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Customs - Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 246 Records
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2015 (12) TMI 1202
Undervaluation of import of Dyed Woven Fabrics - denial of availment of DFIA licence for clearance of the goods - confiscation and imposition of fine and penalty - Held that:- appellant is engaged in trading of imported fabrics and imported “Polyester Dyed Woven Fabrics” from China. Appellant’s contention is that contemporaneous imports relied by Revenue in the case of Bill of Entry No.6800547 dt. 11.5.2012 of M/s.ICON Fibers and Fabrics P. Ltd., Mumbai is not comparable. In this regard, we find that the impugned goods and the comparable goods were originated from China and shipment made from M/s.Shaoxing Mina Textile Co. Ltd., China in and around the same time and the date of shipment of both consignments are dt. 29.10.2011 and 11.11.2011 respectively. The appellant is also a trader and purchased the goods from supplier who is also a trader which is similar to evidence relied by Revenue. We find that appellant failed to produce any evidence of purchase order and terms and conditions of sale and manufacturer s invoice before the Commissioner of Customs.
Appellants had relied various Bills of Entry and invoices in the form of additional evidence submitted before the Tribunal of import of Polyester Fabrics. In this regard, we find that appellant submitted written submissions to SCN before the adjudicating authority and also appeared for the personal hearing and failed to substantiate their claim during the adjudication proceedings. Therefore, we do not find any force in appellant relying these documents at this juncture. On the valuation of the goods based on contemporaneous imports, we rely Hon'ble Supreme Court judgement in the case of CC Mumbai Vs ShiBani Engg. System (1996 (8) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA). - In the case of CC Vs Prodeline India Pvt. Ltd. [2006 (8) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] wherein the Court has clearly held that Revenue is bound to prove the declared price is not true value and should bring on record any evidence of identical goods/similar goods imported at higher price.
In the absence of any valid documents by the appellant it is evident that declared price of US$ 0.70 per mtr. is not a normal price and the same cannot be considered as transaction value. We find that adjudicating authority correctly determined the value under Rule 4(3) of CVR 2007 and taken the lowest contemporaneous price of US$ 1.05 per mtr. instead of US$ 2.36/mtr of contemporaneous import was available. Therefore, respectfully following the ratio of above two decisions, we find that rejection of declared price and enhancement of value from US$ 0.70 to US$ 1.05 per mtr. determined by the adjudicating authority is fully justified and liable to be upheld. Consequently, the confiscation of the seized goods under Section 111 (m) and demand of differential duty of ₹ 69,61,352/- on the re-determined value under Section 28 of Customs Act is upheld
There was no allegation made in the SCN for the denial of benefit of DFIA Licence or any misuse of DFIA licene for clearance of the goods. Therefore, we hold that appellants are entitled to utilize DFIA licence for clearance of the said goods. Accordingly, we allow DFIA benefit for clearance of the said goods. - impugned order is upheld but for the reduction in RF and penalty and allowing DFIA benefit - Decided partly in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1201
Valuation - related parties - Import of goods at concessional rate of duty against EPCG Licence - Inclusion of Technical Knowhow fee - Invocation of extended period of limitation - Held that:- technical knowhow fee is for design, drawing and technical information provided to appellant by overseas supplier for setting up of "Instant Coffee" plant which is purely a post-importation activity and not related to imported goods. As held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case, the import components procured from the supplier only 22% on the total value. As regards Revenue's relying the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgement in the case of CC Ahmedabad Vs Essar Gujarat Ltd. (1996 (11) TMI 426 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA), we find that said apex court judgement is distinguishable on facts for the reason that in the said case, licensing fee stipulates a condition for supply of plant and machinery which is not the case in the present appeal.
