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2005 (4) TMI 609
... ... ... ... ..... l Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. That being the position, an award which has become final and binding can be regarded as constituting a valid foundation for the issuance of an Insolvency Notice under sub-section (2) of Section 9. ( 10. ) Under these circumstances, we hold that the Insolvency Notice issued under sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 can be sustained on the basis of arbitral award which has been passed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which has also become final and in view of the fact that in spite of affording sufficient opportunity, the debtors have not paid any money, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge is perfectly right in directing the debtors to pay at least ₹ 5 lakhs out of ₹ 14 lakhs due on or before 29-10-2004. There is no merit in the appeal; consequently the same is dismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
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2005 (4) TMI 608
... ... ... ... ..... vs. Hukam Singh (2002) 6 SCC 416 . This case does not fulfil the said conditions and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not excluded by reason of Sections 53 and 53A of the Act. The reliance placed by the Appellant on the decision of this Court in Math Sauna and others Vs. Kedar Nath alias Uma Shankar and others AIR 1981 SC 1878 is wholly erroneous. In that case the Court had held that the question whether properties in possession of a mahant were math or personal was to be decided on the basis of facts and circumstances of the case. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3740 of 2000 This appeal has been filed against certain observations made by the High Court in paragraph 50 of its judgment. In view of the dismissal of Civil Appeal 2395 of 2002, this appeal also fails and is dismissed accordingly.
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2005 (4) TMI 607
... ... ... ... ..... ect or inadequate or incomplete has been explained in the Explanation attached to section 143 of the Act and it is with reference to section 143(2). Therefore, the argument of the learned standing counsel that the exercise of power of passing the assessment order in question is referable to only section 143(1) and not to section 143(3) of the Act is not correct. The Income-tax Officer is not required to pass summary assess-ment order under section 143(1) if he is of the opinion that the return is incorrect or incomplete and in such circumstances he has to issue a notice under section 143(2) of the Act. 13. In view of the conclusion that the assessment order was under section 143(3) of the Act, the same was appealable under section 246(1) of the Act and the appeal was rightly entertained by the appellate authority. 14. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 606
... ... ... ... ..... thers reported in 2000 (115) E.L.T. 622 (Del.) 1999 (33) RLT 793 held that delay in depositing the tax and filing the mens rea is no place in such matters. In view of the above decision of the Delhi High Court and in view of the fact that Service Tax was depositing late. I find no infirmity in the impugned order whereby the penalty is imposed. However, taking into the facts and circumstances of the case as the finding of the Commissioner is that the appellant acted in a bona fide, though erroneous, belief that the Service Tax has been paid the same was collected from the customers and in view of the provisions of Section 80 of the Finance Act, the impugned order is sufficient to meet the ends of justice. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, I find no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue whereby the Revenue prayed for enhancement of the penalties. In these circumstances, the appeals are dismissed. (Dictated & pronounced in open Court on 27-4-2005)
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2005 (4) TMI 605
... ... ... ... ..... ernment of un-economical burden of taking over and running sick units but save the Government from social costs in terms of loss production and unemployment. With such objection in view, in order to facilitate the merger of sick industrial units with sound ones and as and by way of offering an incentive in that behalf, section 72A was introduced, where under, by a deeming fiction, the accumulated loss or unabsorbed depreciation of the amalgamating company is treated to be a loss or, as the case may be. The Revenue before the first appellate authority emphasised the application of section 72A of the Act, to the facts of the case. The First appellate authority and also the Tribunal failed to consider the scope and object and section 72A of the Act. Thus the Tribunal committed an error in treating the waiver of interest as not income of the assessee. 11) For the reasons stated above, we answer the question of law referred us in the negative and against and against the assessee.
