|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 1014 Records
-
2008 (7) TMI 1057
... ...
... ... ..... hanvati SG., Ms. Shweta Garg, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,Adv. For the Respondent Mr. P.N. Monga, Adv., Mr. S.S. Ray, Adv., Mr. Manu Monga, Adv., Ms. Rakhi Ray, Adv. ORDER Dismissed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1056
... ...
... ... ..... se consumers indicated in Sub-clause (I) of Clause 5 of the several licenses held by Tata Power. 78. Having earlier held that MERC had overstepped its jurisdiction in making out a third case which had not been made out by BSES and had on the basis thereof issued orders which had not even been prayed for by BSES, we quash the orders passed both by MERC and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity and allow all these three appeals upon holding that under the terms and conditions of the licences held by it, Tata Power Company Ltd. is entitled to effect supply of electrical energy in retail directly to consumers, whose maximum demand is less than 1000 KVA, apart from its entitlement to supply energy to other licensees for their own purposes and in bulk, within its area of supply as stipulated in its licences and also subject to the constraints indicated in relation to Sub- Clause (I) of Clause 5 in relation to factories and the Railways. 79. The parties shall bear their own costs.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1055
... ...
... ... ..... ench of this Court in the case “Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Mulla and Mulla and Craigie, Blunt and Caroe, 1991 ITR 198”, in our opinion, no exception can be taken to the order passed by the Tribunal. Hence, the appeals are disposed of.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1054
... ...
... ... ..... (sic) (1994) as in force, at the relevant time, inasmuch as the last condition in the definition of ‘franchise’ to the effect that there is an obligation on the other party not to engage in providing similar services for any other person, is not satisfied in the Appellants case.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1053
... ...
... ... ..... However, we hasten to add that while considering the question of validity of the action of the Bank, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to adjudicate the exact amount due to the secured creditors. In other words, the purpose of an Application under Section 17 is not the determination of the quantum of claim per se as the Tribunal is concerned with the issue of the validity of the measures taken by the Banks/Financial Institutions under Section 13(4). In our opinion, the judgment of the Division Bench in Misons Leathers Ltd., lays down the law correctly and does not require any reconsideration. 11. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, I am of the considered view that the proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank by issuing possession notice and the subsequent sale notice are not ultra vires, unconstitutional or illegal. In the result, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected petitions are closed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1052
... ...
... ... ..... ters is very limited and that the Court should not interfere where the decision of the authority is in respect of a policy matter unless it is shown that it is beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonable. In view of the findings that the impugned conditions cannot be said to be discriminatory or unreasonable, the learned single Judge held that there was no question of interfering with the impugned conditions in Annexure-D-Notification. Having heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and having considered the materials placed on record we fully agree with the findings and conclusions of the learned single Judge. The reasons stated by the learned single Judge for arriving at the said findings and conclusions are factually correct and legally valid. In our view the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge does not call for any interference by this Court. In the above circumstances, we hold that there is no merit in the writ appeal and the writ appeal is dismissed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1051
... ...
... ... ..... Section 202 Cr.P.C. 31. I am, in these circumstances, satisfied that Crl.M.C. No. 2247 of 2008 deserves to be allowed. The learned Magistrate must be directed to take a-decision on the question of cognizance on the basis of the enquiry already conducted and without embarking on a further detailed enquiry. The decision must be taken by the learned Magistrate on the basis of the materials available. The direction that the case be posted for production of loan documents and examination of the complainant deserves to be set aside. 32. In the result (i) Crl.M.C. No. 2247 of 2008 is allowed. The learned Magistrate is directed to consider the question of issue of process at the stage of Section 203/204 Cr.P.C. on the basis of the available materials without proceeding further to conduct an enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. ii) Crl.M.C. No. 292 of 2008 is, in these circumstances dismissed and it is held that the cognizance taken and the issue of process do not warrant interference.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1050
... ...
... ... ..... showing sufficient cause, without there being such application, the Controlling Authority proceeding with the matter would be in violation of Rule 10 of the Rules. Hence, the petition requires to be allowed. 12. Since the Controlling Authority has rejected the claim petition of the deceased respondent only on the ground that, it did not accompany an application for condonation of delay, in the light of the same, justice has to be made to the legal representatives of the workman by permitting them to make a claim petition along with an application for condonation of delay showing sufficient cause. If such an application is made, the Controlling Authority is at liberty to consider the same in accordance with law. 13. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The order passed by the first respondent dated 31.1.2007 is quashed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to make a fresh application in accordance with law. The amount in deposit is directed to be refunded to the petitioner.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1049
... ...
... ... ..... /plaintiff's advertisement budget and the scale of advertisement carried out by the Respondent/plaintiff it would be difficult for us to presume at this stage, by a few isolated incidents that the Respondent/plaintiff was aware of the Appellant's product since 2005. In fact, in AUTOMATIC ELECTRIC LIMITED referred to hereinabove it has been held by this Court that publication of Defendant's advertisement in the same magazine by itself is not sufficient to infer plaintiff's awareness of use of a similar mark. 26. Consequently, the present appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. However, keeping in view the facts of the case we request the learned Single Judge to expeditiously dispose of the present suit preferably within six months from today. Needless to mention, that the observations made are on a prima facie view of matter and would not prejudice either of the parties at the time of trial of the present suit.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1048
... ...
