Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 623 Records
-
2007 (1) TMI 612
Maintainability Of Suit - Arbitration Agreement - businesses of export - predecessor-in-interest - non-payment of the amount under the two dishonoured cheques - application dismissed opining that no dispute existed between the parties for reference to an arbitration - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the appellant’s claim is not confined to the question regarding non-payment of the amount under the two dishonoured cheques. Thus, there existed a dispute between the parties. Had the dispute between the parties been confined thereto only, the same had come to an end.
Appellant evidently has taken before us an inconsistent stand. If he was satisfied with the payment of the said demand drafts, he need not pursue the suit. It could have said so explicitly before the High Court. It cannot, therefore, be permitted to approbate and reprobate.
Section 8 of the 1996 Act is peremptory in nature. In a case where there exists an arbitration agreement, the court is under obligation to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums [2003 (7) TMI 493 - SUPREME COURT] and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited [2006 (8) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT] No issue, therefore, would remain to be decided in a suit. Existence of arbitration agreement is not disputed. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was right in referring the dispute between the parties to arbitration.
Thus, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs.
-
2007 (1) TMI 611
... ... ... ... ..... the defendant were of the nature which could have been raised during the course of cross-examination of the witness and the cross-examination ought not to have been refused by the defendant. In my view, the defendant by its conduct, has disentitled itself to its right of cross-examining the witness. The defendant must be taken to have acted at its own peril. Due to the conduct of the defendant, this court has had to put aside the other urgent and pressing matters since a foreign witness is waiting to be cross-examined before he leaves India. I, therefore, allow as the last and the only opportunity to defendant to cross-examine the aforesaid plaintiff's witness today itself at 2 P.M. before the Joint Registrar/Local Commissioner subject to the payment of ₹ 50,000/- as costs. The Joint Registrar may conduct the cross-examination today itself and if necessary, tomorrow as well. The matter be placed before the Joint Registrar today at 2 P.M. for recording of evidence.
-
2007 (1) TMI 610
... ... ... ... ..... Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the Assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 80 HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961?? It may be noted that till date the Export House Certificate has not been issued to the exporter through whom the goods were exported by the Assessee. Paper books be filed in accordance with the High Court Rules.
-
2007 (1) TMI 609
... ... ... ... ..... d for our consideration - Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the sum of ₹ 3,15,31,750/- is not taxable in the hands of the assessee being a capital receipt?? Paper book be filed in accordance with the High Court Rules.
-
2007 (1) TMI 608
... ... ... ... ..... adopted a recalcitrant attitude and have made up their mind to move out of the company or get their share as per their own calculations. In these circumstances, though no case of oppression has been made out, I find that the petitioners will not be able to contribute anything to the functioning of the company and would rather be impeding the company's progress, I hold that the petitioners' hereby move out of the company on receiving fair valuation of their shares to be done by the independent valuer to be appointed by the consensus of the parties in the next Board Meeting to be held within a month of receipt of this order. The valuer so appointed by the Board shall be directed to make a valuation of the shares of the petitioners within a month of giving such assignment to him/them. 12. With the above directions, I dispose of this petition. No order as to cost. All interim orders stand vacated. All Company Applications made in this Company Petition stand disposed of.
-
2007 (1) TMI 607
... ... ... ... ..... n such advances on account of interest-free advances. 12. This is also the ratio of the decision in the case of Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills vs. Asstt. CIT (supra) and CIT vs. Sridev Enterprises (supra) wherein it was held, inter alia, that where the AO had failed to establish any nexus between funds borrowed on interest and amount invested in the plot, there was no justification for making any disallowance out of interest expenditure. 13. Then, where no nexus is established between the borrowed funds and the interest-free advances, no disallowance can be made, as held in Bharat Motors (supra). Similar is the ratio of Shree Digvijay Cement Co. Ltd. (supra), R.D. Joshi vs. CIT (supra) and Smt. Tara Devi vs. ITO (supra). 14. In view of above, it cannot be said that the learned CIT(A) has, in any manner, erred in deleting the addition made by the AO. Accordingly, the grievance raised by the Department is rejected. 15. In the result, the appeal of the Department stands dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 606
... ... ... ... ..... nteriors Pvt.Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore & Anr. reported in 2006 (11) Scale 78 and in particular paragraph 17 of the said Judgment. In view of the above Judgment, the order passed by the Assessing Officer and as affirmed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai requires re-consideration. We, therefore, remit the matter to the Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai-III for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appeals stands allowed accordingly. Both parties are at liberty to place additional documents before the Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai-III.
