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2001 (1) TMI 1006
... ... ... ... ..... r. K.N. Raval, A.S.G. Mr. Rajiv Nanda, Mr.B.V.B.Das, Advs. Ms. Sushma Suri, Adv ORDER There is a delay of 973 days. The explanation is not satisfactory. The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2001 (1) TMI 1005
... ... ... ... ..... even in cases where the accused are languishing in prisons for long years as under-trials only on account of the slackness, if not inertia, in accelerating the process during trial stage." 5. Apart from the directions in this very case, it has been repeatedly stressed that NDPS cases should be tried as early as possible because in such cases normally accused are not released on bail. 6. However, despite the delay, in our view, this would not be a fit case for granting bail to the accused. Trial Court shall comply with the directions issued by this Court for expeditious disposal of the matter. If there is non-compliance, the High Court is directed to take appropriate action. The High Court is also requested not to interfere and grant stay order with regard to further proceedings at the interim stage and if any such revision/application is pending, the High Court to decide the matter at the earliest. 7. With these observations, the special leave petitions are disposed of.
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2001 (1) TMI 1004
... ... ... ... ..... that a statement of confession made under threat and pressure would come within the ambit of Section 24 of the Evidence Act. This decision therefore would not be direct authority on the point in issue. In the aforesaid premises, the decision of Raja Ram would apply to the alleged confessional statement made by the appellant to the Superintendent of Excise and therefore would be inadmissible in evidence. If that statement is taken out from the purview of consideration then on the residue of material, namely, that the appellant was found coming together with the co-accused and on the statement of co-accused, a conviction under the provisions of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 cannot be sustained. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and he is acquitted of the charge leveled against him. The appeal is allowed. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Fine paid must be refunded.
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2001 (1) TMI 1003
... ... ... ... ..... ER Delay condoned. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (1) TMI 1002
... ... ... ... ..... he Regional Rural Banks, the said Union Government shall decide the question as to what would be the salary of the employees of the RRBs subsequent to the 6th Bipartite settlement having been given effect to, in case of employees of the commercial banks and with effect from what date and the benefit flowing from such decision be given to the RRB employees. The decision in question shall be taken within a period of six months from today. Hereafter, as and when the pay structure of the employees of the nationalised commercial banks get revised on the basis of any bipartite settlement, the Union Government should take a decision so far as the employees of the Regional Rural Banks are concerned, within a reasonable time and bearing in mind the conclusions, we have already arrived at, so that the so-called parity could be maintained. The impugned judgment of the Kerala High Court, must accordingly stand set aside. These appeals and Transfer Petition stand accordingly disposed of.
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2001 (1) TMI 1001
... ... ... ... ..... Adv., Ms. Bina Gupta, Adv. For the Respondent Mr. T.L. Vishwanathan Iyer, Sr. Adv., Mr. K.C. Kaushik, Adv., Mr. A.D.N. Rao, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das, Adv., Ms. Sushma Suri, Adv. O R D E R The appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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2001 (1) TMI 1000
... ... ... ... ..... its judgment and the High Court in the judgment impugned before us. 21. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restoring the judgment of the trial court by which the accused-respondent has been convicted and sentenced for offence as noticed earlier. However, giving the respondent benefit of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act, the sentences of imprisonment awarded to him for all the offences are reduced from one year to six months. Such terms of imprisonments of the sentences would run concurrently. Sentences of fine imposed upon the respondent amounting to ₹ 16,000/- in all are also reduced to ₹ 5,000/-. The respondent shall be taken into custody to undergo the sentence on all account for a period of six months and to pay the fine in terms of the order of the trial court. In default of the payment of fine he will undergo further imprisonment as awarded to him by the trial court.
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2001 (1) TMI 999
... ... ... ... ..... ervice conditions of such employees are governed by the Fundamental Rules. It would be open for the employer to frame separate conditions of service of the employees or to adopt the Fundamental Rules. There is no decision of the employer that Fundamental Rules would be applicable to such employees and in the absence of such decision the Tribunal was not justified to direct that the question of payment of subsistence allowance should be reviewed in accordance with the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rules. In this view of the matter, though we uphold the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain applications filed by employees serving in Unit-Run Canteens but the impugned direction for reviewing the payment of subsistence allowance in terms of Fundamental Rules cannot be sustained and that part of the direction accordingly stands set aside and Union's appeal to that extent stands allowed. 7. These appeals are disposed of with aforesaid directions and observations.
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2001 (1) TMI 998
... ... ... ... ..... e present case. The right of the appellant to recover money from respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 who stood guarantors arises out of the terms of the deeds of guarantee which are not in any way superseded or brought to a naught merely because the appellant may not be able to recover money from the principal-borrower. It may here be added that even as a result of the Nationalisation Act the liability of the principal-borrower does not come to an end. It is only the mode of recovery which is referred to in the said Act. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed, the preliminary issue framed by the trial court is decided in favour of the appellant and the case is remanded to the trial court for decision on merits. No costs. 8. I. A. No. 3 filed in this court by respondent No. 3 under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the applicant to move the appropriate application before the trial court.
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2001 (1) TMI 997
... ... ... ... ..... ection to award damages for the wrongful acts of the second respondent without any particulars of the alleged improper activities of the second respondent after the order of Madras High Court. If this relates to the acts of the second respondent before the order of the Madras High Court then it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court, wherein the High Court itself has come to the conclusion (at para 32) that the petitioner had not established that there has been misappropriation of funds belonging to the company. Therefore, no directions are sought for in this regard from us. Another prayer of the petitioner is that we should declare that the respondents 2 to 10 have no authority of to alienate or deal with the company's properties. The petitioner has not justified with proper material to seek this prayer against the new board of directors and as such the same cannot be considered. 9. The petition is disposed in the above terms. No order as to cost.
