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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 724 Records
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2007 (4) TMI 723 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... he Supreme Court decision in Laghu Udyog Bharati’s case (supra) amendments were carried out in terms of section 116 of the Finance Act, 2000 making recipient of the clearing and forwarding service liable for payment of service tax for the period from 16-7-1997 to 16-10-1998. The Chennai Tribunal in the cited decision supra, has exhaustively dealt with the issue and has held that the Parliament has authorised the collection only up to 16-10-1998 and the revenue cannot assume authority to collect such tax from the service recipient for any period beyond 16-10-1998. It has also held that section 117 is procedural and does not in any way alter in substantive provision brought on the statute book by section 116. Thus, in terms of law as interpreted by the CESTAT’s Chennai Bench, no service tax liability can be fastened on the recipient of the C & F agent beyond 16-10-1998. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the revenue’s appeal. Hence we reject the same.
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2007 (4) TMI 722 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counsel at a considerable length and regret our inability to accept his submissions. In the present case neither the capacity of the donor to make gift nor his identity and the source from where the gift is made, has been established. No special reason for gifting such a huge amount to the assessee and his wife has come on record. There are clear doubts which have been brought to surface as to why the draft was purchased with US dollars at Singapore when the donor himself is having his bank account in the same bank namely Indian Overseas Bank. The assessee has failed to produce any evidence to establish the known source of the income of the donor and genuineness of the gilt. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere in the well-reasoned order passed by the Tribunal. The findings recorded by the Tribunal have not been shown to be perverse in any manner. The case pleaded is beyond human probabilities. The appeal is wholly mis-conceived and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2007 (4) TMI 721 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct Magistrate has without realizing the limited scope of powers available under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act acted beyond the jurisdiction statutorily vested in the said authority. Various observations made by the District Magistrate are not warranted in light of the limited powers available to the authority under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act. The impugned order dated 28-6-2006, therefore, cannot be permitted to stand and operate. Therefore, order No. M.A.G. Vashi. 776 of 2006 dated 28-6-2006 (Annexure-B) is hereby quashed and set aside and the proceedings restored to file of respondent No. 3-District Magistrate & Collector, Vadodra. The application dated 30-9-2005 made by the petitioner-Bank shall stand revived and respondent No. 3 is directed to pass an order in accordance with law for taking over possession and handing over the same to the petitioner-Bank. 11. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (4) TMI 720 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ESTAT and hence by our order dated 7th March, 2007 we had directed the Respondents to move the Tribunal to obtain the stay with regard to the order dated 18th January, 2007 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), and accordingly adjourned the matter to 28th March, 2007. Thereafter on 28th March, 2007 we had again adjourned this matter to 12th April, 2007 so as to enable the Respondents to obtain stay from the Tribunal. Till today, however, there is no stay from the Tribunal with regard to the order dated 18th January, 2007. 3. Under these circumstances, Rule. There shall be interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b). The learned Counsel for the Respondents waives service.
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2007 (4) TMI 719 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... of transfer of assets i.e. the shares of the Indian Company in the present case, the assessee owned 1/4th share in the flat at Prabhadevi and also owned the property at Khar as the same was in the possession of assessee, income of which was being computed under the Income from house property'. The assessee does not fulfil the conditions laid down in the Proviso to Section 54F of the Income Tax Act and accordingly, is disentitled to claim of deduction under Section 54F of the Income Tax Act. 21. The issue of the ownership of 1/4th share of the house property though decided in favour of the assessee in the case of Smt. Varsha P. Thanawala has no relevance as the facts of the present case are different on account of the fact that the assessee owns another property on the date of transfer of the original asset. Accordingly, we confirm the order of the CIT(A) and dismiss the ground of appeal raised by the assessee. 22. In the result appeal filed by the Assessee is dismissed.
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2007 (4) TMI 718 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f Income Tax v. Devi Dass Mahlhan (ITA No. 155/2007), no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. We may mention that a similar appeal in respect of the same Assessee being ITA No. 333/2007 was dismissed on 30th March, 2007.
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2007 (4) TMI 717 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... facts, we do not wish to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.”
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2007 (4) TMI 716 - CESTAT, BANGALORE
Cenvat credit - failed to maintain separate inventory and accounts for receipt and consumption - Interest u/s 11AB r/w Rule 14 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, demanded - Manufacture of both dutiable final products and exempted goods - whether M/s. MRPL the appellant has to pay an amount equal to 10% of the total price of the exempted goods viz., SKO and LPG charged by them at the time of clearance from the factory - HELD THAT:- This bench in a large number of cases has followed the ratio of the decision in the case of Chandrapur Magnet Wires Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE [1995 (12) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT] to hold that even when common inputs are used for exempted and dutiable goods and if the appellant is not in a position to maintain separate accounts if he reverses the credit attributable to the inputs contained in exempted products, then there is no requirement of payment of 8/ 10% on the value of the exempted goods.
Thus, we allow the appeal of the appellant with consequential relief.
