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Showing 41 to 60 of 489 Records
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2006 (10) TMI 480 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and the renewals granted thereon from time to time, would remain unchanged. (b) As a consequence of the dismissal of the 2 revision petitions C.R.P.Nos.808 and 809 of 2006 filed by the Kangayam Party against the rejection of their review petitions R.P.Nos.2 and 3 of 2004 by the Appellate Board, the Kangayam Party s claim for a right to use the trade mark as a concurrent user is rejected. (c) As a consequence of the C.R.P.No.810 of 2006 and writ petition W.P.No.28352 of 2004 being allowed, (and the writ appeal getting dismissed) the amendment of the certificate of registration of the trade mark of the Tindivanam Party granted by the Registrar goes and the Tindivanam Party shall not be entitled to have renewal of the registration. (d) As a consequence of our finding with respect to the assignment made by the Delhi Party in favour of the Kangayam Party, they shall be entitled to the benefit of the assignment so long as the Delhi Party does not dispute the validity of the same.
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2006 (10) TMI 479 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n of their witnesses, Section 36 comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence, it is not open either to the trial Court itself or to a Court of Appeal or revision to go behind that order. In the case on hand, the document in question was marked exhibit with objection which leads to show that the objection as to admissibility on the ground that the instrument is not duly stamped has not been judicially determined but it was merely postponed with tentatively marking it as an "exhibit". In such circumstance, the said provision of Section 36, in my view is not attracted..." The said decision has also no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed no error in dismissing the revisional application as also the review application filed by Appellant herein. The appeal is therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee quantified at ₹ 5,000/-.
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2006 (10) TMI 478 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other court. “ Perusal of Section 42 of the Act shows that only purpose for which the legislature has enacted this provision is that in a case where several courts are competent to deal with the matter and if one of the parties approaches one of those Courts then by operation of Section 42 of the Arbitration Act jurisdiction of all the other courts which may otherwise be competent to entertain the dispute on the subject matter stands ousted. Section 42 of the Act is not even remotely connected with the question of power of the Court to review the order made under Section 34 of the Act without there being any power vested under the Act. For all these reasons the petition is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to pay cost of this petition to the respondents as incurred by the respondents.
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2006 (10) TMI 477 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g on business of moneylending, he cannot be termed as moneylender. Perusal of the plaint shows that there are no averments made in the plaint showing that though it is a loan, how it does not amount to money lending transaction. In any case, in my opinion, the defence put up by the defendants cannot be termed as a moonshining defence. The defendants are therefore granted unconditional leave to defend the suit. Written statement to be filed within four weeks from today. Summons for judgment is disposed off. . Parties to act on the copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate / Private Secretary as true copy.
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2006 (10) TMI 476 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -facie, defendants have built a good market. Balance of convenience lies in favor of the defendants. 40. Issues of the Business Transfer Agreement not subjected to payment of stamp duty and effect of subsequent assignment deed are not being dealt with by me as I am of the opinion that at this stage it is not necessary to consider the said issues. Similarly, I have not considered effect of impleadment sought by Unichem Laboratories Ltd. Needless to state, issue of interim relief has to be predicated on prima facie findings. 41. The two applications are disposed of vacating the ex-parte injunction granted on 6.9.2006. But on terms. Defendant shall file yearly statement of sale of LOPARIN. 42. The usual mantra. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. Observations made in the order are only prima facie findings to decide the fate of the interlocutory application. Final adjudication would be as per evidence led. 42. No costs.
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2006 (10) TMI 475 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icant and the same was being used for residential purposes by the applicant. He has also further submitted that nothing is on record to suggest that even any rent was paid by the company to the applicant. It is also further submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant that as such there are no dues of the secured creditors/ financial institutions and/or the workers by the company in liquidation. 3.Considering the above and considering the documentary evidence along with the application and considering the fact that the applicant is the owner of the property in question, the Official Liquidator is directed to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the room which was sealed by the Official Liquidator of property bearing No. A/21, Tulsi Park Society, B/h, Gyaneshwari Society, Arbudanagar, Odhav, Ahmedabad, to the applicant within a period of 10 days from today with proper inventory, if any. 4.With these, the present application is disposed of.
