
... ... ..... t the order dated April 24, 1998 passed by respondent No. 2 cancelling the exemption certificate as also the orders passed by respondents Nos. 5 and 6 dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioner are illegal and are liable to be quashed. 15.. In view of the above conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the petitioner s plea that the order dated April 24, 1998 should be declared void on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 16.. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. Orders annexures P-11, P-17 and P-21 are declared illegal and quashed with the direction that the surety bond furnished by the petitioner shall be accepted by the competent authority subject to its satisfaction about the genuineness thereof. If the concerned authority comes to the conclusion that the security furnished by the petitioner is not genuine or adequate, then it may reject the same after hearing its representative. Writ petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1084
... ...
... ... ..... 35 STC 491 (All.), it was held that ammeters and voltmeters were electrical goods as they could perform their function only when electrical energy is made to pass through them. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Metro Electrical Globes 1977 39 STC 188, the Madras High Court held that globes and lamp-shades are accessories of electrical goods. 3.. According to us the simple question considered is whether how the goods are described in the common parlance. People go in search of mosquito repellants. The mosquito repellants are of various kinds. Certain mosquito repellants are operated by electrical energy. But the other mosquito repellants need not have the use of electricity. Thus we are of the view that mosquito repellants are not electrical goods. Probably it is because of this that the Legislature itself has subsequently included the mosquito repellants under new entry 123-B of the First Schedule from August 1, 1991. For the above reasons the T.R.C. is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1083
... ...
... ... ..... 1999, for the sake of argument, is taken to be the explanatory note, other requirements relating to a revised return, which were to be fulfilled, were not done. But at the same time, it is not impermissible for an assessee to deposit tax voluntarily in advance to meet the demand which may be fashioned subsequently. In view of this position we feel that best course would be to direct Revenue to deposit the entire amount paid/collected pursuant to application of the petitioner dated November 24, 1999, in this Court within a period of one month. On the amount being deposited the same shall be kept in interest bearing fixed deposits and shall be dealt with on the basis of adjudication to be done by the revenue authorities. The cheques which have not been encashed shall not be encashed until the assessment is completed and if any tax demand is raised collection thereof shall be in accordance with law. The petition stands disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed of accordingly.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1082
... ...
... ... ..... the petitioner became entitled to get the refund of the amount deposited by it immediately after the acceptance of its appeal by the Tribunal, but the actual payment was made after a period of two years and three months. This shows that the money due to the petitioner was retained by the respondents for that long without any lawful authority. For this, they must compensate the petitioner and in our opinion, the rate of interest prescribed under section 12(3) of the Act can be treated as reasonable yard-stick for compensating it. 10.. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to pay interest to the petitioner at the rate prescribed under section 12(3) of the Act for the period between the date of receipt of application dated March 20, 1998 and the date of actual payment. The respondents shall pay the amount of interest within one month from the date of submission/receipt of certified copy of this order. Writ petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1081
... ...
... ... ..... nation furnished is/is not satisfactory or he was directed to appear in person or through an agent/representative on..... but he failed to appear on the stipulated date nor any explanation has been filed . In response to notice Shri P.P. Singh appeared and explained that delay in filing returns/reasons for not filing return was due to financial crisis...... , as is the case at hand, shows non-application of mind. Even if something is recorded in the order sheet, it is of no consequence, unless it is communicated to the assessee. 7.. We, therefore, think it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Sales Tax Officer to consider the explanations offered by the petitioner, surrounding circumstances indicated and take a decision whether levy of any penalty is called for, and if it is called for the quantum thereof. The original orders imposing penalty along with the revisional order confirming the same are quashed. Petition is allowed to the extent indicated. Petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1080
... ...
... ... ..... er had been pre-informed about the proposed imposition of condition embodied in the order passed by the appellate authority, its representative could have produced evidence to establish its inability even to furnish the surety bond. We find some substance in the argument of the learned counsel that before imposing the condition of furnishing surety bond, the appellate authority should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence about its inability to comply with this condition and its failure to do so has resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 5.. In view of the above, we allow the writ petition and quash the order dated May 6, 1999 passed by the Tribunal with the direction that the application filed by the petitioner under proviso to section 39(5) of the Act be decided afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to them. 6.. Copy of the order be given dasti on payment of the fee prescribed for urgent application. Writ petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1079
... ...
... ... ..... smuch as he could not have re-opened the assessment under section 12(8) of the Act for the year 1990-91 after March 31, 1996 in view of the bar contained in the provision which provides time-limit of five years from the expiry of the year to which the period of turnover of the concerned dealer relates. The aforesaid ground which persuaded the Sales Tax Officer to initiate the proceeding cannot be held to be the existence of reason to believe that the petitioner was under-assessed for its turnover of sales for the relevant period. In our considered opinion, the Sales Tax Officer invoked section 12(8) of the Act on an extraneous reason not envisaged thereunder. As it is a clear case of irregular and illegal exercise of power not vested on him by law, we have no hesitation to quash the impugned notice at annexure 1 as well as the final orders of assessments at annexures 2/A and 2/B. The writ application is allowed. No costs. CH. P.K. MISRA, J.-I agree. Writ application allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1078
... ...
