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Showing 41 to 60 of 578 Records
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2003 (1) TMI 723 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ct. We, therefore, do not agree with the High Court to the extent to which it has been held that once a prohibitory order under sub-section (1) or (2) has been issued, then a criminal act done after the promulgation of the prohibitory order can be punished only under Section 6(3) and in spite of prosecution u/s 6(3) failing, on the same set of facts the person proceeded against cannot be held punishable u/s 5 of the Act although the ingredients of Section 5 are fully made out. The appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The prosecution shall proceed against the accused persons consistently with the observations made hereinabove. In view of the delay which has already taken place, it is directed that the Trial Court shall give precedence to the present case and try to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of first appearance of the accused persons before it pursuant to this order.
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2003 (1) TMI 722 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... , in view of the all these facts and circumstances and in view of the decision of the jurisdictional High Court and the Apex Court, we hold that the Assessing Officer and the CIT(Appeals) were not justified in changing the value of sale consideration shown by assessee in respect of both the properties for the purpose of capital gain. Accordingly we set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and the Assessing Officer is directed to accept the sale consideration shown by assessee in respect of both these properties. 11. We have already decided the issue in favour of assessee, therefore, we are not inclined to discuss other contentions raised by the learned counsel of the assessee. The charging of interest under section 234A, B & C are consequential. We have already allowed the appeal of the assessee on the main issue. Therefore, the Assessing Officer is directed to give consequential relief to the assessee accordingly. 12. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2003 (1) TMI 721 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... appeal is dismissed both on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2003 (1) TMI 720 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ar of Companies within 21 days from the date of receipt of the order. (4) That notice of the registration by the Registrar of Companies of this order and or the said minute be published once each in the newspapers, Times of India and Dinatanti within 14 days of the registration aforesaid. SCHEDULE o p /o p “ The company do utilize a part of the share premium account for the purpose of writing off the value of intangible assets - the total cost of acquisition of the software and related expenses as recorded in the books aggregating to ₹ 15,89,56,637 against the share premium account existing in the books amounting to ₹ 30,97,07,000 as on 31st March 2002 on account of the reasons mentioned in the notice accompanying the resolution passed by the shareholders in the meeting held on 27th June 2002.” o p /o p Addition of words “and reduced” after the name of the petitioner’s company pursuant to Section 102(2) of the Act, is dispensed with.
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2003 (1) TMI 719 - CEGAT, KOLKATA
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... ... ..... e case of Flock India Pvt. Ltd., 2000 (71) ECC 4 (SC) 2000 (120) ELT 285 would not be relevant to deny the benefit of the refund if otherwise due under Section 27 of the Customs Act as that decision was rendered by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of refund under the Central Excise Act, it is not found that the provisions of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act and Section 27 are paremateria, The facts in this case were totally different. The later decision issued by a Full Bench of Three Members of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Ltd., 2000 (143) ELT 482 would therefore be the correct interpretation of law on refunds under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962." 8. Inasmuch as the issue is decided in favour of the appellants by the above Division Bench's decision (to which I was a party), following the ratio of the same, I set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to appellants.
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2003 (1) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... circumstances appearing in evidence against him. If such opportunity is not afforded, the incriminating pieces of evidence available in the prosecution evidence cannot be relied on for the purpose of recording conviction of the accused persons. All these aspects of the case, specially the infirmities in the prosecution evidence and the investigation, have not received the attention of the Trial Court as also the High Court. We are very clear in our mind that on the state of evidence available the accused persons could not have been held guilty of the offences charged. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Trial Court as also of the High Court are set aside. The accused appellants are acquitted of the charges framed against them. The appellants shall be released forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence. We place on record appreciation of valuable assistance rendered at the hearing by Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, Adv. who appeared as amicus.
