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Showing 21 to 40 of 568 Records
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2003 (10) TMI 678
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... ... ..... f the petitioners’ group. Considering the facts of this case and in accordance with the provisions of section 402, it is hereby directed that the shares held by the petitioners’ group should be purchased either by the company of the respondents’ group on a fair value to be determined on the basis of the Balance Sheet as on 31-3-2001 being the proximate date to the date of the petition. In case the company purchases the shares, it is authorised to reduce its share capital to the extent of the face value of the shares. Both the parties will appear before this Bench on 1-12-2003 at 2.30 p.m. to suggest a mutually acceptable name of a valuer to value the shares. In case the parties do not agree on the valuer, this Bench will appoint a valuer and give consequential directions. Accordingly the petition is disposed of in these lines reserving the right to appoint a valuer and issue consequential directions. All the interim orders are vacated. No order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 677
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... ... ..... of the High Court dated 8.1.1998, the appellants are in appeal before us. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that in view of the subsequent events that had taken place consequent upon the judgment of the Division Bench, the review petition filed by respondent No. 1 was not maintainable. In fact the judgment of Letters Patent Bench was acted upon and it stood exhausted and the review petition was futile. Under such circumstances, the review petition ought not to have been entertained and decided on merits. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order and judgment under challenge. The appeals are allowed. However, it will be open to respondent No.l to challenge the promotion of respondent No. 2 afresh by a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if he is so advised. In case such a petition is filed, it shall be entertained and decided on merits. We leave all questions of law open to be decided in that case. No costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 676
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... ... ..... in charges have been established against the Appellants, imposition of penalty commensurate with the gravity of the said charges is justified. They deserve to be punished for the proven charges. Taking into consideration all the relevant aspects I am of the view that suspension of certificate of registration of NBS for 2 years is adequate. In the case of BEB and Bama suspension for a period of 3 years, in my view is reasonable. Accordingly the order passed by the Respondent is modified to the said extent. The period of suspension and the period of cancellation already undergone by the Appellants. (NBS, BEB and Bama) will be considered for computing the period of suspension now awarded. 58. Since no charge has been established against Bang Securities Pvt. Ltd., no penalty is called for in its case. Therefore, that part of the order cancelling the certificate of registration granted to Bang Securities Pvt. Ltd., is set aside. 59. The appeals are disposed of in the above lines.
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2003 (10) TMI 675
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... ... ..... Judge Court at Coimbatore for declaration that the award dated 28.02.2002 is null and void, which has been rejected for want of jurisdiction of the court cannot in any way advance the cause of the petitioners for authentication of the statutory records of the Company, in the absence of stay of operation of the award by a Competent Court. A careful consideration of the relevant facts and records before me, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have not made out any prima facie case for grant of any interim relief, and therefore, not inclined to come to the rescue of the petitioners. The claim and counter claim of the parties in regard to enforceability of the award as well as its non-execution and other contentions issues will be considered on merits when the pleadings are completed. Towards this end, the respondents will file their counter to the company petition by 30.11.2003 and rejoinder to the filed by 15.12.2003. The petition will be heard on 24.12.2003 at 10.30 a.m.
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2003 (10) TMI 674
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... ... ..... under Section 6 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. This petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court need interfere under Section 482 using inherent power only if it is satisfied that there is abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. Powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is sparingly used by this Court. I am of opinion that by allowing the amendment application, no injustice is caused. It cannot be stated that there is abuse of the process of the court or miscarriage of justice. Of course, the Magistrate can decide the matter only on the basis of evidence adduced. There is no necessity to quash the order. 5. Petitioner is free to file counter to the amended application and parties shall he allowed to adduce evidence. For the reasons stated above, I decline to quash the impugned order by using powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Crl. M.C. is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 673
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... ... ..... s the alleged conduct, it also appears that the respondents were also not very serious inasmuch as they chose to have the matter decided on merits rather than have their CM for vacation of Stay disposed of. Before parting with this case, it must be borne in mind that in exercise of writ jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, this court does not sit as a court of appeal. Normally, no interference with the judgment and order of the Additional District Judge in an appeal under section 9 of the said Act is called for. Only under exceptional circumstances, such as where there are perverse findings or conclusions, violation of principles of natural jusrice, gross jurisdictional errors or errors in the decision making process, is interference called for. This is not one of those exceptional cases and, Therefore, in any event, the reliefs prayed for cannot be granted. 15. Accordingly, Rule is discharged. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 672
