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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 1319 Records
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2012 (11) TMI 1250
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... ... ..... ose of business as condition for allowability of expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Income Tax Act and thus lays more strict requirement u/s.37(1) of the Act as distinguished from Sec.28 to 36 of the Income Tax Act? 2) The Tribunal by referring the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sasson J. David & Co. P. Ltd. v. CIT (1979) 188 ITR 261 recorded a finding of fact in Para 7 of its order that so long as expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of earning any extra income or profession, merely because some of these expenses were incurred voluntarily i. e. without there being any legal or contractual obligation to incur the same, the said expenses do not cease to be deductible expenses. The fact that the said expenses were incurred by the assessee is not in dispute. 3) In this view of the matter, in our opinion, decision of the Tribunal is based on finding of facts. No question of law arises. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2012 (11) TMI 1249
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... ... ..... he appellant on the above basis is totally erroneous and against the practice followed by the SPE uptil now. 47. However, no document to support the prevalent practice has been filed on record whereas appellant has placed on record judgment delivered in the case of Lokayukta where the calculation of expenditure has been made @50%. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, since the appellant come from an agricultural background, we take expenditure @ 40%. Taking all these facts into consideration, we find that the Lokayukta has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of the disproportionate assets for the purpose of holding him guilty of offence under Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Accordingly, the judgment delivered by the trial Judge is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the alleged offence by giving him benefit of doubt only. The appellant is on bail. His bail bond is discharged.
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2012 (11) TMI 1247
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... ... ..... Del) 3. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Media Circle II, Chennai vs. Real Image Media Technologies (P) Ltd., (2008) 114 ITD 573 (Chennai) 9. On the other hand, Ld. D.R relied upon the order of Ld. CIT(A). 10. We have heard both the parties and their contentions have carefully been considered. It is the contention of Ld. AR that the disallowed amount has not been debited to P&L Account and service tax has also not become payable as the payment for services rendered was not realized. In order to verify all these contentions, we consider it just and proper to restore this issue to the file of AO with a direction to re-adjudicate the same as per law after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. We direct accordingly. This ground is allowed for statistical purposes. 11. In the result, departmental appeal is dismissed and appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed in the manner aforesaid. Order pronounced in the open court on the 9th day of Nov. 2012
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2012 (11) TMI 1246
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... ... ..... ; 3. The test of enduring benefit enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above cited case as no application to the facts of the case in hand. The expenditure incurred is dominantly for advertisement to promote the sales. If the contention of the Revenue is upheld, any expenditure incurred for marketing and promoting sales should have to be held as 'capital expenditure' and in no case, the deduction can be allowed. Such a contention is illogical and untenable. In the cited case, the compensation was paid during the whole period of lease as protection fees in consideration of which the lessor undertook not to grant any lease, permit or prospecting licence for limestone for the manufacture of cement, in a group of quarries. The said payment of protection fee was held to be a capital expenditure. In the instant case, the facts stand on a different footing. In that view, the substantial question of law is answered against the Revenue. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2012 (11) TMI 1245
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... ... ..... ase for assessment year 2008-2009. 3. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the relevant material on record. It is observed from the impugned order that the learned CIT(A) directed to restrict the disallowance at 25 of the total expenses by relying on the Tribunal order passed in assessee’s own case for assessment year 2008-2009, a copy of which is available on page 1 onwards of the paper book. In such order the Tribunal has followed its another order passed in the assessee’s own case for assessment years 1998-99, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. The learned Departmental Representative could not place on record any material to indicate that the said orders of the Tribunal have either been reversed or modified in any manner by the Hon’ble High Court. Respectfully following the precedents, we uphold the impugned orders for all the years under consideration. 4. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed. Order pronounced on this 27th day of November, 2012.
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2012 (11) TMI 1244
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... ... ..... cord and the order of the Co-ordinate Bench as extracted hereinabove in the assessee’s own case, we are of the considered view that the matter should be remitted back to the file of the AO for verifying the nature of expenditure claimed under the head ‘repairs and maintenance’. If the nature of expenditure claim under the head ‘repairs and maintenance’ for the assessment year under dispute are found to be the same which was considered by the ITAT in assessee’s own case for assessment years 2003-04, 2005-06 and 2006-07 and allowed as revenue expenditure, then the AO should also allow the same as revenue expenditure for the impugned assessment year. The AO shall afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee before finally deciding the appeal after following our aforesaid direction. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the department is treated as allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the court on 07-11-2012.
