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2006 (4) TMI 506
Development of children who are in jail with their mothers, who are in jail either as undertrial prisoners or convicts.
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2006 (4) TMI 505
Whether, according to the true delineated scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact?
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2006 (4) TMI 504
... ... ... ... ..... uty. By a bare reading of this proviso, even fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts would not be sufficient to invoke this proviso, unless the fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts had been done with intent to evade payment of duty. There is finding of the authorities below that no loss had incurred to the Department and the excise duty had been paid in full. 8. For these reasons, we do not find there is any scope for this Court to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. 9. The Central Excise Appeal is accordingly dismissed. 10. CERC (Sr) Nos. 59569 of 2003 and 27637 of 2004 Since the Tribunal while passing the impugned order in CEA No. 13 of 2006 followed the order passed by it which is impugned in these Reference Cases and as CEA No. 13 of 2006 is dismissed for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, these Central Excise Reference Cases are also liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 503
... ... ... ... ..... J. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 502
Whether disciplinary action could be taken against the respondent employee on the ground that the employee had been found to be grossly negligent while discharging quasi-judicial functions?
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2006 (4) TMI 501
... ... ... ... ..... . Union of India 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.) 1997 (5) SCC 536 . The three-Judge Bench which considered the correctness of the aforesaid two decisions (of three-Judge Bench) has in Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-II v. Allied Photographics India Ltd. 2004 (166) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) 2004 (4) SCC 34 held that the judgment in Sinkhai Synthetics’s case (supra) was per incuriam para 14 at page 52 and approved the decision in the later case, i.e., TVS Suzuki’s case (supra). The three-Judge Bench has also taken the same view, as was taken by the Tribunal, to the effect that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable to the provisional assessment even after the finalisation thereof. The point in issue in the present case is, thus, squarely covered by the three-Judge Bench decision in Allied Photographics’ case 2004 (166) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) 2004 (4) SCC 34 . In view of this, the appeals are dismissed and the order passed by the Tribunal is affirmed. No costs.
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2006 (4) TMI 500
Whether the detenue was a non-resident Indian and, therefore, the detention order could not have been passed against him?
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2006 (4) TMI 499
... ... ... ... ..... CE, Bangalore 2003 (158) E.L.T. 714 (Tri.-Del.). 2. We find that the Tribunal decision in the case of Micronova Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. stands confirmed by the Larger Bench decision of the Tribunal in the case of Micropure Parenterals Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Mumbai-II 2005 (71) RLT 129 (CESTAT-LB) 2005 (190) E.L.T. 23 (T.-LB.) wherein Multivitamin Tablets were held to classifiable under Heading 3003.10 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Inasmuch as, the issue stands decided by the above decision of the Tribunal’s Larger Bench, by following the same, we reject the Revenue’s appeal. (Dictated in Court)
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2006 (4) TMI 498
... ... ... ... ..... y condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed
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2006 (4) TMI 497
... ... ... ... ..... is undertaken for the purpose of not for imposition of anti-dumping duty but to see whether the revocation of such anti-dumping duty, dumping would increase and whether the domestic industry will suffer. 9.7 From the record produced by the authority we find that the authority has correctly worked out the constructed normal value of the dumped article in accordance with the rules and the conventions followed, and came to a valid conclusion that the anti-dumping duty has to be continued, albeit, less than the first definitive anti-dumping duty. The calculation of the constructed normal value by the authority cannot be faulted with, as this was the conclusion any prudent man could arrive at, given the circumstances and information on record. Final order 10. For the foregoing reasons, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants against the impugned notification are misconceived and cannot be accepted. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. (Pronounced on 4-5-2006)
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2006 (4) TMI 496
Whetehr Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act would be applicable only in a case of personal search of the accused and not when it is made in respect of some baggage like a bag, article or container etc. which the accused at the relevant time was carrying?
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2006 (4) TMI 495
... ... ... ... ..... hta, advocate for the petitioners prays for withdrawal of the writ petition. 2. We accept his statement and allow the writ petition to be withdrawn. Rule is discharged. No costs.
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2006 (4) TMI 494
Whether the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court upholding the view of the learned Single Judge directing the appellants to appoint respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the ’workman’) in an appropriate vacancy in terms of Clause 4 of the Settlement dated 29.1.1979 valid?
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2006 (4) TMI 493
Whether the appellant could not have taken recourse to clause (b) of the proviso appended to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India?
Whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated?
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2006 (4) TMI 492
Whether in this case there has been a gross violation of principles of natural justice?
Held that:- The pattern of charges against the Appellant, categorically point out to the fact that the Appellant had been misbehaving with the Regional Managers and other officers, as well as the customers not only while he was posted in different branches.The validity of the disciplinary proceeding and/or justifiability thereof on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised by the Appellant before any forum. It was not his case either before the Appellate Authority or before the High Court that by reason of any delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding he had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. It may be true that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a finding that enquiry proceeding was vitiated in the event it is shown that by reason thereof the delinquent officer has been prejudiced, but no such case was made out.
