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Customs - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 129 Records
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2016 (4) TMI 1167 - SC ORDER
Permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to approach the High Court - The writ petition is permitted to be withdrawn and is dismissed as such with the liberty as prayed for - The respondents will not arrest petitioner No. 2 for a week.
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2016 (4) TMI 1166 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Maintainability of petition - whether the petitioner can prosecute the writ petitions when the order has already been under challenge before the CESTAT? - Held that: - I am of the view that instead of entertaining the present writ petitions, it would be suffice to direct the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the appeal, filed by the petitioner within a time frame - I direct the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai to entertain the application, to be filed by the petitioner, for transferring of the appeal in No. C/40723/15-DB to some other Bench, where, Presiding Officers are available, and also direct the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai to dispose of the said appeal within a period of eight weeks - petition disposed off - matter on remand.
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2016 (4) TMI 1160 - CESTAT KOLKATA
Restoration of appeal - Held that: - On earlier occasions when Order dated 03.12.2015 was passed by this Bench, none appeared on behalf of the Appellant, however, the Appeals were decided by this Bench on merits by giving details findings on the issue. The restoration of Order dated 03.12.2015 passed by this Bench, therefore, cannot be allowed as this court has no power to review its own Order.
Reliance placed in the case of Alfred Berg & Co.(I) (P) Ltd. vs. CESTAT, Chennai [2009 (6) TMI 673 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] - Held that: - the facts of the case not applicable to the case as in that case no summon was served upon the petitioner whereas in the present case the notice issued to the Appellant has not been returned undelivered - if the address given to Cestat Registry is not proper or has been changed due to any reason, then the responsibility is on the Appellant to intimate proper address to the Cestat Registry for communication - Restoration Applications filed by the Appellants dismissed.
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2016 (4) TMI 1153 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI
Imposition of penalty - Section 112 (b) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 – CHA – classification – food supplements – medicaments – Held that: - the imported goods were declared as classifiable under heading food supplements, as informed to the CHA. Further it was CHA only who applied for first check. The issue of classification is a complex issue and it cannot be said that the CHA should have opinion that the goods were not food supplements but were medicaments. Having made the declaration, it was for the Customs Department to find out the correct classification of the same – penalty not imposed – appeal allowed – decided in favor of appellant.
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2016 (4) TMI 1148 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Application for early hearing rejected by the tribunal - recurring issues - out of turn hearing - Held that:- While the Tribunal is right and justified in holding that all appeals should actually come in queue, it is not easy to reject the contention that there must be an emergency ward also. Some cases, which require urgent attention, not merely due to any reason attributable to the assessee, but also for the reason that the issue raised therein may cover the issues raised in several appeals, may have to be taken up out of turn.
Therefore, the appeal is allowed, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter remitted back to the Tribunal to fix a date for early hearing depending upon the convenience of the Tribunal, taking note of the fact that the issue is of recurring nature and that one disposal may enure to the benefit of several appeals.
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2016 (4) TMI 1106 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Whether in the light of the statutory power of CCESC to exclusively exercise the jurisdiction of the officer of Customs, the impugned Corrigendum could have been issued on a date subsequent to the CCESC deciding to proceed with the applications filed before it - Respondent submitted that the order passed by the CCESC deciding to proceed with the application under Section 127C of the Act was passed without hearing the DRI.
Held that:- the Court notices that there was sufficient opportunity for the DRI, if aggrieved by the order passed by the CCESC, to have challenged that order in accordance with law. However, without adopting that course, it was not open to the DRI to have proceeded to issue a Corrigendum/Addendum to the SCN, since in terms of Section 127F(2) of the Act, the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the matter vested with the CCESC. Hence, the DRI had, on the date it issued the Corrigendum, no jurisdiction to issue Corrigendum/Addendum which made a very significant change to the SCN whereby the classification of the imported goods was changed and the duty demand correspondingly increased. Therefore, the impugned Corrigendum/Addendum is plainly unsustainable in law as it contrary to Section 127F(2) of the Act.