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... ... ..... s as under Though the fourth respondent is a deemed University under Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 it does not fall within the phrase "University established by law" used in Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act, 1948 and therefore they have no right to send their representative in the constituency carved out under Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act to the Council. 27. Hence, I pass the following order Writ Petitions are allowed. Rule is made absolute. The fourth respondent is not a University established under law for the purpose of Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act, 1948 and they are not entitled to be included as a constituency under Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act, 1948 and their inclusion is null and void. Consequently, the election of the fifth respondent to the Dental Council of India from the fourth respondent pursuant to the elections held on 14.07.2003 is void ab initio and accordingly is hereby quashed. Parties to bear their own costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 671
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... ... ..... ent in the EOGM held on 25th January, 2001 and 28th Feb., 2001 when resolutions under Section 81(1A) were passed and as such he cannot question the allotment. In the rejoinder, the petitioner has not contradicted this averment of the respondents. If the petitioner had been present in the meeting and if the general body had permitted issue of further shares in terms of Section 81(1A) of the Act, the petitioner cannot challenge the allotment in the present proceedings. As for as the allegations regarding the accounts of the company, nothing has been substantiated to indicate that either the accounts were fabricated or undue benefits have been taken by the respondents. 9. On an overall analysis of this case, I find that the petition deserves to be dismissed not only on the ground that the requirements of Section 399 of the Act are not satisfied but also on the ground that none of the allegations has been established. Accordingly I dismiss the petition with no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 670
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... ... ..... roup in this company. Accordingly, I order so. 26. Since purchase of shares as directed above cannot be done without proper valuation, it is necessary to appoint an independent valuer to value the shares of both these companies. The independent valuer so appointed will also compute the amount of profit that the 4th respondent has derived from the agency with Contship from 1-12-2001 to 31-3-2003. The parties will appear before me on 1st December, 2003 at 2.30 PM to suggest the name of the mutually acceptable valuer to carry out the assignment. In case the parties could not agree on a valuer, the Bench (sic) will appoint one. Till the process of valuation is completed the terms of the consent order dated 18-7-2002 will continue to operate as an order of this Bench more particularly the terms at Paragraphs 2 a, b, d, and f of that order. 27. Both the petitions are disposed of in the above terms reserving the right to appoint the valuer and also to give consequential directions.
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2003 (10) TMI 669
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... ... ..... onable and therefore denial of cross examination of them is against the principles of natural justice. Therefore SEBI is directed to permit the Appellant to cross examine Shri Nitin Doshi etc. of JSBPL, as prayed for by the Appellant. In case the Appellant fails to make use of the opportunity, SEBI is at liberty to draw appropriate inference in the matter. But the Appellant in all fairness need be provided an opportunity to examine Shri Nitin Doshi and Shri Jaysukhlal Jagjivan with reference to their written/oral statements/communication which have been referred to and relied on by the Respondent in its order. In view of the legal position explained above I do not consider it necessary to go into the merits of the charges held against the Appellant. SEBI is at liberty to pass appropriate order after affording the Appellant to cross examine the persons on whose statement/communication SEBI has relied. For the purpose the matter is remanded. Appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2003 (10) TMI 668
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... ... ..... the Establishments Act as a whole cannot be held to have been abrogated by the Act. In substance, if at all, it can only at best be claimed that the operation of the law as contained in the Establishments Act would stand curtailed, if on any particular aspect there is a contra stipulation or provision in the Act in respect of a Motor Transport worker, and not otherwise. This would be the proper, reasonable and inevitable consequence of a harmonious construction of the provisions of the two welfare legislations, so that the best of the both would be available to the worker concerned. The view taken by the Patna High Court and the Bombay High Court in the decisions noted supra, does not lay down the correct position of law while the one taken by the Gujarat High Court in the impugned judgment, merits approval in our hands. 12. Above being the position, the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 667
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... ... ..... e dismissed and those against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in the contempt petition and the order of the Division Bench in appeals arising out of contempt matter viz. CAs Nos. 5442, 5454, 5447, 5449 and 5450 of 2002 are allowed and the order of the Contempt Judge and the Division Bench in contempt appeals are set aside. ( 11. ) We would, however while parting with the matter particularly relating to appeals against the order passed by the High Court in writ appeals like to observe that all these employees seem to be working since a long time, their regularisation could not be done as it is indicated that there are no sanctioned posts. Legalities and technicalities apart, we feel that it would better serve the ends of justice if the State Government would consider the matter fairly and sympathetically and may like to take any appropriate decision in respect of these employees who are continuing since long. ( 12. ) There would, however, be no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 666
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... ... ..... , the petitioner has approached this Court. The petitioner cannot be accused of any delay so as to disentitle it to the relief. The delay, if any, shows the bonafides of the petitioner." In our view, this reasoning is entirely unsustainable and erroneous. The Respondents did not need to wait 22 years to see that nothing was being done to utilize the land. The High Court was entirely in error in stating that the Respondents could not be accused of any delay and that the delay in fact showed the bonafides of the Respondents. Further, the High Court seems to have overlooked the fact that the Respondents had applied for enhancement of compensation and had filed a Writ Petition only after those proceedings were over. In our view, the Judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the Respondents stands dismissed. Accordingly the Appeal is allowed. The Respondents shall pay to the Appellants costs fixed at ₹ 5,000/-.