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2005 (4) TMI 604
... ... ... ... ..... . This Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bareilly and another Versus M/S Radico Khaitan Ltd, Rampur reported in 2005 UPTC, 82 had considered this aspect and has held that where the amount of any interest free loan is sufficiently covered with the non interest bearing fund available with the assessee, the question of disallowance of interest on borrowed fund does not arise. This view has been followed by this Court in Income Tax Reference No. 89 of 1996 Commissioner of Income Tax, Meerut Versus M/S Prem Heavy Engineering works (P) Ltd., Meerut. We do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal which is based on the material on record and which is in conformity with the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bareilly and another Versus M/S Radico Khaitan Ltd, Rampur (supra). Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2005 (4) TMI 603
... ... ... ... ..... , namely, M/S Prem Engineering Works was fully covered from the interest free advances which was share capital, surplus and reserve with the respondent-assessee had. This Court in the Case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bareilly and another Versus M/S Radico Khaitan Ltd, Rampur reported in 2005 UPTC, 82 had considered this aspect and has held that where the amount of any interest free loan is sufficiently covered with the non interest bearing fund available with the assessee, the question of disallowance of interest on borrowed fund does not arise. It is also not the case of the revenue that any amount borrowed from the bank on which the liability for payment of interest free advance was there with the respondent-assessee who had not utilized for the purposes of business. Respectfully, following the aforesaid decision, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 602
... ... ... ... ..... and set aside. 8. It is necessary to record that despite the fact that the petitioner applied to the Tribunal seeking rectification of its order vide subsequent order dated 22nd June, 2004 (Annexure-F) the Tribunal has rejected the application stating that it has no authority to review. The petitioner had specifically pointed out to the Tribunal that its earlier order was required to be set aside as the same was a non-speaking order but the Tribunal has, unfortunately, failed to appreciate the same. As a natural corollary and consequence order dated 22nd June, 2004 (Annexure-F) can not be permitted to survive and is hereby quashed and set aside. 9. In the result, the petition is allowed. The appeal is restored to the file of CESTAT and CESTAT shall deal with the contentions raised by both the sides after giving adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides and dispose off the appeal afresh on merits. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 601
... ... ... ... ..... horized representative for the assessee, applies to this case also because in that case also the assessee was under a bona fide belief that the interest could not be realized from the sister concern and, as such, changed the accounting system from mercantile to cash. The Tribunal held that mere addition made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT (Appeals) is not a ground for levying the penalty under section 271(1)(c), hence for the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that in the existing facts and circumstances of the case of the assessee, the levy of the penalty under section 271(1)(c) was not exigible and so the CIT (Appeals) has rightly deleted the impugned penalty amounts levied by the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), in this regard is upheld and grounds of appeal taken by the revenue in their respective appeals, are rejected. 6. In the result, both the appeals filed by the revenue, are dismissed.
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2005 (4) TMI 600
... ... ... ... ..... ppeals on merits. Since the High Court has committed error by rejecting the appellants’ applications for substitution treating the same as additional parties and thereby rendering the appellants non-suited. We have no hesitation in setting aside the said orders and permit the appellants to come on record by way of substitution as prayed for. The High Court proceeded on a wrong premise that the appellants had made the application for addition of party whereas the application under consideration was for substitution as the owner had sold the suit property to the appellants and had no interest in the pending litigation. o p /o p In our opinion, the presence of the appellants was absolutely necessary since the appellants are the only persons who has got subsisting right, title and interest in the suit. The appellants are at liberty to contest the matter on merits. o p /o p Consequently, the appeals shall stand allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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2005 (4) TMI 599
... ... ... ... ..... n appointed, with the support of exercise of voting by the respondents 1 to 28, there would have been some justification in the contention of the petitioners that an investigation into the membership of the company is necessary. 9. Thus I find that the estate of late Mrs Birla, controlling majority of the shares in the company is intact and that the said estate has not brought about any change in the composition of the Board of Directors of the company. In other words it is the estate of late Mrs Birla controlling majority shares in the company, which is found to be materially interested in the affairs of the company. Who is entitled to control the estate is an issue before the High Court for a decision and provisions of Section 247(1A)cannot be invoked to determine this issue. Thus, on an over all appreciation of the facts of this case, I find that no case has been made out to order an investigation in terms of Section 247(1A) of the Act and as such I dismiss this petition.