Validity of the Corrigendum/Addendum before the CCESC itself - Held that:- this submission appears to be misconceived since no such Corrigendum/Addendum could have been issued in the first place when the CCESC was seized of the matter. So, the question of the CCESC deciding the validity of such Corrigendum does not arise. Also the Court does not wish to comment on the submission except by noting that it is over two years since the CCESC passed the above order. If the DRI decides to challenge the said order, such petition will be decided on its merits by the appropriate forum. Therefore, the Court quashes the Corrigendum/Addendum to the SCN and the petitioner is permitted to revive its application before the CCESC in terms of the order passed by the CCESC in the matter. - Decided in favour of petitioner
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2016 (4) TMI 1105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Seeking release of goods apprehended from the vehicles - Demand of 40% of value of goods - Deposited the tax demanded by Commercial Tax Tribunal for release of goods - Appellant submitted that truck contained some goods of Indian origin and some goods of foreign origin and, therefore, the goods of Indian origin could not have been the subject matter of proceedings before the Customs Department so, the goods of Indian origin have to be released pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal and the goods of foreign origin can also be released subject to payment of fine under the provisions of section 125 of the Customs Act.
Held that:- it will be appropriate that the petitioners may file a representation before the Superintendent (Prevention), Customs Department, Lucknow Division, Lucknow raising all grievances. The petitioners can also apprise the officer that the goods of Indian origin are outside his jurisdiction and that even the goods of foreign origin can be released subject to payment of fine. If such a representation is filed, we have no reason to doubt that the Superintendent (Prevention), above shall take a decision expeditiously. - Petition disposed of
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2016 (4) TMI 1104 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Demand of a sum equivalent to the bank guarantee amount as Customs Duty/Additional Duty of Customs together with interest - Failure to fulfil the export obligations - Licenses permitted the petitioner to import raw materials at 'Nil' rate of Customs duty and NIL rate of Additional Duty of Customs subject to the petitioner fulfilling its export obligations and producing Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC).
Held that:- considering that this Court, under similar circumstances, in the case of Jonson Rubber Industries Ltd. Versus Union of India & Others [2016 (4) TMI 1022 - DELHI HIGH COURT] required the Adjudicating Authority to examine the matter afresh in the light of the EODC obtained by the Petitioner therein subsequently, the Court in the present case sets aside the Orders-in-Original dated 31st March, 2014 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in respect of two advance authorization licenses dated 19th April, 2007 and 13th June, 2008 and directs the Adjudicating Authority to consider the matter afresh in light of the Petitioner having obtained the EODC from the DGFT.
As regards Advance Authorization Licence dated 30th March, 2006 it is pointed out that the DGFT is yet to issue the EODC to the Petitioner. However, the Petitioner is confident that the DGFT will now issue the EODC without unnecessary delay and if the matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority, the Petitioner will be able to produce the EODC. On the strength of the above statement made on behalf of the Petitioner, the Court set asides the order dated 31st March, 2014 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in respect of the Advance Authorization Licence dated 30th March, 2006 and remits the matter to the Adjudicating Authority for decision afresh subject to the Petitioner producing the EODC in respect of such licence.