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2003 (10) TMI 665
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... ... ..... n the date it receives Presidential assent and is construed as coming into operation immediately on the date preceding its commencement. Thus, if a Central Act is assented by the President on 23.8.1995 then it would be construed to have come into operation on the mid-night between 22nd and 23rd August, 1995. Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1). Sub- section (1) provides that the Act would come into operation on the date it receives the assent of the President where a particular day w.e.f. which the Act would come into force is not prescribed whereas sub-section (3) provides the exact time of the day/night when the Act would come into force. It would not apply to cases where the legislature has delegated the power to the executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be notified by publication in the Official Gazette. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 664
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... ... ..... ent from each other, yet, in the fact situation of the present case with his usual frankness he has contended before this Court that in view of the findings of the CEGAT Tribunal covering the self-same charges against the present petitioner wherein he has been exonerated by the CEGAT there should not have been any other Criminal proceeding before any Criminal Court on the self-same allegation. 17. Now upon hearing the submissions made by the parties and in view of the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court as also of this Court, I hold with certainty that this is a fit case where criminal prosecution should be quashed. 18. In consequence thereof, prayer for quashing of the criminal proceeding pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore in Complaint Case No. C/833/1997 under Sections 132/135(a)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 be allowed. 19. Urgent xerox certified copies of this order, if applied for, by the parties be made available with utmost expedition.
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2003 (10) TMI 663
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... ... ..... ates. Thus, any difficulty could have been resolved by reference to Hindi speaking persons around. As has been held in the matter of State of Raj. v. D.P. Metals that incomplete documentation shows the intention of the assessee to evade the tax. Such can be seen in this respect in the cases in hand. 15. Thus, there being interpretation of the statutes available in favour of Mutha Premraj (supra), along with the decisions of the various courts referred to herein above, it does not appear to be a case where this Court would feel persuaded to observe that there is a case for reconsideration of the law laid down in Mutha Premraj (supra). Thus, it is held that the law laid down in Mutha Premraj (supra), covers these cases and the liability anulled by the Tax Board has been wrongly done. 16. The judgment of the Tax Board is, therefore, liable to be set aside and consequently set aside. The judgment of the original assessing officer as upheld by the appellant authority is restored.
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2003 (10) TMI 662
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... ... ..... ot a single year, the Mill was functional for a period of 240 days and during the years in question, the functioning of the Mill was between 45 days to 199 days. Further, according to the contesting respondents, some of them were permanent and others seasonal but according to the Mill, all the employees were seasonal workmen. In our view, these are disputed questions of facts which cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction and the same can be decided by the courts constituted under the provisions of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ applications. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgments rendered by the High Court are set aside and writ applications dismissed relegating the parties to raise an industrial dispute for adjudication by courts constituted under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 661
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... ... ..... ed that this is not a fit case for our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 660
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... ... ..... puted that the amount of ₹ 51,000 was made over to the Bombay Stock Exchange as a membership fee. At Page 7 of the APB is the letter from the Stock Exchange which requires the assessee to pay the admission fee of ₹ 51,000. Admittedly, this fee has been paid for admission as a member of the Stock Exchange. Without becoming such member, the assessee could not carry on its business as a stock broker. Therefore, the payment can by no means be termed as a capital expenditure. It is definitely a revenue expenditure. This also finds support from the decision of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jindal Dye Intermediate (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT dated 26-9-2002 (copy at Pages 16 to 24, APB) and the decision of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Jt. CIT 2002 8 ITD 456 copy at pages 25 to 28, APB. Hence, this issue was also decided in favour of the assessee. 6. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal stands allowed.
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2003 (10) TMI 659
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... ... ..... ations made hereinbefore as also upon directing the Exchange to file a fresh statement of accounts, if it is found neat and proper. In the event, any doubt or dispute arises, the High Court would be entitled to appoint a competent person as CIT to go into the said accounts and submit a report to it at the cost of the Exchange, However, if it is found that the Governing Board has not specified any date in terms of cl. 7 of Bye-law 343, it shall issue such direction/directions as it may deem fit and appropriate for doing complete justice not only to the respondents but also to the other creditors similarly situated. 37. In view of the fact that the respondents herein had obtained a decree in her favour as bank as on 15th Feb., 1994, we would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within four months from the date of this order. This appeal is disposed of on the above terms with no order as to costs.
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