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2007 (4) TMI 715 - CESTAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... vy of penalty would be a hardship when they sought registration and came forward to comply to the law. Because penalty shall be leviable for the breach of law, that should not be done relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindusthan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa reported in 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J159) (S.C.), E.I.D. Parry (I) Ltd. v. Commissioner reported in 2003 (156) E.L.T. 753 (Tribunal). Therefore, there shall be no penalty imposable on the appellant. 3.2 There being no dispute of the tax and interest payable by the appellant, the deposits if any, made by the appellant towards interest and service tax as per order in original may be verified and shortfall if any, may be recovered. If there is any excess deposit, that should also be refunded. In the result, the impugned order passed by the Ld. Commissioner (Appeal) on 27-7-2006 is modified to the extent indicated above and Appeal is allowed partly. (Dictated and pronounced in the Court)
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2007 (4) TMI 714 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ication. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms. No.1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8- C did not exist." Similarly in the case of P.T.R.Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 268 their Lordships reiterated the same position. As a result of our above discussion, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2007 (4) TMI 713 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ssioner could not have made any order in respect of any issue if the appeal against the issue was pending before the Central Excise Commissioner (Appeals). Since no appeal was pending against the imposition or non-imposition of penalty under section 76, prima facie the Commissioner could have exercised revisional powers under section 84. It prima facie appears that for imposition of penalty under Section 76, no mens rea is required and mere failure to pay tax was sufficient to attract the said provisions. 2. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is therefore, directed that on the appellant’s depositing ₹ 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand only) within six weeks from today, there shall be waiver of pre-deposit of remaining amount of penalty under the impugned order of the Commissioner made on 23-11-06. This application is disposed of accordingly. Post the matter for compliance report on 12-6-07. (Pronounced and dictated in the open Court)
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2007 (4) TMI 712 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of not only functional integrity but also of unity of purpose. In the context of these facts, therefore, in spite of there being separate registration of the two factories under various enactments such as CST Act, RST Act, Central Excise Act, ESIC Act, Factories Act and their separate registration as small scale industries notwithstanding, they would still be liable to be treated as one establishment for the purpose of Section 7A of the Act. In our considered opinion, therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in law in interfering with the satisfaction arrived at by the learned Commissioner based on objective consideration of the material before him as to unity of purpose and functional integrity of these two units. 15. In view of what has been discussed above, the special appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and that of the Commissioner is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (4) TMI 711 - SUPREME COURT
Right to continue in service - Guilty of Misconduct - name removed from the post of Forester - Notified vacancies of Foresters - name of the respondent got registered with the Employment Exchange only in the year 1976 - interim order passed to consider his case for appointment - Respondent was selected having been placed in Sl. No. 3 in the merit list - HELD THAT:- A selected candidate, it is now well settled, has no legal right to be appointed automatically. It is also not a case where an order has been passed without application of mind.
It is also not a case where the appellant had made up its mind and the notice had been issued only by way of a formality. M/s. Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,[2006 (12) TMI 203 - SUPREME COURT]. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, directed the respondent to show his cause. Ordinarily, no writ petition would be maintainable at that stage.
Two other aspects of the matter cannot also be lost sight of. Respondent was not appointed pursuant to selection made in his favour. No offer of appointment was issued by the appellant. He was appointed pursuant to an interim order passed by High Court. The High Court ordinarily should not have done so.
In any event, the writ petition having been dismissed, the interim order also came to an end. It could have been directed to be continued. Respondent did not, thus, have any legal right to continue in service after dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court.
It is furthermore doubtful as to whether an original application could have been filed questioning the report of the District Employment Officer. Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Respondent may file his show cause within two weeks from date whereupon the appellants may take an appropriate decision in accordance with law.
The Appeal is allowed.
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2007 (4) TMI 710 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... s and not merely whether it is a single line of business or more than one line of business An assessee may deal in more than one commodity or services entirely different from each other and yet the same may constitute a single indivisible business. Reference in this respect is invited to the judgments of Hon’ble supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Prithvi Insurance Co. Ltd. 1967 63 ITR 632 (SC); B.R. Ltd. v. V.P. Gupta CIT 1978 113 ITR 647 (SC); Hooghly Trust (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1969 73 ITR 685 (SC); Produce Exchange Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT 1970 77 ITR 739 (SC). 19. In view of the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs we hold that the authorities below were not justified in invoking Explanation to section 73 so as to make disallowance of the sum of ₹ 1,49,01,871 as a loss arising to the assessee in speculation business. We delete the addition to the declared income made in that respect and allow this appeal filed by the assessee. 20. Order pronounced on this 10-4-2007.
