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Showing 21 to 40 of 888 Records
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2009 (8) TMI 1272 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... n or their nominees; (iv) The properties of VML, namely, 17.15 acres of land will be conveyed in favour of ORE or its nominee, in the event of any remote need, which may arise in future, on account of non-compliance with the order dated August 13, 2008, by CEPL, C. G. Holdings and KCP; (v) ORE and N. Athappan will deposit the share certificates together with signed transfer forms in respect of their holdings in CEPL, with the Bench Officer within 30 days; (vi) C. G. Holdings and KCP, in case fail to file an affidavit as stipulated in the proviso to paragraph (i) here above, the SBI will release the entire maturity proceeds of the fixed deposit No. 759413 held in the name of CEPL in favour of ORE and N. Athappan in the ratio of 75 4, without reference to any of the parties to the present proceedings; and (vii) All other terms and conditions of the common order dated August 13, 2008, shall remain unchanged. With the above directions all the company applications are disposed of.
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2009 (8) TMI 1271 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... satisfaction. Under the provisions of the T.P. Act, 1888, if the transferor does not have any title or has an imperfect title to the property, the transferee on transfer will either get no title or be will get an imperfect title. This will be to the prejudice of the transferee and is not of any concern to the registering authority. 11. Therefore, relying on the aforesaid two decisions, I hold that the District Sub Registrar, Ranchi has no jurisdiction to withhold/ refuse registration of the Sale Deed presented by the Proforma Respondents of both these two writ petitions in favour of the writ petitioners. 12. Accordingly, these two writ petitions are allowed and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. District Registrar, Ranchi and District Sub- Registrar, Ranchi respectively, are hereby directed to register the Sale Deeds in question presented by the Proforma Respondents in favour of the Writ Petitioners within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2009 (8) TMI 1270 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decision in Charanjit Singh (supra) in its entirety including the question of appointment in terms of the recruitment rules have been followed. It has a positive concept. 50. We would, however, before parting make an observation that the submission of the learned Counsel that only because some juniors have got the benefit, the same by itself cannot be a ground for extending the same benefit to the respondents herein. It is now well known that the equality clause contained in Article 14 should be invoked only where the parties are similarly situated and where orders passed in their favour is legal and not illegal. It has a positive concept. 51. However, as writ petition No. 14045 of 2001 was dismissed as it had become infructuous, the special leave petition filed there against was not maintainable. civil Appeal No. 7466 of 2003 is, therefore, dismissed with costs payable by the State to the respondent. In other cases, the appeals are allowed without any direction to pay costs.
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2009 (8) TMI 1269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... summarily dismissed on that ground. 67. The legal position has been crystallized by a series of the judgments of this Court that all those facts which are essential to clothe the election petitioner with a complete cause of action are "material facts" which must be pleaded, and the failure to place even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section 83(1)(a) of the Act. 68. When we apply the aforementioned test to the election petition in this case, then the conclusion becomes irresistible that the election petition lacks the materials facts. The election petition read as a whole does not disclose any cause of action. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and principles applicable to the election petition, this appeal deserves to be allowed and we accordingly allow this appeal. Consequently, the election petition stands dismissed. 69. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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2009 (8) TMI 1268 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ays from the date of receipt of the regular bail application filed by the petitioner. It is made clear that any observation made by the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara in the impugned order dated 02. 01. 2009 as well as this court in this judgment and order shall not be in the way in deciding the regular bail filed by the respondent No. 1 accused by the concerned Court/magistrate in accordance with law. The respondent No. 1 accused is further directed to appear along with the victim girl to the I/o for assisting the investigation within 30 (thirty) days from today. (20) In the result, the impugned order dated 02. 01. 2009 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara is interfered with and the same is quashed to the extent of grant of pre-arrest bail for the indefinite period. The Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the Superintendent of Police concerned for information and necessary action. The Registry is also directed to send down the lower court record.
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2009 (8) TMI 1267 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... s. It is not the case of the Revenue that the TDR was obtained by the assessee and sold to the third party i.e., developer. In the light of these facts, it is clear that the assessee has not transferred any existing right to the developer nor any cost was incurred/suffered prior to permitting the developer to construct additional two floors. In the absence of any cost at the time of granting permission to the developer to construct additional floors, the computation provisions of Section 45 fail in the light of the Apex Court decision in the case of B.C. Srinivasa Shetty (supra) and also in the light of decisions of the ITAT cited (supra). Therefore, we are of the view that the amount received by the assessee and its Members is not assessable to tax under the head "Long term capital gains". We direct the Assessing Officer accordingly. 10. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is allowed. Order pronounced in the open Court, on this the 28th day of August, 2009.