It is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed
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2006 (4) TMI 491
Prayer made in the applications to appoint a suitable person to act as the sole arbitrator in place of the nominated arbitrator under Clause 6 of the Deed of Reserve and Charge of Property dated 22nd February, 2002 (for short "the Deed") and to refer the disputes between the parties to him
Held that:- Mr. Manabu Nonoguchi was appointed as an arbitrator by the parties. Normally, the parties are the best judge for deciding as to who will be the person capable and competent to adjudicate the disputes raised considering his experience, knowledge and competence in a particular trade or business to which the disputes relate and taking these factors into account the parties have appointed Mr. Manabu Nonoguchi as an Arbitrator, in case a dispute arises between the parties. Unfortunately, for some reason, the named arbitrator refused to act as an arbitrator. However, during the pendency of these arbitration applications, I.A. supported by affidavit has been filed stating that the named arbitrator is ready and willing to take up the arbitration. Considering this fact, it would be appropriate if Mr. Manabu Nonoguchi, Area Manager, Sales Department, Murata Machinery Ltd., Textile Machinery Department, Osaka 541-0041, Japan is appointed as an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes arising between the parties. I, accordingly, appoint him as Arbitrator. He shall take up the steps in accordance with law and shall make all possible endeavour to decide the disputes expeditiously. Arbitration Application Nos. 8 and 9 of 2005 stand disposed of.
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2006 (4) TMI 490
Whether the applicants fulfill the eligibility criteria and are otherwise suitable for grant of licence under the Act and the Rules?
Held that:- The period for which licences had been granted is over. For all practical purposes, the State and the licensees have succeeded in their attempts to defeat the purpose for which the writ petitions were filed by the writ petitioners - Respondents. We must express our dismay that despite our directions, the applications filed by the Appellants had not been scrutinized minutely which should have been done. The State of Chhattisgarh, we are not very sure, whether was aware of its constitutional duties and functions. It seems to have been more concerned with raising of revenue. To that extent it had succeeded, as the High Court in the first round of litigation despite directing a fresh scrutiny of the applications did not direct refund of the huge amount collected by it by way of application fees. We would, however, expect the State and its officers to scrupulously follow the constitutional mandate in future. It was with this intention we have dealt with these matters at some detail.
We hope and trust that the State of Chhattisgarh and its authorities would not commit the same mistakes in the coming years keeping in mind the mandate of Article 47 of the Constitution of India and scrupulously observe the rules for disposal of liquor shops.
With the aforementioned observations and directions, these appeals are allowed.
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2006 (4) TMI 489
... ... ... ... ..... per rules. In case of failure to provide the vehicle, the applicant was liable for penal action the payment was on kilometer basis. The aforesaid terms of the contract clearly shows the effective control over the vehicles always remain with the applicant and has never been passed on to the companies. All the legal consequences arising from the use of the vehicle were the responsibility of the applicant. At no point of time, there was a complete exclusion of legal rights to use such vehicles by the transferor. Thus, the present case on the aforesaid facts does not fall under the transfer of right to use the goods, in view of the law laid down by the apex court in the aforesaid cases. For the reasons stated above, the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. In the result, all the revisions are allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside. The Tribunal is directed to pass appropriate order under section 11(8) of the Act. However, there shall be no order as to cost.
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2006 (4) TMI 488
... ... ... ... ..... lly concur. We in this connection also refer to another Bench decision of this court in West Coast Industrial Gases v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) 1996 KLJ (Tax Cases) 152 where the court was dealing with the application for stay of imposing penalty under section 45A(3) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The court held that when application for stay of penalty is being considered the authorities may have a slightly different approach from an application for stay of assessment proceedings. In any view, so far as the present case is concerned, we are dealing with an assessment proceeding and hence the principle as such may not apply. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any reason to hold that the appellate authority has committed any error in not granting a complete stay while passing exhibit P10 order. We therefore find no ground to interfere with the judgment of the learned single judge. Appeal lacks merits and the same would stand dismissed.
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2006 (4) TMI 487
... ... ... ... ..... ssioner did not act with proper application of mind. He opened his order with a recital that the suo motu revision was under section 80 of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994, although he was considering a case under the 1941 Act. He also mechanically signed a notice dated September 19, 2000. Inapplicable parts were not scored out and the notice did not make any sense. It is the incumbent duty of an officer issuing a notice to see that the notice is properly written and conveys the real meaning and purpose of the notice before he puts his signature thereon. In view of the fact that the requisite satisfaction as required under section 20A(1) was not reached in course of any proceeding under the 1941 Act, initiation of a penalty proceeding under the same section cannot be sustained. Accordingly the penalty proceeding under section 20A of the 1941 Act and the impugned penalty order and the demand notice are all quashed and set aside. B.K. MAJUMDAR (Technical Member). - I agree.
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