Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 501 to 520 of 520 Records
-
2004 (5) TMI 20
Application for deleting the name of respondent No. 2, i.e., the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal from the array of the respondents - Neither is there practice, nor is there any justification to make the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as a party. The name of respondent No. 2, i.e., the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, is therefore, deleted from the array of respondents.
-
2004 (5) TMI 19
Rejection of book results - Assessing Officer has rejected the book results of the assessee on the ground that the average cost of production has been increased to Rs. 5,400 P.M.T. as against Rs. 4,217 P.M.T. No justification has been shown for this increase. Even the wages have also been increased. The assessee has also shown no justification for it. Therefore, invoking the provisions of section 145(2), the book results were rejected and additions have been made on the ground of low gross profit shown in the books - What should be the addition after rejection of the book results is basically a question of fact - We see no perversity in the impugned order especially when the Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal, all the three authorities have given findings of fact against the assessee. - reference application stands rejected
-
2004 (5) TMI 18
Question of law - issue involved in this case relates to addition/deletion of certain amount under section 69 - the impugned addition was not sustained in view of the satisfactory explanation offered by the assessee in relation to the source of income. Now, once the explanation offered by the assessee is accepted by the taxing authorities and the same having been upheld up to the Tribunal in second appeal, then, in our opinion, no question of law as such arises in this case which can be said to be a referable question for answer u/s 256(1) - Since, in our opinion, the issue being mostly of facts and no issue of law is involved, there is no case made out for allowing this application and calling for any reference - application is dismissed.
-
2004 (5) TMI 17
Penalty u/s 271C non deduction of TDS - 'reasonable cause' so shown and the explanation offered has not been considered on merits by the lower authorities while levying/upholding the penalty - lower authorities were rather highly influenced in levying/upholding the penalty by the alleged non-co-operation in furnishing details of salary or denial of payment of salary in Japan and the ultimate payment of tax and interest was not suo motu but was as a result of investigations and efforts made by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax - as the levy of penalty under section 271C is concerned these are extraneous considerations as what the revenue authorities are required to consider while levying such penalty is existence of reasonable cause for non-deduction of tax at source - reasonable cause as shown by the assessee-company has not been properly appreciated and deliberated by the lower authorities Tribunal was right in cancelling the penalty imposed under section 271C
-
2004 (5) TMI 16
"1. Whether, Tribunal was right in holding that the sum paid by the assessee as penalty for late payment of sales tax was an allowable deduction? 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the sum being the unclaimed balances written off by the assessee was not taxable?" - On examination of the facts, the Tribunal has recorded that the amount was not paid by the assessee as penalty for late payment of sales tax but it was by way of interest - Both questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
-
2004 (5) TMI 15
Recall of order by tribunal - appeal to HC - The assessee has filed this appeal under section 260A against the orders of Tribunal, dated October 29,1999, disposing of the appeal filed by the assessee and dated August 8, 2002, rejecting its application under section 254(2) for recall of its order dated October 29, 1999. - application has been filed after about two years and that too when the constitution of the Bench had undergone a change. Thus, to decide the claim made in the application u/s 254(2), the successor Members of the Bench could only refer to the material on record to see as to whether such contentions had been raised or not. Admittedly, no such material is available. - In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with the finding of the Tribunal that there was no mistake apparent from the record warranting action u/s 254(2) held that no substantial question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal dated August 8, 2002, for consideration by this court.
-
2004 (5) TMI 14
This is an application by Revenue u/s 256(2) requesting this court to direct the Tribunal to refer the questions of law which according to the Revenue does arise out of the order, passed by the Tribunal - We accordingly allow the application and direct the Tribunal to refer to this court the following questions of law - " (i) Whether Tribunal was justified in law in allowing the benefits of section 54F to an assessee who owned another residential house on the date of transfer? (ii) Whether Tribunal was justified in law in allowing the benefits of section 54F even if the transfer is not evidenced by a registered deed?"
-
2004 (5) TMI 13
Deduction u/s 80HH and 80-I - Tribunal holding that deduction u/s 80HH and section 80-I on the income arising from brass scrap obtained in the process of breaking and dismantling of guns is not an income derived from the industrial undertaking of iron rerolling - In our opinion, there is no nexus with the brass scrap obtained on dismantling of the guns in the main activity of the appellant of steel rerolling. Gun is not the essential raw material of the appellant industrial unit, in any case brass is not at all connected with steel rerolling. Thus, separation of brass cannot be said to be in the process of manufacture or a product or a by-product of the activity of the assessee's industrial undertaking. There is no direct nexus with the separation of the brass from the guns to the main activity, thus, considering the provisions of sections 80HH and 80-I, it cannot be said to be profit and gain derived from industrial undertaking. Thus, deductions on profits and gains under sections 80HH and 80-I are not admissible and have been rightly disallowed by Tribunal.
-
2004 (5) TMI 12
Claim for deduction of the provision for bad debts to Rs. 1,19,36,000 under section 36(1)(viia) - Tribunal was right in holding that since the assessee had made a provision of Rs. 1,19,36,000 for bad and doubtful debts, its claim for deduction under section 36(1) (viia) of the Act had to be restricted to that amount only. Since the language of the statute is clear and is not capable of any other interpretation, we are satisfied that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal for consideration by this court.