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2003 (1) TMI 717 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... e Court has admitted the SLP filed by Revenue, by condoning the delay, However, I find that Revenue has not submitted any stay against the operation of the Tribunal's order. Therefore, that order is binding on Revenue till it is set aside by the Apex Court. I also find that such platforms which are accessories to the plant or which are installed in the factory even they are not used in or in relation to the manufacture of the final product have been treated as 'capital goods' under Rule 57Q of the . rules ibid by the Larger Bench judgement of the Tribunal in the case of Jawahar Mills Ltd. v. CCE, Coimbatore which has been confirmed by the Apex Court reported in 2001 (132) ELT 3 (SC) 2001 (97) ECR 541 (SC) 5. In view of the above position, I do not find any infirmity with the order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and the same is sustained. The appeal filed by Revenue is, therefore, rejected. Ordered accordingly. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
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2003 (1) TMI 716 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he Industrial Disputes Act. It could also approach 'the authority in accordance with law' which would mean authority under a statute. The High Court, by no stretch of imagination, can be an authority under a statute. Furthermore, even otherwise, a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1 . In any event, the orders of the Chief Labour Commissioner dated 4th January, 1995 also shows that other documents which were placed on record by the workmen had also been scrutinized and they had not been found reliable. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. This appeal is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (1) TMI 715 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as directed by the High Court in Sanjai Kumar Srivastava case. Appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) and (Administrative) and members has now to be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. Submission that the amendment carried out in Section 3 regarding appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) as well as (Administrative) and members is not in conformity with the corresponding provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has no substance. For the reasons stated above, we find that the State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned provisions. Further that the provisions enacted are not arbitrary and therefore not violative of Articles 14, 16 or any other provisions of the Constitution. They are not against the basic structure of the Constitution of India either. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2003 (1) TMI 714 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed any finding that the goods were being imported in an attempt to evade the tax. I have perused the order of Tribunal and the authorities below. The Assessing Authority while levying the penalty, has not recorded any finding that there was any attempt on the part of the dealer to evade the tax. The penalty was levied only on the ground that at the initial checking bill and Form 31 could not be produced, though it has not been disputed that the bill and Form 31 were produced. Shortly, thereafter, it is a settled principle of Law that the penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) could not be levied for technical default unless a case of an attempt to evade the tax is made out. A perusal of the penalty order shows that no finding whatsoever has been recorded that there was any attempt to evade the tax. In the circumstances, penalty levied under Section 15-A (1) (o) is not justified. 5. In the result the revision is allowed and the order of Tribunal dated 30th March, 1991 is quashed.
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2003 (1) TMI 713 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ohibitory order under section 132(3) passed by the authorized officer on that day cannot extend the time limit under section 1568BE of the Act. The subsequent warrant of authorization issued on 21-5-1999 in the names of Shri Yogender Chaudhary and Shri R. Janardhan was warrant to search locker No. 906 of ANZ Grindlays Bank which was already searched and inventorised on 21-4-1999. Since these orders are only to revoke the prohibitory order and such prohibitory order issued on 21-4-1999 could not extend the time limit in the light of the decision referred to above, we have to hold that the order passed by the Assessing Officer on 29-5-2001 is barred by limitation and the order is accordingly quashed. 14. In view of the above finding, we do not consider it necessary to go into the merits of the case. Since the order is already quashed, no useful purpose would be served by adjudicating grounds of appeal on merit. We hold accordingly. 15. In the result, the appeal stands allowed.
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2003 (1) TMI 712 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e, he committed jurisdictional error and the order impugned before the High Court by the respondents was a nullity. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the appellants that the respondent was not a person aggrieved and thus could not have maintained the writ petition. It was submitted that the respondents having filed a writ petition after a period of eight years, the same ought not to have entertained. Primarily a question of delay and latches is a matter which is required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court has exercised its jurisdiction despite delay and latches on the part of the respondents, it is not for us at this stage to set aside the order of the High Court on that ground alone particularly when we find that the impugned judgment is legally sustainable. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (1) TMI 711 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... taken by the learned Authorised Representative of the assessee. From the assessment order we find that there is no order of the AO to charge interest. We therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of CIT Vs. Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), the Full Bench desision of the Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case of Smt. Tej Kumari Vs. CIT (supra), the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Kishan Lal (HUF) (supra) and the recent decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Inchcape India (P) Ltd. (2003) 179 CTR (Del) 212 held that the interest under s. 234B of the Act is not chargeable and accordingly the order passed by the CIT(A) on this account is upheld with different reason. The ground taken by the Revenue is therefore rejected. 22. The last ground in both the appeals is general in nature and, therefore, the same is rejected. 23. In the result, both the appeals are partly allowed.
