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Showing 21 to 40 of 593 Records
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2003 (7) TMI 731 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ay by irrelevancies, giving a complete go bye to contextual considerations throwing to winds the principle of proportionality in going farther than what was strictly and reasonably required to meet the situation. In short, the Competent Authority completely misdirected itself in taking such an extreme and unreasonable decision of canceling the entire selections, wholly unwarranted and unnecessary even on the factual situation found too, and totally in excess of the nature and gravity of what was at stake, thereby virtually rendering such decision to be irrational. For all the reasons stated above, we could not find any infirmity whatsoever in the judgment of the High Court which adopted a practical, pragmatic, rational and realistic solution to the problem. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. The interim order earlier granted thus automatically stands revoked. The appointments shall be made within 60 days from this day, without any further delay. No costs.
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2003 (7) TMI 730 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccordance with law. In the circumstances we decline to answer the question of law referred to in I.T.R. No. 9 of 2001 as also the question of law on which notice is ordered in I.T.A. No. 97 to 1999. 6. Question No. 2 in I.T.A. No. 97 of 1999 relates to the assessability of income of an assessment year covered by a block period where the total income is below the taxable limit. We find that this question is covered by the judgment dated 8-7-2003 in I.T.R. No. 57 of 2000 where it was held that undisclosed income below the taxable limit for any assessment year covered by the block period is not liable to be included in the undisclosed income for the block period. In the light of the said decision we answer the second question in I.T.A. No. 97 of 1999 in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We make it clear that the Tribunal has to decide only the question with regard to the rate of tax applicable to capital gains in the block assessment under section 158BC of the Act.
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2003 (7) TMI 729 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Mumbai University and College Tribunal cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed and set aside and the matter is to be remanded to the College Tribunal with direction to deal with the appeals on merits and in accordance with the provisions of law. Hence, the petition succeeds. The common judgment and order dated 31st October, 2002 passed by the Mumbai University and College Tribunal in Appeal Nos. 37 to 41 of 2002 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Mumbai University and College Tribunal to decide the appeals on merits and in accordance with the provisions of law, after hearing the parties. The rule is made absolute in above terms with no order as to costs. 27. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 prays for stay to this order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any justification for grant of stay to this order. Prayer is accordingly rejected.
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2003 (7) TMI 728 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l has taken the view that the CIT(A) has not properly looked into the papers in the paper book which was submitted to him and he should reconsider his views and discuss the evidence which has been brought on record in the form of paper book. In our view, there is nothing wrong in the observations in the earlier order and at least it cannot be said that there was an apparent mistake in the order dated 29‑10‑1993 which can be corrected on application under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act. 7. In our considered opinion, the Tribunal has committed error in upholding the view of the CIT(A), after specific observations that the CIT(A) has not properly appreciated the evidence on record. That cannot be said to be an apparent mistake which can be corrected under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 8. In the result, we answer the question in negative i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The reference so made, stands disposed of accordingly.
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2003 (7) TMI 727 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, since it applies only to infant dairy milk products or the infant dairy milk food, the sample which has been taken and has been analysed is neither infant milk substitute/infant food nor it is skimmed milk powder, an article for which standards have been prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. Any prosecution in regard to an article for which no standards have been laid, applying the standards for other articles would not be sustainable. 8. The position as indicated above is clear on the face of it, on the basis of the documents of the prosecution itself. It requires no further enquiry much less factual in nature. In the above circumstances we find that continuation of the prosecution proceedings is not valid. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the proceedings in Case No. ST No. 2412 of 1999, pending against the appellant in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Alwaye, are quashed.
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2003 (7) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s carrying the contraband or was, in any manner, conniving with the said accused in carrying the contraband. In the absence of any such material, to convict the second Appellant only on the ground that he was found in the auto rickshaw, in our opinion, is not justified. As a matter of fact, the Courts below have rightly acquitted the other two accused on similar ground and, in our opinion, the said benefit ought to have gone to Accused 2 also. For the reasons stated, we find the prosecution has failed to establish its case against Appellant 2. Therefore, this appeal, so far as he is concerned, succeeds and the same is allowed. The said Appellant 2, if in custody, shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. However, the appeal of the first Appellant is dismissed. 8. We record our appreciation for the services rendered by Ms. Ranjana Narayan, advocate as amicus curiae in disposing of the appeals and we direct the payment of a sum of ₹ 750 as fee to her.
