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2011 (7) TMI 1302 - SC ORDER
Judicial Discipline - Held that:- We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution - SLP dismissed.
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2011 (7) TMI 1301 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... son who claims to be the owner of the goods. The aforesaid statement of law made by the learned Single Judge is erroneous. Further the learned Single Judge has though set aside the order of seizure, has permitted the confiscation proceedings to proceed. A confiscation proceeding has to be preceded by a valid seizure. Unless the seizure is upheld the confiscation proceeding cannot proceed further. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal. The impugned judgment and order dated 20th May, 2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 16678 of 2010 is set aside. C.W.J.C. No. 16678 of 2010 is dismissed. 12. The appellants will, however, release the stock of seized betel nuts on the respondent furnishing a bank guarantee in the sum of ₹ 25,00,000/- (twenty five lacs). The bank guarantee will be kept alive throughout the confiscation proceedings. 13. The Interlocutory Applications stand disposed of. 14. Parties will bear their own cost.
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2011 (7) TMI 1300 - SUPREME COURT
Interest on arrears of royalty - The first respondent is the holder of a mining lease for limestone. Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (‘Act’) deals with Royalties in respect of mining leases. Sub-section (2) requires the holder of a mining lease to pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule to the Act. under Sub-section (3), Second Schedule was amended and the rate or royalty for limestone was increased from ₹ 10/-per tonne to ₹ 25/- per tonne by Central Govt. the first respondent in these appeals (‘contesting respondents’) filed writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of section 9(3) of the Act and the notification increasing the rate of royalty from ₹ 10 to ₹ 25 per tonne. In the case of J. K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd, the High Court made an interim order as in the other cases, with an additional condition that in case the said writ petitioner ultimately failed in the writ petition, the difference amount due from the writ petitioner shall be recovered with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
HELD THAT:- whenever there is an interim order of stay in regard to any revision in rate or tariff, unless the order granting interim stay or the final order dismissing the writ petition specifies otherwise, on the dismissal of the writ petition or vacation of the interim order, the beneficiary of the interim order shall have to pay interest on the amount withheld or not paid by virtue of the interim order. we are of the view that the appellants will be entitled to interest at 18% per annum in respect of royalty that became due between 17.2.1992 and the date of dismissal of their respective writ petitions. For the period subsequent to the dismissal of the writ petitions, the contesting respondents will be liable to pay interest on the said amount, at the rate of 24% per annum till date of payment.
Whether Rule 64-A vests any discretion in the state government to charge interest at a rate less than 24% per annum in appropriate or deserving cases - HELD THAT:- It is true that annual interest at 24% per annum appears to be marginally higher than the standard market lending rate of interest. But it is not penal in nature. Revenue from mining constitutes one of the major sources of non-tax revenue of the State Governments. Mining lessees are expected to pay the mining dues promptly and without default. If a lesser rate of interest is provided under the Rules, it may lead to unscrupulous lessees indulging in delaying tactics. The intention of Rule 64A is to discourage practices that may be detrimental to recovery of revenue, by providing for a higher rate of interest.
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2011 (7) TMI 1299 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Government stadium meant for developing sports and athletics allowed to be misused by private hands - Petition for canceling the sub-lease/licence - the District Cricket Association (`DCA’) was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 to fulfill the requirements of the citizens of NIT area of Faridabad, by providing facilities like lawn tennis, badminton, table tennis, billiards, swimming pool, gymnasium and a card-room, T.V. lounge and a Bar and Restaurant. the DCA Club granted a licence in regard to the lawn area in front of the Kapil Pavilion to ‘Modern Tent House’.The appellant herein filed a public interest litigation before the High Court, alleging that instead of using the leased premises which is part of the stadium complex, for sports and sports related activities, it was being used for illegal activities; that the club had become an adda (den) of gamblers; that though clause 10 of the lease deed in favour of the club barred subletting or transfer of the premises in violation thereof, the premises had been sub-let to the Modern Tent House. It was also alleged that the funds were misused by the corrupt members of the Executive Committee who were least interested in fulfilling the objects of the club.
HELD THAT:- the common malaise found in various parts of the country in regard to sports stadia and sports facilities. Firstly, inadequate and inappropriate use. Secondly, poor maintenance. Thirdly, lack of access to students, public, athletes and sports persons. A huge tract of valuable land belonging to the local authority was earmarked exclusively for sports activities by constructing a stadium. The sports facilities in the Stadium are meant to be used by residents and sports persons of the city/town and surrounding areas. The prime area of the stadium cannot be taken over by persons in power and the rich and mighty for an elitist recreational club by paying a token annual rent of Re.1. The affidavit shows that in the leased area sports activities are not encouraged and the entire leased area is used for commercial activities. The affidavit in reply filed by DCA Club vaguely states that it is being used for the activities of cricket, lawn tennis, badminton, billiards, swimming pool, gymnasium, football, athletics. This is obviously false as the football ground and athletics ground are outside the area leased to the DCA Club.