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2001 (1) TMI 996
... ... ... ... ..... ution cannot be maintained, in so far as it concerns petitioners 2 to 6 and 8 to 14. It maybe, that the petitioners 1 and 7 may have to be represented by some person in charge of the respective companies. On that score it would not be fair to sustain the prosecution against petitioners 2 to 6 and 8 to 14." In the fact situation above, I am inclined to conclude there is no material that the petitioners have played any part in the issue of the cheque or gave instructions to the Bank to disclose the same and, therefore, the proceedings against the petitioners before the trial court have to be quashed. 6. In the result, the petition is allowed in respect of petitioners, who are accused 2 to 8 before the trial court and the prosecution against them shall stand quashed. The learned Magistrate, shall proceed with the trial of the case against accused Nos.1,9 and 10 and finish the same as expeditiously as possible. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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2001 (1) TMI 995
... ... ... ... ..... the goods in question. Inasmuch as the Tribunal found that nothing was suppressed by the assessee from the Revenue, it is not a fit case to admit the appeal. It is, therefore dismissed.
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2001 (1) TMI 994
... ... ... ... ..... ted 1.7.2008 are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were not right in recording a contrary finding qua the date specified in notification dated 1.7.2008. We further hold that the provisions contained in Section 14 and the Regulations framed for grant of recognition including the requirement of recommendation of the State Government/Union Territory Administration are mandatory and an institution is not entitled to recognition unless it fulfils the conditions specified in various clauses of the Regulations. The Council is directed to ensure that in future no institution is granted recognition unless it fulfils the conditions laid down in the Act and the Regulations and the time schedule fixed for processing the application by the Regional Committees and communication of the decision on the issue of recognition is strictly adhered to. 30. The appeals are disposed of in the manner indicated above.
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2001 (1) TMI 993
... ... ... ... ..... ima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption. As the appellant was convicted by the High Court under Section 304-B IPC, without such opportunity being granted to him, we deem it necessary in the interest of justice to afford him that opportunity. The case in the trial court should proceed against the appellant (not against the other two accused whose acquittal remains unchallenged now) from the stage of defence evidence. He is put to notice that unless he disproves the presumption, he is liable to be convicted under section 304-B IPC. To facilitate the trial court to dispose of the case afresh against the appellant in the manner indicated above, we set aside the conviction and sentence passed on him by the High Court and remand the case to the trial court.
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2001 (1) TMI 992
... ... ... ... ..... ustice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. If the aforesaid test is applied in the instant case, the amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case, as is evident from the perusal of averments made in paras 8(a) to 8(f) of the plant which were sought to be incorporated by way of amendment. We feel that in the circumstances of the case the plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed for. In view of the legal position, as noted hereinabove, the impugned order is not sustainable. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order and permitting the appellant-plaintiff to amend the plaint subject to payment of costs of ₹ 500/-.
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2001 (1) TMI 991
... ... ... ... ..... at interest on equitable grounds can be awarded in appropriate cases. Given the facts recorded in the order under challenge, the rate of eighteen per cent per annum is an award at a reasonable rate. The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2001 (1) TMI 990
... ... ... ... ..... red by a competent Court/Tribunal having jurisdiction is wrong, it is as much binding between the parties as aright one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher forum or other procedure like review which law provides (AIR 1966 SC 1061 at 1066, para 14). In the instant case, as stated above, the Commissioner of Appeals, Ahmedabad by order dated 27.5.1999 held that GSFC is entitled for the refund and the said view is confirmed by CEGAT on 1.11.1999. The Revenue did not challenge the same within a reasonable period. Hence, so far as the parties are concerned, the judgment has become final as the same is not challenged. 11. In the facts of this case, we are of the considered view that the order has become final but for one or the other reason, the Revenue was delaying the refund, and at this belated stage, the Revenue is not entitled to any relief as it appears to us that the Revenue has played a tactics to stall the refund. We, therefore, summarily dismiss this petition.
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2001 (1) TMI 989
... ... ... ... ..... orkmen to receive benefits and imposes an obligation on the appellant to pay such benefits provided in the said section. That order cannot but be 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of Letters Patent, Patna. The High Court is obviously in error in holding that the said order is not judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna. 15. For the above reasons, we hold that the order of the learned Single Judge passed on application under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act on April 26, 1999 is judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna and is, therefore, appealable. The order of the High Court is accordingly set aside, the Letters Patent Appeal is restored to the file of the High Court and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the LPA on merits in accordingly with law. 16. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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2001 (1) TMI 988
... ... ... ... ..... d the sentence of dismissal from service. The High Court dismissed the writ petition at the admission stage by holding "In view of the fact that the summary court-martial proceedings were conducted in the State of Punjab and orders were also passed in Punjab by the West Command, we are of the view that this Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition." The writ petition was filed in 1992. The impugned order was passed in 1999. This is a fact that the High Court should have taken into consideration. More importantly, it should have taken into consideration the fact that the Chief of Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the country. Placing reliance only on the cause of action, as the High Court did, was not justified. The Appeal is Allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. The writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 39209 of 1992) is restored to the file of the High Court to be heard and disposed of on merits, expeditiously. No order as to costs.
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2001 (1) TMI 987
... ... ... ... ..... thout registering a criminal case. On the facts alleged, it transpires that the appellant approached the police for registering a case and get the allegation investigated into and yet for no reasons whatsoever the police failed to register the case. In the aforesaid premises, we allow this appeal and direct that a case be registered on the basis of the report to be lodged by the appellant at the Police Station within a week from today and thereafter the matter will be duly investigated into and appropriate action be taken accordingly. 2. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly.
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