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2001 (7) TMI 1330
... ... ... ... ..... an over reading power. As mentioned earlier we have perused the file under which the revocation order was passed and we find no illegality in the order of such revocation. Any representation on behalf of the detenue or his relative for revoking the order of undue delay in passing the order has recognized by the Supreme Court in various judgments and on the very same ground this Court set aside the detention of the co-accused. We find no illegality in such revocation of the order. As observed by the Supreme Court in 1974 CriLJ 1479 (supra) a detention order is a condition precedent for invoking SAFEMA and that order is no more valid or in existence. The show cause notice issued in this case suffers from the vice of lack of jurisdiction and it Is therefore liable to be set aside. 15. In the result, we allow the writ petition. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). 16. Parties to act on the ordinary copy of this order authenticated by the sheristadar of this Court.
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2001 (7) TMI 1329
... ... ... ... ..... was required to be read in the facts of that case where the further charge was that officer had shown undue favor in the matter. This is how it was distinguished by the court in Nagarkar's case laying down that there must be something more alleged than a mere negligence flowing from a mistake of law to sustain the charge sheet against the quasi judicial Authority. 8. We respectfully follow the ratio and reasoning of the Supreme Court Judgment to hold a mere charge of negligence or recklessness against an officer in passing an adjudicatory order in exercise of quasi judicial functions unaccompanied by any further charge of extraneous considerations or quid pro quo in passing such order would not constitute a misconduct under the relevant rules to justify disciplinary proceedings against the quasi judicial Authority. The reason and rationale for this is not far to seek and is adequately brought out in the judgment supra. 9. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1328
... ... ... ... ..... would enable the defendant to set up a defence that the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant is illegal and therefore, the appellant is not entitled to benefit of the maxim in pari delicto . 26. The Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court, in my opinion, is more appropriate and applicable to the case on hand and by following the principles enunciated in the said case, I come to the conclusion that there was no illegality or impropriety in the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, therefore, the defendant is liable to pay the suit claim. The said view of mine also derives support from the case of M.N. Roy v. N.V.P. Pandian. In fact, the defendant neither pleaded nor had chosen to make such a submission before the trial Court. Even otherwise, the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the above said maxim nor he is entitled to have the benefit of Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act. 27. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1327
... ... ... ... ..... he result, therefore, the petitions succeed. The impugned orders are hereby quashed and set aside to the extent the same are beyond the decision of the Labour Court on the point that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not based on legal and acceptable evidence and hence, were perverse and the matter is remanded to the Labour Court to decide it afresh by giving opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in support of the charges framed and punishment imposed in the matter and, in accordance with the provisions of law. Considering the fact that the matter relates to the year, 1995, the Labour Court shall expedite the hearing of the matter and dispose of the same. In any case, on or before 31st March, 2002, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and the Labour Court shall decide the matter in accordance with the provisions of law applicable to the case. Rule is made absolute in the above terms with no order as to costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1326
... ... ... ... ..... nullifying he concession given under the' original notification. (12). We, therefore, hold that the corrigendum to the notification is illegal in so far as it relates to the vested rights of the first respondent (herein). (13). The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by placing reliance on various judgments rendered by different High Courts and also by the Apex Court. In any case, in the present case, it cannot be said that there is a corrigendum or arithmetical error. It amounts to removal of the first respondent and nomination of another person which takes away the vested rights of the first respondent (herein). There is no substance in this writ appeal. (14) In the result, the writ appeal fails and is dismissed. However, the order passed In writ petition by the learned Single Judge or the dismissal of this appeal by us will not stand in the way of the government in following the procedure in accordance with law. (15). The writ appeal is ordered accordingly.
