|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 665 Records
-
2008 (11) TMI 668 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the miscellaneous application preferred by the first appellant could be said to be founded on a fresh cause of action?
-
2008 (11) TMI 667 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an order of bail granted in favour of the appellant herein could have been directed to be cancelled on the basis of a report of analysis of the articles recovered from him containing `heroin'?
-
2008 (11) TMI 666 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... he Commissioner in this regard deserves to be upheld.” In the above said order, the Hon’ble Tribunal has clearly held that as the electricity is not excisable, the Cenvat credit is not available even at the premises of the wind mills and therefore, the appellants is not eligible to avail Cenvat credit claimed in this regard. The ratio of the above judgment squarely applies to the present appeal as the issues are identical in nature, accordingly the appellants are not entitled to avail the Cenvat credit in the present case.” Learned advocate Shri P.V. Sheth fairly agrees that the issue is squarely covered by the earlier decisions of the Tribunal in case of Rajhans Metals P. Ltd. 2007 (8) S.T.R. 498 (Tri.-Ahmd.). He further submits that the said decision stand followed in case of M/s. Atul Auto Ltd. being Order No. A/332/WZB/AHD/08, dated 29-2-2008. 3. In view of the above, I find no merits in the present appeal and reject the same. (Pronounced in Court)
-
2008 (11) TMI 665 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
... ...
... ... ..... for reopening the assessment was not allowed to be cross-examined. Learned counsel for the assessee also submits that in view of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO 2003 259 ITR 19 1, the department was under obligation to dispose of objections of the assessee to the initiation of proceedings, by way of separate and independent order. 5. We are unable to accept that there is any rigid rule that even if there is adequate material justifying reassessment and no prejudice is caused to the assessee, the same should be set aside on a technicality. The Tribunal held that transaction of gift was not genuine and the assessee failed to produce Suresh Bajaj. On probabilities, the transaction of gift was held not to be genuine. 6. The findings of the authorities are not shown, in any manner, to be perverse. 7. In view of above, no substantial question of law arises for consideration. 8. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. In favour of revenue
-
2008 (11) TMI 664 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - Deduction u/s 80IA - concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income in relation to the deduction claimed - CIT(A) deleted the penalty.
HELD THAT:- On the strength of the reasoning adopted by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in CIT vs. Ashok Leyland Ltd.[1979 (7) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], the assessee canvassed before the AO that the profits in question were eligible for s. 80-IA benefits. Though the subsequent development in the case of the assessee shows that the said view has not found favour with the IT authorities. However, to say that the claim of the assessee made in the return of income was fanciful or was completely untenable, would be a misnomer. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the claim of the assessee made in the return of income could be said to have rested on a bona fide consideration.
Nevertheless, having regard to the fact that the assessee had made adequate disclosure in the return of income which was accompanied by a report by the auditor and under the circumstances noted, the claim did not lack in bona fides.
Whether the denial of the claim made in the return of income can lead to an automatic imposition of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act? - HELD THAT:- It is sufficient to say that the assessment proceedings and the subsequent penalty proceedings are independent proceedings. The findings and conclusions drawn by the authorities in the assessment proceedings are relevant but cannot be construed as conclusive so as to fasten the assessee with the charge of concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars thereof.
A similar situation arose in the case of Deep Tools (P) Ltd.[2004 (8) TMI 52 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT]. In the said case too, the assessee had staked claim for deduction u/s 80HHC, which was declined. The AO levied penalty u/s 271(1)(c). The stand of the assessee was that the claim was mistaken but was based on bona fide considerations. The Hon'ble High Court observed that the claim, though untenable, was based on the report of a chartered accountant in terms of s. 80HHC and the said fact led to the conclusion that it was a bona fide mistake. In our view, the said parity of reasoning is applicable in the present case too.
In the case of T. Ashok Pai vs. CIT [2007 (5) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT], Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was not exigible where the claim of the assessee was based on the report of an expert. In the present case too, as observed earlier, the accounts of the assessee are duly audited. The return of income was accompanied by the audit report required u/s 80-IA and there is nothing to suggest, rather there is no charge against the assessee, that the report of the auditor was collusive.
Therefore, we are in agreement with the conclusion of the CIT(A) that penalty u/s 271(1)(c) is not exigible in this case.
Appeals of the Revenue are dismissed.
-
2008 (11) TMI 663 - ITAT CHENNAI
Claim for deduction u/s 10A/10B - 100 per cent EOU - scope of undertaking - assessee transferred the plant and machineries from another company - AO noted that it was merely a case of transfer of machinery and held that not entitled to deduction u/s.10A or 10B.
HELD THAT:- A plain reading of the section 10A, would make it clear that not only units located in SEZ which are eligible for deduction under cl. (c) of sub-s. (2) of this section, but even the units located in any free trade zone or any electronic hardware technology park or software technology park are also eligible for the deduction. This is further clear because after cls. (a) and (b) the word used is 'or' which means every clause would have independent effect. Therefore, we reject the objection raised by the ld DR that since the unit is not located in SEZ area, the assessee is not eligible to the deduction.