... ... ..... ued such D forms to his seller for purchase of raw materials mentioned in the R.C. for manufacture of products specified in the same (the R.C.). Thus, a use is not bona fide if the dealer purchases the raw materials for the deliberate purpose of manufacture of goods not mentioned in the R.C. In the instant case the applicants have done exactly the same. The respondent No. 1 being the appropriate assessing authority after giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard has by his order dated June 26, 1998 (vide annexure B to the application) rejected the prayer for issue of D form. In view of the findings above, the impugned orders cannot be faulted or said to be illegal. On the same ground we find nothing to interfere with the impugned orders of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 dated March 1, 1999 and April 30, 1999 respectively. 12.. In the result, the application is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. D. BHATTACHARYYA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1077
... ...
... ... ..... at the petitioner s unit was closed at the time of rejection of its application by the appellate authority and that, later on, it had become operational. Even during the course of arguments, the learned Deputy Advocate-General, could not draw our attention to any document to show that the petitioner s status had undergone a change between March 25, 1997 and October 22, 1998. In view of this, we are constrained to observe that the decision of the Tribunal not to entertain the petitioner s prayer for exemption is wholly arbitrary and vitiated by an error of law. 7.. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Order annexure P11 dated October 22, 1998 is declared illegal and quashed with the direction to the Tribunal to hear and decide the appeal filed by the petitioner on merits. The representative of the petitioner is directed to appear before the Tribunal on September 1, 2000. We hope that within next three months, the Tribunal will decide the appeal. Writ petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1076
... ...
... ... ..... cally. The finality attached by sub-section (9) of section 21 is a finality from the stand point of the appeal that was considered and decided by the Tribunal. The finality contemplated by sub-section (9) does not obviously extend to the appeals which were not before the Tribunal and which came up for consideration subsequently in respect of a different year. The interpretation sought to be placed on sub-section (9) of section 21 is, in our view wholly untenable. 4.. As regards the next question, both the appellate authorities including the Tribunal held that no break-up of labour charges has been furnished and the component of labour charge for each item of work was not evident from the accounts. Hence, the deduction of 30 per cent as prescribed by rule 6(2)(iv) of the A.P. General Sales Tax Rules, 1957 was rightly adopted by the assessing authority. We see no legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. In the result, the T.R.C. is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1075
... ...
... ... ..... that the aluminium scrap said to have been purchased by the appellant from his sellers cannot be linked with the scrap vehicles said to have been sold by the R.T.C. to the sellers of the appellant. As there were no bills issued by the sellers to the appellant for the sale of the scrap to the appellant showing the payment of the tax, the Tribunal rejected the contentions of the appellant. 2.. The finding of the Tribunal is a finding of fact. As rightly observed by the Tribunal, the appellant has not proved the linkage between the scrap sold by the R.T.C. and the products manufactured and sold by the appellant. 3.. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on subsection (1-A) of section 7-A of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957. 4.. In view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal, the said provision has no relevance. No question of law can be said to have been erroneously decided by the Tribunal. 5. The tax revision case is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1074
... ...
... ... ..... rtificate and its advocate had done so in the meeting of the HLSC held on November 11, 1997. This inference is supported by the fact that the respondents have not given any explanation about the misplacement of the revised option letter allegedly submitted by Shri Y.P.S. Rana, Advocate, before the HLSC and they have also not explained as to why the representation dated February 14, 1998 submitted by the director of the petitioner immediately after receipt of the impugned certificate was not considered and disposed of by the HLSC for more than one year. 9.. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned certificate is quashed with the direction to the respondents to issue fresh eligibility certificate for tax exemption for a period of seven years from October 6, 1994 to October 5, 2001 to the tune of fixed capital investment of Rs. 152.96 lacs within a period of one months of the submission of a certified copy of this order. Writ petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1073
... ...
... ... ..... stainable in law that D.E.T.C. (I) was competent to take action in the matter despite the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal? 2.. Whether in the light of ratio of law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in Tel Utpadak Kendra v. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax 1981 48 STC 248 where the decision relied upon by the Tribunal in Santoshi Tel Utpadak Kendra v. Deputy Commissioner 1979 43 STC 307 stands reversed, the decision of the Tribunal dated January 16, 1997 is liable to be set aside? 3.. Whether in view of the retrospective effect of section 15A explanation by Act 7 of 1996 which has been made applicable to the assessment year 1983-84 also the levy of tax on consumable store, etc., is sustainable in law? 4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the ex parte decision of the Tribunal is legal and void? 7.. The Tribunal is directed to draw up a statement of case and refer the aforementioned questions to this Court for its opinion. Petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1072
... ...