As the High Court has not considered these aspects and the matter requires monitoring and appropriate directions, we consider it necessary to remand the matter to the High Court. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, remand the PIL to the High Court.
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2011 (7) TMI 1298 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... clear that transactions of derivates are also covered by the scope of expression “securities’ for the purpose of tax deduction requirements u/s.194H of the Act. The hedging transactions of commodities, if in the nature of derivatives transactions, will, therefore, be outside the ambit of transactions on which TDS requirements come into play. As this aspect of the matter is not clear from the material on record, we deem it fit and proper to remit the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in the light of our observations above. We also make it clear that except in the situation above, commission paid on transactions of sales and purchase of commodities through commodities Exchange are clearly covered by the scope of section 194H and the matter does not call for any interference in such a situation. 7. In the result, appeal is allowed for statistical purposes in the terms indicated above. Pronounced in the open court on 29th July, 2011.
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2011 (7) TMI 1297 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... umbai Police to take some decision on this issue. As to how much information should be supplied to the Press and who should supply it must be decided. Frequent issuance of statements unnecessarily giving minute details of investigation will adversely affect the investigation and in the long run damage the prosecution case. Such disclosures are not in public interest. A balance must be struck. This applies to the investigating agencies and also to the public prosecutors or police prosecutors, some of whom are seen giving detailed interviews to the Press even when the cases are subjudice. We hope and trust that this issue will be examined by the police at the highest level. We make it clear that these observations are unconnected with the present case. They are made because arguments were advanced on this issue and we felt that in the interest of fair trial, we must touch this issue. 25. In the view that we have taken, the petitions must be dismissed and are dismissed as such.
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2011 (7) TMI 1296 - SUPREME COURT
Pendente lite interest - Whether an arbitrator has jurisdiction to grant interest despite the agreement prohibiting the same - According to clause 1.15 of the General Conditions of the Contract between the parties, the arbitrator does not have the power to award interest pendente lite. the appellant challenged his case with regard to interest that was granted by the arbitrator and confirmed by the High Court.
HELD THAT:- In view of the specific prohibition of contract contained in Clause 1.15, the arbitrator ceases to have the power to grant interest. We also clarify that the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not contain any specific provision relating to the power of arbitrator to award interest. However, in the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, there is a specific provision with regard to award of interest by the arbitrator. The bar under clause 1.15 is absolute and interest cannot be awarded without rewriting the contract. Therefore, we set aside the award of the arbitrator granting interest in respect of the amount payable to the contractor under the contract as well as the order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court confirming the same.
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2011 (7) TMI 1295 - ITAT KOLKATA
Assessment u/s 153A - Unexplained LTGC - Relying upon the report of SEBI, AO treated the Long Term Capital gain declared by the assessee as income from undisclosed sources - CIT(A) confirmed such order - HELD THAT:- Since in our considered opinion the SEBI on which the Revenue placed reliance is not applicable to the facts of the present case. On the other hand, the undisputed facts which was admitted by the Revenue are that the assessee has submitted the requisite details and evidences including copies of contract notes, demat account, bank statements etc. which was filed before the AO to substantiate the genuineness of the Long term capital gain which was dis-regarded by the AO by linking with the SEBI’s report.
It is further observed that the Revenue has not brought any material on record to the effect that neither the assessee nor the family members of the assessee are responsible for inflation/deflation of the share market which is evident from the share transactions submitted by the assessee. It is further observed that the AO has simply added the long term capital gain and commission ignoring the evidences which was already available with the Revenue authorities.
Keeping in view of the above facts we are of the considered view that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of SUMATI DAYAL VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX [1995 (3) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT], on which the Revenue has relied is not at all applicable to the present facts. Therefore, we set aside the orders of the Revenue authorities. Also, the Revenue’s presumption is based on suspicion, capricious and probabilities and without any contradictory material against the one submitted by the assessee in respect of genuineness of the transactions - Decision in favour of Assessee.