-
2007 (1) TMI 605
... ... ... ... ..... turer shall be allowed refund of such amount is an unlimited expression and can not be narrowed or curtailed down by the department authorities," 7. On examining the facts and circumstances of the case and applying the ratio in the aforesaid decision, I am of the considered opinion that both authorities below have erred in disallowing the refund claim made by the appellants. Claim has to be sanctioned on account of export of goods for which the credit can not be adjusted in the shape of duty payment, because the export of goods are duty free. In a such situation, there is no other alternative for the appellants, to claim their refund in cash. The authorities concerned can not circumvent the facts and circumstances of the case, while applying the Cenvat Credit Rules and turned down the reliance on applicable decisions. The issue is squarely covered by the aforesaid decisions and all the appeals are allowed while setting aside the impugned order with consequential relief.
-
2007 (1) TMI 604
... ... ... ... ..... . A perusal of the circular particularly Clause (e) of paragraph 4 shows that even if a machinery is attached to the earth, it can be considered as goods if it can be dismantled without substantial damage to its components. Paragraph 4(e) of the circular reads as under - “4(e) If items assembled or erected at site and attached by foundation to earth cannot be dismantled without substantial damage to its components and thus cannot be reassembled, then the items would not be considered as moveable and will, therefore, not be excisable goods. xx xx xx xx” 9. There is no evidence on record to show that the machinery imported by the petitioner could not be dismantled without any substantial damage to its components or that it could not be reassembled. 10. In the absence of any evidence in this regard, we cannot go into the correctness of the decision taken by the Tribunal. 11. No substantial question of law arises for consideration. Dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 603
... ... ... ... ..... 3. This Court in the case of G.C. Mehrotra vs. Deputy Collector (Collection) Sales Tax, reported in (1997) U.P. Tax Cases page 1217 has held that recovery cannot be made from the personal assets of the Directors. The said view was also followed by this Court in the case Bheekhu Ram Jain vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2001) U.P. Tax Cases page 364. The Circular dated 15.09.1998 was quashed by the Court by the judgment and order dated 9.8.2000 passed in the case of Bheekhu Ram Jain vs. State of U.P. and others (Supra). 4. We therefore, dispose off the writ petition with a direction to the respondents not to recover the arrears of tax and outstanding dues of the Company from the personal assets of the petitioner. However, it will be open for the respondents to recover the arrears of trade tax due against the Company from the assets/property of M/s Bhagirathi lron & Steel Private Limited as well from Directors, who are in possession of the assets of the Company.
-
2007 (1) TMI 602
... ... ... ... ..... al chief standing counsel appearing for the respondents in the case of sri ram shyam shukla and others vs. Assistant collector. Collection trade tax (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The circular dated 15-9-1998, a copy which has been annexed as annexure-1 and the notice dated 26-11-1998, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure 4 to the writ petition, so far as it relates to the petitioner are against the provisions of the trade tax act. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and a writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the circular dated 15-9-1998 issued by the commissioner, trade tax, u. P. Lucknow, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure 1 and the notice dated 26-11-1998, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure 4 to the writ petition. However, it will be open for the respondents to proceed against the company to recover the outstanding dues. In these circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2007 (1) TMI 600
... ... ... ... ..... Rajesh K. Sharma, Adv., Ms. Shalu Sharma,Adv. O R D E R The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 599
... ... ... ... ..... recorded by the Departmental authorities and thus enable the assessee to claim the benefit out of a transaction which has not been found to be genuine. 13. Before parting with this matter, we may mention that the decision in the case before us turns essentially on the facts which, according to us, are sufficient to establish the non-genuine nature of the transaction. Decisions and authorities will be helpful only when the transaction is found to be genuine. As stated above, the essential features of trade or investment are lacking in the dividend-stripping transaction undertaken by the assessee in the case before us. It is a well-settled proposition of law that bogus, sham or non-genuine transactions cannot form the basis for claiming deduction. They have to be ignored and this is what the Departmental authorities have done. In our view, the decision rendered by the ld. CIT(A) deserves to be confirmed which accordingly is confirmed. Appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 598