Admittedly, the unit is located in Software Technology Park of India and even copy of the approval letter has been placed on record. A combined reading of sub-ss. (i), (ii), (iii ), (iv) and (v) would make it abundantly clear that deduction refers to particular undertaking. Though the term 'undertaking' is not defined u/s.10A but such terms which are not defined in a particular provision would be understood in commercial parlance or business parlance.
An undertaking in a normal parlance would have constitute business activity and not just any activities or liabilities or any combination thereof. In fact, the High Court had made the observations while considering the meaning of undertaking in the case of A.G.S. Tiber and Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd.[1996 (7) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT].
The benefit of this deduction attaches to a particular undertaking and not to the whole business. Admittedly, the assessee has taken over the medical transcription unit from K.G. Information Systems (P) Ltd.
It clearly shows that not only the unit or undertaking itself was transferred to the assessee by KGISPL but also the obligations of exports etc., in view of the exim policy were also taken over by the assessee. Therefore, this is a plain case of purchase of business undertaking.
Moreover, it was also pointed out by the ld counsel for the assessee that undertaking was purchased in the year 2001 and deduction has already been allowed to the assessee company for the asst. yrs. 2002-03 and 2003-04, Though the deduction has been allowed u/s.143(1) of the Act, i.e., without examining all the facts in detail we are of the view that it is too late in the day to examine the question of formation of the undertaking after a lapse of more than two years.
Therefore, following the Board's circular as well as the decision in the case of A.G.S. Tiber and Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. (supra), we find nothing wrong with the order of the CIT(A).
The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
-
2008 (11) TMI 662 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the first respondent/writ petitioner was entitled to payment of any compensation from the appellant for occupation of the land for over a period of 35 years?
Whether all the notifications issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 including the award passed and the reference made to the Civil Court are to be set aside?
-
2008 (11) TMI 661 - SC ORDER
Clandestine manufacture and removal - the decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS Versus SWATI POLYESTER [2007 (1) TMI 559 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that the Department has failed to establish any unaccounted production or non-duty payment removal of PTY, even otherwise Tribunal has found that the period for which the Department wants to impose duty is barred by limitation - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - SLP dismissed.
-
2008 (11) TMI 660 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sole Executor could be discharged of his obligation on deposit of the amount as set out in the Chamber Summons was surely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Testamentary Court?
-
2008 (11) TMI 659 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... Processors & Others, reported in 2008 (13) SCALE 233 2008 (231) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) in favour of the Department. Accordingly, the Civil Appeal filed by the Department stands allowed with no order as to costs.
-
2008 (11) TMI 658 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tra only, where the Plaintiff’s principal office is located. Had it allegedly arisen at a place where the Plaintiff does not have its principal or subordinate office, the suit could have been filed in any Court holding territorial jurisdiction over any of its offices. Thus, it is evident that we are, in no wise, whittling down the provisions of either the Copyright Act or the Trade Marks Act. We hold that if the cause of action has arisen at a place where the Plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, that place is not only the appropriate but also the only place where a suit can be instituted ventilating a grievance of violation of copyright, (and since the provisions are similar) to an infringement of the trademark. In holding so we are not ignoring the provisions of either the Copyright Act or the Trade Marks Act; we are only imparting a pragmatic interpretation to them. 14. We, however, make no order as to costs.
-
2008 (11) TMI 657 - SC ORDER
Valuation - Transportation cost - the decision in the case of MONARCH PIPES LIMITED Versus COMMISSIONER OF CUS. & C. EX., TIRUPATI [2006 (6) TMI 410 - CESTAT, BANGALORE] contested - Held that: - The matter stands disposed of in favour of the Department in terms of the judgment of the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. M/s. Dharmendra Textile Processors & Ors. [2008 (9) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT], where it was held thatWilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as is the case in the matter of prosecution under Section 276C of the I.T. Act - appeal allowed.
-
2008 (11) TMI 656 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... 4.1 Before us the Learned AR for the assessee argued that the assessee had let out temporarily only the factory building and not any plant and machinery and therefore the income should be assessed under the head 'house property'. The Learned DR placed reliance on the order of the CIT(A). 4.2 We have perused the record and considered the matter carefully. In our view the matter has not been examined properly. There is no material available to show whether only building had been let out or the running factory with plant and machinery and what were the reason for letting out i.e. whether the business had closed. The lease agreement is also not on record. We, therefore restore this issue to the file of Assessing Officer for passing a fresh order after necessary examination and after allowing opportunities of hearing to the assessee. 5. In the result appeal of the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purpose. 6. The order was pronounced in open court on 26.11.2008.
-
2008 (11) TMI 655 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the detention order dated 22.05.2008 passed against the petitioner, Deepak Gopaldas Bajaj, resident of Mumbai under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 is correct?
-
2008 (11) TMI 654 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the cause of action has arisen at all as the notice sent by the complainant to the accused was returned as "unclaimed"?
Held that:- As was noted in K. Bhaskar's case [1999 (9) TMI 941 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] it is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.