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2003 (1) TMI 710 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... na, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (1) TMI 709 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any loss. On the other hand it has gained by earning 24 interest. Therefore, there was no justification for levying penalty for such a trifling default. In Western India Match Co. Ltd. Vs. CST 1989 (2) UPTC 1074 and Eastern India Transformer & Switch Gear (P) Ltd. Vs. CST 1993 (1) UPTC 212, this court has held that penalty should not be levied in such circumstances. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (1972( 83 ITR 26 has; held that penalty will not be imposed merely because it is lawful to be so and whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. For the above reasons, revisions are allowed, penalty under Section 15 (1)(a) for the month of April, 1990 and for the month of May, 1990 are deleted. The order of Tribunal dated 29.8.1991 is quashed. Both the revisions are allowed.
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2003 (1) TMI 708 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... count of carriage of passengers, livestock, mail or goods shipped at any Indian port, as also of any amount received or deemed to be received, in India on account of the carriage of passengers, etc. shipped at any port outside India. It is pertinent to note that Explanation has been inserted with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1976 after section 44B(2) by the Finance Act, 1997. After such insertion, demurrage charges or handling charges or any other amount of similar nature are to be taxed in the same way as freight taxable under clause (i) or (ii) of section 44B(2). Slot charges and ancillary charges are of similar nature. By applying the dictum of Ejusdem Generis, it can be said that slot charges and ancillary charges are coming within the ken of the Explanation. As such, these are taxable under section 44B of the Act. We find no infirmity in the impugned order on this count. Accordingly, we uphold the same. 13. In the result, appeal of the assessee stands dismissed.
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2003 (1) TMI 707 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that the Forum or the Commission would be entitled to execute its order. It however, may send the matter for its execution to a court only in the event it is unable to do so. Such a contingency may arise only in a given situation but in our considered opinion the same does not lead to the conclusion that the Consumer Courts cannot execute its own order and by compulsion it has to send all its orders for execution to the civil courts. Such construction of Section 25 in our opinion would violate the plain language used therein and, thus, must be held to be untenable. It is now well settled principle of interpretation of statute that plain language employed in a Section must be given its ordinary meaning. For the reasons aforesaid in Writ Petition 417 of 1996, Writ Petition 12 of 2002, Civil Appeal 4613 and Civil Appeal 4614 of 1999 are dismissed and Civil Appeal 9927 of 1996 is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (1) TMI 706 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iation on generator is admissible at the rate of 30 as against 15 claimed and allowed during the course of assessment proceedings?" 2. It is not in dispute that first question has been answered by the decision of this Court in CIT v. Surendra Textiles 2002 258 ITR 3871 . The second question has been answered by the decision of this Court in CIT v. Agarwal Transformers (P.) Ltd. 2002 258 ITR 2512 . 3. In view of this, the aforesaid first question stands answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee and the second question stands answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2003 (1) TMI 705 - ITAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... 1 on account of not deducting tax at source nor, even if we presumed that such a non-levy of demand on such non-deduction was a ‘mistake’, can it be said that there are no two views on the tax deduction liability of the assessee so far as commission in the nature of trade discounts are concerned. 9. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the CIT(A) indeed erred in sustaining the impugned order under section 154 of the Act. We, accordingly deem it fit and proper to cancel the impugned order. 10. We may make it clear that as well have decided the matter on the question of scope of section 154, we see no need to give any specific adjudication on merits of the case or adjudicate as to whether or not the assessee was indeed liable to deduct tax at source. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, it is not necessary for us to address ourselves to that broader question. 11. In the result, assessee’s appeal is allowed.
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2003 (1) TMI 704 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the identity of the contributor to the fund of the recipients of the funds; the treatment of the company, though incorporated as a mere entity for the convenience of the members, in other words as an instrument obtained to their mandate; and the impossibility that the contributors should derive profits from contributions made by themselves to a fund which could only be expended or returned to themselves is established, the doctrine of mutuality is established. 4. It is not the Revenue's case that the afore-noted three conditions are not established in the instant case. As a matter of fact, before the Tribunal, the learned Departmental Representative had conceded that the controversy, sought to be raised again in this appeal, stands concluded against the Revenue in Chelmsford Club v. CIT (supra). In this view of the matter, no question of law much less a substantial question of law survives for our consideration. Accordingly, we decline to entertain the appeal. Dismissed.
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