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2001 (7) TMI 1325
... ... ... ... ..... s for the Appellant to satisfactorily account for the gifts. He could have done so by showing that even before the check period Accused No. 4 had made gifts of substantial amounts. It has not been claimed by Accused 2 and/or 3 and/or 4 that before the check period also Accused No. 4 had made any such gifts. It is also not their case that after the check period gifts were made. Thus the Trial Court and the High Court were right in not believing the case of gifts supposedly made out of a sudden burst of love and affection. Both the Trial Court and the High Court were right in convicting Appellant. As we are told that the State is going to file an appeal against the acquittal of accused Nos. 2 and 3 we are not making any comments thereon. 34. In our view, there is no infirmity in the Order of the High Court so far as the conviction of Appellant is concerned. We see no reason to interfere. 35. Accordingly these Criminal Appeals stand dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1324
... ... ... ... ..... Vs M/s. D.K. Processors Pvt. Ltd., 2000 (122) ELT 802 . Hence this appeal by the Revenue. 2. Although the respondents' Advocate has asked for an adjournment, we proceeded to hear the ld. SDR Shri P.K. Jain and dispose of the appeal since the issue has been settled in favour of the assessees. The finding of the Larger Bench is that duty has to be discharged by the principal manufacturer and not the job worker as otherwise Clause (ii) of Rule 57F(4) will become superfluous inasmuch as duty will be charged twice on the same goods once from the job worker and again from the modvat assessee (Principal Manufacturer). The Revenue has filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against the Larger Bench decision. However, filing of an appeal is not sufficient ground to urge that a Larger Bench decision should not be followed. Hence applying the ratio of the Larger Bench decision cited supra, we hold that the impugned order has been correctly passed, uphold the same and reject the appeal.
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2001 (7) TMI 1323
... ... ... ... ..... , Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi does not call for any intereference. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1322
... ... ... ... ..... further report or reports under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268/97 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside. On this conclusion it is unnecessary to deal with the other aspects of the case including the fourth point, namely to direct investigation of the case by the C.B.I. Criminal Appeal No. 689 of 2001 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1522/2000 and Civil Appeal No. 4066 of 2001 arising out of SLP(C) No. 8840/2000 filed by the appellants T.T. Antony and Damodaran P. & Ors. respectively are allowed. Criminal Appeal Nos. 690-91 of 2001 arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2724-25/2000 filed by the State of Kerala are dismissed. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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2001 (7) TMI 1321
... ... ... ... ..... vy of permit fee under Section 69-B is concerned, we in our separate judgment have upheld its validity as part of consideration. 56. In view of aforesaid, we hold that the State Government has no authority to levy the import duty in addition to excise duly and countervailing duty under Notifications dated 9th July, 1998 and the provisions under Rule 69-B. However, as the burden of this duty must have been passed on to the consumers prior to passing of interim order referred to above, it would be unjust to allow the refund on that ground. No import duly payable ante to interim order shall be refunded. However the respondents were restrained from realising import duty by way of interim orders of Court and SLP against which has been refused we have held the import duty to be invalid recovery shall be effected as a result quashing of the aforesaid Notifications to extent they levy import duty from petitioner. 57. Accordingly, petition is allowed in the stated above. 58. No costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1320
... ... ... ... ..... ing out of the judgment in Shri Chakra Tyres Ltd. case. The Revenue, involved in the present appeal, is only ₹ 1934/-. Applying the doctrine of de-minimus, we find that since the issue of law will be debated in civil appeals, we need not interfere in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1319
... ... ... ... ..... il Appeal No. D19710/99 filed by International Auto Products Pvt. Ltd. I.A. Nos. 3-4 are allowed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1318
... ... ... ... ..... ’s finding that the appellant is a promoter of MRL is tenable it cannot be held that the appellant is an acquirer or a person acting or deemed to be acting in concert with the acquirers and thereby ineligible to participate in the public offer. I am of the view that there is no legal backing flowing from the Act, or the Regulations to uphold the SEBI’s decision holding the appellant ineligible to participate in the public offer made vide letter dated 30-5-2001. 43. For the reasons stated above the appeal is allowed and the SEBI’s direction in the impugned order that the appellant shall not be eligible to participate in the public offer made by the acquirers vide letter dated 30-5-2001 is set aside. 44. I cannot part with this case without expressing my gratitude to the learned counsel on all sides who have co-operated with me extremely well for the disposal of the appeal within the time limit as specified in the order of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court.
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2001 (7) TMI 1317
... ... ... ... ..... ver of right of pre-emption by the preemptor does not arise at all." 14. The learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal very strongly contended that the evidence on record does not lend any credence to the case of the Respondents herein and as such the High Court was in gross error in the matter in issue. Incidentally the finding of fact arrived at upon consideration of the evidence on record ought not to be interfered with unless there is a total perverse view of the matter in issue. On perusal of the records, we do not find any such perversity so as to attribute the judgment of the High Court, otherwise not sustainable. In out view the High Court has dealt with the issue in its proper perspective having due regard to the language used in the notification and as such question of any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India would not arise. 15. In that view of the matter this appeal fails and is dismissed without however any order as to cost.
