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Showing 61 to 80 of 1957 Records
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2018 (11) TMI 1901 - ITAT PUNE
Long term capital gains - assessee had entered into Development Agreement - assessee had acquired the property in the year 1989 which was registered in the name of assessee - AO holds that the said property was acquired out of funds of husband as the assessee had no income - plea of assessee was that the said property was acquired out of joint funds and jointly belongs to all the members of family i.e. assessee, her husband and her sons and daughters - assessee in the year under consideration had entered into Development Agreement and had received an advance which was in the form of security deposit - HELD THAT:- The assessee is in appeal for assessment year 2012-13 i.e. the financial year in which the Development Agreement was entered into between the parties. At the time of entering into Development Agreement, the assessee received only sum of ₹ 5,50,000/- which was though called as entire consideration amount, was actually part of consideration amount since the assessee was also entitled to receive six constructed flats on different floors in the proposed building. The main part of consideration i.e. value of constructed portion to be received by the assessee, was definitely in future.
In such circumstances, where the assessee though had parted with the possession of property for the purpose of development of the said project and had also received so-called consideration for the property, but had not received the main part of consideration i.e. constructed flats, then such a transaction of entering into Development Agreement would not make the assessee liable to pay capital gains tax on entering into such Development Agreement. The said transaction does not amount to transfer under section 2(47) of the Act and in the absence of the same, the assessee is not liable to pay capital gains tax under section 45.
No capital gains has arisen in the hands of assessee on the date of entering into Development Agreement and the computation of long term capital gains in the hands of assessee is not warranted, since the property has not been developed and the assessee has not received constructed portion which is allocated to her share. In such circumstances, order of CIT(A) is reversed and hold that there is no merit in assessing the income from capital gains in the hands of assessee in the year under consideration. The ground of appeal No.1 raised by the assessee is thus, allowed.
Whole capital gains are not to be assessed in the hands of assessee since the assessee was holding the said property on behalf of its family and after family partition, each of the family member shall have equal share - In view of holding that the capital gains do not arise in the year under consideration, the said issue becomes academic at present and hence, we do not address the same.
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2018 (11) TMI 1900 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL AHMEDABAD
Seeking liquidation of the Corporate Debtor - section 33(1) & 33(2) of the insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - HELD THAT:- A liquidation order needs to be passed in respect of the present Corporate Debtor Company eg. Kohinoor Diamonds Pvt. Ltd., as, there is more than 89% voting of the members of the COC favouring for liquidation process.
The order for liquidation of the present Corporate Debtor is passed - Application allowed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1899 - ITAT CHENNAI
Allowable revenue expenditure - Addition towards purchase of movies, programme production expenses, amortization of film and Broadcast rights, consumables and Media expenses - HELD THAT:- This issue also subject matter of discussion before this Tribunal in assessee's own case for assessment years 2004-05 to 2009-10 [2013 (10) TMI 1368 - ITAT CHENNAI] and for the assessment year 2012-13 . [2017 (8) TMI 1661 - ITAT CHENNAI] - This Tribunal specifically found that the monies received are shown as deferred revenue in the year of receipt and are offered as income in the year when programme is aired. The ld. CIT(A), in fact, followed the order of Tribunal in assessee's own case for assessment years 2004-05 to 2009-10 - Therefore, this Tribunal do not find any reason to interfere with the order of ld. CIT(A). Accordingly, the order of ld. CIT(A) is confirmed in the departmental appeal.
Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r. 8D - expenditure relating to the exempt income and investments - HELD THAT:- We have considered the submissions of the ld. Counsel that the dominant intention in making investments in the subsidiary company is not to earn the dividend income, but, to control the business of the subsidiary company and therefore, the said investments should be excluded for the purpose of computation of disallowance under section 14A r.w. Rule 8D. Similar issue was subject matter in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. [2018 (3) TMI 805 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it is amply clear that any investments made in the subsidiary, which is not for the purpose of earning dividend and may be for the purpose of having controlling interest therein, shall attract the provisions of section 14A read with Rule 8D. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the ld. CIT(A) on this issue and sustain the disallowance made under section 14A r.w. Rule 8D(2)(iii).