Following the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment (supra) and the final order of Tribunal in the case of Godrej Agrovet Ltd. (2015 (11) TMI 1025-CESTAT Chennai), we hold that technical knowhow of US$ 1,30,000 is not addable to the value of imported goods. We set aside the demand on merits. Correspondingly, the imposition of redemption fine and penalty is also set aside. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1200
Classification of Optical Fibre Cables used in Telecommunication - exemption under Notification No. 20/2005 dt. 1.3.2005 - Held that:- Since there are judgments of differing opinions, Our differing view is based to a significant extent on the Technical books/Literature, the benefit of which was not available to the bench in the case of Reliance Communications Infra Ltd case or in Optel Telecommunication Ltd. Therefore in our opinion, the matter needs to be referred to a Larger Bench of the CESTAT for resolving the dispute. At this stage we find that other issues such as confiscability and penalties would depend on the decision regarding classification. Therefore we do not propose to take a view on these issues till the larger question of classification is decided. - Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon'ble President CESTAT for constitution of a Larger Bench to decide the following Question of Law which arises in the present case:-
Whether Optical Fibre Cables (OFC in short) imported by Vodafone Group of Companies and used in Telecommunication are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 8544 and eligible for exemption under Notification No. 20/2005 dt. 1.3.2005 or they would fall under Customs Tariff Heading 9001 leviable to basic Customs Duty at 10% under Notification No. 21/2002-Cus dt. 1.3.2002.
Matter referred to larger bench.
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2015 (12) TMI 1199
Demand of CVD - Detention of goods - Held that:- On a perusal of the appeal book, the appellants have enclosed the Customs receipt dt. 13.8.2015 of predeposit of ₹ 6,34,162/- for both the appeals. Therefore, appellants have duly complied with amended provisions of Section 129E of the Customs Act in so far as these two appeals are concerned. Therefore, we do not find any valid reason for detaining live consignments of 2418 monitors for realizing arrears of revenue pertaining to these appeals. Accordingly, we direct the Revenue to release the goods detained under detention order dt. 1.12.2014 subject to payment of customs duty on the 2418 monitors if not paid already. - disputed CVD amount involved in all the three appeals is more than ₹ 1 crore and has recurring effect as regular imports are being done, accordingly early hearing allowed - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1198
Revocation of CHA Licence - Held that:- under Rule 41, this Tribunal has limited power to exercise and pass any order to give effect in relation to its order or to prevent abuse of its process order to secure end of justice. It provides that the Tribunal can only pass miscellaneous order in respect of all the order which have already been passed or to prevent abuse of its process to secure the ends of justice. In case of revocation of CHA Licence of CHA, passing stay order does not fall within the four corners of Rule 41. Therefore it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to pass stay order in a case wherein CHA Licence was revoked by the Adjudicating Authority. Moreover passing stay order from operation of impugned order will be as good as allowing the appeal and CHA Licence will get restored. This Tribunal in case ofM.P. Agro Vs. CC [2014 (12) TMI 859 - CESTAT MUMBAI] has held that there is no provision for granting stay under Rule 41 of the CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982. We are therefore of the view that stay order of this Tribunal could not be passed under Rule 41 particularly in case of revocation of CHA licence - Stay denied.
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2015 (12) TMI 1189
EPCG license - Non-fulfillment of export obligations for the second block period - extension of time from the JDFT - Held that:- In spite of the efforts made by the appellant, the period does not stand extended by the JDFT authorities. They have also observed that they failed to note the EPCG licence No. on export documents and failed to furnish details of exports done during the block period within 30 days of completion of the block period. They did file a statement of exports to JDFT showing details of the shipping bills without EPCG licence No. The Commissioner (Appeals) has observed that though the lapse of non-mentioning of EPCG is a condonable lapse but the same is required to be condoned after submission of certain documents and verification of the same. As the appellants have not produced any evidence for following the procedure in the case, he has not accepted the appellant’s stand and has held that they have failed to fulfill the export obligations and also did not get any extension from the licencing authorities - In fact till date there is nothing on record, even after a lapse of a period of about ten years, the appellants have not produced any evidence to show that the time for export was extended by JDFT authorities. As such we find no reasons to interfere with the impugned order of Commissioner (Appeals) - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1150