... ... ..... t, however, was not able to show that the Sales Tax Officer, Sector 4, Gorakhpur, had passed any assessment order. From the perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it appears that the file was closed without passing any assessment order. The Sales Tax Officer, Sector 4, could have got the jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings under section 21 of the Act and also to pass assessment order only if he had passed earlier assessment order as provided in Explanation II to section 21(1) of the Act. In absence of any assessment order having been passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Sector 4, Gorakhpur, the said authority had no jurisdiction to pass assessment order as territorial jurisdiction in respect of the assessee is with the Sales Tax Officer, Varanasi and not with the Sales Tax Officer, Sector 4, Gorakhpur from assessment year 1981-82. 5. In the result, there is no legal infirmity in the order dated November 17, 1990. The revision lacks merit and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1071
... ...
... ... ..... pressing. 14.. Therefore, gathering the impact of the meaning given by the foremost dictionaries and understanding it correctly, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court which decided M.C.C. No. 135 of 1976 Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Wearwell Dresses, Gwalior (1980) 13 VKN 361 . We uphold the view taken by the Division Bench which decided M.C.C. No. 208 of 1976 Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Central Stores, Indore (1981) 14 VKN 305 . 15.. Thus, in view of the discussion above, we answer the question referred to us whether neck ties fall under entry 26, Part IV of Schedule II or not by holding that the neck ties are ready-made garments and, therefore, do fall under the entry 26, Part IV of Schedule II to the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and return the reference accordingly. 16.. This L.P.A. shall now be placed before the appropriate Division Bench for passing final order in the matter. Reference answered accordingly.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1070
... ...
... ... ..... titioner at 15 per cent. 2.. After hearing the counsel for the petitioner and the Government Pleader for the respondent, we are of the view that the matter should be examined again by the Tribunal. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, it is stated that the appellant could not produce copies of the sale bills for our perusal. In the absence of a prescribed form of declaration, the appellant could have prepared a list of sales to each registered dealer and produced before the assessing authority with copies of registration certificates. The petitioner states that he has filed a declaration form containing all particulars. 3.. In the above view of the matter, we set aside the judgment of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and remand the matter to the Tribunal for hearing de novo. The matter should be disposed of by the Tribunal untrammelled by the observations made earlier. The petitioner shall also be allowed to adduce fresh evidence. T.R.C. is disposed of as above. Petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1069
... ...
... ... ..... power to condone the delay. 11.. In our opinion, the dismissal of the petitioner s appeal as barred by time and confirmation thereof by the Tribunal is vitiated by a patent error of law and, therefore, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed. The assumption on which respondent No. 3 proceed d to decide the appeal, namely, the absence of power to condone the delay will have to be treated as erroneous in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in Bharat Rubber and Allied Industries v. State of Punjab 1980 46 STC 367 (P and H), and of the Division Bench in Shivam Riceland v. State of Haryana (C.W.P. No. 16973 of 1998 decided on May 10, 2000)- 2001 123 STC 23 (P and H). Therefore, the order passed on the basis of such assumption cannot be sustained. 12.. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Order dated November 30, 1998 passed by respondent No. 3 is quashed with the direction that the appeal filed by the petitioner be heard and decided on merits. Writ petition allowed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1068
... ...
... ... ..... Department and the Sales Tax Department is very specific that in the survey made on August 28, 1995 the machines in question were found lying outside, whereas in a survey dated July 23, 1994 they were found to have been installed. No finding has been recorded by the surveying officer as to whether the machineries have been put in use or not. At this stage, it would be impossible of the authority to take a decision as to whether the said machineries are utilised or not as more than 8 years have passed. The Tribunal being the last fact-finding authority ought to have been decided the appeal on merit on the basis of the material available on record. The order of remand passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal in accordance with law in the light of the directions made above. In the result the revision succeeds in part and is allowed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed in part.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1067
... ...
... ... ..... March 31, 1986. 15.. There is no question of any bona fide or mens rea for imposition of penalty under section 4-B(6) of the Act as section 4-B(6) does not mention without reasonable cause being there, unlike mention of such words in other penal provisions of the Act. In the last, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal ought to have determined the exact quantity of paddy purchased by the applicant without payment of tax and the quantity of rice manufactured and sold on consignment basis outside U.P. while determining the quantum of penalty. No such argument appears to have been advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant before the Tribunal and thus, the learned counsel for the applicant cannot be permitted to raise the said argument for the first time before this Court in revision under section 11 of the Act. 16.. In the result, all the three revision petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
2000 (8) TMI 1066
... ...
... ... ..... . 7.. The honourable Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Indra Industries reported in 2001 122 STC 100 2000 UPTC 472 has laid down that the circular issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax is binding upon the tax authorities. The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court in the case of Raghu Nath Laxmi Narain Spices Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in 2000 UPTC 554. Thus while upholding the order of the Tribunal I direct the applicant to make an application before the assessing authority for claiming remission in pursuance of the circular dated January 15, 1986 in respect of the tax imposing on the purchase of foodgrains of Rs. 17,68,084. The assessing authority will decide the matter of remittance expeditiously preferably within a period of three months from the date. The applicant makes an application along with the certified copy of this order before him. Subject to the aforesaid observation the revision is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
........
|