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2006 (10) TMI 474 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... ties before him in relation to the transfer of shares, the appointment and removal of the directors. (v) The petitioners group and the respondents group will appear before this Bench on 30.11.2006 at 2.30 P.M and submit their offer in closed covers indicating the price per share that they are willing to offer. The group which quotes the higher price should purchase the shares of the other group at that price and the consideration for the same shall be made within two months. If for any reason, the group quoting the higher price fails to purchase the shares of the other group within two months, the other group will have the right to purchase the shares of the defaulting group within the next two months at the price quoted by the other group. With the above directions, the company petition is disposed of, reserving the right to pass consequential order on 30.11.2006, when both groups will present their offer quoting their price per share in closed covers. No order as to costs.
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2006 (10) TMI 473 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on whatsoever. There is serious breach of the licensing provisions or building regulations which may call for extreme step of demolition. In our view, these are matters for the Municipal Commissioner to consider at the appropriate time. 35. Taking into consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and while deciding the matter, we make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits of the rival claims. The Authorities are entitled to examine and grant such relief as the appellants may be entitled to under the law. The respondent-Commissioner is directed to decide the matter absolutely on merits after affording opportunity to the first respondent herein within 3 months from the date of this judgment. During this period however, no demolition shall be made. We also make it clear that the appellant shall not put up any further construction or alter the construction already made. The civil appeal therefore stands allowed with the above direction. No costs.
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2006 (10) TMI 472 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... nd any winding up order against the Company on just and equitable grounds would unfairly prejudice the Company and its members. In view of my foregoing conclusions I am of the view that the Board of Directors of the Company shall comprise of the petitioner and the respondents 2 to 4. Accordingly, the members are at liberty to constitute the board of directors of the Company providing proportional representation to the petitioner and the respondent 2 to 4, which shall appropriately be incorporated in the articles of association of the Company. The board of directors constituted in terms of this order will manage the day-to-day affairs of the Company as per its articles without interference of any outsiders and take appropriate action on the issue of share certificates to the shareholders including the petitioner. Ordered accordingly. These reliefs are granted in order to do substantial justice between the parties. With these directions the company petition stands disposed of.
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2006 (10) TMI 471 - SUPREME COURT
Notice inviting tender issued by ’Maharashtra State Power General Co. Ltd.’ ('MAHAGENCO') - coal liaisoning, quality and quantity supervision for its Thermal Power Station - failed to fulfill the essential qualifications of the notice inviting tender - whether having regard to the fact that tender document issued on 03.03.2005, the requirement to engage minimum 100 persons in the previous year would mean financial year 2003-04 or 2004-05 - violation of Condition No.1.5(vii) - 'declared defaulter' - HELD THAT:- The expression ’declaration’ has a definite connotation. It is a statement of material facts. It may constitute a formal announcement or a deliberate statement. A declaration must be announced solemnly or officially. It must be made with a view ’to make known’ or ’to announce’. When a person is placed in the category of a declared defaulter, it must precede a decision. The expression ’declared’ is wider than the words ’found’ or ’made’. Declared defaulter should be an actual defaulter and not an alleged defaulter.
In this case, Appellant had made a counter claim. It had raised a bona fide dispute. It may be true that when the tender document was not furnished to Appellant by the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board, on the premise that he is a defaulter, it filed a writ petition. A learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court while passing an order recorded a finding that it was a defaulter in respect of the said demand.
We, however, at the cost of repetition would place on record that the other three bidders had clearly stated that they would not be able to match the rates of Appellant. It is also relevant to note here the categorical stand taken by MAHAGENCO before the High Court in its counter affidavit was that the contract had been awarded in favour of Appellant in its own interest. In regard to the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it stuck to its stand that a clear finding was arrived at therein that the observations which were incidentally made in the judgment should not come in the way of Appellant in securing other contracts.
Law operating in the field is no long res integra. The application of law, however, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not in dispute before us that there are only a few concerns in India who can handle such a large quantity of coal. Transportation of coal from various collieries to the thermal power stations is essential. For the said purpose, apart from transportation job, the contractor is required to see that coal of appropriate grade is supplied. Appellant herein is in business for the last 52 years. It had been taking part in contracts involving similar jobs in various parts of India. It had all along been quoting a low rate. According to it, despite the same it has been generating profits.