Classification - whether the Virginiamycin imported under brand name STAFAC 1000 is classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 2941.90 and Central Excise Tariff Heading 2941.90 or under Customs Tariff Heading 2309.90 and Central Excise Tariff Heading 2302.00 - Held that:- Insofar as the judgment in Tetragon Chemie Pvt. Ltd. is concerned, which was upheld by this Court, it pertains to two competent classifications, i.e., 29/36 as Vitamins or 23.09/23.02 as preparation of a kind used in animal feed. In that case, the product was a premix, the additional items in the product were calcium carbonate, benzene, dextrose, lactose, yeast, soya flour etc. On the other hand, in the present case, imported goods Virginiamycin is a well defined chemical of 100% purity with anti bacterial properties included specifically under Chapter 29 by virtue of Chapter Note 1(a). The judgment of Tetragon Chemie Pvt. Ltd. has, therefore, no application to the facts of the present case. - Decided in favour of revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1149
Levy of penalty on CHA / agent, broker - Import of high end luxury cars from various foreign suppliers by mis-declaring as new - Undervaluation of goods - Imposition of penalty under sections 112(a) and 114AA of Customs Act, 1962 - Demand of differential duty - Held that:- Court noted that the CCIG proceeded to adjudicate the SCN in question, as far as Respondent No. 1 is concerned, without recording the statement of anyone on behalf of Respondent No. 1. Further Respondent No. 1 was not confronted with the statement made by Mr. G.S. Prince. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Sanjay Kantawala, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1, there was no evidence to show that Respondent No. 1 was aware of the acts of his agent, Mr. Prince, as far as clearance of the car in question was concerned. Sections 112 (a) and 114AA of the Act are penal in nature. Therefore, in the absence of some tangible material to show that the illegal import was with the knowledge of Respondent No. 1, no penalty can be imposed on Respondent No.1. - There was no finding, based on the evidence on record, that Respondent No. 1 was aware of the illegal import in which the G-card holder was involved. Considering that it was a question of penalty, there ought to have been some tangible material to show that Respondent No. 1 was aware of the acts of its employee/agent, Mr. Prince. As rightly pointed out, if Respondent No. 1 was found to have acted in breach of Regulation 19 (8) of CHALR 2004, that might call for a separate action to be initiated under those regulations. However, that by itself will not justify the imposition of penalty under Sections 112 and 114AA of the Act unless knowledge of the illegal acts of the agent/employee is able to be attributed to his employer/principal, i.e. Respondent No.1.
Registration certificate of the car obtained by the First Secretary (Trade), High Commission of India, London (UK) was produced before the Appellant. The car was imported into India through M/s. A.K. International and cleared through customs on 4th April 2008 on payment of duty on the basis that it was a new car. It was ultimately sold to Respondent No. 2 on 21st April 2008. The CCIG sought to place the onus on Respondent No. 2 to show how the prior registration in UK, though stated for the purpose of onward sale to India, “has helped the transport authorities of UK for allowing the export of the impugned car.” There was no warrant for shifting the burden to prove the negative to Respondent No.2 unless the Department had discharged the primary onus of showing the involvement and knowledge of Respondent No.2 in the illegal import of the car in question. - deletion by the CESTAT of the penalty imposed on Respondent No. 2 cannot be faulted. The reduction of the redemption fine also does not call for interference - No substantial question of law arises - Decided against Revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1148
Scope of Provisions of CBLR 2013 - Mandatory or Directory - Maintainability of petition Held that:- Writ petitions have been filed, questioning the authority to issue the notice and that the respondent has already predetermined the issue. Though this court is aware of its limitation, while entertaining a writ petition against a notice, the show cause notices in the present cases are clearly predetermining the issue and when the sustainability of the notice is questioned as being barred by law, this court is of the view that directing the petitioners to submit their objections would be a futile exercise. Hence, this Court is of the view that the writ petitions are maintainable.
Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2013 were promulgated in exercise of powers conferred under Sub-Section (2) of Section 146 of the Customs Act,1962. It is only under the regulations, the licence is granted and the regulations also contain various provisions to regulate the affairs of the customs broker including the revocation of the licence. The Regulations contemplates action against the customs broker dehors the provisions under the Customs Act. Therefore, the regulations cannot be treated as sub-ordinate legistlation. Moreover, every implementing authority of any fiscal statute is only performing a public duty. Therefore, it cannot be said that the provision is to be termed as 'directory' just because its adherence is in the nature of performance of a public duty. What is to be considered is the object of the enactment in prescribing a period for the performance of such public duty.