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2009 (8) TMI 1266 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... loans remaining unpaid. The same is to be allowed on the facts and circumstances of the assessee. 7. On the last issue, with respect to disallowance of R & D expenses, we are inclined to hold that the amounts were not claimed as a double deduction as pointed out by the learned Departmental Representative but at the same time the claim so made in the earlier assessment year as well was to identify the expenses incurred by the assessee company for maintaining its quality and development being manufacturer of IMFL where blending is a common occurrence. We are inclined to hold that the assessee not claiming any weighted reduction thereupon, was to claim the same in its normal course of business which we direct to be allowed. 8. Levy of interest under section 234B & 234C is mandatory as has been held by the Tribunal and is consequential to merit additions considered above. In the result the appeal is considered as allowed. Pronounced in the open court on 21st August, 2009.
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2009 (8) TMI 1265 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... if an amount in excess of that prescribed in law was charged, the profit motive would pervade and mutuality would cease to exist and the amounts collected would be exigible to tax ? 5) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law receipts on account of sale of scrap are not covered by the principle of mutuality and are chargeable to tax ? 2. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of appellant fairly states that so far as first three questions are concerned, they are covered by the judgment of this Court in ITXA No.931 of 2004 Sind Coop. Housing Society Vs. Income Tax Officer decided on 17th July, 2009. In this view of the matter, the first question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and question Nos.2 and 3 are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant does not press question Nos.4 and 5. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of in terms of this order. No order as to costs
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2009 (8) TMI 1264 - SUPREME COURT
Murder - Offence punishable u/s 302 and 394 of the IPC - someone by killing and also amputating the feet of a lady has taken away her silver anklets - The High Court acquitted the respondent of all the charges by setting aside the judgment and order of conviction passed against the accused by the trial court - recovery of ornaments of deceased on the basis of the information furnished by the accused - PW-17, recovered a pair of silver anklets of feet, one pair of silver bracelets of hands, one pair of silver earrings and one golden nose- ring (nath) from Ramcharan and prepared memo, Exhibit P-14. Again on 27.01.1994 accused Naresh gave information, Exhibit P-18, to PW-21 for the recovery of "Khurpi" the alleged weapon of offence and pursuant to which PW-21 recovered "Khurpi" at the instance of accused Naresh under Exhibit P-10.
High Court held that there was no eyewitness to the occurrence and the entire case of the prosecution rests on the circumstantial evidence. Each of the circumstance allegedly making a chain was examined by the High Court and on scrutiny thereof held that none of the said circumstances lead to the inference that the respondent had committed the aforesaid offence.
HELD THAT:- Before we discuss the evidence on record, we must bear in mind the scope of interference with an order of acquittal. An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused. This Court has dealt with the scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of cases. The principle deducible from the said Judgments regarding the scope of interference with an order of acquittal could be summarized.
None of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution stands proved against the accused leading to a definite conclusion that it was the accused, who had committed the offence. It is also not known why the said witness had turned her back towards the accused only because the accused was washing his hands. If accused was washing his hands as stated by Mathura (PW-4) there is no likelihood of body of the accused being smeared with mud as alleged by some of the prosecution witnesses (PWs 7 & 8).
We do not find any such direct evidence that the said strap of wristwatch belongs to the watch of the accused. None of the witnesses stated that such strap of wristwatch belongs to the accused nor any wristwatch has been recovered from the accused. So far the time of occurrence is concerned there is also no unanimity and the evidence is scanty regarding the time of occurrence. In our considered opinion, the evidence regarding commission of offence by the accused in the field and also amputation of legs of the deceased is neither cogent nor reliable, and therefore, those circumstances cannot be relied upon for basing conviction of the respondent.
Recovery of ornaments is concerned, the star witness in that regard is PW-20. If the accused has taken away the jewellery on the same day then how could the police recover the same jewellery from the custody and possession of PW-20. Besides, since he had stated that he would not purchase the jewellery there was no occasion for Naresh to keep that jewellery with PW-20. In the disclosure statements the accused stated that he sold the jewellery to Ram Chandra Saraf whereas the same was recovered from PW-20. On scrutinizing the evidence, we find that the aforesaid recovery of jewellery is shrouded in a total mystery as it was not recovered from the place and person to whom allegedly accused sold.
Recovery of "Khurpi" is concerned the same admittedly did not contain any bloodstains on it and it was recovered from an open place. Since there was no bloodstain on it, the police also did not send it for chemical examination. Therefore, it cannot be said that the said weapon was used for committing murder of the deceased. There could be some suspicion regarding the conduct of the accused at the time of occurrence but the same cannot in any manner conclusively prove and establish that the accused has committed the murder of the deceased. Unless and until we are satisfied that the evidence adduced clearly and pointedly establish the guilt of the accused we cannot pass an order of conviction by setting aside the order of acquittal.
