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Showing 41 to 60 of 888 Records
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2009 (8) TMI 1252 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... the restrictive clause contained in section 80-IA(9). The restrictive clause in section 80-IA makes it abundantly clear that wherever deduction under any other sections of Chapter VI-A(C) is claimed, the computation will be subject to the restrictions laid down in section 80-IA(9). It precludes pro tanto, all the deductions of such profits and gains claimed under Chapter VI-A(C). Section 80HHC is a part of Chapter VI-A(C). It is not a self-contained provision. There is absolutely no ambiguity on this aspect. We are therefore of the opinion that relief under section 80-IA should be deducted from the profits and gains of the business before computing relief under section 80HHC of the Act.” Accordingly, this issue of the assessee’s appeal is dismissed by following the decision of Chennai Bench (SB) in the case of Rogini Garments (supra). 18. In the result, assessee’s appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in Open Court on 28/08/2009
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2009 (8) TMI 1251 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... name Madhuban Restaurant in the new business if he starts. On facts it is disclosed that the assessee simultaneously started restaurant business under another name and therefore the payment was for agreeing for a covenant that he will not use the name Madhuban Restaurant. The assessee's claim for exemption was turned down by all the authorities and the Tribunal because the income was received from business and the same was not for stopping the Restaurant business. There was no restriction for continuing the business by the assessee but only restriction against the use of the name Madhuban Restaurant. We do not think the income received is anything different from business income falling under Section 28(i) of the Income Tax Act. Since the Tribunal found on facts that the assessee was continuing his business though under different name, we do not find the conclusion rendered by the Tribunal gives rise to any substantial question of law. Consequently the appeal is dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1250 - SUPREME COURT
Murder - Offence Punishable u/s 302 r/w 149 IPC and 324 of IPC - Two of the candidates contesting the election were the deceased - weight of evidence - the deceased was standing along with PW.1 his nephew in front of the polling station, when all the accused, 20 in number, armed with lethal weapons such as axes, knives, sticks and stones attacked him. A.1 Kotesswara caught hold of the deceased by his hair and gave two blows with a stone on his forehead and also stabbed him with a knife on his chest, A.2 Hanumantha Rao and A.3 Krishniah who were both armed with axes caused injuries on the back of the head of the deceased where after A.1 again stabbed the deceased on his shoulder.
All the accused were charged u/s 148 - A1 to A3 were charged u/s 302 - the others u/s 302 r/w 149 IPC and u/s 324 by the trail court - The Trail Court found that the evidence with regard to the accused other than A.1 to A.3 was even more unacceptable and, having held as above, acquitted all the accused. The State thereupon took the matter to the High court in appeal.
The High Court held that calling the judgment of the trial Court qua A.1 to A.3 as perverse, partly allowed the appeal and convicted them but confirmed the judgment of the trial Court with respect to the other accused. A.1 to A.3 are before us by way of special leave.
HELD THAT:- A perusal of the injuries would reveal that injury No. 1 has been caused by A.1, Injury No. 2 either by A.2 or A.3, Injury No. 3 by A.1, Injury Nos. 4 and 5 by A.1 with a stone and there are three or four additional injuries (on which emphasis has been laid by Mr. Rao) as they remain unexplained. Even assuming, however, that three injuries out of eight are unexplained, this one circumstance alone would not destroy the flow of the other evidence.
It is clear that the incident had happened in the course of the Mandal Parishad Elections with several people being involved and a large group of spectators being present at the spot. In this scenario we feel that it would have been well nigh impossible for any witness to have given a mathematical or precise description of all the injuries that had been caused and that too in a melee. The fact remains that the injuries found on the dead body correspond fully with the weapons that had been used.
As a matter of fact injury Nos. 4 and 5 which appeared to be inflicted with a stone allegedly in the hands of A.1 clearly prove the veracity of the story as it would have been inconceivable for a witness to have imagined that a stone, (a very unusual weapon for a pre-planned attack) would be used as A.1 was also armed with a knife which he used after the injury had been caused with a stone. We are thus of the opinion that the medical evidence does not in any way contradict the ocular evidence.
As gone through the so called improvements/inconsistencies in the statements given by PW.1 and PW.5 to the police vis-a-vis their statements in court. It must be emphasized that the incident happened in the year 1995 whereas the evidence was recorded after about 8 years. Some discrepancies are, therefore, bound to occur.