Purpose for which time limit has been prescribed is to curb the smuggling of goods and in the result to cancel the licences of the brokers if they are involved and to impose penalty. The interpretation of a statute must always be to give a logical meaning to the object of the legislation and the aim must be to implement the provisions rather than to defeat it.
When a time limit is prescribed in Regulations, which empowers action in Regulation 18 and procedure in Regulation 20 (1), the use of the term 'shall' cannot be termed as 'directory'. It is pertinent to mention here that the CBLR, 2013 have replaced the CHA Regulations. The CHA regulations did not have any time limit to complete the proceedings. Therefore, by a Circular 09/2010 dated 08.04.2010, the necessity to include a time limit for initiating action was addressed by the Board after field inspection and by a notification dated 08.04.2010, amendments prescribing time period for initiating action and completing proceedings was made. The same was given effect by notification dated 20.01.2014. Whereas, under the CBLR, 2013 having found the necessity to prescribe a period, the Central Board, the statutory authority had included the same in the Regulations itself, when they were brought into force. Therefore, when a time limit is prescribed in Regulations, which empowers action under Regulation 18 by following the procedure in Regulation 20 (1), the use of the term 'shall' cannot be termed as 'directory'. Under such circumstances, the rule can only be termed as 'Mandatory'.
It is only when the provision is strictly adhered to the object can be achieved. Moreover, such an exercise would open the Pandora box. Hence, this court is not inclined to exercise the discretion in favour of the respondents. - writ petitions are liable to be set aside - Decided in favour of appellant.
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2015 (12) TMI 1147
Import of Erythritol - Whether it is only pre-packaged food required to be labelled as per the Food Safety and Standards (packaging and Labeling) Regulations, 2011 but also any kind of food - Rejection of the request of the petitioner for drawing the samples from the consignment for analysis - Held that:- Goods in question namely, 'Erythritol' whether it is a food or food additive is admittedly a food product and finally eatable, therefore, even the remote argument of the petitioner that the product of the petitioner are indeed meant for retail as well as industrial sale, hence, they need not be labelled, is highly unacceptable as per the regulation 2.2.2 of the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011 which states that every package of 'food' shall carry the information on the label as required by the regulation, therefore, it is not only for the pre packaged food but also all kinds of foods whether it is going to be sent to retail outlet or directly to the market for consumption, the labelling regulations will apply.
As a matter of fact, all goods are likely to perish, hence, to avoid undue delay in clearance that may result in degradation of the product making it useless of the food item, labelling has been made mandatory, therefore, the contention advanced by the petitioner that the goods in question 'Erythritol' is used as a food additive in manufacture of the foods and cannot be termed as item which meets the personal needs of the consumers, is liable to be rejected outright, therefore, the impugned order rejecting the request for drawing of sample from the consignment for analysis cannot be interfered with.
When the petitioner failed to affix necessary label on the imported goods with all details, namely, 'Best before use', 'Use by date', and date of manufacture, it is not known whether the goods in question is having the life time for further future use, therefore, this Court finding that the product in question namely, 'Erythritol' has miserably failed to satisfy the labelling requirements, is not able to see any merits in this writ petition, hence, the same fails and is dismissed - Decided against the assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1146
Suspension of CHA licence - Rule of consistency - violations of various conditions by the CHA - Held that:- In the affidavit in reply it has been asserted that a look at the charges against “S.P. Pawar & Sons” would show that similar are the violations alleged to have been committed by the present respondents. Hence, a different treatment is not warranted. We are of the opinion that the case of “S.P. Pawar & Sons" and the present appellant is more or less identical. Though a larger issue of discrimination in the matter of punishment need not be gone into, what we find is that the consistent view of the Tribunal in such cases and in similar circumstances was not found to be perverse or vitiated by any serious error of law apparent on the face of the record.
it is for the Authorities issuing the licence to inquire into the allegations of violations thereof and equally into the lapses committed during the operation of the licence. However, they have certain amount of discretion in matters of this nature and equally while imposing penalty. That should not be lightly interfered with. However, that does not mean that once the orders of the Authorities like Commissioner are capable of being challenged in further appeal, then, the Appellate Tribunal's powers are in any way restricted or circumscribed. In order to render substantial justice and if the Tribunal feels that there is a certain period which has gone by during which the agent has been out of business, then, that is sufficient penalty but such a view cannot be taken in all cases and as a matter of rule.