... ... ... ... ..... ing Officer assessed the income as salary income and then for the next 10 assessment years, the income was assessed as business income. The Tribunal, however, found this to be salary income. Thereafter, again for the next two assessment years, the income was assessed as salary income and then for the next two assessment years as business income and again for the next three assessment years as salary income. We have been deprecating this attitude of the Revenue of not showing any consistency in the orders passed by the Assessing Officer. This flip-flop not only causes harassment to the Assessee but also adds to the work of this Court for no good reason. This being the state of affairs, we do not think that this appeal raises any substantial question of law that would warrant our consideration particularly since the Assessing Officer as well as the CIT(A) have in the recent past taken the view that the income of the Assessee is salary income and not business income. Dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 597
... ... ... ... ..... 003 based on the principles governing Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC, in which case the defence based on this rule must be deemed to have been waived by the respondent and therefore, it is not open to the respondent at this belated stage to question maintainability of the present company petition on the strength of Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC. It cannot further be said at this preliminary stage whether the petitioner is engaged in vexatious and bogus litigation and therefore, the decision in T. Aravindanam v. T.V. Satyapal (supra) will be of little assistance to the respondent. In the circumstance, there is no merit in the present contention of the respondent based on Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC. Accordingly, the issue is answered in the negative. To expedite the disposal of the present company petition, the respondent is directed to file counter to the main petition by 12.02.2007 and rejoinder, if any, to be filed by 28.02.2007. The matter will be heard on 07.03.2007 at 2.30 P.M.
-
2007 (1) TMI 596
Maintainability Of Petition - Validity of scaling system adopted by the Commission - recruitment to the posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division) - 'scaled marks' in the written (Main) examination and the marks awarded in the interview - valuation of the answer- scripts by 'scaled marks' - meritorious students being ignored, and less meritorious students being awarded higher marks and selected - violating the fundamental rights of the candidates - HELD THAT:- When the issue is re-examined and a view is taken different from the one taken earlier, a new ratio is laid down. When the ratio decidendi of the earlier decision undergoes such change, the final order of the earlier decision as applicable to the parties to the earlier decision, is in no way altered or disturbed. Therefore, the contention that a writ petition under Article 32 is barred or not maintainable with reference to an issue which is the subject-matter of an earlier decision, is rejected.
It is no doubt true that Judicial Service Rules govern the recruitment to Judicial Service, having been made in exercise of power under Article 234, in consultation with both the commission and the High Court. It also provides what examinations should be conducted and the maximum marks for each subject in the examination. But the Judicial Service Rules entrust the function of conducting examinations to the Commission. The Judicial Service Rules do not prescribe the manner and procedure for holding the examination and valuation of answer-scripts and award of the final marks and declaration of the results.
Therefore, it is for the Commission to regulate the manner in which it will conduct the examination and value the answer scripts, subject, however, to the provisions of the Judicial Service Rules. If the Commission has made Rules to regulate the procedure and conduct of the examination, they will naturally apply to any examination conducted by it for recruitment to any service, including the judicial service. But where the Judicial Service Rules make a specific provision in regard to any aspect of examination, such provision will prevail, and the provision of PSC Procedure Rules, to the extent it is inconsistent with the Judicial Service Rules, will be inapplicable. Further, if both the Rules have made provision in regard to a particular matter, the PSC Procedure Rules will yield to the Judicial Service Rules.
We cannot accept the contention of the petitioner that the words "marks awarded" or "marks obtained in the written papers" refers only to the actual marks awarded by the examiner. 'Valuation' is a process which does not end on marks being awarded by an Examiner. Award of marks by the Examiner is only one stage of the process of valuation. Moderation when employed by the examining authority, becomes part of the process of valuation and the marks awarded on moderation become the final marks of the candidate. In fact Rule 20(3) specifically refers to the 'marks finally awarded to each candidate in the written examination', thereby implying that the marks awarded by the examiner can be altered by moderation.
Rule 20 of Judicial Service Rules requires the Commission to call for interview such number of candidates, who in its opinion have secured the minimum marks fixed by it. Because of application of scaling system by the Commission, it has not been possible for the Commission to fix such minimum marks either for individual subjects or for the aggregate. In the absence of minimum marks, several candidates who secured less than 30% in a subject have been selected.
Thus scaling system adopted by the Commission, contravenes Rule 20(1) also.