As regards the Advance Authorization Licence dated 25th October 2006, it is stated by the Petitioner that the Petitioner did not avail of the said licence at all and surrendered it by a letter dated 10th June, 2014. It is further pointed out that the DGFT wrote a letter dated 14th March, 2014 to the Commissioner of Customs in this regard and Deputy Commissioner of Customs in fact confirmed the said fact by letter dated 7th May, 2014. The Court is of the view that the Adjudicating Authority requires to take these facts into account and decide the issue afresh. Consequently, the order dated 31st March, 2014 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in respect of the Advance Licence dated 25th October, 2006 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for a decision afresh in the light of the above facts. - Petition disposed of
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2016 (4) TMI 1065 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Seeking release of goods - Tax already deposited - Samples were not taken in the presence of the petitioners and that it is without jurisdiction - Truck contained some goods of Indian origin and some goods of foreign origin - Held that:- it will be appropriate that the petitioners may file a representation before the Superintendent (Prevention), Customs Department, Lucknow Division, Lucknow raising all grievances. The petitioners can also apprise the officer that the goods of Indian origin are outside his jurisdiction and that even the goods of foreign origin can be released subject to payment of fine. If such a representation is filed, we have no reason to doubt that the Superintendent (Prevention), Customs Department, Lucknow Division, Lucknow shall take a decision expeditiously and preferably within a period of ten days from the date of filing of the representation. - Petition disposed of
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2016 (4) TMI 1064 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking direction for release of bank accounts - Export of imitation jewellery - Petitioner indulged in fraudulent exports by inflating the Prevailing Market value and Free On Board value in order to claim duty drawback and other benefits - Held that:- We are not denying to the Revenue an opportunity of investigating or unearthing huge fraud. We are also not denying them their powers, but surely if drastic powers have to be exercised by public bodies, they must be exercised reasonably and fairly. We fail to understand if a huge and systematic fraud is alleged and perpetrated not only on the Revenue but on the public as a whole resulting in a voluntary deposit from the petitioner, then, why the investigations could not be concluded nor a show cause notice issued nor any steps taken till date. When such petitions are filed, it is our experience that detailed affidavits are filed in order to justify the act, but there is not a word about the delay. On 21st April, 2016, the deponent has time to file a very detailed affidavit-in-reply and file it in Court, but it is surprising that the Directorate and whole of it does not have time to proceed against those indulging in fraud on the public. A justification of this nature comes promptly only when parties like the petitioner complain of a freezing or attachment of their bank accounts and refusal to release them even if bona fides are shown.
This is not a case of an admitted fraud or a liability which is undisputed. Once there are allegations of fraud the Revenue has a larger responsibility and duty to the public. It cannot refuse to take all steps and rest only on freezing of bank accounts of the alleged defaulters. That such an act and which is to be found traceable to different powers and of the nature conferred in the Customs Act, 1962, will not permit the respondents to deprive parties like the petitioner of their source of livelihood. They cannot stop their business by continued freezing of their bank accounts. It is further very clear and requires no reiteration that what is prohibited directly cannot be achieved indirectly or in an oblique manner. A refusal to carry out a duty in accordance with law cannot be justified by such a continued attachment and freezing of the bank accounts. In the given facts and circumstances, we do not see any justification for the same.
Therefore, we direct that the bank accounts shall be released and this direction shall apply to all such accounts which are bearing the name of the petitioner in HDFC Bank and other banks whose names are also notified to the Revenue. The release shall become effective within 48 hours from today. - Decided in favour of petitioner
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2016 (4) TMI 1063 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Revokation of CHA licence and forfeiture of security deposit - Requirement of Regulation 22(5) not fulfilled - Held that:- this Court is not bound by the order of the CESTAT for its precedential value. A careful perusal of the said order reveals that no plea was urged by the said Appellant CHA before the CESTAT that the mandatory time limit under Regulation 22(5) of CHALR 2004 was violated. What has been recorded in the said order is a contention of the said Appellant that the time limit under Regulation 22(1) of CHALR 2004 was not adhered to. That time limit concerns the issuance of show cause notice "within 90 days from the date of receipt of offence report”. In that case there was no occasion for the CESTAT to consider whether the violation of the time limit under Regulation 22(5) of CHALR 2004 for submitting the enquiry report would vitiate the proceedings.
No explanation has been offered by the Department for not adhering to the time limit of ninety days stipulated in Regulation 22 (5) of the CHALR. All that is stated in the memorandum of appeal is that the file could not be traced and therefore there was delay in the SCN being issued under Regulation 22(1) of the CHALR. The issue here is not so much about in the issuing of the SCN. It is about the unexplained delay of over three years in submitting the enquiry report. For the said delay the only explanation is that the first inquiry officer retired without submitting the report. This by no means justifies the extraordinary delay of more than three years after the date of the SCN in completing the inquiry and submitting a report. In the circumstances, the view taken by the CESTAT that the consequential order of revocation of licence is vitiated in law cannot be faulted with. No substantial question of law arise for consideration by this Court. - Decided against the revenue
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2016 (4) TMI 1062 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Seeking bail - Consignment of 37 kg of Methamphetamine seized - Applicant is involved in heinous crime of drug paddling - Earlier bail application is rejected upto the Apex Court - Held that:- delay if any in trial is solely attributable to the applicant and other co-accused, for which, no benefit could be granted to the applicant. It is submitted that as many as 16 applications were submitted either for regular, interim, temporary bail and at one stage even trial Court had observed that accused is trying to delay the trial by indulging into frequent applications devoid of merit and, therefore the application for bail is to be rejected. So far as, report received from Central Forensic Laboratory, New Delhi, is concerned it is a case for the trial Court to appreciate the evidence in light of materials available against the accused and at this stage no clean chit can be given to the applicant.