The question to be noted is as to whether the discrepancies or improvements are such which go to the root of the matter and affect veracity of the prosecution's story. We are of the opinion that the evidence herein does not fall within this slippery category. It is clear from the FIR recorded by PW.1 and his statement in Court that PW.5 had been present at the time of the incident. The other discrepancies that have been pointed out are to no avail keeping in view the over all picture. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was fully justified in interfering in the matter and was well within its jurisdiction to do so, even in the light of the judgments cited by Mr. Rao. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1249 - ITAT BANGALORE
Deduction u/s 10B - Gain on forward contracts - Whether proceeds from hedging foreign currency risk does not constitute income derived from exports and is also not received in convertible foreign exchange ? - HELD THAT:- As in the instant case, there are a number of transactions and the forward contracts have been taken in respect of 46 per cent of the export turnover. Thus, it is not an isolated transaction. Hence, in view of Explanation 2 to section 28, the profit from the forward contract will have to be assessed as profit from speculation business.
It is true that section 10B(1) says that a deduction of such profit and gains as are derived by 100 per cent export oriented undertaking is to be allowed as deduction. For the purposes of sub-section (1), the quantum of deduction is to be computed as per section 10B(4). The deduction permissible is in the same proportion to the profit of the business of the undertaking as it bears to the export turnover to the total turnover.
The words uses are "profit of the business of the undertaking". The business of the undertaking is to manufacture and export readymade garments. As held profit from forward contract is profit to be assessed under the head ‘Speculation business’ and speculation business is not the business of the undertaking. Hence, for the purpose of computing deduction u/s 10B, speculation business cannot be considered as the business of the undertaking.
Thus we hold that the CIT(A) was not justified in holding that profit from forward contract is to be included in the profit of the business of the undertaking for the purposes of computing deduction u/s 10B.
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2009 (8) TMI 1248 - SUPREME COURT
Determination of market value in regard to lands - acquisitions initiated by notifications issued u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("LA Act') - acquired for (i) construction of a supplementary drain; (ii) construction of sewage treatment plant; (iii) re-modeling of drain; and (iv) planned development - awards of the reference court were challenged by the landowners - Whether valuation by the High Court is proper? - HELD THAT:- On deduction of 40% from ₹ 50790/- per bigha which the market value of small plots, the market value for the large tracts of lands acquired in December, 1981 would be ₹ 30,474/- (rounded off to ₹ 30500/-) per bigha. As the earlier three acquisitions were of the same year, but were in February and March (that is on 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981) which are about 10 to 11 months earlier, the compensation in regard to the three earlier acquisitions is determined as ₹ 28000/- per bigha. To this extent, the award of the High Court requires to be modified.
The reference court had, after referring to several sale transactions, determined the market value as ₹ 15,700/- per bigha in one case and ₹ 18,500/- per bigha in another case. On appeal by the claimants, the High Court excluded several sale transactions relied upon by the reference court as not inspiring confidence, and on the basis of a solitary transaction dated 10.9.1981 in regard to a small area of one bigha, increased the market value to ₹ 30,000/- per bigha. This Court held that the High Court erred in relying upon a single sale deed relating to a small extent of one bigha to determine the market value of a large extent of 5484 bighas. It further held that if that sale deed was excluded, there was no other evidence to support the increase in compensation made by the High Court. Consequently, this Court set aside the increase awarded by the High Court and restored the market value determined by the reference court.
We accordingly increase the compensation, in regard to acquisition dated 31.12.1981 from ₹ 27000/- to ₹ 30,500/- per bigha. We also increase the compensation in regard to the acquisition dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981 from ₹ 25,000/- to ₹ 28,000/- per bigha. The statutory benefits and interest awarded are not disturbed.
The appeals by the claimants are partly allowed increasing the compensation. As a consequence, the cross objections by DDA seeking reduction of the compensation are rejected without going into the question whether such cross objections are maintainable.
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2009 (8) TMI 1247 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... hri, Adv. And Mrs Anil Katiyar, Adv. ORDER On the facts of the case, we are not inclined to interefere in the matter. Dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1246 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the A.Y. 2001-02 and even for A.Y. 2005-06 the very same claim of the assessee has been allowed by the A.O. In the wake of these facts, this question cannot be said to be a substantial question of law. 3. Mr. Sahadevan agrees that so far as the question (e) is concerned, it does not arise from the order of the Tribunal and so far as question (f) is concerned, it is not in dispute that the assessee did not incur any loss in programming business. In this view of the matter, the findings recorded by the Tribunal cannot be faulted. 4. So far question (g) is concerned, it needs consideration and we propose to admit the appeal on the said question, which reads as under - " Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT is correct in directing to reduce 90% of the "NET" commission received by the assessee from the profits of the business for computation of deduction u/s. 80HHF ? 5. Mr. Poros Kaka waives service for the respondent.