The employer concededly is not bound to accept a bid only because it is the lowest. It must take into consideration not only the viability but also the fact that the contractor would be able discharge its contractual obligations. It must not forget the ground realities. MAHAGENCO considered all aspects of the matter while accepting Appellant’s offer. In its counter affidavit, it categorically stated that Appellant would be able to perform the contractual undertaking even at such a low rate.
While saying so, however, we would like to observe that that having regard to the fact that a huge public money is involved, a public sector undertaking in view of the principles of good corporate governance may accept such tenders which is economically beneficial to it. It may be true that essential terms of the contract were required to be fulfilled. If a party failed and/or neglected to comply with the requisite conditions which were essential for consideration of its case by the employer, it cannot supply the details at a latter stage or quote a lower rate upon ascertaining the rate quoted by others.
Keeping in view a particular object, if in effect and substance it is found that the offer made by one of the bidders substantially satisfies the requirements of the conditions of notice inviting tender, the employer may be said to have a general power of relaxation in that behalf. Once such a power is exercised, one of the questions which would arise for consideration by the superior courts would be as to whether exercise of such power was fair, reasonable and bona fide. If the answer thereto is not in the negative, save and except for sufficient and cogent reasons, the writ courts would be well advised to refrain themselves in exercise of their discretionary jurisdiction.
What relief can be granted - The private respondents who had formed a cartel have successfully obtained the contract after the judgment of the High Court. Award of such contract although was subject to the decision of this appeal, this Court cannot ignore the fact that if Appellant is permitted to take over forthwith, supply of coal to the Thermal Power Station may be affected.
We, therefore, intend to give another opportunity to MAHAGENCO. It shall consider the offer of Appellant upon consideration of the matter afresh, as to whether it even now fulfils the essential tender conditions. If it satisfies the terms of the tender conditions, the contract may be awarded in its favour for a period of one year; but such contract shall take effect after one month from the date of the said agreement so as to enable the private Respondents herein to wind up their business. This order is being passed in the interest of MAHAGENCO as also the private Respondents herein.
Private Respondents, however, shall be paid their dues in terms of the offer made by them and accepted by MAHAGENCO. The appeal is allowed. All the Private Respondents shall pay and bear their cost of Appellant which is quantified at ₹ 50,000/- each.
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2006 (10) TMI 470 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... lders will sell their shares in favour of the respondents at a value to be determined by an independent valuer. Accordingly, M/s Deloitte Touche, Millers Road, Bangalore (Phone No. 22254610) will determine the fair market value of the shares of the Company as at 31.03.2005, being proximate to the date of company petition, after taking into account the submissions which may be made by both the parties. The valuation which may be made by the valuers shall be binding on them. Within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the valuation report, the respondents, on receipt of the original share certificates together with blank transfer forms from the petitioners, settle the consideration for the shares at the value arrived at by the valuers. The Company will negotiate the lee payable to the valuers and shall bear the same. With the above directions, the company petition stands disposed of. In view of this, all the interim orders in force are vacated. No order as to costs.
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2006 (10) TMI 469 - SUPREME COURT
Suit Filed for a declaration that the orders passed by the Board are null and void and for recovery of possession of the suit property - Application u/s 25 of the Wakf Act, 1954 ("the 1954 Act") for registering the Dargah as a Wakf - barred by limitation - private parties application for recall of the order was rejected by the Madhya Pradesh Wakf Board ("the Board") - power of Tribunal to determine disputes regarding wakfs - HELD THAT:- The property was dedicated to the Dargah, if any, a long time back. An application for registration of the said property as a Wakf property in terms of Section 25 of the 1954 Act, therefore, could have been filed only within the period specified thereunder, viz., nine months from the date of coming into force of the said Act. Registration of Wakfs whether created before or after the commencement of the said Act is governed by Section 25. A copy of the Wakf deed was also required to be enclosed with such an application. Sub- section (7) of Section 25 of the 1954 Act provides for making of an inquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the contents of the said application.
