|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 615 Records
-
2004 (9) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... duties at all, we are of the opinion that the Labour Court and the High Court committed a manifest error in granting back-wages in his favour. As noticed hereinbefore, the letter of termination issued to the workman itself suggests that such an opportunity had been granted. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if it is assumed that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was obligatory on the part of the State to comply with Rules 5 and 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, the workman having regard to the totality of the situation was not entitled to back-wages. We may place on record that keeping in view of the fact that the workman had already been reinstated and has since retired, it was not considered expedient to go into the question of correctness or otherwise of the award directing reinstatement of the workman. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal preferred by the State is allowed and that of the workman is dismissed. No costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 692 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t be drawn. The said decision, thus, has no application in the fact of the present case. Curiously the respondent produced copies of some muster rolls before this court. If he was in possession of the said documents, it betrays one's imagination as to why the same had not been produced before the Tribunal. As indicated hereinbefore, he filed some documents before the High Court but the same were not accepted. The High Court, therefore, proceeded to pass the impugned judgment only on the basis of the materials relied on by the parties before the Tribunal. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in setting aside the award of the Tribunal only on the basis of adverse inference drawn against the Appellant for not producing the muster rolls. For the foregoing reasons the impugned judgments are not sustainable in law and they are set aside accordingly. These appeals are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 691 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... id. 13. Applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, we find that the respondent had realized the amount of 7% as tax from its customers. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd. (supra), Sinclair Murray & Co. (P.) Ltd. (supra) and Thirumalaiswamy Naidu & Sons (supra) the said amount forms part of its trading receipt. The respondent had paid to the Sales Tax Department only 3% as tax, therefore the balance 4% cannot be said to be liability which had accrued during the assessment year in question. As and when it is paid over to the department, it can be deducted. Thus, the present case is squarely covered by the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd. (supra). 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 690 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... t of immovable property as these cannot be dismantled and fitted anywhere else or are capable of being bought and sold. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that by no stretch of imagination it can be held that the goods involved in the present case are goods for the purpose of levying Central Excise duty. 7. In view of the above, since we have held that the goods are not excisable and that the appellants are also eligible for exemption in terms of Notification No. 59/90, the appellants succeed in their appeal by either way and we order accordingly. 8. Inasmuch as, we have allowed the appeal of the assessee-appellants on merits, as noted above, the other subsidiary questions involved such as, re-quantification of demand and also the invocation of longer period of limitation does not survive for consideration. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee-appellants is allowed with the consequential relief, if any, and the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
-
2004 (9) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ndent herein have lodged separate complaints giving different versions but while the complaint of respondent was registered by the concerned police, the complaint of the appellant was not so registered, hence on his prayer the learned Magistrate was justified in directing the police concerned to register a case and investigate the same and report back. In our opinion, both the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the same is hit by Section 161 or 162 of the Code which, in our considered opinion, has absolutely no bearing on the question involved. Section 161 or 162 of the Code does not refer to registration of a case, it only speaks of a statement to he recorded by the police in the course of the investigation and its evidentiary value. 26. For the reasons state above, this appeal succeeds and the impugned orders of the High Court and the learned Additional Sessions Judge are set aside and that of the Magistrate restored.
-
2004 (9) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... reason that the complaint is being thrown out on a technical ground, we put it to the learned counsel for the appellant that it is just and proper that the appellant shall furnish a bank guarantee to the extent of ₹ 11,34,056 (which is arrived at after deducting the advance amount). The learned counsel for the appellant, after taking time to obtain instructions, has consented to the same. We, therefore, direct that a bank guarantee for ₹ 11,34,056 shall be furnished within a period of six weeks to the satisfaction of the Registrar (Original Civil Side) of the High Court of Calcutta. The said bank guarantee shall remain as security to the extent of the amount specified above to satisfy the decree if any passed by the Court in the pending suit. This direction shall not be construed as any expression of view on the merits of the suit and also on the question whether the advance is liable to be adjusted or not. 5. The appeal is allowed subject to the above direction.
-
2004 (9) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5.1.1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15.1.1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies. In the result, therefore, we are of the view that the Special Officer ought not to have exercised his powers under Section 71A of the Act after such an unreasonable long period of time, in the facts and circumstances of the case brought to light. The appellants succeed. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the impugned judgments of the authorities below are all set aside and the application for restoration made by the fifth respondent being SAR 415/77-78 is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. We place on record our appreciation of the able assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae Shri P.S. Narasimha.