The view that is taken by the High Court is found to be a plausible view, and therefore, the benefit must always go to the accused and not to the prosecution. If the prosecution wants to prove the fact, the same must be proved by leading evidence, which is reliable and trustworthy, which pinpoints and conclusively proves the guilt of the accused. This is not a case where we can safely hold that the evidence led was trustworthy and conclusively establishes that it is the accused only, who had committed the offence. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the order of acquittal.
We, accordingly, dismiss this appeal and uphold the order of acquittal passed by the Division Bench of the High Court.
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2009 (8) TMI 1263 - SUPREME COURT
Commission of offence u/s 467/468/120B of the Indian Penal Code - Whether after charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency u/s 173(2) of the CrPC, and charge has been framed against some of the accused on the basis thereof and the other co-accused have been discharged, the Magistrate can direct the investigating authorities to conduct a re-investigation or even further investigation under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC? - HELD THAT:- Once a charge-sheet is filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. and either charge is framed or the accused are discharged, the Magistrate may, on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authorities permit further investigation under Section 173(8). The Magistrate cannot suo moto direct a further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. or direct a re-investigation into a case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code.
In the instant case, the investigating authorities did not apply for further investigation and it was only upon the application filed by the de facto complainant under Section 173(8), was a direction given by the learned Magistrate to re-investigate the matter. As we have already indicated above, such a course of action was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the Magistrate. Not only was the Magistrate wrong in directing a re-investigation on the application made by the de facto complainant, but he also exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the said application filed by the de facto complainant.
ince no application had been made by the investigating authorities for conducting further investigation as permitted under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., the other course of action open to the Magistrate as indicated by the High Court was to take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 of the Code at the stage of trial.
No reason to interfere with the order of the High Court since it will always be available to the Magistrate to take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 if any material is disclosed during the examination of the witnesses during the trial.
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2009 (8) TMI 1262 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s placed before this court by the petitioner are enough to rebut the presumption and discharge the reverse burden cast on the petitioner/accused. This court is also of the view that the trial cannot result in conviction as there are enough materials to prove the case of the petitioner/accused on preponderance of probabilities, capable of causing a reasonable suspicion in the case of the respondent/complainant. This court is also of the considered view that the petitioner has made out a clear case of abuse of process of court by preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, this court comes to the conclusion that the petition shall succeed and the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner by the respondent in C.C.No.120/2007 has got to be quashed. 13. In the result this petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings initiated in C.C.No.120/2007 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Dharapuram is quashed. Consequently, the connected MP.No.1 of 2009 is also closed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1261 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rit petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than Article 32.” Counsel submits that since the respondent school is discharging the important public duties, therefore, the filing of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the impugned orders is efficacious remedy. After hearing counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any force in the contention raised by him. The respondent school, being an unaided and a private school being managed by a Society, is not an instrumentality of the State. In my opinion, the petitioner has the efficacious remedy to challenge the impugned orders before the Civil Court. In the instant case, while challenging the impugned orders, the petitioner has raised certain disputed questions of facts. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to entertain this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail his alternative remedy.
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2009 (8) TMI 1260 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Applicants shall attend the office of the Respondent No.1 once a week till the completion of the trial. (iii) The Applicants’ passports which are presently with the Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau shall not be returned to the Applicants without permission of the Court. (iv) Copy of this order be sent to the Intelligence Officer of Narcotic Control Bureau, incharge of N.D.P.S. Special Case No. 192/2006 forthwith. (v) The Applicants shall not leave Mumbai without prior permission of the Court. (vi) Applications are disposed of. (A.P. DESHPANDE, J.) After pronouncement of order learned counsel appearing for the applicant requests that initially for a period of four weeks applicants be permitted to deposit cash in lieu of surety so that in the intervening period surety can be arranged. The request is reasonable. Hence the same is granted. Applicants are permitted to deposit cash amount in lieu of surety for a period of four weeks. Certified copy expedited.
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2009 (8) TMI 1259 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... other litigation for such redressal. Courts are meant for adjudication of bonafide conflicts and not for causing injury to the other by merely involving in litigation. 19. The privy council as far back as in Kissori Mohan Roy v. Harsukhdas ILR 17 Cal 436 held that no finding of malice or want of reasonable care is necessary in case where the property of a person who is not a party to the suit is wrongfully attached. The same view is taken in Bank of India v. Lakshimani Dass (2000) 3 SCC 640. Having found that the Decree Holder in the present case to have wrongfully obtained attachment of the property of the Objectors and persisted in the same, the Decree Holder has become liable. 20. The application/objections are allowed. Attachment earlier ordered is vacated. For above purposes, Col. J.S. Pental who has signed and verified the execution and filed the affidavit in support of the execution is directed to remain personally present before this Court on the next date of hearing.
