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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 649 Records
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2002 (1) TMI 1331 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... e Mr. Justice Doraiswamy Raju, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1330 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n a period of one year the SYL Canal is not completed by the defendant-State of Punjab, then the Union Government should get it done through its own agencies as expeditiously as possible, so that the huge amount of money that has already been spent and that would yet to be spent, will not be wasted and the plaintiff-State of Haryana would be able to draw the full quantity of water that has already been allotted to its share. Needless to mention, the direction to dig SYL Canal should not be construed by the State of Haryana as a license to permit them to draw water in excess of the water that has already been allotted and in the event the tribunal, which is still considering the case of re-allotment of the water, grants any excess water to the State of Haryana, then it may also consider issuing appropriate directions as to how much of the water could be drawn through then SYL Canal. The plaintiff's suit is decreed on the aforesaid terms. There will be no order as to costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1329 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder dated 6.1.1999 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola in Criminal Complaint Case No. 10/1999, impugned order dated 15.1.1999 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola in Criminal Complaint Case No. 31/1999, impugned order dated 4.1.1999 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola in Criminal Complaint Case No. 5/1999, impugned order dated 24.3.2000 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola in Criminal Complaint Case No. 393/2000, impugned order dated 9.6.1999 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yavatmal in Criminal Complaint Case No.204/1999 and impugned order dated 17.6.1999 passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pusad in Criminal Complaint Case No. 81/1999 are quashed and set aside only to the extent of above referred Directors (accused) of the Company, who are petitioners/applicants in the present proceedings and the Magistrates are directed to proceed against the other accused according to law. 50. The petitions/applications are allowed in the above terms.
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2002 (1) TMI 1328 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e take the original loan at ₹ 2 lakhs in 1989 at 24% interest, the amount due as on date would far exceed ₹ 20 lakhs. The principal would double in five years and it is very unfortunate that the plaintiff has been deprived of the benefit of the amounts advanced by him. 36. The proper course in the circumstances, in my view is to direct the defendants to deposit a decent amount in case they want to ward off the appointment of an Advocate-Receiver within a stated time, failing which to appoint a Receiver to takeover the property. 37. Consequently, I direct the defendants to deposit into this Court a sum of ₹ 20 lakhs within six weeks from today, failing which an Advocate-Receiver will be appointed. Call after six weeks. 38. So far as the application for dismissing the suit as barred by limitation is concerned, I satisfied that on the defendants own showing the suit is not barred by limitation. However, I direct the application to be posted along with the suit.
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2002 (1) TMI 1327 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o state here that while considering the question of disobedience or otherwise of an order passed in a pending case not only the letter of the order but also the spirit, is to be understood and the plea of bona fide / genuine belief taken by the contemnor is to be considered on that basis. The High Court after rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of the contemnor did not feel persuaded to accept the unconditional apology tendered by him. o p /o p 6. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, we are not satisfied that on the fact situation of the case, the judgment/order passed by the High Court calls for interference by this Court. We have no hesitation to hold that the High Court was right in recording the finding that the appellant was guilty of wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order passed on 8.6.1990. o p /o p 7. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No costs. o p /o p
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2002 (1) TMI 1326 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... um of ₹ 15 lacks in the form of FDR in the Trial Court is an unreasonable condition and, therefore, we set aside the said condition as a condition precedent for granting anticipatory bail to the accused/appellant. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the condition imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to deposit the sum of ₹ 15 lacs in the form of FDR in the Trial Court, and on the other hand direct that on executing a bond to the tune of ₹ 25,000/- with two solvent sureties to the satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate, and further that the accused shall make himself available for interrogation whenever is required and the accused should surrender his passport immediately to the concerned Magistrate where the matter is pending and would not leave this country without appropriate permission from the Court, he would be entitled to the order granting him anticipatory bail. 5. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. 6. Appeal disposed of.