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2003 (7) TMI 725 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of Air India of merger of the two cadres males and females was accepted, may alone be quashed and the remaining part be left undisturbed and intact as valid. In view of the detailed discussion of the various grounds urged before us, we have held that both impugned parts of the judgment of the High Court are unsustainable. It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept the alternative submission made on behalf of the respondents/associations that since two parts of the impugned judgment are severeble, one of the parts fixing age of retirement for air hostesses on flight duties up to the age of 58 years be upheld. In the result, these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 20/23.8.2001 is hereby set aside. The Writ Petition of respondent/association is dismissed. All interim orders including dated 14.12.2001 shall stand vacated. Looking to the nature of the controversy involved, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
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2003 (7) TMI 724 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . The argument of learned counsel M. R. A. Achar is that in the later decision, the earlier decision was not followed. The controversy is not acceptable as it is well settled law of precedent that where there are two judgments rendered by the Benches consisting of equal number of Judges as in this case, the later in time would prevail and hence we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in R.Venkatesham Chetty's case referred to above. In the light of the said decision, we answer the question referred to us as follows It is not permissible to grant variation of the conditions of a stage carriage permit held by a saved operator under the Kolar Pocket Scheme or Bellary Pocket Scheme by increasing the number of trips or number of vehicles unless the reciprocal agreement between the States so permits as held by the Supreme Court in R. Venkatesham Chetty's case. The writ appeals and writ petitions shall now be posted before appropriate Bench for disposal on merits.
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2003 (7) TMI 723 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ated the consistent view taken by the High Courts and the Supreme Court and resolved the contradictory view taken in Bhushan Sachdeva (supra) and settled the controversy. In paragraph 29 of the said decision in Nicolletta Rohtagi (supra), it was held that the learned Judges in Bhushan Sachdeva (supra) failed to notice the limited grounds available to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act and he Court was of the view that the decision in Bhushan Sachdeva (supra) did not lay down the correct view of the law. It had held that the view taken in Bhushan Sachdeva (supra) that a right to contest would also include the right to file an appeal is contrary to well-established law that creation of a right to appeal is an act which requires legislative authority and no Court or Tribunal can confer such right, it being one of limitation or extension of jurisdiction. Therefore, ratio decided in Bhushan Sachdeva (supra); Celine (supra) and Gita Rant Mondal (supra) is no more good law.
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2003 (7) TMI 722 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the cause of action arose at Chennai"..... where the first defendant is located....". In the apply to the counter filed in O.A.No. 95 of 2003 they had stated that the first respondent has a consignee agent at Chennai and carries on business at Chennai. This reply is sworn to on 08-03-2003, the notice in Application No. 1396 of 2003 was served on the applicant 18-03-2003 and in the counter, in that application the deponent has slated that he came to know that he was a consignee agent only from the endorsement in the receipt of the notice. It is rather unfortunate that ambivalent statements are being made to suit the occasion. 24. While the burking of the registered address of the first respondent-Corporation and furnishing the address of a stray dealer throws enough doubt on the bona fides of the applicant deny the equitable remedy of injunction it may not be sufficient to warrant initiating criminal proceedings. So no orders are necessary in this application.
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2003 (7) TMI 721 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stances, awarded 10 of the cost of the overhead charges. In the case of Brijpal Singh, the Supreme Court had allowed loss of profit in similar circumstances. Therefore, on merit also, it cannot be said that the award of ₹ 2.85.000/- towards reimbursing overhead charges and further sum of ₹ 2,85,000/- towards compensating loss of profits is illegal or arbitrary. 33. In conclusion, we hold that the plea contained under Clause 15(a) of the Agreement was not specifically raised before the Court below, though there is some reference to Clause 15 generally in para h(i) of the amended plaint. Be that as it may the award of ₹ 2.85.000/- towards reimbursing overhead charges and further a sum of ₹ 2,85,000/- towards compensating loss of profits is also justified, legal and in conformity with the law laid down by this Court and the Apex Court. In the result and foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal with cost. The Advocate's Fee is fixed at ₹ 1000/-.
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2003 (7) TMI 720 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the Finance Act, 1988 with effect from 1st June, 1988 was again amended by the Finance Act, 1989 with retrospective effect from 1st June, 1988 to the effect that where any order referred to in the sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject matter of any appeal (filed on or before or after 1st June, 1988), the powers of the Commissioner of Income-tax under the sub-section shall extend and shall be deemed always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal. The consequence of the amendment made with retrospective effect is that the powers under section 263 of the Commissioner shall extend and shall be deemed always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and decided in an appeal. 3. Similar view has been reiterated in CIT v. Jaykumar B. Patil 1999 236 ITR 469 (SC). Thus, in view of the above, we answer the reference in the negative, i.e. in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2003 (7) TMI 719 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of the State of Maharashtra who are empowered with the power of detention either under COFEPOSA Act or any other Act, which permits detention by the said authority and State shall direct all those authorities to follow the observations in this judgment meticulously, otherwise those authorities will invite the appropriate action by the State, as it is the duty of those authorities to further the cause of the State and not to sabotage it by negligence on their part. 17. In view of this, the detention order No. PSA-1102/16/SPL-3(A) dated 30.4.2002 is hereby quashed. The petitioner - detenu be released forthwith if not required in any other crime. 18. Rule made absolute accordingly. Judgment was declared in chamber in the presence of counsel for both the sides. At this stage, Mr. Mhaispurkar learned APP appearing for the State made a request to stay the judgment for the period of two weeks. However, that request is not supported with any reason. Hence, that prayer is rejected.