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2012 (11) TMI 1243
Benefits under Section 11 - Held that:- The assessee claimed exemption, being an educational institution as such it was required to obtain exemption from the prescribed authority under Section 10(23C) of the Act, which is mandatory. Since no exemption from the prescribed authority under Section 10(23C) of the Act has been obtained as such the assessee was not entitled to claim benefits under Section 11 of the Act. The submission is wholly misconceived.
Admittedly, the assessee is an educational institution and was established for charitable purposes for running educational institutions and imparting education. Section 10 of the Act deals with the income not liable to be included in total income of the assessee while Section 11 deals with the income from property held for charitable or religious purposes. Both Section 10(23C) and Section 11 of the Act are independent sections. The assessee was registered under Section 12A of the Act. As such the assessee was rightly granted benefits under Section 11 of the Act.
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2012 (11) TMI 1242
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... ... ..... apply to the present case which falls under instruction No. 3 dated 9.2.2011. Following the ratio of the decision in the case of CIT v Pithwa Engg. Work wherein it has been held that “In our view, the Board’s circular dt. 27th March, 2000 is very much applicable even to the old references which are still undecided”, we dismiss the departmental appeal on the ground that the tax effect is less than 3 lakhs.” Following the aforesaid precedent, the present appeal filed by the Revenue is liable to be dismissed in view of CBDT Instruction No. 3 dated 9.2.2011 (supra) as the tax effect with respect to the quantum of relief allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is below ₹ 3 lakhs and it has not been shown that the appeal falls under any of the exceptions provided in para 8 of the CBDT Instruction (supra). We order accordingly. 5. In the result, the appeal by the revenue is dismissed. Decision is pronounced in the open court on 12-11-2012.
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2012 (11) TMI 1241
Withdrawal/encashed amount using forged Signature - Application for Quashing of Charges against Bank manager and other - the Appellant lodged a complaint before the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police New Delhi that he along with his wife had opened five FCNR-FD in their joint names. According to the complainant, accused who is his father-in-law had forged his signatures on the F.D receipts and got the same renewed in the sole name of his wife who, thereafter, encashed the value thereof and unauthorisedly received the payments due.
Role of Bank manager - No material has been brought on record to, even prima facie, show the involvement of either of the accused - Appellants with any of the offences alleged. Mere holding of the office of Chief Manager and Senior Manager of the concerned Bank, by itself, will not make the accused - Appellants liable unless the positive role of either of the Appellants in the renewal of the FDs in the sole name of accused Anita Mehra or in the encashment of one of the FDs by the aforesaid accused is disclosed. the provisions of the Regulations/Guidelines, relating to Fixed Deposit, as in force in the Bank to contend that the action of accused - Appellants has been in conformity with the mandate of the Banking Norms even if it is to be assumed that they had any role to play in the matter of renewal of the FDs in the sole name of the accused Anita Mehra and the subsequent encashment .
HELD THAT:- Court do not see as to why the action of the accused father in law in making the endorsement in the Investment Renewal of Vyasa Bank, in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances already noted, cannot, prima facie, amount to making of a document with an intention of causing it to be believed that the same was made by or by the authority of the joint account holder. The said document having contained an endorsement that the FD be altered/renewed in the single name of accused wife and the Bank having so acted, prima facie, the commission of offences u/s 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B IPC, in our considered view, is disclosed against the accused father in law.
The order of the High Court quashing the charges framed against father in law u/s 467, 468 and 471 IPC r/w Section 120B IPC in so far as the Investment Renewal and FD with Vyasa Bank, therefore, is clearly unsustainable. We therefore interfere with the aforesaid part of the order of the High Court in so far as the accused father in law is concerned.
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2012 (11) TMI 1240
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... ... ..... . Therefore, in respect of the residential units numbering 211 in all, the persons who undertook this undertaking are entitled to the benefit of section 80IB(10) of the Act in proportion to the share to which they are entitled to in the built up area.” A perusal of the above clearly shows that the owner of the land as well as the party that has undertaken construction of the housing project are termed as ‘developer’ and are therefore entitled for the benefit of section 80IB(10) of the Act. 10. Thus, from the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the judgement of the Hon’ble High Court, it is evident that the assessee is a developer and builder of the project. The assessee had already placed on record the necessary documents for claiming deduction under section 80IB(10). We therefore, uphold the order of the CIT(A) and dismiss the appeal of the Revenue. Order pronounced in the open court on Friday, the 30th day of November, 2012 at Chennai.