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2002 (1) TMI 1325 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ayat, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1324 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bout the deposit under Section 30(2) being bonafide or not, appears to have been raised before the Trial Court. No such issue was framed, nor finding recorded either way and rightly. It is not understandable how the observation came to be made by the Revisional Court for the first time. There is no denial of the fact that the Municipal Board had also served notice upon the defendant to make payment of the rent to it. It also does not appear that the plaintiff placed any document on the record to show that the Court where the deposit was being made under Section 30(2) may have rejected the petition for deposit holding it to be not bonafide. Such an observation by the Revisional Court at the first instance is but only to be ignored. In view of the discussions held above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the Revisional Court, and the order passed by the Trial Court is restored. There would, however, be no order as to costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1323 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gement shall prevail and held that a person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all (see 1997 (4) SCC page 18). 23. The date of selection of the 4th respondent in this particular case was on 30.11.1995 when the original Judgement of the Supreme Court reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 held in filed. 24. In this case, admittedly, the 4th respondent was fully qualified on the date of the written examination and viva-voce and had obtained better marks. In other words by the time he sat for the written examination and subsequently the viva-voca he was qualified to apply for the post. It is only in these circumstances, the learned Single Judge applied the law as pronounced by the Supreme Court on the date of appointment. 25. No other point has been raised other than this by the learned counsel for the appellant before us. 26. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for. The Writ Appeal stands dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1322 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of this Court in Dy. C.I.T. v. Core Healthcare Ltd. reported in 243 ITR 61 and the question No.2 is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court which is referred to in that question itself (CIT v. Mahendra Mills Ltd. reported in 243 ITR 56). The question No.3 does not raise any question of law. The appeal is, therefore, summarily dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1321 - COMPANY LAW BOARD WESTERN REGION BENCH, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ral times over and the identity of the shares has been lost. In the absence of the aforesaid parties as well as the brokers (especially Shri Sunil Kumar Jain) through whom the transaction had taken place, it will not be possible to prove that there was fraud and forgery in the transfer of the said 500 shares. This Board had in the case of Subhash Chandra v. Vardhman Spinning Mills 1994 13 CLA 385 held that all persons to whom shares were transferred subsequent to the registration should be impleaded as parties before rectification of the register of members or to restore status quo ante could be ordered. As the petitioner has not impleaded the transferees as well as the brokers through whom the transaction had taken place, the petition suffers from a serious defect of non joinder of necessary parties. Besides no effective order can be passed in their absence. 11. For the reasons stated above, the petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost.
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2002 (1) TMI 1320 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e is not enough to show that the plaintiffs' domain name had acquired the secondary meaning. The allegations of abusive registration/cyber squatting are also not substantiated. In the result, on relative strength, the case appears to be in favor of the defendants. It may be clarified here that the ex parte ad interim injunction was granted to the plaintiffs on 24th April, 2000, till the next date of hearing, but the same was not extended on account of the oral undertaking given by the counsel for defendants, which continued thereafter. 27. For the foregoing reasons application of the defendants under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC is allowed, and order dated 24th April, 2000 granting interim injunction in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants is hereby vacated. Consequently application (I.A. No. 3064/2000) of the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC stands dismissed. 28. No order as to costs. Any observations made herein shall not affect the merits of the case.
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2002 (1) TMI 1319 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appellant partakes the character of permissive possession and this averment negates the very concept of land grabbing. it is no doubt true that if the possession is permissive then it cannot be treated as illegal for purposes of Clauses (d) and (e) of Sub-section (2) of the Act. We have already discussed above with regard to the alleged plea of permissive possession and held that those averments in the plaint would not constitute plea of 'permissive possession'. 78. In the light of the above discussion, we have no option but to sustain the view of the High Court in approving the finding of the Special Court on Issue No. 6, that the appellant falls within the mischief of the definition of the expression "land grabber" under the Act. 79. In the result, we uphold the judgment and order of the High Court under challenge declining to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Special Court. The appeal is dismissed; the parties shall bear their own costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1318 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... meeting the case now sought to be set up by the appellant. We do not think this Court would be justified in taking notice of a fact sought to be projected by the appellant in a very cavalier manner. The fact remains that the present one is a landlord-tenant dispute and we cannot upset the relief granted by the courts below and the High Court to the plaintiff-respondent by relying on the doctrine of eviction by title paramount as it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated by HUDA against the plaintiff-respondent have achieved a finality or are such proceeding wherein the plaintiff-respondent cannot possibly have any sustainable defence. 14. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is held liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly with costs throughout. The appellant is allowed three months time to deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff respondent subject to his filing usual undertaking and clearing all the arrears under the decree within 3 weeks.