Simply because the accused has remained behind the bar for about 4 ˝ years and that another report of Central Forensic Laboratory, New Delhi described substances seized by the DRI has no Methamphetamine it cannot be said that the applicant-accused is not involved in the crime where ample material is available for the progress to establish its case before the trial Court. No material exists for this Court to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant is not guilty of offence under NDPS Act, and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail., That involvement of the applicant in the offence involving commercial quantity, prima facie, stands established by the prosecution and it is not necessary at this stage to discuss merit of the subject in detail as the trial is in progress. Further, allegations levelled against the applicant which also include statement of the applicant recorded under Section 67 of NDPS Act, 1985, who accepted 37 Kgs contraband manufactured in the factory where the applicant was the Managing Director, a case is made out by the prosecution to reject this successive bail application in absence of any merit. Therefore, no case is made out to exercise powers under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as prayed for. - Decided against the applicant
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2016 (4) TMI 1032 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Validity of circulars under Section 151A of the Customs Act - Whether ultra vires or not - Import of gold jewellery from Indonesia - Held that:- the impugned Circulars dated 6th October 2015 and 20th January 2016 do in fact whittle down the scope of the exemption available for import of gold jewellery from Indonesia, across the board, only because, according to the Department, the COOs issued by the Issuing Authority in Indonesia could not be verified. The Circular dated 6th October 2015 requires an Officer of the Customs who has issued a SCN not to pass orders of provisional assessments. It requires the original COOs along with “appealable orders” to be sent to the CBEC. Clearly the Circular does not, as was sought to be explained by Mr Dubey, merely elaborate the procedures. It interferes with the discretion to be exercised by the customs officer who is performing a quasi-judicial function. Para 7.1 of the said Circular requires the importers to present facts in support of the COOs, which is not a requirement in the original exemption notification. There is considerable merit in the contention that this goes beyond the mandate of the Customs Tariff Origin Rules and constitutes an unreasonable and onerous condition as far as the importers are concerned.
As far as the circular dated 20th January 2016 is concerned, Regulation 2 (2) of the CPDA Regulations provides for a maximum payment of only 20% of duty differential in the case of a provisional assessment. The insistence on a bank guarantee for the entire differential duty appears to be contrary to Regulation 2 (2). The Court is unable to accept the plea of Mr Dubey that the above Circular emerges from the Regulation 4 and is intended to adequately secure the Revenue and ensure uniformity of provisional assessments across all ports. The said Circular does not leave the issue of what conditions should be imposed for provisional assessment to the concerned customs officer. It requires the officer to demand 100% bank guarantee even in respect of those B/Es which have been provisionally assessed under Section 18 of the Act. It certainly is contrary to proviso (a) to Section 151A inasmuch it dictates to the customs officer in what manner he should complete a provisional assessment. The consequent impugned letter dated 22nd January 2016 came to be issued to M/s. J.B. Overseas only on the basis of the said Circular. Therefore, the Circular dated 6th October 2015 issued by the CBEC and the instructions issued on that basis on 20th January 2016 by the CBEC addressed to the customs officers are in violation of Section151A of the Act and are hereby quashed.