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2012 (11) TMI 1239
Temporary absence of the presiding officer - whether Tribunal cannot said to be validly constituted in absence of regular presiding officer? - Held that:- The expression “temporary absence” only means that the arrangement under which one of the two members is to preside over the sitting of the tribunal is to be made on temporary basis and not on a regular basis. Accordingly when efforts are going on to select and appoint a presiding officer in accordance with the provisions of Section 15M of the Act, authorization given to one of the two members of the appellate tribunal has to be treated as a temporary arrangement and therefore, we find no merit in this contention.
Even if the above contentions were to be accepted, another person who to be appointed to the post of the presiding officer of the appellate tribunal will have to possess the qualification stipulated in Section 15M of the Act. Since the selection committee constituted for the purpose is not in a position to find any eligible and willing person as per that provision, it is obvious that even under Section 15P the presiding officer cannot be appointed. The Government of India is, therefore, justified in resorting to the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2000 for dealing with the present contingency.
No impediment to the petitioner's appeal being heard by the Appellate Tribunal, which presently has two members and one of whom is authorized to preside over the sitting of the Appellate Tribunal.
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2012 (11) TMI 1238
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... ... ..... ard along with Arbitration Application No. 244 of 21012 on 5th December, 2012. The respondent is directed to file affidavit in reply to section 11 application within one week from today.
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2012 (11) TMI 1237
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... ... ..... o the rights and contentions of both the parties including the existence of arbitration clause. In the event of this court coming to the conclusion that there is no arbitration agreement, petitioner no. 2 who is present in court through his learned counsel undertakes to return the aforesaid amount withdrawn from the aforesaid bank account within one week form the date of order as may be passed by this court. The parties are directed to act on the copy of this order authenticated by the Associate of this court. The Undertaking given by the learned counsel on instructions of petitioner no.2 who is present in court, is accepted. It is made clear that in the event of respondent refusing to sign the cheques as directed, the aforesaid banks would permit the petitioner to withdraw such amounts on the basis of the signatures of the petitioners on the said cheques without insisting for the signature of the respondents. Stand over to 21st November, 2012 for hearing and final disposal.
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2012 (11) TMI 1236
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... ... ..... he petitioner who states that the sum involved is heavy and he is not agreeable to this proposal and the respondent himself in the month of August had issued post dated cheques up to 07.11.2012 for complete payment and he cannot now wriggle out of this proposal. He is asking for enlargement of time which is not acceptable to the petitioner. This Court has put a proposal to the respondent which is to the effect that the entire payment be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within an outer limit of 10 months from the next date of hearing with interest at the agreed rate on the reducing balance. Learned counsel for the petitioner will also take instruction on this proposal which has been put to the respondent by the Court. Learned counsel for the respondent also seeks time to take instruction in this regard. In case this proposal does not to fructify arguments will be heard on merits. Reply if any be filed within 10 days with advance copy. List for direction on 21.11.2012.
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2012 (11) TMI 1235
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... ... ..... ut any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. 12. An identical situation arose in the case of Mrs. Aditi Dalal mentioned above. The alleged transactions related to 1999-2000 and an order came to be passed in 2011. Interestingly, in the case of Aditi Dalal also there was investigation related to Roofit Industries Limited, the company referred to in the present case. We have held hereinabove that the finding of the whole time member with regard to the wrong doing of the appellant is upheld. However, considering the significant mitigating factor of delay in finalisation of proceedings, we find that suspension of certificate of registration of the appellant belatedly for a period of one week is not justifiable. Considering the facts on record, we are of the view that a warning to the appellant to be cautious in future would meet the ends of justice. The order of the whole time member is modified to the extent mentioned above. The appeal is disposed of as above. No costs.