-
2004 (9) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ust show some other very strong prejudice. The right does not protect an accused from all prejudicial effects caused by delay. Its core concern is impairment of liberty. Possibility of prejudice is not enough. Actual prejudice has to be proved. The plea is inexorably and inextricably mixed up with the merits of the case. No finding of prejudice is possible without full knowledge of facts. The plea must first be evaluated by the trial court." In the aforesaid background the decision of the High Court affirming the acquittal of respondent cannot be maintained. We set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court. The trial before the trial court shall be revived. Since the trial is pending for a considerable period of time, it would be appropriate for the concerned court to take up the matter on day to day basis, keeping in view the mandate of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the "Cr.P.C."). Appeal is accordingly allowed.
-
2004 (9) TMI 685 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... he relationship, if any, was irrelevant to such a valuation. We find that the factual matrix of the instant case is, essentially, the same as that of Hatsun Milk Food. The decision in the said case has become final and binding for want of challenge by Revenue and hence the same has to be followed in the instant case. Accordingly, we hold that the clearances effected by HFC to HAPL during the period of dispute are liable to be assessed to duty on the basis of the price at which the former were selling identical goods during the same period at factory gate to other independent buyers, however small the proportion of such sales may be. The assessee, in this case, valued their goods only on this basis and paid duty accordingly. They are not liable to pay any more on those clearances. The demand of duty is, therefore, set aside. Once the demand of duty is set aside, penalties should follow suit and we vacate the same. The impugned order is set aside and the appeals stand allowed.
-
2004 (9) TMI 684 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... 77; 50,000/-. In the circumstances of the case, direction to deposit ₹ 2,50,000/- was not warranted, as part of the conditions for granting bail. 4. Hence, the direction to deposit ₹ 2,50,000/- is deleted and subject to this modification the order passed by the learned Single Judge granting bail is confirmed. 5. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
2004 (9) TMI 683 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ahajan, learned Standing counsel for the Revenue and Shri R.R. Agrawal, learned Counsel for respondent. It may be mentioned here that the question whether interest on excess levy sugar price is allowable deduction or not have been considered by this Court in Income-tax Reference No. 18 of 1983 decided on 25th August, 2004 which is inter parties. This Court after considering the provisions of Levy Sugar Price Equalization Fund Act, 1976 has held that liability of interest accrued after 7th April, 1976 and not before that date. Since liability for payment of interest amounting to ₹ 11,38,507 is relatable to the assessment year in question, the Tribunal was justified in allowing its deduction. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Court in the aforesaid decision. 4. In view of the foregoing discussions, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 682 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... intend to abrogate the provisions of the Architects Act embodying a complete code for architectural education, including qualifications of the Architects by enacting a general provision like section 10 of the AICTE Act. It is clear that the Parliament did have before it the Architects Act when it passed AICTE Act and Parliament never meant that the provisions of the Architects Act stand pro tanto repealed by section 10 of the AICTE Act. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the Architects Act are not impliedly repealed by the enactment of AICTE Act because in so far as the Architecture Institutions are concerned, the final authority for the purposes of fixing the norms and standards would be the Council of Architecture. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the order of the Deputy Director reducing the intake capacity of the petitioner college of architecture from 40 to 30. Rule is accordingly made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) with no order as to costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 681 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dvocate for the petitioner that a perusal of the said affidavit shows that there is nothing vague in the said affidavit and therefore, there is no need for the complainant to be called for the purpose of recording his examination-in-chief. The affidavit filed is sufficient and this in keeping with the spirit of the amendment which is to expedite the hearing and disposal of cases under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. 5. Be that as it may, sub-section (1) of 145 of the N.I. Act makes it obligatory on the courts to summon and examine the complainant on the application made by the accused. In view thereof, petition allowed. 6. Learned J.M.F.C., Pune, is directed to summon the complainant and record his examination-in-chief and thereafter, permit the accused-petitioner to cross-examine the complainant. The trial to be concluded within three months from the date of receipt of writ of this Order. With the above order, Rule made absolute. Petition to stand disposed of.