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2003 (7) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the Court will refrain itself from interfering see U.P. State Electricity Board v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd., 2001 3 SCC 397 and ISPAT Engineering & Foundry Works, B.S. City, Bokaro v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., B.S. City, Bokaro, 2001 6 SCC 347 . For that reason, we are of the view that the appeal has no merit and must fail. However, the parties are agreed that from the date of filing of the claim till the date of award the interest chargeable would be at the rate of 1? per cent in place of 18 per cent. For that reason, the award and judgment under challenge stand modified to that extent. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (7) TMI 717 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earned Judge. By not granting the interim injunction, the learned Judge has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. It is also clear that the respondents have not taken the precaution to ascertain the truth before publication. 58. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Appeal from Order is allowed, and the impugned Judgment and order passed by the learned Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court dated 29th March, 2003 is set aside and the Appellant Company is entitled to the following order of injunction. "The respondents shall not make defamatory statements against the Appellants imputing financial irregularity or dishonesty on the part of the Appellants or the Shree Maheshwar Hydel Project including but not limited to allegations viz. connivance, conspiracy, syphoning of funds, loot, unleashing terror." 59. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Personal Secretary or the Associate. 60. Issuance of certified copy is expedited.
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2003 (7) TMI 716 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f a citizen is undoubtedly very important. It is our duty to ensure that there is strict compliance with the provisions of law. In our view, strict compliance of the provisions of law has been made. The Court, in our opinion, cannot lose sight of the fact that those who commit economic offences do harm to the national interest and economy. Thus, the High Court, while examining the case, has taken a cumulative view of the situation and had seen all the relevant facts. On a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that the detenu has violated the provisions of law and his activities are not in the larger national interest and that the Court should be slow to come to the aid of the detenu. We agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. The instant appeal filed by the wife of the detenu is totally devoid of any merit or substance and as such we have no hesitation in rejecting the same. The appeal shall stand dismissed.
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2003 (7) TMI 715 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... red stock. The nature and character of the land being non-agricultural, the same evidently was not in cultivating possession of the intermediaries and, thus, an application for settlement of such land by the intermediaries purported to be in terms of Section 7 of the Act was not maintainable. Furthermore, the land being not used either for cultivation or for horticulture purposes on the date of vesting did not attract the provisions of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 7. For the reasons afore-mentioned, it must be held that the settlement made in favour of ex-intermediary was bad in law. Furthermore, as admittedly two of the applicants being sons of the intermediary died in the years 1961 and 1963, no settlement could have been made in their favour. The order of settlement clearly depicts a total non-application of mind on the legal principles. We, accordingly, set aside the order and judgment under challenge. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to cost.
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2003 (7) TMI 714 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... have been dismissed, appeals by special leave have been filed there against. All the writ petitions and appeals shall also stand dismissed. In some of the matters the High Court had by interim order stayed the disqualification and in some cases proceedings before the Director under Section 177 (2) of the Act. With the decision in these writ petitions, the proceedings shall stand revived at the stage where they were. Within 15 days from the date of this judgment the person proceeded against, may file appeal against the decision of the Director, as the case may be. In such of the cases where defence to the proceedings under Section 177(2) of the Act was raised on the ground of disqualification, being not attracted on account of the child having been given in adoption, the defence shall not be available. The proceedings shall stand concluded and the disqualification shall apply. All the appeals and writ petitions be treated as disposed of in terms of the above said directions.
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2003 (7) TMI 713 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Janarthana Raja, Adv., Ms. Radha Rangaswamy, Adv. O R D E R Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay as well as on the Special Leave Petition.
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2003 (7) TMI 712 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tice on behalf of respondent. Reply, if any, to the stay application. In the meanwhile, it is provided that appellant shall be free to sell and dispose of the existing stock but it shall remain restrained from manufacturing in terms of the impugned decree related to prayer 22 (a) and 22 (c) of the prayer in the suit till next date. List for disposal on 25th August, 2003.
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