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2009 (8) TMI 1258 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ltd. and Ann vs. DCIT and Ors. 251 ITR 53 which has been followed in appeal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bharti Celluar Ltd. I.T.A No. 1120/2007. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. It could not be disputed that the question covered there is a pure question of fact. No question of law has arisen. Dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1257 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng it to be false. The second is that there was also no material before the division bench to show that any person having an interest in the acquired lands had played fraud upon the government or the court. The third is that respondents 7 to 18 who had neither initiated any legal proceedings, nor took any action in the matter, could not have been ordered to be prosecuted, thereby showing non-application of mind in issuing the direction for prosecution. The fourth is that if a fraud had been played on the court, the High Court ought to have made a complaint in writing through an authorised officer of the court, instead of directing respondents 1 and 2 to prosecute the parties. 14. On the facts and circumstances, the direction to initiate criminal prosecution against the appellants and the respondents 3 to 18 was wholly unwarranted. We therefore allow this appeal in part and set aside the direction to initiate criminal proceedings against the appellants and respondents 3 to 18.
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2009 (8) TMI 1256 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ovember, 2006 imposing penalty of ₹ 5,250/- on the petitioner on the ground that he was the CPIO, who had committed the fault, is set aside. 7. The matter is remanded back to the Central Information Commission for re- examination. Central Information Commissioner will issue notice to the concerned CPIO and if required, impose penalty in accordance with law. 8. The respondent MCD will appear before the Central Information Commission on 23rd September, 2009, when further date will be fixed. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion whether or not penalty should be imposed. It is also clarified that in case the petitioner is found to be responsible for the delay or violating any of the provisions of the Act, the Central Information Commission will be competent to pass an appropriate order. ₹ 5,250/- deposited by the petitioner in this Court will be released to the petitioner. The writ petition is disposed of. Dasti to the counsel for the parties.
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2009 (8) TMI 1255 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... ll also increase the profit derived from the eligible undertaking and is therefore liable for deduction u/s 80IB. 38 So far as the rental income of ₹ 28,500/-is concerned, the immediate source is the eligible business and it can not be said to have been derived from the eligible business and accordingly the assessee will not be entitled for the deduction on the rental income u/s 80IB. We, therefore, direct the AO to allow the deduction u/s 80IB in respect of Exchange Gain ₹ 40,33,509/-, Discount from the customers ₹ 4,75,924/- and Insurance claim of ₹ 51,676/-. Thus, this ground is partly allowed. 39 Ground Nos.13 and 14 are general in nature and do not require any adjudication. 40 The Cross Objection filed by the assessee is merely supportive in nature and stands dismissed, as such. 41 In the result, both the appeals are partly allowed while the cross objection filed by the assessee is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court today on 21-08-2009
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2009 (8) TMI 1254 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Defendants 2 and 3 that the interim order dated 12th March 2007 restraining Defendant No.1 from pursuing the proceedings in the UK courts does not survive on account of the fact that a decree of divorce has in fact been granted by that court in favour of Defendant No. 1. In that view of the matter, the said interim order also stands vacated as having become infructuous. 42. The application stands dismissed. IA No. 1712/2007 in CS (OS) No.276/2007 43. For the reasons stated in the application, it is allowed and disposed of as such. IA No. 8904/2007 in CS (OS) No.276/2007 44. In terms of the order passed today, the application stands disposed of. CS (OS) No.276/2007 45. Despite filing written statement Defendant No.1 is not appearing. He is accordingly set ex parte. 46. The Plaintiff will file her affidavit by way of evidence before the learned Joint Registrar by the next date of hearing. 47. List before the learned Joint Registrar on 27th October 2009 for further proceedings.
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2009 (8) TMI 1253 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... the amount added represented assessee's income. 6.6 In another decision ,Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. C. J. Rathnaswamy 1997 223 ITR 5 held that the mere fact that the assessee had admitted the income in the revised return is not conclusive of the factum of concealment of income by the assessee in the original return. 7. In view of the foregoing, especially the returns were filed by the aforesaid assessees voluntarily before detection of any concealment by the Department, we are of the opinion that levy of penalty is not justified. In view thereof, we vacate the findings of Ld. CIT(Appeals) and cancel the penalty levied by the Assessing Officer. Therefore ground no.1, in these four appeals is allowed. 8. No additional ground having been raised in terms of residuary ground no.2 in these four appeals, therefore, these grounds are dismissed. 9. In the result, all the four appeals are allowed. Order pronounced in the Open Court on 4th September 2009.
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