... ... ..... de against them that they exceeded the authority conferred upon them to enter into derivatives transactions. In other words, the plaintiff requires their presence as witnesses and not as parties against whom any relief is sought for. In paragraph-30 of the plaint, it is made clear by the plaintiff that no specific relief has been sought against defendants 2 and 3. In such circumstances, their impleadment in the suit, cannot enure to the benefit of the plaintiff to avoid the Arbitration Agreement. 69. In the light of my conclusion that in an application under Section 8 (as distinguished from an application under Section 45), the Judicial Authority cannot go into the question as to whether the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, the plaintiff should only raise these issues before the Arbitrator Justice B.N.Srikrishna (Retd.), who has already entered reference. 70. In view of the above, the application A.No.8078 of 2007 is allowed. No costs.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1047
... ...
... ... ..... produced, the refund could not have been ordered. 3. We find from the record that at no point of time the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant was disputed and therefore the tribunal rightly held that the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant was not disputed at any point of time, the authority was justified on relying on the certificate. We do not see any substantial question of law arises. Hence, the appeal is rejected.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1046
... ...
... ... ..... imilar as held in Kshounish Chowdhury and Ors. v. Kero Rajendra Monolithics Ltd. (supra). At this juncture, it shall be borne in mind, that the MOU came to be executed on 18.09.2002. under which Selvarathinam exclusively claims the Company. Whereas, the impugned shares were purportedly allotted on 10.09.2002. one week before the MOU was executed. Similarly, the grievances in relation to the appointment of additional directors and exclusion of the petitioners from the office of director are just prior to the execution of the MOU. There is no material to show that the impugned shares were allotted in pursuance of the MOU. There is neither any reference to the Company in the MOU. of which this Bench will not be concerned, while determining the issues involved in the present proceedings. In view of my foregoing conclusion I am of the firm view that the company application is liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. The company petition will be heard on 26.08.2006 at 2.30 PM.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1045
... ...
... ... ..... v. unfairness, when this Court has found that the defendant has been deliberately unfair in its said advertising campaign, it is reason enough for this Court to impose punitive damages so as to discourage such a sharp practice and to put to an end to this growing tendency. Consequently, I am of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages from the defendant, which I quantify as ₹ 5,00,000/-. 67. In view of the forgoing discussion, there shall be a decree of injunction in favor of the plaintiff and restraining the defendant from issuing or telecasting the impugned advertisement or in any other manner disparaging the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff and its product sold under the trade mark DETTOL. There shall also be a decree of punitive damages of ₹ 5,00,000/- in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Costs of the suit are also awarded in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The formal decree be drawn up accordingly.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1044
... ...
... ... ..... Reddy, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1043
... ...
... ... ..... t. Ltd. was based on the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) in the case of appeal of the appellant. It is obvious, therefore, that the order passed by the Tribunal in the case of “M/s.Paramount Silk Mills (P) Ltd. & M/s.Paramount Fabrics Pvt. Ltd.” and the order passed in the case of the appellant are contradictory orders. In our opinion, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal impugned in this appeal has to be set aside. In our opinion, the Tribunal will have to re-consider the appeal in the light of those orders in the appeals filed by M/s.Paramount Silk Mills (P) Ltd. & M/s.Paramount Fabrics Pvt. Ltd., and the stand of the department of not challenging that order any further and accepting it. 3. In the result, therefore, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned in the appeal is set aside. Appeal no.E/3185/2000 is remitted back for reconsideration and decision in accordance with law and in the lights of the observations made above.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1042
... ...
... ... ..... that in the interests of justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third condition is that before commencing the summary trial for punishment the witness must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these conditions are mandatory. See Narayanswamy v. State of Maharashtra AIR1971SC1789 . 9. The object of the provision is to deal with the evil perjury in a summary way. 10. The evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the menace effectively it is desirable for the courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently done. 11. In the case at hand, the court has rightly taken action and we find nothing infirm in the order of the Trial Court and the High Court to warrant interference. The special leave petitions are, accordingly dismissed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1041
... ...
... ... ..... come Tax Act are not liable to pay by the assessee because they are not liable to pay advance tax interest. 4. We have perused the judgment of the Tribunal, who relied upon two earlier judgments including that of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in case of Sedco Forex International Vs. DCIT reported in 72 ITD 415 and in case of Motorola Inc. 95 ITD 269(SB)(Del). The view taken by the Tribunal in case of Sedco Forex International was also affirmed by the Bench of High Court in 264 ITR page 320. No question of law, much less substantial question of law arises in the present case. We see no reason to take a different view. Hence appeal is dismissed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1040
... ...
... ... ..... ceedings brought out any such evidence on record to contradict the submission made in the retraction letter. It is well-settled law that a presumption, howsoever strong, cannot be equated with conclusive evidence. In our opinion, learned CIT(A) rightly deleted the penalty taking note of the fact that the Department itself had taken different views on the same retraction statement and, therefore, in any view of the matter, the same cannot be a basis for levying the penalty. There had to be concrete evidence, in the shape of documents seized during the course of search, which could directly lead to the declaration of ₹ 20 lakhs by the assessee. Unless such corroborative evidence was available, merely on the basis of strong presumption drawn on the basis of circumstantial evidence, no penalty can be levied. We, accordingly, uphold the order of learned CIT(A) deleting the penalty of ₹ 4,56,800 levied by the AO. In the result, appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1039
... ...
... ... ..... pped up except those already existing, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-à-vis the High Court.” 13. The perversity as highlighted in Puran’s case (supra) can also flow from the fact that as noted above, irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration adding vulnerability to the order granting bail. The irrelevant materials should be of a substantial nature and not of a trivial nature. 14. Since the High Court has not indicated any reasons for directing cancellation of bail, the impugned order cannot be maintained and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the matter afresh and dispose of the application filed. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 14.The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
-
2008 (7) TMI 1038
... ...
... ... ..... ioner(s) Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, SG, Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,Adv. ORDER Delay condoned. Dismissed.
........
|