However, that having been taken in this case consistent with the material produced and seriousness of the charges, that we are of the view that substantial question of law cannot be answered in favour of the Revenue - Tribunal's order in the present case shall be construed as substitution of the penalty imposed, namely of permanent revocation of Respondent's CHA Licence with partial revocation from 20th December, 2007 till 3rd March,2011 and forfeiture of entire security deposit - Decided in favour of appellant.
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2015 (12) TMI 1145
Classification of Brass Builder Hardware - Classification under CTH 8302 1010 under Tariff heading 7415 - Held that:- Respondent has clearly described the goods as Brass Builder Hardware (Nuts). Although the respondent has classified the goods under Tariff heading 8302, later-on they classified the goods correctly under Chapter heading 7415. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the respondent has mis-classified the goods as the description of the goods given by the respondent is correct. Therefore, confiscation of the goods is not warranted and consequently, redemption fine and penalty is not imposable. In these circumstances, I do not find any infirmity with the impugned order and the same is upheld - Decided against Revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1144
Confiscation of goods - Misdeclaration of goods - penalty under Sections 112(a) and 114AA - Held that:- The vehicle before reaching to India was first registered in U.K. and was deregistered thereafter to give an impression to Customs that the said vehicle was new. The motive behind such act is well known to the commonsense - no one can buy a foreign vehicle just casually. Sumit Walia cannot be ruled out to be unknown to the appellant. So also Tarun Kumar does not appear to be unknown to the appellant, when both the persons came to the scene were not unknown to the appellant, he cannot claim innocence being a buyer of Mercedes Benz GL 320 Cdi car came from England. The authority has recorded that vehicle was first registered in the name of Tarun Kumar with registration No. DL4CAV1366 and subsequently within 17 days that was transferred to the appellant. That Registration was supported by indemnity bond to immune Customs duty in the event there is a loss. When the bond was executed the appellant was fully aware about the history of the vehicle. - Bank account was opened in the HDFC and Standard Chartered Banks to deal with the transaction. Tarun Kumar was middleman between Sumit Walia and appellant, it has also come to record that the appellant’s approach to buy the foreign vehicle was not a sudden decision. - Assessee directed to make a pre deposit - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1143
Availment of CENVAT Credit while claiming Duty drawback - Misdeclaration - Held that:- Fact of availment of Cenvat credit and the fact of making wrong declaration in the ARE-I has not been disputed by the appellant. The Commissioner has observed that inasmuch as the appellant has intentionally mis-declared the facts and have claimed the excess drawback, the goods in question are liable for confiscation under Section 113 (h)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962. As the same are not physically available, having been exported, the appellant is liable to penalty under Section 114.
Appellants are regular exporter their product in question and were aware of the legal position that no Cenvat credit is admissible if the exports are being made under drawback scheme. It is precisely for this reason that they availed the credit but did not declare the same in the export documents. On the contrary, they declared that no such credit has been availed. This fact cannot be held to be a human error so as to extend the benefit to the appellant. Huge drawback to the extent of around ₹ 11 lakhs stand availed by the appellant on the basis of mis-declaration made by them. I find no reasons to accept the appellants contention that the penalty should not have been imposed upon them neither do I find justifiable reason to reduce the penalty amount. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1142
Condonation of delay - Delay of 74 days - provisional release of the goods - Held that:- As the provisional release order was passed on 23-9-2013 and received by the applicant. Thereafter the applicant made three representations to the customs authorities for modification of the conditions for release of the goods. We find the appropriate authority has passed the order for provisional release of the goods and there is no provision for modification. In the present case as the applicant filed the appeal with the delay of 74 days, therefore the application for condonation of delay is allowed subject to payment of cost of ₹ 25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand only). The cost is to be deposited with the jurisdictional customs authorities within a period of two weeks - Delay condoned conditionally.