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2009 (8) TMI 1245 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... na Roadways has issued Form 3-D which have been obtained by them from their assessing authorities. The said Form 3-D was not found forged and non-genuine. The question for consideration is whether the benefit of concessional rate of tax against Form 3-D issued by the Haryana Roadways can be disallowed. The Tribunal and all the authorities have denied the benefit of concessional rate of tax merely on the ground that Haryana Roadways was not the department of State of Haryana, which on the facts and circumstances of this case, referred hereinabove, is wholly unjustified. 22. In the result, both the revisions are allowed in part. The order of the Tribunal dated 6.10.2006 is quashed. The question nos. A and C are answered in favour of the applicant and it is held that denial of benefit of concessional rate of tax against Form D furnished by the Haryana Roadways is unjustified. The Tribunal is directed to pass appropriate order under Section 58(4) of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act.
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2009 (8) TMI 1244 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... omes only formality. 8. In this case itself seizure is to the extent of more than two and half kg. However the actual Narcotic drug will be identified only after the chemical examination and quantity analysis. But due to the lapse on the part of the department in not getting the report, has benefited the accused to get the bail. It is purely due to the default on the part of prosecution. 9. Though the seizure is made on 20.02.2009 till 01.06.2009 there was no report, Reason given by the prosecution is that the machine had failed. In view of the default in not producing the material before the court, the learned Judge has rightly enlarged the accused No. 2 on bail. There was no possibility for the learned Judge to find out as to whether petitioner is liable under Section 21(a) or 21(b) or 21(c) and in view of the fact that no charge sheet was filed, he has enlarged the petitioner on bail. I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Hence, the petition is dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1243 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... therefore, the appeal is dismissed. However, the revenue is allowed to file application u/s 254(2) for recalling the order in case the revenue gets permission from COD for pursuing the appeal. 3. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed. Pronounced in the open court on 13th August, 2009.
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2009 (8) TMI 1242 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Tax on Lotteries Act, 2006 - levy of sales tax on Lottery tickets - It is the contention of the petitioners that the legislature of State of Maharashtra has no legislative power to enact Laws relating to State Lotteries including Laws relating to taxation, and therefore, according to the petitioners, the State Act is beyond the legislative competence of the legislature of State of Maharashtra.
Held that:- Looking to the scheme of the Act, it is clear that Draw is used only as a measure of tax. What is said to be taxed is betting and gambling. From the preamble of the State Act it is clear that levy and collection of tax is on the lotteries (betting and gambling). The tax , as defined under the State legislation, means the tax levied and collected on lotteries. The Act does not levy tax on Draws or sale of tickets, the levy of tax is on betting and gambling which is offered within the State of Maharashtra by organising sale of tickets for participation in the lottery. The measure of levying of tax depends upon as to whether the lottery organised is relating to weekly draw, monthly draw or bumper draw. It is, thus, clear that levying of tax is not on the draw which takes outside the State. The draw is only a measure of tax and the tax is not imposed on the draw itself.
Merely because the term Scheme is not defined, the provisions under Section 3 of the Act do not become vague.
Whether the exercise of legislative power is colourable? - Held that:- Once we find that there is clear legislative competence in the State legislature to legislate, there is no exercise of power being colorable merely because earlier a particular type of tax was levied which was found to be not legal.
So far as the submission that the State Act has been enacted to make the business of selling of lottery tickets of the lotteries organised by the other States unviable is concerned, we find from the petition that there is no material placed in support of this submission, and therefore, it is not possible for us to examine this submission.
Petition dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1241 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision." 14. Therefore, the necessity to record reasons has been well settled by the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as in the decisions cited above. 15. In that view of the matter, I deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter for fresh consideration to the first respondent, who shall take into consideration the facts and question of law raised by the petitioner in the petition and pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law at the earliest. Accordingly, this Writ Petition stands disposed of. Consequently, connected M.P. is closed. No costs.
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2009 (8) TMI 1240 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ient cause to take a liberal approach to condone the delay. It is true that the provisions under which the application for condonation of delay is required to be entertained should be construed liberally and the length of delay is not a necessary criterion, but the cause shown in the application has to be seen. The averments in the application for condonation of delay in bringing legal representatives of the deceased appellant on record, by any stretch of imagination, do not disclose the sufficient cause so as to come to the conclusion that the delay of 2945 days caused in filing the said application is bonafide. I am afraid to accept the averments in paragraph 8 of the application that there is no negligence or laches on the part of the applicants in filing the application for bringing legal representatives on record. Viewed from any angle, the delay as prayed for, does not deserve to be condoned. Hence, the Civil Application No.9464 of 2008 is rejected. Rule is discharged.