-
2008 (11) TMI 653 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Entry Tax Act - whether is invalid, illegal and void being violative of articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India? - Held that:- In view of the settled decisions of this court in a case where prima facie there is clear evidence to establish that the disputed tax which is being charged being paid or is not payable, then the financial capacity of assessee is not the sole criteria for either accepting or rejecting the prayer made by the assessee for stay or waiver of pre-deposit.
The appeals of the assessee itself for the months January to June 2008 may be decided expeditiously preferably within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The appeal shall be presented within a week from today and the same may be decided in accordance with law. For a period of two months or till the decision is taken in the appeal, there will be stay of the balance 20 per cent of the predeposit provided the assessee deposits adequate security to the satisfaction of the assessing authority other than cash or bank guarantee.
-
2008 (11) TMI 652 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in their finding that the assessee failed to prove the conditions for claiming return of tax paid in respect of articles returned by the purchaser?
Held that:- Section 4C provides the procedure for refund of tax of sales return and as per the said provision, the claim for refund of tax should be made before the assessing officer within thirty days of the receipt of despatch of the goods or before the completion of final assessment, whichever is later, in the statutory form as prescribed under form I and admittedly, no such claim was made by the assessee, invoking section 4C of the TNGST Act. In such circumstances, the assessing authority was not obliged to accept the plea of the assessee at a belated point of time. In any case, the assessee was not able to demonstrate the return of goods by the purchaser and the corresponding return of the value of such sale with the sales tax collected to the purchaser. In the face of such factual finding rendered against the petitioner, it is not possible for this court to take a different view in the tax case.
Therefore, no merit in the contention of the petitioner and accordingly, the question of law is decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue
-
2008 (11) TMI 651 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it cannot be said that no power was used in making furniture. We do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Prasad. The Tribunal on the facts has found that the petitioner does sawing of timber logs using power and thereafter manufactures furniture out of such timber. This being one integrated process, it cannot be said that no power was used while making furniture. In our opinion, manufacturing of furniture involves several steps and in case those steps are integrated, merely the fact that at one step, power was not used, shall not take it out from the net of manufacturer by virtue of rule 2(9) of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983. Accordingly, our answer to the question is that the petitioner is a manufacturer and shall not come out from its net in view of the definition of rule 2(9) of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983. Reference is answered accordingly. Tax case stands disposed of. Let a copy of our opinion be forwarded to the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna.
-
2008 (11) TMI 650 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Entry tax on entry of coal - Benefit of tax exemption - Held that:- The judgment of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. [2004 (9) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA], cannot be read to lay down the proposition that where an assessee is exempted from payment of sales tax under section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act he becomes automatically exempted from payment of entry tax for the goods purchased from outside the State for its use or consumption. In our considered view, the aforesaid decision does not help the case of the petitioner at all.
The petitioner is not entitled to any declaration that it is not liable to pay entry tax on entry of coal caused by it after making purchases from, outside the State because of sales tax exemption certificate issued to it exempting it from payment of sales tax on sale of its finished products. Appeal dismissed.
-
2008 (11) TMI 649 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Whether the order of the Appellate Tribunal is correct in reversing the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and sustaining the levy of tax on the alleged sales turnover of gold jewellery in assessment year TNGST 1996-97, when the alleged excess gold jewellery of 16.428 kgs seized by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence of the Income-tax Department on January 30, 1997 were returned to the petitioner only on March 17, 1998?
Whether the Appellate Tribunal being a final fact-finding authority is correct in sustaining the levy of tax on the alleged sales turnover of gold jewellery when the fact remains that the alleged excess stock seized on January 30, 1997 was returned to the petitioner only on March 17, 1998 and so the petitioner would not have effected sales out of the alleged excess stock during the assessment year 1996-97 itself?
Whether the Appellate Tribunal is correct in sustaining the levy of purchase tax under section 7A on the gold jewellery brought from other State on approval receipt?
Whether the Appellate Tribunal is correct in invoking section 7A of the TNGST Act when there was no proof to show that gold jewellery brought from other States were manufactured out of the worn-out jewellery obtained from undisclosed sources?
Whether the Appellate Tribunal is correct in sustaining the levy of penalty under section 12(3)(b) of the TNGST Act in the absence of a best of judgment assessment?
Held that:- The very documents were produced by the assessee before the assessing authority as well as before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as is evident from the averments in the respective orders of the assessing authority as well as appellate authority. The said fact is also found from the grounds of appeal filed by the Department before the Tribunal wherein they have clearly admitted about the receipt of the jewellery on March 17, 1998. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the finding with regard to suppression of turnover. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 are decided in favour of the assessee and against the Department.
As it was evident that the assessee was liable for purchase suppression and as such the assessing authority was justified in making the assessment on the ground of such wilful suppression and the said finding was set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner without any basis. In such view of the matter, we do not find any reason to disagree with the order of the Tribunal setting aside the finding with regard to the purchase omission. Accordingly, the substantial question of law Nos. 3 and 4 are decided against the assessee and in favour of the Department.
As there was no sales suppression as found by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, penalty is confirmed only to the extent of purchase omission and as indicated in the order of the assessing authority and accordingly the last substantial question of law is answered partly in favour of the assessee and partly in favour of the Department. The assessing officer is directed to re-determine the penalty as indicated above.
........
|