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2015 (12) TMI 1141
Valuation - Inclusion of demurrage charges - Held that:- In the appellant’s own case, the Larger Bench of the Tribunal [2013 (10) TMI 246 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] (both of us were Members) had taken a view that if the demurrage charges cannot be included for levy of Customs duty on the imported goods, even if the assessments are made provisionally. Since the issue is now settled by the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal, we hold that the impugned order passed by the first appellate authority is correct, legal and does not suffer from any infirmity. - Decided against Revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1140
Bar of limitation in filing appeal before Commissioner (appeals) - date of communication of order - Held that:- The order is passed by the Joint Commissioner of Customs, Customs House, Kolkata, against which the appellant has preferred appeal before the ld. Commr. of Customs (Appeals). The preamble of the order itself is very clear, it mentions the date of issue as 6-7-2006 i.e. apparently the date of the communication of the order. It is irrelevant, under what circumstances and how the appellants had paid the dues against the assessed bill of entry, but it is relevant, in filing appeal, the date of communication of the order. In our opinion, the date of communication of the order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Customs as per Board’s Circular No. 16/2003-Cus., dated 17-3-2003, is the relevant date of issue i.e. 6-7-2006 mentioned in the said order for filing the appeal under Section 128(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. No merit in impugned order - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1094
Liability to pay interest on the differential duty of the customs - Delay of 103 days in making duty deposit - no show-cause notice issued by the Revenue in terms of Section 28 - Difference of opinion.
Whether the appeal filed by the Revenue has to be allowed, as held by the Member (Technical) or the same has to be rejected as held by the Member (Judicial).
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2015 (12) TMI 1093
Smuggling of goods - export of the smuggled zirconia into India from Malaysia by a premeditated design - Confiscation of goods - undeclared goods - Held that:- It is surprising that show cause notice does not reveal any incriminating evidence against M/s. Carvel Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, in absence of justifiable ground by Revenue in its appeal, it is very difficult at this stage to implead M/s. Carvel Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. as respondent. Therefore, Revenue s appeal against M/s. Carvel Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. is dismissed. But it does not mean to say that there was no smuggling racket operated to occasion export of the smuggled zirconia into India from Malaysia by a premeditated design. - there was a smuggling racket operated to bring cubic zirconium into India. It is also shocking to note that there was a total failure of investigation to conduct proper investigation in India and overseas. Spirit and intent of section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 was burried causing prejudice to the interest of customs without bringing the members of smuggling racket to the fold of law. When the investigating authority as well as adjudicating authority failed in their duty to bring necessary parties to the fold of law, it is not possible at appellate stage to implead them and press them to undergo trial. M/s. Caravel Shipping Services Pte. Ltd. was neither issued show cause notice nor was adjudicated. There appears lapse on the part of adjudicating authority to keep this concern out of purview of adjudication. No efforts were made by investigation to identify the members of the smuggling racket.
Authority failed to conduct overseas enquiry against the racket and no thorough investigation was made into the affairs of CHA, freight forwarder as well as the consignee and there was only pretence to justice by investigation following an empty formality to pass a superfluous adjudication order. - No doubt there was confiscation. But that is merely a consolation to this country when the racket and mastermind behind that remained in mystery and unidentified. Facts and circumstances of the cases suggest that there was premeditated design to cause subterfuge to Revenue. It is high time to arrest smuggling, without encouraging that to perpetuate. - Decided against Revenue.
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2015 (12) TMI 1092
Demand of differential duty - Held that:- Revenue has not referred to any provisions of law under which it seeks stay of the order. We find that w.e.f. 6/8/2014 Section 129 E of the Customs Act was amended. Prior to this date Section 129 E provided that where in particular case the appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty, penalty, etc. would cause undue hardship to a person, the appellate Tribunal cannot dispense with such deposit under condition to be satisfied. However, from 6/8/2014 there is no provision under new Section 129 E that provides for stay by the Tribunal against order of the Commissioner or Commissioner(Appeals) - Decided against Revenue.
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