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2007 (4) TMI 709 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... ve order of the Commissioner (Appeals), inasmuch as there is nothing on record to show that the goods were not entered in RG-1 with an intention to remove the same by clandestinely. For non-entry of goods in the statutory records, the Commissioner (Appeals) has already imposed maximum penalty of ₹ 2,000/- in terms of Rule 226 of the erstwhile Central Excise Rules. 3. In view of the above, I find no merits in the appeal and reject the same. (Dictated in Court)
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2007 (4) TMI 708 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le 46A of the Income-tax Rules would stand satisfied. Question No. (iii) 8. As far as question No. ( iii) is concerned, learned counsel appearing for the revenue could not point out from any material on record to show that issue regarding genuineness of the firm was questioned before the Tribunal as it has been specifically recorded by the Tribunal in its order that no specific ground was raised before it in the Memorandum of Appeal. Accordingly, question No. 3 is answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. Question Nos. (iv) to (vi) 9. As far as question Nos. 4 to 6 are concerned, from a perusal of unimpeachable material on record, it is evident that Smt. Darshna Devi and Smt. Darshna Devi Gupta were two different persons and on appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal was right in holding that the genuine firm was in existence during the assessment year 1973-74 and the continuance of registration was rightly granted. The reference is disposed of, accordingly.
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2007 (4) TMI 707 - CESTAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... the appellants cites a decision of the Tribunal in the similar case of M/s. Central Cables Ltd. vs. CCE reported in 2006 (74) RLT 767 (CESTAT-Mum.) 2006 (196) ELT 157 (T), wherein it has been held that when the final goods are supplied under Chapter X procedure, the credit is not deniable following the ratio of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of Escorts Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise reported in 2004 (64) RLT 227 (SC) 2004 (171) ELT 145 (SO. He also states that the decision of the Tribunal has been accepted by the Department and no further appeal has been filed against the same. As such, following the ratio of the said decision in the case of Central Cables Ltd. (cited supra) which is similar to the case at hand, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal holding that the credit is not deniable in respect of Sulphuric Acid supplied duty free under Chapter X procedure. 2. Appeal is allowed. Dictated and pronounced in the open Court.
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2007 (4) TMI 706 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ade regarding entitlement to abatement of duty for the period for which the factory was closed. 4. We have considered the submissions. We find that all the show cause notices and order-in-original referred to annual capacity of production as determined by the Commissioner vide his letter dated 29.09.1997. This capacity was determined on provisional basis and even after the direction of the Hon ble Bombay High Court, the matter was left open till the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court. No final order has been passed as yet. In such a situation, confirmation of demand of duty is premature. As the capacity has to be finalized first and thereafter the question of payment of differential duty should arise. In view of this, we set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and hold that the annual capacity of production should be first determined finally and thereafter the demands, if any, should be adjudicated. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. (pronounced in court)
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2007 (4) TMI 705 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion of the accused with reference to the said photographs. It was not necessary for the appellant to prove the same. 24. We have noticed hereinbefore that the appellant herein was not named in the First Information Report. The fact that he had some identification marks had not been disclosed in the F.I.R. The purpose of preparing the inquest report is only to notice as to whether the murder committed was homicidal in nature or not and not for making a note in regard to identification marks of the accused. 25. The manner in which the occurrence took place as well as the conduct of the prosecution witnesses as discussed hereinbefore do not lead to an inference that the appellant has properly been identified. He is, in our opinion, at least entitled to benefit of doubt. 26. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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2007 (4) TMI 704 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Addition made on the basis of statement during survey - return filled at "nil income" - assessment getting time-barred - reasonable opportunity not granted - sale consideration at the higher amount fixed solely relying upon the statement of this seller and without conducting any independent enquiry relating to the value of the property - HELD THAT:- From the records of this case show that the assessee was afforded reasonable opportunity and was also given opportunity that he can ask for documents, if any, but in spite of that the assessee did not ask for any documents for cross-examination till 22-3-2000 which goes to show that the assessee had nothing to explain and he was not interested to cross-examine Smt. Pushpa Seth. A number of opportunities were provided by the Assessing Officer to the assessee-company but the assessee-company was indulging in delaying tactics and only when the assessment was getting time-barred on 31-3-2000, it responded for the first time on 23-3-2000 when the documents furnished by Smt. Pushpa Seth were sought for the first time. Naturally, at that stage the Assessing Officer could not give any further opportunity because the assessment was getting time-barred on 31-3-2000. It is also apparent from the record that, the assessee-company was not a party before the Settlement Commission and, therefore, the proceedings could not be kept in abeyance by the Assessing Officer when the same were getting time-barred.
There are concurrent findings of three statutory authorities with regard to this fact that sufficient opportunities have been granted to the assessee to cross-examine the vendor Smt. Pushpa Seth but the assessee did not avail of the opportunity granted to it. So, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the authorities below and there is no reason to disagree with the finding given by the Tribunal on this regard.
Thus, no fault can be found with the view taken by the Tribunal. Thus, the order of the Tribunal does not give rise to a question of law, much less a substantial question of law, to fall within the limited purview of section 260A of the Act, which is confined to entertaining only such appeals against the order which involves a substantial question of law.
Accordingly, the present appeal filed by the assessee is, hereby dismissed.
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