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2005 (4) TMI 598
... ... ... ... ..... es to the said agent for the period commencing on and from the 16th day of July, 1997 and ending with the 16th day of October, 1998; or (ii) in relation to services provided by goods transport operator, every person who pays or is liable to pay the freight either himself or through his agent for the transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage for the period commencing on and from the 16th day of November, 1997 and ending with the 2nd day of June, 1998. shall be deemed to be a person liable to pay service tax, for such services provided to him, to the credit of the Central Government.” 6. In view of the above decision of the Tribunal, I find merit in the arguments of the appellant that the demand in respect of service tax is not sustainable and set aside. The Cross-objection filed by the appellants is allowed, demand and penalty are also set aside. As the demand is set aside, therefore, Revenue appeal has become infructuous. The appeal is dismissed as such.
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2005 (4) TMI 597
... ... ... ... ..... tion under Section 152 C.P.C. before the Special Sub-Judge, Ranchi claiming that he was entitled to the benefit conferred by Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Amendment Act. The learned Sub-Judge held that the said application was not maintainable and the said finding has been affirmed by the High Court. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court because a mere perusal of Section 152 makes it clear that Section 152 C.P.C. can be invoked for the limited purpose of correcting clerical errors or arithmetical mistakes in the judgment. The Section cannot be invoked for claiming a substantive relief which was not granted under the decree, or as a pretext to get the order which has attained finality reviewed. If any authority is required for this proposition, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Darshan Singh 2004(1)SCC 328. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 596
... ... ... ... ..... in. The said writ petition was filed having regard to the judgment of the Civil Court. A decree passed by the Civil Court must be executed in terms of the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The writ petition is not the appropriate remedy therefor. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. It, however, goes without saying that the First Respondent herein shall be entitled to execute the decree in accordance with law.
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2005 (4) TMI 595
... ... ... ... ..... is admitted. Tag with C.A. Nos. 4247-4248/2000.
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2005 (4) TMI 594
... ... ... ... ..... consideration as to its legality or is a decree granted by a court which has no jurisdiction to grant such decree, principles of res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC will not be attracted and it is open to the defendant in such suits to establish that the decree relied upon by the plaintiff is not a good law or court granting such decree did not have the jurisdiction to grant such decree. In the instant case, as noticed hereinabove, the present suit is filed for possession of the suit properties on the basis of a declaratory decree obtained earlier which is found to be not a lawful decree as per the law prevailing at present. Hence, the impugned judgment cannot be interfered with. Thus, examined from any angle, we do not find any merit in this appeal. We make it clear that we are not deciding the correctness of the judgment in the case of Teg Singh (supra) and Kesar Singh (supra), since it is not necessary for us to go into that question in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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2005 (4) TMI 593
... ... ... ... ..... ing the decision of the learned Single Judge would not make the decision less binding. See State of West Bengal vs. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee AIR 1966 SC 1061; Gorie Gouri Naidu vs. Thandrothu Bodemma AIR 1997 SC 808, 809 The counsel for Jagriti has referred us to several decisions viz. Gopal Upadhyaya and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. 1986 (Supp) SCC 501, Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 213, Deena Alias Deen Dayal & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. etc.etc. (1983) 4 SCC 645 and Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1990) 4 SCC 207. None of the decisions are apposite. They refer to the principle of precedent which is distinct from the principle of res judicata. A precedent operates to bind in similar situations in a distinct case. Res judicata operates to bind parties to proceedings for no other reason, but that there should be an end to litigation. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed without any order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 592
... ... ... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2005 (4) TMI 591
... ... ... ... ..... es of order dated April 19, 2005. The same is taken on record and marked ‘X’ for identification. 2. The petition, accordingly, stands disposed of in terms of the minutes of order with no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 590
... ... ... ... ..... the Income Tax Act, 1961. The purpose of the clause was in disallow a part of the allowance under that Section only when the entire deducting claimed could not be regarded as being relatable of exports.” 13.The Madras high Court without specifically referring to the provisions of Sec.82-HHC(3)(a) and (b) of the Act, has merely proceeded to decide the issue on the basis that the assessee is maintaining separate books of accounts of its export and domestic sales, and therefore, there was no warrant for disallowing any portioned export earnings pro-rata by invoking clause (b) of sub section (3) of Section 80-HHC of the Act, we do not subscribe the view expressed by the Madras High Court in view of the clear language employed in Sec.80-HHC(3)(a) and (b) of the Act. 14. In that view of the matter, the question of law refereed for our consideration and opinion requires to be answered in the negative i.e. in favour of the revenue and against the assessee Ordered accordingly.
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