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2011 (7) TMI 1294 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... amine such evidence or cross examination of such witness produced by the assessee or to produce any counter evidence or documentary evidence or witness in rebuttal to the additional evidences so produced by the assessee. 14 In the case in hand, the CIT(A) undisputedly considered the fresh evidence without recoding any reason and without giving opportunity to the Assessing Officer to examine or cross examine the same or to produce the counter evidence in rebuttal of the same. Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the CIT(A) has violated the Rules 46A while considering the fresh material/evidence for adjudicating the issue. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the order of the CIT(A), qua this issue and remand the same to the record of the Assessing Officer to examine the evidence produced by the assessee and decide the issue afresh. 15 In the result, the appeal filed by the revenue is partly allowed. Order pronounced on the 13th day of July 2011.
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2011 (7) TMI 1293 - SUPREME COURT
Execution of the sale deed - time for payment '' essence'' of the contract - HELD THAT:- considering the facts of the case, We are of the view that the failure of the appellant to pay the balance and failure to pay the last instalment clearly amounted to breach and time for such payment was the essence of the contract, the respondents were justified in determining the agreement of sale which they did by notice. Therefore rejection of the prayer for specific performance is upheld.
dismissal of the suit for injunction - HELD THAT:- The appellant was not put in possession of the suit properties in part-performance of the agreement of sale. Under clause 15 of the agreement of sale, she was only entrusted with the suit schedule properties as a caretaker until possession is given on receipt of the entire sale consideration. As neither the entire sale consideration was paid nor possession delivered, the plaintiff remained merely a caretaker and on cancellation of the agreement of sale by the respondents, the plaintiff became liable to leave the suit schedule properties as the possession continued to be with the defendants. We have held that the cancellation of agreement was justified and upheld the rejection of the suit for specific performance. In the circumstances, the dismissal of the suit for injunction by the learned Single Judge, affirmed by the Division Bench, is also not open to challenge.
Dismissal of the suit for recovery - HELD THAT:- the liability to refund the advance has nothing to do with the appointment of the plaintiff as caretaker or the obligation of the plaintiff to return the property on cancellation of the agreement. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the rate of interest shall be increased to 12% per annum instead of 9% per annum.
that In the High Court the learned counsel for the appellant during arguments clearly stated that the appellant was not pressing for any decree against the fourth respondent in view of the finding that the amount paid was part of the consideration for movables. Therefore the dismissal of suit for ₹ 1,25,000 is also upheld. We also find no reason to interfere with the dismissal of the suit.
That the evidence of the fourth defendant (examined as DW2) was sufficient to put forth the case of the defendants and there was no need to examine the other three defendants who did not have full or complete knowledge of the transactions. In the circumstances we find no merit in the contention that the suits ought to have been decreed, as defendants 1,2 and 3 did not step into the witness box.
Contempt Petition - This Court while granting leave in the special leave petitions, made an interim order that the respondent shall not encumber the property in any manner. HELD THAT:- Receiving advances or amounts in pursuance of an MOU would not also amount to creating an encumbrance. The MOUs said to have been executed by respondents 1 to 3 provide that agreements of sale with mutually agreed terms and conditions will be entered between the parties after clearance of all pending or future litigations. Therefore the MOUs are not even agreements of sale. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the respondents have created any encumbrances or violated the order. Hence, these contempt petitions are liable to be rejected.
Relief of specific performance - agreement of sale was cancelled - we have affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had filed false, frivolous and mischievous suits. In view of the above, in terms of the agreement and in terms of its offer, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amounts paid by her. A sum of ₹ 2,25,000 was paid under the agreement of sale to defendants 1 to 3. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the sum of ₹ 1,25,000 paid by the plaintiff to the fourth defendant was also the consideration for the movables in addition to the consideration of ₹ 3,75,000 under the agreement of sale, was not been challenged by the defendants. In the circumstances, the Division Bench was justified in granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff for ₹ 3,50,000 with interest. These appeals are therefore liable to be dismissed.
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2011 (7) TMI 1292 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... assessee has thereafter paid additional stamp duty and incurred other charges on the ground of underpayment of stamp duty, those amounts subsequently paid by the assessee should also be added to the amount of ₹ 24 lakhs to arrive at the cost of acquisition. To this extent the assessee is entitled for the relief. Therefore we direct the assessing authority to refix the acquisition cost by adding the amount of ₹ 24 lakhs and the amount of additional stamp duty and expenses incurred by the assessee. But for this modification, the computation made by the assessing authority is upheld. 8. In the facts and circumstances of the case the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) on this point is vacated and the order of the Assessing Officer is restored, subject to the marginal relief ordered by us. 10. In result this appeal filed by the Revenue is allowed. Order pronounced in the open Court at the time of hearing on Monday, the 18th day of July, 2011 at Chennai.