A perusal of the SCN issued to M/s. J.B. Overseas on 26th November 2015 reveals that it is a virtual reproduction of the impugned Circular dated 6th October 2015. SCN suffers from the fatal flaw and has been issued overlooking the COOs produced by the said importer verified by Issuing Authority. Since the SCN has been issued on the basis of an invalid Circular, relegating the Petitioners to the alternative remedy of statutory adjudication and consequent appeal would be a pointless exercise, the said SCN and the proceedings consequent thereto are held to be invalid and unsustainable in law. The proceedings consequent thereto the circulars including the communication dated 22nd January 2016 issued to M/s. J.B. Overseas requiring it to furnish a bank guarantee of 100% of the duty differential while making provisional assessment are hereby set aside. It is made clear that any SCN or any application for provisional release of goods by members of the Petitioner Association and similarly placed importers would be decided by the customs officers in accordance with law uninfluenced by an of the abovementioned circulars, instructions or directions.
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2016 (4) TMI 1023 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of High court order - Appellant contended that consideration of High Court that 'circumstances in which the recovery of articles is stated to be made from the respondent herein is doubtful' could not be dislodged, therefore, High Court has discarded the version of the prosecution by observing that the same appears to be totally unnatural - Held that:- In view of the findings which appear to be without any blemish and those findings are recorded after deep and thorough analysis of the evidence on record, it is found that the respondent herein was rightly and justifiably acquitted of the charges by the High Court. - Decided against the appellant
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2016 (4) TMI 1022 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Validity of impugned order - EODC Certificate not been placed before the Commissioner because of non-receipt from the DGFT - Petitioner submitted that now he has received the EODC Certificate - Held that:- the impugned order is set aside and matter is remitted back to the original adjudicating authority for examining the matter afresh after taking into consideration the EODC Certificate which has now been obtained by the petitioner. The Adjudicating Officer shall issue a notice to the petitioner indicating the date on which the hearing is to be conducted and by which date the petitioner has to file the EODC Certificate. - Petition disposed of
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2016 (4) TMI 1021 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition - Refund of Customs duty - paid at the time of import of the goods - Non-establishment of precondition i.e. there was a non-availment of CENVAT credit for the sanctioning of refund under the Customs Act - Held that:- the appellate authority rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner against Ext.P2 order of the 2nd respondent. Both the 2nd respondent, original authority as well as the 3rd respondent, appellate authority are situated in Chennai, within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. Going by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2007 (5) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA], the High Court having jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions against orders passed by the appellate authorities under the Customs Act, would be the High Court having jurisdiction over the original authority, that passed the first order in adjudication proceedings under the said Act. By applying this test, the jurisdictional High Court in the instant case would be the Madras High Court and not the Kerala High Court. It is noted that the petitioner has an effective alternate remedy by way of an appeal before the CESTAT, under Section 129E of the Customs Act. Thus, in any view of the matter, I do not see any reason to entertain this writ petition, challenging Ext.P7 order of the 3rd respondent. - Decided against the petitioner
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2016 (4) TMI 1020 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Cancellation of CHA licence - Export of Inorganic Chemical through Pipavav Port - On examination, goods found to be Muriate of Potash (MOP) instead of Cobalt Sulphate as declared in the shipping bills.
Held that:- the various statutory time limits prescribed have not been followed in the proceedings, which resulted in the cancellation of the licence. We find that the licensing authority was informed of the offence vide order received on 31.05.2011. The licence was suspended on 17.06.2011 which was confirmed on 26.07.2011. A show cause notice was issued on 11.10.2012. Such notice has been issued after more than 16 months of offence report, that too after the intervention of the Tribunal. Even after issue of such show cause notice, the inquiry report was not submitted within 90 days as required by the provisions of Regulation 22(5) of CHALR 2004- Regulation 20(5) of CBLR 2013. Even the impugned order dated 27.06.2013 was issued to the appellant on 3.7.2013 -beyond the period of 90 days of submission of inquiry report. We find that the Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Courts held that the time limit prescribed under the CHALR/CBLR are to be strictly adhered to. Delay in proceedings, in any stage, will have a bearing on the legality of the proceedings.
