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Showing 61 to 80 of 440 Records
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2003 (2) TMI 501
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... ... ..... e the compensation fixed by the Collector. This Court followed the judgment in the case of Prem Kumar Singh (supra) in a later case in the case of State of Bihar and others v. D. N. Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. and others (1998 (2) SCC 572) (1997 AIR SCW 4301 AIR 1998 SC 322) in Civil Appeal No. 7695 of 1997 decided on 13-11-1997. In both the abovecited judgments of this Court, we find the Court has not considered the nature of power exercised by the Commissioner under proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act nor has the Court considered the effect of introducing Section 15A of the Act. However, since the view taken by this Court in those two judgments is somewhat in conflict with the view we have expressed in this case, to settle the law in question, we think it appropriate that this matter should be referred to a larger Bench. Therefore, the papers in this appeal shall be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for necessary orders. Ordered accordingly. Order accordingly.
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2003 (2) TMI 500
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... ... ..... said amount has also to be considered for the purpose of section 80HHC of the Income-tax Act. In appeal by the Department, the Tribunal set aside the order of the first appellate authority and restored the order of the Assessing Officer. Hence this appeal by the assessee. Though the matter has come up for admission, since the matter is, prima facie, covered by the decision of this Court in the judgment dated 8-11-2002 in IT A. No. 291 of 2002 and in the judgment dated 7-2-2003 in ITA No. 102 of 2000, we have heard Shri P. Balachandran, learned counsel appearing for the assessee and Shri P.K.R. Menon, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent. We have also perused the aforesaid two judgments. We find that the questions raised by the appellant and extracted above are squarely covered by the said judgments against the assessee and in favour of the department. 2. In the above circumstances, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly, dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 499
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... ... ..... advance or more than two years from the date of advance? (2)Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction in respect of the claim of a debit notwithstanding the uncontroverted finding of the Assessing Officer that the claim was not genuine ? (3)Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction of any debt written off in the books of account as a bad debt and the Assessing Officer has no power to question the genuineness of the claim?" 2. Shri J.P. Bengra, the Hon’ble Vice-President (Mumbai) was nominated as the Third Member. In his order dated 8th October, 2002, the Third Member concurred with the view taken by the Learned Accountant Member and held that the amount written off by the assessee as bad debt is allowable as deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in the year under consideration. In accordance with the majority view, the issue stands decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 3. In the result, the appeal filed by Revenue is dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 498
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... ... ..... correct law, in our opinion. The original appeal filed by the respondents herein was found to be not maintainable as not covered by any of the clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-Section (1) of Section 39 of the Act. It was dismissed as incompetent. The question of the memo of appeal filed in the High Court by the appellants herein being treated as cross objection and being taken up for hearing on merits does not arise. Independently treated as an original appeal the same was held to be hopelessly barred by time as the delay was not explained satisfactorily. On this aspect we are not persuaded to take a view different from the one taken by the High Court. The appeal filed in the High court by the appellants herein has been rightly held liable to be dismissed as time-barred and is not available to be heard and decided as cross objection in view of the original appeal filed in the High Court by the respondents herein having failed as incompetent. The appeals are dismissed. Costs easy.
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2003 (2) TMI 497
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... ... ..... pany would continue to remain liable unless they prove that the owner/insured was aware or had noticed that the licence was fake and still permitted that person to drive. More importantly even in such a case the Insurance Company would remain liable to the innocent third party, but it may be able to recover from the insured. This is the law which has been laid down in Skandia 's Sohan Lal Passi 's and Kamla 's case. We are in full agreement with the views expressed therein and see no reason to take a different view. In this view of the matter we see no substance in this appeal. The appeal stands dismissed with cost of ₹ 20,000. This amount of costs to be shared equally between the claimants on one hand and the insured on the other. Clarified that the costs awarded therein is in addition to the costs directed to be paid by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal. The amount deposited is allowed to be withdrawn by the claimants i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 11 herein.
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2003 (2) TMI 496
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... ... ..... ventions with foreign countries." The concept of grant of immunity from legal process is not per-say constitutionally repugnant. Article 261(2) and (3) provide "361(2) No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against the President or the Governor of a State, in any court during his term of office. 361(3) No process for the arrest or imprisonment of the President, or the Governor of a State shall issue from any court during his term of office." Similarly under Article 105(2) which provides for the powers, privileges etc. of the Houses of Parliament and of the Members and committees thereof says "105(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings."