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2011 (7) TMI 1291 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t that any person "contravenes any of the provisions of this Act", has not been proved and what has been proved is that the Respondent disobeyed the summons issued and the disobedience of the summons issued is not an offence under the provisions of this Act. Even the high Court of Kerala in the decision reported in 1992 (58 ELT 172 Ker (Itty v. Assistant Director) has taken the same view and it also held that disobedience of summons for appearance is not equivalent to the contravention of the provisions of the FERA. So when the contravention of the provisions of the FERA is entirely different from the disobedience of the summons, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the complaint and granting an order of acquittal to the Respondent. So taking into consideration these all circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Appellant has not made out any such grounds to warrant interference. In that view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed.
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2011 (7) TMI 1290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Bhopal for facing analytical difficulties during the determination of uniformity of content by the IP 1985 method.” (Emphasis added) In that letter also the appellant company does not make its intention clear to adduce any evidence to controvert the Government Analyst’s report rather made the following request “Under these circumstances, we respectfully reiterate that our product Betnesol Tablets referred above are of standard quality and request you to kindly treat all the matter as closed.” 12. As explained hereinabove, the appellants and other co-accused did not give any option to adduce evidence in contravention of the analyst’s report within statutory limitation period. Even if there was inordinate delay in launching the criminal prosecution or filing the complaint, it is thereby of no consequence. We do not find any ground to interfere with the well reasoned judgment of the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2011 (7) TMI 1289 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered (but compulsorily registrable) instrument and which is not duly stamped is valid and enforceable - In this case, A lease deed was executed between the respondent and appellant under which respondent granted a lease to the appellant for a term of 30 years in regard to the said two Tea estates with all appurtenances. Clause 35 of the lease deed provided for settlement of disputes between the parties by arbitration. The respondent abruptly and illegally evicted the appellant from the two estates and took over their management. The appellant thereafter wrote a letter to the respondent expressing its willingness to purchase the said two estates for a mutually agreed upon consideration and also discharge the liability towards the bank. Here the dispute is related to the claim of the appellant that the respondent should either sell the estates to the appellant, or permit the appellant to continue in occupation of the estates for 30 years as lessees or reimburse the amounts invested by it in the two estates and the payments made to the Bank.
The Guwahati High Court dismissed the appellant's application. He held that the lease deed was compulsorily registrable u/s 17 of the Registration Act and section 106 of the TP Act; and as the lease deed was not registered, no term in the said lease deed could be relied upon for any purpose and therefore clause 35 could not be relied upon for seeking reference to arbitration. The High Court also held that the arbitration agreement contained in clause 35 could not be termed as a collateral transaction, and therefore, the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act would not assist the appellant. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
HELD THAT:- An arbitration agreement does not require registration under the Registration Act. Even if it is found as one of the clauses in a contract or instrument, it is an independent agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration, which is independent of the main contract or instrument. Therefore having regard to the proviso to section 49 of Registration Act read with section 16(1)(a) of the Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registrable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration.
If the document is found to be not duly stamped, The court should then proceed to impound the document u/s 33 of the Stamp Act and follow the procedure u/s 35 and 38 of the Stamp Act. If the document is found to be duly stamped, or if the deficit stamp duty and penalty is paid, either before the Court or before the Collector (as contemplated in section 35 or 40 of the Stamp Act) and the defect with reference to deficit stamp is cured, the court may treat the document as duly stamped.
the document is compulsorily registrable, but is not registered, but the arbitration agreement is valid and separable, what is required to be borne in mind is that the Arbitrator appointed in such a matter cannot rely upon the unregistered instrument except for two purposes, that is (a) as evidence of contract in a claim for specific performance and (b) as evidence of any collateral transaction which does not require registration.
In present case, appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Chief Justice of Guwahati High Court to first decide the issue of stamp duty, and if the document is duly stamped, then appoint an arbitrator in accordance with law.
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2011 (7) TMI 1288 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ity - ITA no. 5008 (Del) 2007 order dt. 20.6.2008. 7. Hapur Pilkhuwa Development Authority - ITA no. 2735/Del/2006 order dt. 15.5.2007. 8. Ghaziabad Development Authority - ITA no. 2903/Del/2006 order dt. 31.1.2007. 9. Ayodhya Faizabad Development Authority. 10. Unnao-Shuklaganj Development Authority - ITA no. 686, 690, 696, 703 and 736 (Luck)/2003 for A.Y. 2003-04 dt. 25.7.2005. 11. Muzzafarnagar Development Authority decided by ITAT, Delhi ‘E’ Bench on 1.2.2010 the latest order on the issue Apart from the above as per the departmental prayer the orders of the Amritsar Bench and the Chandigarh Bench relied upon by the CIT shall also be considered while deciding the issue. Needless to say that the said authority shall pass a speaking order in accordance with law after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 11. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Pronounced in the open court on 14th July, 2011.