-
2004 (9) TMI 680 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... reliance was placed on Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Delhi Steel Industries. 1981 U.P.T.C. 154 and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s.Hindustan Aluminum Corporation Ltd. 1981 U.P.T.C. 531. Both these cases were decided under different facts and circumstances and have no relevancy to the facts involved in the present case. 14. The Tribunal in the case in hand has recorded a specific finding that on the facts, it is established that the goods in question were sold in its entirely within few hours by the depot as soon as it reached from Modi Nagar to Delhi. This is a finding of fact and cannot be challenged except on limited grounds such as perversity. The applicant was unable to point out any perversity in the said finding. In view of the said finding, no question of law is involved as all the three ingredients for holding transaction as inter-State transaction exists in the present case. 15. In the result, there is no merit in the revision. The revision is dismissed with costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tnam Verma v. Union of India (1985)ILLJ79SC and J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise 1996(86)ELT472(SC) . 12. This Court in Anil Sood (supra) did not lay down any law to the contrary. The contention raised on the part of Mr. Jain to the effect that in fact in that case an application for setting aside an award was made long after 30 days cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, a fact situation obtaining in one case cannot be said to be a precedent for another. See Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra -2004CriLJ1359 . Secondly, from a perusal of the said decision, it does not appear that any date of publication of the award was mentioned therein so as to establish that even on fact, the application was made 30 days after the expiry of publication of the award. Furthermore, the said decision appears to have been rendered on concession. 13. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
-
2004 (9) TMI 678 - COMPANY LAW BOARD CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... make their submissions before the valuer, who will take such submissions into consideration while arriving at the value of the shares. The valuation made by the valuer shall be binding on both the sides. Within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the valuation report, the respondents, on receipt of the original share certificates together with the blank transfer forms from the petitioners, pay the consideration for the shares at value determined by the valuer after deducting the sum of ₹ 40,000/-already paid by them in accordance with the order dated 09.05.2003 of this Bench and the present value of the two wheeler of the Company now in the custody of the petitioners. The Company will negotiate the lees payable to Shri Venkataraman and shall bear the same. With these directions, the company petition stands disposed of. No order as to cost. Liberty to apply in case of any difficulty in implementation of this order. Dated this the 30th day of September, 2004
-
2004 (9) TMI 677 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Award by the Arbitrator is aimed at expeditious resolution of the disputes rather than to leave the disputes unsettled or inconclusive on the expiry of the stipulated period. -Thus, looking at the matter from any angle, this Court is of the opinion that having regard to the entirety of the facts and circumstances, the petitioner will be deemed to have waived its right to object about the continuation of the proceedings or alleging the termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator simply on the ground that the time prescribed under Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement for making the Award had expired. 23. In the result, this petition being devoid of any merits, is hereby dismissed. Parties are directed to appear before the learned Arbitrator on 1st October, 2004 at 4.00 P.M. for further proceedings in accordance with law. As sufficient time has been consumed in these proceedings, learned Arbitrator is requested to conclude the proceedings and make his Award expeditiously.
-
2004 (9) TMI 676 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ot obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production, other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the evidence adduced by the respondent." 12. If we apply the principles laid down by this Court in the above stated case of Siri Niwas, it is clear that the Labour Court not having drawn any adverse inference, on facts and circumstances of this case the Industrial Court or the High Court could not have based an order of re-instatement solely on the basis of an adverse inference. 13. For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed. The impugned orders of the High Court as well as the Industrial Court are set aside and that of the Labour Court is restored. 14. These appeals are allowed.
-
2004 (9) TMI 675 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o not help the accused much to hold the complainant as 'money lender' under Karnataka Money Lenders Act. Consequently, none of the grounds urged for the petitioner/accused helps him in any way. No other point has been raised or argued. In the result, the revision petition is rejected. S.R.B.M and S.B.M, JJ. 16.9.2004 After pronouncement, it is submitted that the subordinate Courts are following in judgment in G. PREMDAS's case supra, which is held by this Court now as no more good law. Hence, office is directed to send the copies of this judgment to all the Courts concerned dealing with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. After pronouncement of the judgment, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has filed application under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence as the petitioner intends to challenge the pronouncement and on merits. Since no substantial question of law arises for consideration, the prayer for suspension of sentence is rejected.
-
2004 (9) TMI 674 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er coming to know of the said fact served the detention order in jail on 12.9.2002. A detention order which has been validly passed cannot be rendered invalid on account of the own conduct of the detenu of absconding and evading service. That apart, the ACJM had passed the order of remand only till 17.9.2002 and thereafter there was possibility of his being released or at any rate the petitioner could furnish another surety in place of one who had withdrawn his consent and thereafter he would have been released from custody. The bail granted to the petitioner in the case under Customs Act had not been cancelled. This is not a case where the petitioner may have been taken into custody in connection with some serious criminal case where there may be no immediate possibility of his getting bail. Therefore, even on merits, the ground urged in support of the writ petition has no substance. 23. For the reasons discussed above, the writ petition lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
........
|