Title to a property has a definite connotation. It is not the same as user. The Tribunal failed to deal with the question as to whether the Board had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by Munna Bai being barred by limitation, insofar as whereas period of limitation provided for under sub-section (8) of Section 25 is merely three months, Munna Bai filed an application after 12 years after coming into force of the 1954 Act.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the Board itself could have initiated proceedings in terms of Section 27 of the 1954 Act but then no suo motu proceeding was initiated by it. No notice in this behalf has been issued.
If the proceeding was initiated by the Board for which it had no jurisdiction whatsoever, its order would be 'coram non judice'. Unfortunately, the attention of the Tribunal or the High Court was not drawn to this aspect of the matter.
If the property in question was not a Wakf property and the order registering the property as a Wakf property was invalid in law, the matter might have ended there. But, the Tribunal has gone a step further and directed framing of scheme.
The Tribunal had been constituted for the purposes mentioned in Section 83 of the 1995 Act. It is an adjudicatory body. Its decision is final and binding but then it could not usurp the jurisdiction of the Board. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision which empowers the Tribunal to frame a scheme. In absence of any power vested in the Tribunal, the Tribunal ought to have left the said function to the Board which is statutorily empowered therefor. Where a statute creates different authorities to exercise their respective functions thereunder, each of such authority must exercise the functions within the four corners of the statute.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that the matter requires fresh consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. We direct accordingly. Orders of the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside. The appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned directions. The Tribunal is directed to consider the matter afresh as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from date.
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2006 (10) TMI 468 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... available on barge in Import General Manifest (IGM) as required under Import Manifest (Vessels) Regulation, 1971 results into evasion of duty by wilful suppression of facts and thereby attracting penal provisions under Section 114A of Customs Act, 1962? While dismissing the appeals, the High Court held that “Counsel for the appellant has failed to show that diving equipments are forming part of the stores as per Section 2(38) of the Customs Act, 1962. No substantial question of law arises. The Appeals and Civil Applications stand dismissed.”
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2006 (10) TMI 467 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the same was incorporated in the main IT Act. 7. As regards the order of this Court in Roshan Singh Makker's case (supra), we find that provisions of Finance Act, 2000 were not brought to the notice of the Tribunal nor the same were brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel for the Revenue in that case and do not find mention in the order of the Tribunal which has been extracted in the order of this Court. This Court only interpreted the effect of proviso to s. 113 added w.e.f. 1st June, 2002, without taking into account the provisions of the Finance Act, 2000 which has been relied upon in the impugned order. The said order cannot, thus, be taken to be an authority for the proposition that irrespective of a provision in the Finance Act, levy of surcharge was not permissible on the ground that proviso to s. 113 of the Act was added only w.e.f. 1st June, 2002. 8. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed.
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2006 (10) TMI 466 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Aggarwal, Advocate ORDER No substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2006 (10) TMI 465 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the present case the opportunity to cross examine Sri Mohd. Shamim Khan was afforded but the appellants did not avail. 13. So far as additions under section 69C of the Act are concerned, we find that in view of the specific finding recorded by the Assessing Authority, which has been upheld in appeal by the Tribunal that the alleged gifts were purchased by the appellants after paying 10 per cent commission, the additions have rightly been made under section 69C of the Act. The question Nos. 3, 7 and 8, therefore, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law. 14. So far as the question No. 9 is concerned, we find that the Tribunal has held that the levy of interest is consequential. In any event the learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to disprove the levy of interest. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that no substantial question of law arises in the present appeals. Thus, all the appeals are dismissed in limine.
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2006 (10) TMI 464 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... However, she set aside the penalty imposed on the company as well as its proprietor. Hence the Revenue is in appeal. 3. The contention of the Revenue is that the penalty amount should have been confirmed either on the proprietor or on the company as per established principles of law but cannot be imposed on both of them. It is well settled law that the penalty can be imposed on the assessee or the proprietor of the firm but not on both of them. Therefore, the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this aspect is not tenable and needs indulgence of this Tribunal in correcting the same. Therefore, minimum penalty of ₹ 10,000/- (ten thousand) imposed on the proprietor of the firm is confirmed while setting aside the penalty on the company under Section 11AC of Central Excise Act read with Section 14A of the Customs Act. In the result, Revenue appeal is allowed while modifying the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) to the above extent. (Pronounced in Court)
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2006 (10) TMI 463 - SUPREME COURT
Partition Suit - Execution of sale deed - Grand-father as lineal heirs - lawful heirs entitled to the bequests under the Will - Order of permanent injunction the defendants, their agents, servants from demolishing, altering, constructing or reconstructing the suit schedule property - grant cost of the suit - bungalow which was the subject mater of the suit was demolished by Appellants - HELD THAT:- Plaintiffs who are the daughters of the original defendant No. 1, in law was not entitled to inherit their father's share in the properties but for the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, which brought statutory change. Admittedly, by reason of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, they became heirs of their father in terms whereof the sister's share is equal to that of the brothers. If they were to be excluded, it would have been said so in the Will.