The material placed does not disclose that the Commission or its expert committee have kept these factors in view in determining the system of scaling. We have already demonstrated the anomalies/absurdities arising from the scaling system used. The Commission will have to identify a suitable system of evaluation, if necessary by appointing another Committee of Experts. Till such new system is in place, the Commission may follow the moderation system set out with appropriate modifications.
The selected candidates have also been appointed and functioning as Judicial Officers. Further as noticed, the scaling system adopted by the Commission has led to irrational and arbitrary results only in cases falling at the ends of the spectrum, and by and large did not affect the major portion of the selection.
We, therefore, direct that our decision holding that the scaling system adopted by the Commission is unsuited in regard to Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination and directing moderation, will be prospective in its application and will not affect the selections and appointments already made in pursuance of the 2003 Examination.
So far as the petitioners are concerned, we deem it proper to issue the following directions to do complete justice on the facts of the case : a) If the aggregate of raw marks in the written examination and the marks in the interview of any petitioner is less than that of the last selected candidate in the respective category, he will not be entitled to any relief (for example, the petitioners in WP(C) belonging to the Category 'BC' have secured raw marks of 361 and 377 respectively in the written examinations, whereas the last five of the selected candidates in that category have secured raw marks of 390, 391, 397, 438 and 428 respectively. Even after adding the interview marks, the marks of the petitioners in W.P. [C] is less than the marks of the selected candidates).
b) Where the aggregate of raw marks in the written examination and the interview marks of any petitioner, is more than the aggregate of the raw marks in the written examination and interview marks of the last selected candidate in his category, he shall be considered for appointment in the respective category by counting his appointment against future vacancies. This relief will be available only to such of the petitioners who have approached this Court and the High Court before 31st August, 2005.
The petitions are allowed in part accordingly.
-
2007 (1) TMI 595
... ... ... ... ..... eptance of confirmation from the donor of gift through Banking channel cannot be treated to have explained and established the genuineness of the gift. The financial worth of the donor was not looked into and the genuineness of the transaction of the gift remained unexplained. The CIT has set aside the assessment to be framed afresh by the Assessing Officer keeping in view the provisions of the Act. We are of the view that the order passed on an incorrect assumption of facts or incorrect application of law or without applying the principles of natural justice or without application of mind or without making requisite inquiries will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue within the meaning of Section 263 of the Act. We confirm the order of CIT under Section 263 of the I.T. Act in setting aside the assessment to be made denovo by the Assessing Officer. 16. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 594
... ... ... ... ..... ains to valuation and as such this Court ought not to entertain the present Appeal. However, after reading the order of the Tribunal we have reframed the aforesaid question of law, and admittedly there is no finding on the above issue. The Tribunal could not have remanded the matter without giving finding on the aforesaid issue. 3. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned order dated 26th October, 2005 passed by the CESTAT and remand back the matter to the CESTAT to give a finding on the aforesaid question of law and pass an appropriate order. 4. Writ Petition stands disposed of accordingly.
-
2007 (1) TMI 593
... ... ... ... ..... section 271(1)(c) of the Act is not exigible. It is true that the quantum appeal the addition was justified but that fact by itself will not justify the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. 5. The rejection of some explanation given by the assessee is sufficient to upheld the addition in the quantum appeal but something is needed to support the levy under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Judicial support in this view can be seen in the case reported in 171 ITR 683 and 124 ITR 15. Thus we allow the appeal of the assessee and cancel the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act." 6. As in the present case, we find that the assessee has not offered any explanation, clause (A) of Explanation 1 was clearly attracted and, therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in deleting the penalty. 7. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2007 (1) TMI 592
... ... ... ... ..... ated under Section 2(43) of the MV Act read with Rule 128 of the MV Rules would not come in their way to levy service tax on tour operators who are not using tourist vehicles for the purpose of tour. However, as already mentioned above, the Circular dated 10-9-2004 is very clear to the effect that the amendment made in the definition of “Tour Operator” in the Budget of 2004 was with reference to extending the scope of package tour operators and not with reference to the normal tour operators where the condition of use of tourist vehicle would continue to be operative. In other words, except for tour operators offering package tours, in respect of other tour operators, the levy would be operative from 1-4-2000 provided the vehicle used is a tourist vehicle and in case the vehicle used is not a tourist vehicle, there cannot be any levy of services for the service rendered by using such non-tourist vehicles. 9. The appeal of the Appellants is therefore allowed.
........
|