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2003 (2) TMI 495
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... ... ..... nation by him. This was not done despite opportunity given. The confirmatory letter did not mention even the mode of payment of the alleged brokerage. On query by the Bench, it was fairly admitted by the learned Counsel for the assessee that the payment was made in cash. It is therefore, obvious that cash payment if any, did not admit verification. There is no material on record brought by the assessee to prove the nature of services if any rendered by the recipients of the brokerage. Existence of the payee alone is not sufficient. Genuineness of payment is an important and relevant factor. On appraisal of the material on record, we have come to the conclusion that the assessee’s claim of payment of alleged brokerage is non-genuine and revenue authorities were perfectly justified in making the impugned disallowance. 21. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed. 22. In fine, the appeal of the revenue is partly allowed and that of the assessee is dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 494
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... ... ..... elay condoned. The appeal is dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 493
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... ... ..... be condoned in view of the interim orders passed by the High court and is hereby condoned. The time for deposit, as appointed by the Trial Court, shall be deemed to have been extended upto the dates of actual deposits made by the appellants. The amount of ₹ 2,40,000/- lying deposited in the Court and invested in fixed deposits shall, along with the interest earned, be released to the respondents. In addition the appellants shall, as offered by them, deposit with the executing court for payment to the respondent another amount of ₹ 1,20,000/- within a period of eight weeks from today. On that being done, the decree passed by the Trial Court shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied. The respondent shall deliver the agreements dated 30.11.1988 and 15.7.1991 to the appellants endorsing upon the agreements the amount of money received and that the agreements stand discharged and need not be performed. The costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred throughout.
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2003 (2) TMI 492
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 491
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... ... ..... e matter and there is an existing limitation on the High Court to that effect." Again at paragraph 12, this Court observed "Payment of back wages having a discretionary element involved in it has to be dealt with in the facts and circumstances of each case and no straight- jacket formula can be evolved, though, however, there is statutory sanction to direct payment of back wages in its entirety. (See Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya and Anr., (2002) AIR SCW 3008)". In our considered opinion, a further payment of ₹ 12 lacs towards back wages and for giving effect to the order of dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence would suffice. The total amount of ₹ 15 lacs shall be in full and final settlement of all claims. The payment is to be paid within eight weeks from today after making permissible deductions statutorily provided" and/or adjustments, if any, to be made. The appeal is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.
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2003 (2) TMI 490
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... ... ..... e been arrived at. Having regard to the discussions made hereinbefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the agreement of sale in question could not have been specifically enforced and in that view of the matter the question is as to whether the Original Defendant No.1 had an absolute right to dispose of the property in question in exercise of his power as an Executor of the Will or not takes a back seat. In any event, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and in particular the subsequent events as well the conduct of Plaintiff No.1, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where a discretionary jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 should be exercised. See V. Muthusami (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Angammal and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 316 and Nirmala Anand vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and Others, (2002) 8 SCC 146 . The appeal being devoid of any merit is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 489
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... ... ..... is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2003 (2) TMI 488
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... ... ..... cal data does not make the Euroclean as a commodity in packed form or pre-packed commodity. 24. The contention of the respondents that vacuum cleaner falls within the definition of 'combination package' as defined in Rule 2(c) of the Rules and therefore covered by the provisions of the Act and the Rules is devoid of any merit. As per Rule 2(c) of the Rules 'combination package' means a package intended for retail sale, containing two or more individual packages, or individual pieces, of dissimilar commodities. When a vacuum cleaner is purchased, standard accessories form part of the unit. They are inseparable pails of the vacuum cleaner without which the utility of the machine will be nil. Vacuum cleaner with its standard accessories is sold as one single unit and it cannot be treated as 'combination package' or 'group package'. 25. In the result, for the above reasons, the Writ Petition is allowed as prayed for, without any order as to costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 487
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... ... ..... ory in nature as so held in Amarjit Kaur v. State of Haryana and Ors., 2003 (1) RCR (Cri) 99. 34. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and we uphold the same. 35. So far as quantum of sentence is concerned, we feel that the appellant does deserve some leniency. He is stated to be in custody since 1998 and is not a previous convict. He is a married man. He has already suffered the rigour of protracted trial for about five years. In our view the ends of justice would be adequately met if the substantive sentence of fifteen years RI is reduced to twelve years. It is ordered accordingly. However, the sentence of fine of Rs. one lac, which is the minimum requirement of law, would remain the same. 36. With the modification in quantum of sentence as indicated above, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Intimation of this judgment be sent to the learned trial court and the Jail authorities.