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2002 (1) TMI 1317 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... consideration for the shares as computed on the basis of the fair value should be paid on or before 30-6-2003 in one or more instalments. The option to purchase the shares is either with the 2nd respondent and his group or with the company. In case the company chooses to purchase the shares, in terms of Section 402 of the Act, it is authorized to reduce the share capital to the extent of the face value of the shares so purchased. Since the remittance of both the application money and the consideration for the shares to NRIs may require the approval of the RBI, the company will approach the RBI along with a copy of this order and the RBI, taking into that this order is being passed in the interest of the company and the shareholders, will accord its approval at the earliest. 41. The petition is disposed of in the above terms without any order as to cost with liberty to the parties to approach this Bench in case of any difficulty in implementing the directions contained above.
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2002 (1) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... have not expressed any opinion on the merits of any of the issues arising for decision in the suit or appeal and whatever we have stated herein is only for the purpose of demonstrating that no remand was required. So also although the order of remand has been set aside and the parties too are not desirous of adducing any evidence excepting for placing on record the relevant requisite documents as to the two admitted subsequent events yet we should not be understood as depriving the High Court of its power to require any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41. That power inheres in the court and that court alone which is hearing the appeal. It is the requirement of court (and not of any of the parties) and the conscience of the court feeling inhibited in satisfactory disposal of lis which rule the exercise of this power.
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2002 (1) TMI 1315 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nting a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from smuggling of goods, etc. In the present case, as referred to above, there is nothing on the ground to show that the petitioner had indulged in any of the above said activities. That being so, it can certainly be said that the order of detention has been passed for a wrong purpose. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the case of the petitioner would be covered by condition No. (i) and condition No. (iii), as laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, in Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra). That being so, in my opinion, this Court would be competent to interfere with the detention order, even at the pre-execution stage. For the reasons recorded above, the present petition is allowed, the detention order dated 21.7.2000 copy Annexure P33 and the grounds of detention dated 21.7.2000, copy Annexure P36, are hereby quashed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1314 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d June, 1999 to 30th June, 1999 and due to this reasons could not file appeal under Section 9 within the limitation period. The First Appellate Authority, Deputy Commissioner vide his order dated 25th October, 2000 rejected the appeal. Against that order the applicant-assessee preferred second appeal which was rejected on 21st September, 2001 by Trade Tax Tribunal. After having heard the parties and keeping in view that the business started is in the initial stage. It is necessary to hear the assessee on the merits of case and the explanation given by the assessee should have been given sympathetic consideration. From this point of view the order dated 21st September, 2001 is legally not sustainable and is set aside and the First Appeal is directed to be heard by Deputy Commissioner (Appeal) on merits of the case preferably within six weeks from receipt of this order. 3. In view of the above observation the Trade Tax Revision above mentioned is allowed. No order as to costs.
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2002 (1) TMI 1313 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the matter expeditiously, try the same on day-to-day basis and conclude the same within a period of six months from today, as held by the Apex Court in SATYA NARAYAN SHARMA Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN . If the petitioners or prosecution have any bonafide reason to comply with the above directions, they are at liberty to bring the same to the Designated Court, which shall be considered by the Designated Court on merits, in the light of the observations made in SATYA NARAYAN SHARMA Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (referred supra). 15.9. Issue 4 is answered accordingly. 16. I am greatly obliged to record my appreciations to Mr.R.Shanmugasundaram, learned Senior Counsel and former Public Prosecutor, and Mr.N.R.Elango, former Government Advocate (Criminal Side), for their valuable assistance rendered as Amicus Curiae, in the above petitions. In the result, these petitions are dismissed with directions ordered above. Consequently, Crl.M.P.Nos.7560 of 2001 and 7686 of 2001 are also dismissed.
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2002 (1) TMI 1312 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Cashier with the appellant. He was dismissed from service. As certain proceedings were pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, an application seeking approval of the Tribunal for the said dismissal was submitted by the appellant before the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b). The said application was contested on various grounds by the respondent including that the appellant-Bank had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) as salary for one month was not paid. The Tribunal, on facts, found that the appellant failed to comply with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) and in that view dismissed the application. The appellant challenged the order of the Tribunal before the High Court in writ petition No. 666 of 1980. The same was dismissed concurring with the order passed by the Tribunal. In the view we have taken, the contentions raised in these appeals do not help the appellant. We find no merit in these appeals. Consequently, these are dismissed. No costs.
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