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2012 (11) TMI 1234
Appellants non-suited on the ground of delay and non-availability of records - acquisition proceedings - Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (Development Corporation) - The land in dispute admeasuring, was owned by the predecessors-in-interest of the Appellants. A very large chunk of land including the said land stood notified u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('Act') on 6.6.1964 for the establishment of the industrial development. However, no subsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter, and the acquisition proceedings lapsed. The predecessors-in-interest of the Appellants were not merely illiterate farmers, but were also absolutely unaware of their rights and hence too inarticulate to claim them. Thus, they could be persuaded by the officers of the Respondent authorities to hand over possession of the said land. Actual physical possession of the said land was taken by the State authorities and handed over to the Development Corporation in the year 1964 itself.
HELD THAT:- The learned senior Counsel appearing for the State came forward with a welcome suggestion stating that in order to redress the grievances of the Appellants, the Respondent-authorities would notify the land in dispute u/s 4 of the Act within a period of 4 weeks from today. Section 6 declaration will be issued within a period of one week thereafter. As the Appellants have full notice and information with respect to the proceedings, publication in the newspapers either of the notification or of the declaration under the Act are dispensed with. Notice u/s 9 of the Act will be served within a period of 4 weeks after the publication of Section 6 declaration and award will be made within a period of three months thereafter. The deemed acquisition proceedings would thus, be concluded most expeditiously. Needless to say, the market value of the land in dispute will be assessed as it prevails on the date on which the Section 4 notification is published in the Official Gazette. Payment of compensation/award amount will be made to the claimants/persons-interested immediately thereafter, along with all statutory benefits. The Appellants shall be entitled to pursue the statutory remedies available to them for further enhancement of compensation, if so desired.
With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of.
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2012 (11) TMI 1233
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... ... ..... ce of recoverability, then there is a provision in the Act to claim the same as bad debt. Various case law relied by the assessee's counsel is of no relevance to the facts of the present case. In view of this, we are of the opinion that CIT(A) not justified in deleting the disallowance proportionate interest on the loan advanced to the sister concern. This ground of appeal of the revenue is allowed.” 23. Since the issue is identical to that of the case M/s Suryavamshi Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra) decided by the coordinate bench, respectfully following the same we set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer to decide the same in the light of the said decision of the coordinate bench in the case of M/s Suryavamshi Spinning Mills Ltd.(supra). This ground of appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. 24. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Pronounced in the open court on 27/11/2012.
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2012 (11) TMI 1232
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... ... ..... y in the interest of investors or securities market. The appellant company has acted as broker to Zala and Dave in the trading of the scrip of the company done on October 14, 2011 which has allegedly manipulated the market and induced gullible investors to invest in the shares of the company. This conduct is under investigation. After considering the response received from the appellants the whole time member of the Board has come to the prima-facie conclusion that appellants have failed to act in accordance with the provision of the regulations in its dealings with its clients. The investigation is over and the Board is likely to issue a show cause notice within next two weeks. The whole time member has brought on record sufficient justification for continuation of interim order against the appellants. We are convinced that no case for intervention by the Tribunal at this stage is made out. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2012 (11) TMI 1231
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... ... ..... submissions and perusing the material on record, I found that this issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Smt. Durgadevi Mundra and Shri Mukesh Mundra (supra), where identical facts were involved. Similarly, these cases were also reopened on information that the assessee was involved in claiming purchase and sale of shares to earn capital gain etc. The Tribunal after examining the issue in detail and following the decision Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Chandrakant Babulal Shah, passed in 6108/M/2008, where similar facts were involved, allowed the issue in favour of the assessee. Copy of the decision of the Tribunal has been placed on record. Therefore, following the aforesaid decisions, I delete the addition of ₹ 1,71,615/- as the facts are similar to the above mentioned cases. I order accordingly. 10. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on this 27thday of Nov. 2012. 2012.
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2012 (11) TMI 1230
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... ... ..... perspective, in the case in hand, we find that learned counsel for the appellants has rightly argued that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the fact that there was no trading in the scrip of the company since 1998, the shares allotted on preferential basis to the appellants were not listed on the stock exchange till February 3, 2011 are mitigating factors. It is also not a case of market manipulation or of investor’s interest having been adversely affected. There is no change in the management. Perhaps, for these reasons, the Board has not thought it fit to give any direction to the appellants to make a public announcement as required under the takeover code. We are, therefore, of the view that ends of justice would be met by reducing the penalty to ₹ 10 lacs. While upholding the findings of the adjudicating officer in the impugned order, we reduce the penalty to ₹ 10 lacs. The appeal stands disposed of as above with no order as to costs.
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