In Sanco Trans Ltd. [2015 (7) TMI 455 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], the Hon'ble Madras High Court held that the show cause notice should be issued within the period stipulated under the Regulations. Notice issued beyond the time limit cannot be sustained for want of jurisdiction. Similar views were expressed by the Tribunal in Eltece Associates [2014 (11) TMI 695 - CESTAT CHENNAI]. In S.K. Logistics - [2015 (11) TMI 1155 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], it was held that the time limits prescribed for submission of inquiry report are to be followed. In view of the above the order of cancellation of licence issued without following the prescribed time limits cannot be legally sustained, accordingly, set aside. - Decided in favour of appellant
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2016 (4) TMI 971 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Revokation of CHA licence and forfeiture of security deposit - Non-declaration of retail sale price on auto parts imported for assessment under Section 4 A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for CVD - Failure to verify the presence of the importers in the given address.
Held that:- the bill of entry was filed by the appellant after the goods were detained by the officers of DRI. The said bill of entry was filed on first check basis for verification of the goods before assessment. In such a situation, we find that no malafide or intentional violation of any provisions of the Customs Act can be alleged on the part of the Customs broker. Regarding KYC norms and obligations under Regulation 11, we find that case as made out in the original order is neither convincing nor sustainable.
The Tribunal also observed that it is a settled law that the punishment has to be commensurate and proportionate to the offence committed. In the present case, it is noticed that the punishment of revocation is not justifiable even if it is to be admitted that physical verification of the importer’s premises could have avoided the filing of bill of entry by the appellant. Even in such a situation, the violation in respect of the cargo viz. the non-declaration of the RSP on the auto parts, a debatable point of interpretation, cannot be held against the appellant to result in the revocation of their licence. Here, it is to be noted that the bill of entry was filed after the detention of the goods for inquiry by the DRI Officers and request for physical verification of the cargo before assessment has been made in the form of first check bill of entry. It is found that the impugned order passed on dis-agreement with the inquiry report has not brought out clear sustainable ground for such extreme action of revocation of licence. Violation of CBLR, 2013 has not been brought out as all the points have been elaborately discussed in the inquiry report and no sustainable ground for differing with the same could be made out. - Decided in favour of appellant
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2016 (4) TMI 970 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Imposition of penalty - Section 112(a) and 114 AA of the Customs Act, 1962 - Import of Measuring Tapes of Malaysian origin from Singapore by M/s. Western Impex - Held that:- there is no dispute about the fact that M/s. Western Impex being an actual importer, in terms of the definition of Importer as per the provisions of Section 2(26) of the Customs Act. By confirming the differential demands, as also by giving an option to M/s. Western Impex, Revenue has accepted the said fact. Revenue stand that by helping M/s. Western Impex in placing the orders on the foreign sellers as also by financing the imported consignments would lead to an inevitable conclusion that the appellant was the master mind in the entire export, thus making him liable them to penalties in terms of Section 112(a) or Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 does not appeal to us. The Tribunal in the relied upon decision has clearly held that the appellant having no role to play as regards the declarations required to be made to the Customs Authorities, no penalties upon him can be called for, even if he was the financer of the consignments, since he cannot be said to have done any act or omitted to do as act which have rendered the goods liable to confiscation. In terms of the said decision, we find no justifiable reasons to impose penalty upon the present appellant. - Decided in favour of appellant with consequential relief
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2016 (4) TMI 969 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
Maintainability - Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed appeal filed as not maintainable on the ground that he has powers to hear the appeals which are filed within 60 days extendable by 30 days only, as per Section 128 of the Customs Act 1962.
Held that:- appellant had received the impugned Order in Original on 31.10.2012. However, he could not file the appeal within the prescribed time limit because of his personal pre-occupations. He prepared the appeal and sent the same to the Office of the Commissioner (Appeals) only on 22.2.2013. We find force in the argument of Revenue that time limit for filing appeal with Commissioner (Appeals) is 60 days which is extendable by 30 days as per Section 128 of the Customs Act 1962. It is found that the appeal filed by the appellant before the Commissioner (Appeals) is much beyond the prescribed time limit. The Commissioner (Appeals) have no powers or authority to relax or condone the delay for more than 30 days. Therefore, we find that the impugned Order in Appeal dismissing the appeal field by the appellant as not maintainable is proper and legally correct. - Decided against the appellant
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