The decision of this Court in N. Krishnammal [1979 (4) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT] is binding on this Court. The meaning of the expression "heir" in the context of the Hindu Succession Act has been considered therein. The expression "heir" would mean a legal heir. In construing a document, this Court cannot assign any other meaning. A document as is well-known must be construed in its entirety. Although some parts thereof should not be read in isolation, the contents of Clause (7) of the Will are really important. It may be true that in the last part of the Will, the propounder while placing his sons adduced the words 'Putra Poutra'. But the same cannot control the unequivocal expression contained in Clause (7) thereof.
We fail to understand as to how in the year 1975 the sale deed could be executed. The original defendant No. 1 knew the implication of Will. He was aware that an embargo had been created in his right to transfer the property to any other person. In view of the injunction contained in the said document he could not have alienated the property. He could only be in enjoyful possession thereof. The original defendant No. 1, therefore, thought that if his son is impleaded as one of the executant of the document; probably the embargo created under the Will would not come in his way. In law, he was not right there. His son also did not inherit the property as he was alive. In terms of Clause (7) of the Will, the question of his son's inheriting the property from the original defendant No.1 did not arise. Mr. Bhat is correct in his submission that the suit was pre-mature as no cause of action for the suit arose for the plaintiffs for obtaining a decree to set aside the deed of sale dated 3.12.1975.
The cause of action arose on the death of the original defendant No.1 which took place during pendency of the suit. If the cause of action arose during pendency of the suit and if having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the suit keeping in view the subsequent event could not have been dismissed on the ground that it was barred under the law of limitation, we are of the opinion that it would not be proper for us to interfere with the impugned judgment.
An appeal is in continuation of the suit. The appellate court in view of Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure may take into consideration subsequent events with a view to mould the relief. The High Court, therefore, could not be said to have acted illegally and wholly without jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment.
The son of the original defendant No.1 was not a party but he is a party before us now. He supports the plaintiffs but then he himself did not challenge the deed of sale. So far as his interest in the property is concerned, the same may be claimed by the appellants herein having regard to the principles contained in Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is, therefore, not a case where Articles 59 and 60 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act would apply.
Submission of Mr. Lalit that his clients are bona fide purchasers is not of much significance in this case. If the deed of sale executed by the original defendant No.1 and the Respondent No.3 is void and thus, not binding upon the plaintiffs-respondents, the consequences therefor would ensue. What would be the effect of the sale deed vis-`-vis the Respondent No.3, as we have noticed hereinbefore, would be different having regard to the provisions contained in Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the event a partition suit is filed, which property shall be allowed in the share of the Respondent No.3 is not a matter wherewith this Court's attention is required to be engaged. Such question shall appropriately fall for consideration in appropriately constituted suit.
Thus, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the constitution of India. This appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (10) TMI 462 - SUPREME COURT
Recovery of dues - Validity Of clause 21A of the terms and conditions of Supply could incorporated - Consumer defaulted in paying the consumption charges - consequent disconnection of supply - Advertisement for the undertaking - offered for sale on "as is where is basis" - Possession given by the Financial Corporation - Seeking mandatory injunction directing the appellant- Company to give a fresh electric connection to the first respondent without insisting on the clearing of the dues of the prior owner of the premises - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the decision in Isha Marbles [1995 (2) TMI 442 - SUPREME COURT] cannot be applied to strike down the condition imposed and the first respondent has to make out a case independent on the ratio of Isha Marbles (supra), though it can rely on its ratio if it is helpful, for attacking the insertion of such a condition for supply of electrical energy. This Court was essentially dealing with the construction of Section 24 of the Electricity Act in arriving at its conclusion. The question of correctness or otherwise of the decision in Isha Marbles (supra) therefore does not arise in this case especially in view of the fact that the High Court has not considered the question whether clause 21A of the terms and conditions incorporated is invalid for any reason.