-
2004 (5) TMI 11
Powers of tribunal under section 254 for rectification - By impugned order, the Tribunal allowed the application made by the assessee u/s 254(2) seeking rectification in the main appellate order - Mere perusal of the impugned order of the Tribunal quoted supra would indicate that the rectification was done or was required to be done on the strength of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. v. CIT. It is in this case, their Lordships have explained the manner in which the tax is to be calculated on the interest earned by the assessee. So the rectification had to be done to make the direction of the Tribunal to the taxing authorities to follow the law laid down by the apex court. Indeed, the law laid down by the Supreme Court being binding on all courts/Tribunals in our country by virtue of article 141 of the Constitution of India, the rectification had become necessary so as to make the judicial orders in accord with the law explained by the Supreme Court. - We, therefore, do not find any error of law committed by the Tribunal in invoking their powers of rectification u/s 254
-
2004 (5) TMI 10
"(1) Whether, the Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing 1/6th as repairs irrespective of the fact that the assessee has incurred any expenditure on repairs, though the same is not allowable deduction in the Wealth-tax Act for valuation purposes? (2) Whether, the Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing collection charges at Rs. 10,578 as against the Wealth-tax Officer allowing this expenditure to the extent of Rs. 3,600?" - Tribunal is right in allowing 1/6th as repairs irrespective of the fact whether the assessees have incurred any expenditure on repairs though the same is not allowable deduction in the Act for valuation purposes and also is right in law and on facts in allowing collection charges at Rs. 10,578 as against the Wealth-tax Officer allowing this expenditure to the extent of Rs. 3,600. We, therefore, answer both the questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue
-
2004 (5) TMI 9
Whether in view of the provisions of section 194C read with article 265 of the Constitution, the respondents are bound in law to make the refund of amount which has been paid by the petitioner by way of advance payment of tax, inter alia, under section 210 for which no regular assessment was made and the same was allowed to become time-barred by the Income-tax Officer the tax paid by the assessee must be accepted as it is, and in the event of the tax paid being in excess of the tax liability duly computed on the basis of return furnished and the rates applicable, the excess shall be refunded to the assessee, since its retention may offend article 265 of the Constitution - writ petition has to be dismissed
-
2004 (5) TMI 8
Taxability of Malaysian Business Income in India - Taxability of Capital Gains arising from Immovable Property situated in Malaysian - Scope of the term "may be taxed" as per DTAA - Overriding effect of DTAA over Provisions of Income Tax - Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Malaysia - Absence of permanent establishment in India - Whether the Malaysian income cannot be subjected to tax in India on the basis of the DTAA entered into between GOI and Government of Malaysia.
HELD THAT:- The immovable property in question is situate in Malaysia and income is derived from that property. Further, it has also been held as a matter of fact that there is no permanent establishment in India in regard to carrying on the business of rubber plantations in Malaysia out of which income is derived and that finding of fact has been recorded by all the authorities and affirmed by the High Court. We, therefore, do not propose to re-examine the question whether the finding is correct or not. Proceeding on that basis, we hold that business income out of the rubber plantations cannot be taxed in India, because of closer economic relations between the assessee and Malaysia in which the property is located and where the permanent establishment has been set up will determine the fiscal domicile.
We need not enter into an exercise in semantics as to whether the expression "may be" will mean allocation of power to tax or is only one of the options and it only grants power to tax in that State and unless tax is imposed and paid, no relief can be sought. Reading the treaty in question as a whole, when it is intended that even though it is possible for a resident in India to be taxed in terms of sections 4 and 5, if he is deemed to be a resident of a contracting State where his personal and economic relations are closer, then his residence in India will become irrelevant, the treaty will have to be interpreted as such and prevails over sections 4 and 5 of the Act.
Whether the capital gains should be taxable only in the country in which the assets are situated - HELD THAT:- The contention put forth by the learned Attorney-General that capital gains is not income and, therefore, is not covered by the treaty cannot be accepted at all because for purposes of the Act capital gains is always treated as income arising out of immovab1e property though subject to different kind of treatment. Therefore, the contention advanced by the leaned Attorney-General that it is not a part of the treaty cannot be accepted because in the terms of the treaty wherever any expression is not defined the expression defined in the Income-tax Act would be attracted. The definition of "income" would, therefore, include capital gains. Thus, capital gains derived from immovable property is income and therefore article 6 would be attracted.
Appeal of the revenue dismissed. Decided in favor of assessee.
-
2004 (5) TMI 7
Held that decision taken by the High Powered Committee is binding on all Departments of Union of India
-
2004 (5) TMI 6
Service Tax Consulting Engineer Commissioning and installation services are not covered under consulting engineer services Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit of service tax
-
2004 (5) TMI 5
Service Tax Clearing and forwarding agent (1) Definition (2) Classification (3) Insurance and Clearing and forwarding services
-
2004 (5) TMI 4
Service Tax Consulting Engineer Any professionally qualified Engineer or Engineering firm who rendered any service to a client are liable to the imposition of service tax
-
2004 (5) TMI 3
Service Tax Courier Service Appellant under a bona fide belief that they are not covered under definition of courier and service tax being a new concept (1) Meaning of Courier (2) Penalty
-
2004 (5) TMI 2
Service Tax Courier Service Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Service tax ... ... ... ... ..... -door and not pertaining to time bound sensitive document and hence, they were eligible to take deduction of the same. The learned Commissioner, in the impugned order, has found that there was no distinction in the delivery of documents which are time bound, whether from door-to-door or from the office of the appellants. 2. We have heard both sides in the matter. 3. On a careful consideration of Rule 6 of Clause 3 of Service Tax Rules, we find that the provision provides for adjustments of excess tax paid. Prima facie, the appellants have shown from the definition of Courier Service , that they are eligible to seek benefit in respect of the activity which does not serve door-to-door delivery of time bound documents. In view of the prima facie nature of the case being in favour of the appellants, the stay application is allowed granting waiver of pre-deposit of the amount and its recovery till the pendency of the appeal. Stay application allowed. Appeal to come up in its turn.
-
2004 (5) TMI 1
Service Tax Consulting Engineer (1) Service provided by consulting engineers (2) Design and Development charges
....
|