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2009 (8) TMI 1239 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ting and misappropriation. Sequence of events undoubtedly suggests that the criminal proceedings have been maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the appellants and with a view to spite them due to personal grudge. It was clearly intended to prevent the public servants from discharging their duties. The criminal law has been set in motion by the learned SDJM by mere asking to do so by the complainant. The High Court almost abdicated its duty in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure though the case on hand required its interference in order to prevent abuse of the process by a court subordinate to it. A clear case is made out requiring our interference to secure the ends of justice. 17. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the criminal proceedings arising out of Complaint Case No. 916 (c) of 2003 are quashed. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1238 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... acts of the case as also the decision referred to by the ld. AR. We find that the ITAT in their aforesaid order dated 8-8-2008 in para nos.33 to 37 and 56 and 57 decided the issue against the assessee. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision of the ITAT, we have no alternative but to reject the ground raised by the assessee. Therefore, ground no.7 in the appeal of the assessee is dismissed. 28. Ground nos. 3 & 4 in the appeal of the Revenue and ground no.1 in the appeal of the assessee, being general in nature nor any submissions having been made on these grounds, do not require any separate adjudication and ground No. 4 in the appeal of the assessee having not been pressed before us while no additional ground having been raised in terms of the residuary ground in the appeal of the assessee, all these grounds are dismissed. 29. In the result, both these appeals are partly allowed, but for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the open Court on 28th August, 2009
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2009 (8) TMI 1237 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... From The Surface Of Oil. 3. VMCH Coating Station (Heat Seal Lacquer) 4. While Passing Through The Hot Tunnel of 40? Length Then Immediately Pass Through Chilled Rollers. 5. Rewind The Material To Rewinding Station. B. Take The Material To Rewinding/Trimming Machine. C. Take the Material to Slitting Machine For Slitting To The Required Sizes.? 4 The process is undertaken with the use of machines. It becomes necessary because of the specific requirement of the pharmaceutical industry for packaging of the medicines. The aluminum foil simplicitor, in its original form is of no use and unless it under goes the aforesaid process and is produced in a different form, there cannot be packaging of medicines by the pharmaceuticals industries. Mr. Mahna also states that it is treated as separate product under the excise laws as well. 5. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the authorities below is perfectly justified and no question of law arises. 6 Dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1236 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeal found as that fact in the case of Government supplies, even though the orders are placed through open tenders, still services of agents are duly required for various purposes like obtaining pre-information for tenders, collecting information about competitors, arranging of inspections, collecting of dispatch/goods receipts, release of payments, collection of statutory forms and for completion of various other formalities. These agents also provide information regarding the conditions prevailing in the rnarket as well as strength and workings of the competitors. The payment of service charges hiring those liaison through commission agents may be necessary in augmenting the business activity. The Assessee had also furnished documentary evidence in support of the payment in the forum of bills agreement with these agents and no discrepancy was found therein by the Assessing Officer. 5. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that no question of law arisen. Dismissed.
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2009 (8) TMI 1235 - ITAT, PANAJI
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... ... ..... y of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in the intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from the deeming provision. Therefore, there being no assessment under s. 143(1)(a), the question of change of opinion, as contended, does not arise." 11. In the light of the aforecited judgment, we are of the view that the assessee was justified in filing revised return within a period of one year, as specified in s. 139(5) of the Act, and thus acceptance of claim as made in the revised return, though in the process of completing the assessment consequent to the issuance of notice under s. l48 of the Act, cannot be said to be erroneous under law. Consequently, the ratio of the decision of the apex Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works ( P) Ltd. (supra) has no application to the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order of the revisional authority and allow the appeal filed by the assessee.
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2009 (8) TMI 1234 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... umar Sehgal and Ors. v. Smt. Anita Vinayak and Ors.) and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38755 of 2007 (Rajesh Kumar and Ors. v. Smt. Anita Vinayak and Ors.) have no force and they are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed. The Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25550 of 2006 (J.V. Trinidade and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.) succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8.2.2006 passed in O.A. No. 1590 of 2002 is quashed. As a consequence the decision dated 22.9.1998 of Central Board of Direct Taxes and the consequent orders passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur are also quashed. 59. We direct that the respondent Nos. 5 to 35 of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25550 of 2006 will not be shown senior to the petitioners of this case. The petitioners of this petition shall be entitled to all the consequential benefits. 60. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs. 61. The interim stay order, if any, stands vacated.
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2009 (8) TMI 1233 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e insurer after rejecting the assessments of the surveyor and the joint surveyor has accepted the assessment made by the Chartered Accountant. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that insurer while settling the claim has caused an unnecessary delay of three years. But once the insurer has reached a settlement he should make the payment at the earliest. And if further delay is caused by the insurer in making the payment then he should be made liable to pay the interest on the amount settled, as compensation at the current rate of interest till the payment is made, as it has deprived the appellant from using his money for which he is legitimately entitled. 28)Thus, in view of the above discussion, we direct the respondent Insurance Company to pay ₹ 1,05,00817/- with interest at the rate of 9 as compensation from the date of assessment done by the Chartered Accountant, within two months from the date of this order. The appeal is partly allowed. No order as to costs.
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