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2011 (7) TMI 1287 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... the cash book maintained by the assessee or under his instructions. Therefore, a cash credit for the previous year shown in the assessee’s bank pass book but not shown in the cash book maintained by the assessee for that year, does not fall within the ambit of section 68 of the Act and as such the sum so credited is not chargeable to tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year.” Respectfully following the aforesaid binding judgment of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court, we have to necessarily hold that the addition made under section 68, is bad-in-law. On the face of such a finding, the penalty levied, in our opinion, cannot be sustained. Consequently, we delete the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) by the Assessing Officer, and as confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order and allow the ground raised by the assessee. 9. In the result, assessee’s appeal is allowed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 29.7.2011
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2011 (7) TMI 1286 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted the reassessment proceedings. The same view has been taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Director of Income-tax Versus Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (2010) 40 DTR (Del) 17 and by the Bombay High Court in the case of Allana Cold Storage Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer and others (2006) 287 ITR (Bom) . Admittedly, in this case, notice was issued under Section 148 on 18.3.2002 and before any return be filed in response thereof, another notice under Section 143 (2) was issued on 2.4.2002. Therefore, it can safely be inferred that the Assessing Officer has not applied mind to the contents of the return filed in response to notice under section 148. Further, in view of the settled proposition of law, the questions are answered in favour of appellant. Accordingly, the Income-tax Appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 26.9.2005 is quashed. However, it is provided that the Assessing Authority is directed to proceed, as provided under law.
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2011 (7) TMI 1285 - ITAT DELHI
Unexplained Cash Credits u/s 68 - AO made the addition on money received from share applicants and commission paid because summons issued to parties in question were returned back as un-served - CIT(A) deleted such additions on the ground that assessee has submitted return of allotment of shares filed with ROC, Affidavits from the parties, confirmation of the parties, copies of bank accounts etc - HELD THAT:- We find that assessee in this case has duly submitted all the details to establish the identity of the parties, the income tax particulars in the form of PAN were also provided by the assessee. In the background of the above details, it can be said that assessee has submitted enough details to establish the identity of the parties. Assessing Officer has primarily relied upon the Report of the Investigation Wing which cannot conclusively prove that assessee own money was invested in the form of share application money.
We place reliance of the Hon’ble Apex Court decision delivered in the case of COMMR. OF INCOME TAX VERSUS M/S LOVELY EXPORTS (PVT) LTD [2008 (1) TMI 575 - SC ORDER], where it was held that, if the share application money is received by the assessee company from alleged bogus shareholders, it cannot be regarded as undisclosed income of the assessee.
Further, reliance on COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-IV VERSUS M/S. DWARKADHISH INVESTMENT (P) LTD. AND M/S. DWARKADHISH CAPITAL (P) LTD. [2010 (8) TMI 23 - DELHI HIGH COURT] was made, where it was held that, just because the creditors/share applicants could not be found at the address given, it would not give the revenue the right to invoke section 68. One must not lose sight of the fact that it is the revenue which has all the power to trace any person. Moreover, it is settled law that the assessee need not to prove the source of source.
On considering the facts of the present case and considering the orders made in aforementioned judgements, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order of the Ld. CIT(A), accordingly, we uphold the same - Decision in favour of Assessee.
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2011 (7) TMI 1284 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... o the original authority as the case is required to be re-considered in the light of the retrospective amendment made through Finance Act, 2010 allowing reversal of proportionate credit. Learned DR has no objection to such remand. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the original authority to decide the matter in the light of the camendment made through Finance Act, 2010 after allowing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellants. Appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2011 (7) TMI 1283 - ITAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... -vis Instruction No. 4 of 2009 of C.B.D.T. is not found to be at par with the activities of the assessee and method of accounting regularly followed by it. Hence the action of the A.O. to reject book results of the assessee even on the ground that the method of accounting followed by the assessee is not in conformity with AS-7 is not justified. We, therefore, uphold the order of ld. C.I.T.(A) by dismissing the appeal of the department. 29. Considering the above facts and the fact that the assessee was a developer of the project and not merely a contractor, we hold that the ld. C.I.T.(A) has rightly held, for the reasons mentioned hereinabove in para-8 of this order, that the A.O. was not justified in denying deduction claimed by the assessee u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act. We, therefore, uphold the order of ld. C.I.T.(A) and dismiss the appeal of the department. 30. In the result, the appeal of the department is dismissed. This order is pronounced in the open Court on 14.07.2011.
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