Thus, we think that the proper course to adopt is to set aside the judgments of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench and remit the writ petition filed by the first respondent to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The first respondent would be free to amend its writ petition including the prayers therein and in the case of such an amendment the appellant would be entitled to file an additional statement in opposition. The writ petition will be considered afresh by the High Court in the light of what we have stated above.
It is seen that after the High Court allowed the writ petition, the connection was restored to the first respondent in obedience to the writ, even though subsequently, this Court stayed the operation of the judgment of the High Court by its order dated 5.7.2006. It is now brought to our notice that a fresh connection has been provided to the first respondent in the light of the direction in the judgment under appeal without collecting the arrears that were due from M/s L.L.C. Steel Pvt. Ltd. Strictly, in view of the fact that we have set aside the judgment of the High Court, the first respondent should lose the benefit of the fresh connection. But considering that the first respondent is an industrial undertaking and taking note of the plea that investments have been made by it to make the unit workable, we think that it will be appropriate to direct the first respondent to deposit a portion of the amount in arrears as a condition for continuance of the supply to it by the appellant on payment of regular monthly bills as per the terms and conditions between the parties.
We, therefore, direct that if the first respondent pays to the appellant, without prejudice to its contentions in the writ petition, a sum of ₹ 25 lakhs (rupees twenty five lakhs) within a period of six weeks from today, the fresh connection given to the first respondent will not be disconnected by the appellant, until the writ petition is disposed of afresh by the High Court pursuant to this order of remand. In case the High Court accepts the challenge of the first respondent to clause 21A as inserted in the terms and conditions of supply, the appellant will refund the sum of ₹ 25 lakhs with six per cent interest thereon from the date of payment by the first respondent till the date of its return by the appellant. In case the writ petition is dismissed by the High Court, the appellant would be entitled, at the volition of the first respondent, to adjust the amount of ₹ 25 lakhs towards the dues claimed from the previous consumer, M/s L.L.C. Steel Pvt. Ltd. and maintain the fresh connection given to the first respondent on it fulfilling its obligations in terms of clause 21A and act on that basis.
If the first respondent, does not desire to have a power connection based on clause 21A of the Terms and Conditions of Supply, the appellant will refund the sum of ₹ 25 lakhs to the first respondent without interest within two months of the judgment of the High Court and would disconnect the power connection now given. Of course, if the first respondent fails to deposit the sum of ₹ 25 lakhs within the time fixed by us, the appellant would be free to disconnect the power supply granted to the first respondent pursuant to the judgment of the High Court which we have set aside herein and take all steps that may be permissible in law for recovery of the amounts due.
The appeal is allowed. The High Court is requested to expeditiously dispose of the writ petition afresh according to law and in the light of the observations contained herein.
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2006 (10) TMI 461 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... CIT, (2005) 277 ITR 341, wherein following the judgment of Delhi high Court in CIT v. KC Sahni (HUF), (2000) 246 ITR 299, it was held that prior to amendment in the year 1988, the benefit of Section 54 of the Act was not available to the assessee, which is HUF. Similar view has been expressed by various High Courts in Kanhyalal and Ramswaroop v. CIT, (1984) 149 ITR 157 (MP), Shrigopal Rameshwardas v. Addl.Commissioner of Income Tax, MP, (1979) 119 ITR 980 (MP), Smt.Rampyaribai Narayandas v. CIT, MP, Bhopal, (1984) 147 ITR 223 (MP), Anam Venkata Krishna Reddy v.CIT, (1988) 172 ITR 425 (AP), Ravindra Gunvantlal Shah v. CIT, (1994) 208 ITR 995 (Guj.) and Pravin Chand Mohin Kumar v. CIT, (1994) 208 ITR 11 (Raj.). Concurring with the view already expressed by this Court in Raghunath Dass Sethi's case (supra). None appears for the assessee. Following the above view, we answer the question in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly.
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