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2003 (2) TMI 486
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... ... ..... High Court is established. The powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent." Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 provides for an appeal before the High Court and thereafter to the Supreme Court and despite the same it was held that a letters patent appeal under clause 15 would be maintainable. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the order passed by the Single Judge was appealable to Letters Patent Bench and the objection in regard to maintainability of appeal was rightly overruled by the High Court. Consequently, this appeal falls and is, accordingly, dismissed. We direct the High Court to decide the letters patent appeal expeditiously
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2003 (2) TMI 485
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... ... ..... sidered as a tax on movement of goods. Bringing the goods in municipal area with the intention to use and not in transit would be the decisive factor. The nature of such a levy is regulatory in character and is adequately covered by Entry 52, List 11 of Seventh Schedule. It cannot be considered to have violated Articles 301, 304 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as it would be within the reasonable restriction contemplated by Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It is a compensatory tax as is well settled. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Kota, Rajasthan v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., Delhi, (2001) 3 SCC 654 (AIR 2001 SC 1060) and State of Bihar v. Bihar Chambers of Commerce, (1996) 9 SCC 136 (AIR. 1996 SC 2344). Therefore, the last contention of the learned counsel too has to be rejected. 30. No other point has been urged. 31. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 484
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... ... ..... of the decree passed by the civil court are set aside. It is held that the jurisdiction of the civil court to pass the decree for ejectment was barred. A decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter would be a nullity and the judgment-debtor can object to the execution of such a decree being a nullity and non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced including the stage of execution of the decree or any other collateral proceedings. We are conscious of the fact that it would work a great hardship on the respondent-decree holder who would not be able to reap the benefit of the decree passed in his favour having won at all the stages but the vagaries of law cannot be helped. Accordingly, appeal is accepted. Orders of the High Court and the executing court are set aside. It is held that the decree obtained by the decree-holder cannot be executed being a nullity and non est. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 483
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... ... ..... High Court under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are set aside. The appellants need not surrender and their surety bonds are discharged. In view of the fact that the judgment of the High Court has been set aside, no orders are required to be passed in Criminal Appeals No.725-27/02, having rendered infructuous, they stand finally disposed of as such. Blackstone's Criminal Practice 1992, edited by Peter Murphy, page 64, A-5.2 2. 2002 (5) SCC p.86 Subash Parbat Sonvane Vs. State of Gujarat 3. Ram Kishan Vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 476 4 M.W.Mohiuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 3 SCC 567 5.C.K.Damodaran Nair Vs. Government of India, (1997) 9 SCC 477 Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1965 (2) SCR 7 ibid A2.1 p.18 Criminal Law, Smith, Hogan, 6th Edition, p.31 Criminal Law - cases and materials, K.D.Gaur, Third edition, p.23 Criminal Law - Glanville Williams - The General Part - Second Edition p.1
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2003 (2) TMI 482
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... ... ..... oing or overruling the abovesaid mandate of the Supreme Court contained in the decision of Grahak Sanstha Manch's case. Accordingly, all the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside subject to the clarification made hereinabove. It was stated at the Bar, during the course of hearing that the impugned judgment decided only the question of vires of the impugned Amending Act. Some of the writ petitions filed in the High Court raised the question of vires of the impugned Act as the sole issue for decision which writ petitions shall stand dismissed in view of this judgment. Some of the writ petitions filed in the High Court raised other issues as well which in the event of the impugned judgment being set aside shall have to be remanded to the High Court for hearing on issues other than the issue as to vires of the impugned Amendment Act. All the appeals shall therefore now be listed for appropriate consequential directions before the Court.
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