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2001 (7) TMI 1316
... ... ... ... ..... ch debit balance as constituted from time to time, during the continuance of the guarantee, by the surplus of the total debit over the total credits, and accordingly at the date of the counterclaim the Association's claim against the plaintiff for payment of the unpaid balance due from the Nosworthys, with interest, was not statute-barred. 10. In the instant case also the account was alive, not settled and there was no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out its obligation and the continuing guarantee was subsisting. Therefore, the Appellant was very much liable. 11. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Mhamane, the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the suit claim is barred by law of limitation. Hence, the Appeal is devoid of merits, hence stands dismissed, however with no order as to costs. 12. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court.
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2001 (7) TMI 1315
... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal unfortunately has neither considered the relevance and/or evidentiary value of the said documents nor has it come to a finding that the petitioner had evaded payment of tax or had intended to do so. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the judgment and order of the Tribunal impugned in this writ petition. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the learned Tribunal and remand the matter back to the learned Tribunal to consider the said documents in the light of Rule 214C of the Rules and to arrive at a finding as to whether the petitioner had evaded payment of the tax or had intended to do so and to pass fresh orders on the basis of such finding. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions. There will be no order as to costs. If an urgent xerox certified copy of this order is applied for, let it be supplied to the applicant expeditiously, subject to compliance with all the required formalities. A.K. Basu, J. 37. I agree. 38. Petition disposed of.
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2001 (7) TMI 1314
... ... ... ... ..... ring at a point of time in the future, merely on account of those possibilities, will not constitute a cause of action for relief, for securing which, those events are not materially relevant. 12. Counsel also submitted that Pondicherry is at a short distance from Madras and that also is a factor, which should weigh with the Court in granting or refusing to grant the leave. Once a border is drawn it does not matter how far away from the border one is - whether it is an inch or a mile makes no difference. If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, the fact that it can be said to arise at a short distance away from it, is of no avail. 13. Counsel placed before us number of judgments to which it is unnecessary to refer as none of them deal with the point which is under consideration here. 14. The impugned order of the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1313
... ... ... ... ..... n has been rightly restricted to one-half of the claim ? 6. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the profit of ₹ 1,03,495 realised from the sale of agricultural lands is assessable to tax as the profit of the assessee’s business ?" 3. The dispute relates to assessment year 1972-73. This Court had occasion to deal with a similar issue in the assessee’s own case in D.L.F. United Ltd. v. CIT 1986 161 ITR 714 . The first five questions in the present case are identical to the questions which were under consideration in the aforesaid case except the figures. The answers given in respect of five questions in the reported case are equally applicable to the present case. So far as the sixth question is concerned, it is closely linked with the third question and in view of answer given to the third question, the sixth question is really of academic interest and, therefore, need not be answered. The reference stands disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (7) TMI 1312
... ... ... ... ..... (2) Whether amount standing to the credit of the workers regarding their contribution to Employees State Insurance Act in the books of the Mill Company (In Liquidation) is impressed with the character of a Trust and hence, it does not form part of the assets of the company and the Liquidator is bound to pass the same in priority before any distribution of the assets of the company is made by him ? (3) Whether the property/assets of the Company which has already been mortgaged or earmarked by the secured creditors and when the Company is in the liquidation whether the Liquidator was having that equity alone and whether the entire amount was required to be paid to the secured creditors or the applicant is entitled to priority over the said dues in this behalf.? 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion in the matter, as the matter is required to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for obtaining suitable orders regarding placing this matter before appropriate Court.
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2001 (7) TMI 1311
... ... ... ... ..... be "may", the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that if it should be construed as "shall", then, it would be restricting the discretionary power of a judicial authority and the Statute cannot be construed in such a manner. The heading of the Section reads as "Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement." The exercise of power can only be discretionary but however, I do not propose to decide this question since in any event, I have held in the aforesaid paragraphs that the application under Section 8 is not maintainable because it has come after the petitioner had submitted his first statement on the dispute. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not come to his aid in view of the fact that I hold that the petitioner had placed before the Court, his first statement in defence of the suit. For these reasons, the C.R.P. is dismissed. No costs. CMP 1811 of 2001 is closed.
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