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2018 (11) TMI 1898 - ITAT MUMBAI
Estimation of income - bogus purchases - Addition sustained by Ld. CIT(A) to the tune of 25% of the total bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- We find that the AO has not disputed the consumption of material in the development of property meaning thereby that assessee might have purchased the goods from the grey market and under these circumstances it is only the percentage of the total such purchases has to be brought to tax. The Ld. CIT(A) sustained the addition at 25% which is quite unreasonable and on the higher side - we find from the perusal of the orders of co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Adeshwer [2018 (2) TMI 1785 - ITAT MUMBAI] that the Tribunal in group concerns restricted the addition to 3% of the total such purchases. We, therefore, respectfully following the said orders of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal direct the AO to make the addition at the rate of 3% of such bogus purchases. Appeals of the assessee are partly allowed
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2018 (11) TMI 1897 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Maintainability of petition - waiver of pre-deposit - validity of auction sale - auctioned property - proper publication for sale of property, published or not - Section 20 of the SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT:- The admitted facts are that the property in question has been auctioned by the Bank and purchased by the respondent No.2 for an amount of₹ 11.77 crores, whereas the notice under Section 13(2) to be recovered from the borrower / petitioner was ₹ 9,25,11,879.56. Pursuant to the sale, as seen from the reply filed by the respondent No.1 Bank (at page 507 of the paper book), the sale certificate has been issued in favour of the respondent No.2, and even a sale deed has been executed in favour of respondent No.2. Physical possession of the property has also been given to the said respondent.
Whether for entertaining the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, the petitioner is required to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from the petitioner as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Recovery Tribunal, in terms of second proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act? - HELD THAT:- On a perusal of the second proviso to Section 18, it is clear that the same pre-supposes two eventualities; (i) that debt is due from the petitioner as claimed by the respondent No.1 Bank or; (ii) debt has been determined by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, and the same is liable to be paid / recovered on the date when the appeal is entertained by the DRAT. In either of the eventualities 50% of the amount of debt need to be made as pre-deposit - It is a conceded case of the respondents that none of the eventualities exist as the amount due to the Bank has been recovered. The application has been opposed by the respondents and decided by the DRAT primarily on an apprehension that since, the petitioner has challenged the auction, the same may be set aside. In other words, the sale remains in a nebulous stage and the sale will achieve finality / confirmed only when the legal proceedings come to an end.
The amount of pre-deposit has to be made in DRAT and not in the Bank. But still when no amount is due from the petitioner whether the pre-deposit can still be insisted upon. The argument can be made that the condition of pre-deposit is to discourage frivolous litigation which if permitted, would defeat the very purpose of the enactment of early settlement of the disputes. The argument is appealing but the same shall not hold good in the facts of the case with which we are concerned. Otherwise, the provision of appeal for persons / entities like the petitioner, shall become otiose / illusory. In fact, the insistence of pre-deposit shall be inequitable in the facts. Nothing precludes DRAT while deciding the appeal, if it finds that the appeal filed by the petitioner is frivolous, to impose such cost as deemed fit, to be recovered from the excess amount already lying deposited with the Bank.
Petition disposed off.
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2018 (11) TMI 1896 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Deduction u/s 80IC - Unit-III was not a new Unit within the meaning of section 80IC of the Act and its initial assessment year would be the same as of the Unit-II - CIT-A held unit-3 is reconstruction of existing business activity of the company and thereby holding both units as a single unit - HELD THAT:- Merely because the assessee company had started conducting its operation of Unit-III, from its registered office, that does not mean that the assessee company has been split out or reconstructed out of Unit-II. There is no allegation that the plant and machinery of Unit-II has been used for Unit-III.
The assessee company has also not only shown tremendous growth in business but has also demonstrated that it has been dealing with and attracting new clients and servicing in new products. We do not find any justification on the part of the lower authorities in denying the claim of the assessee by assuming that Unit-III was not a new unit or that it was started by way of spitting or reconstruction of an existing unit. The orders of the lower authorities are therefore, set aside and the Assessing officer is directed to give relief to the assessee as per the provisions of section 80IC of the Act treating the Unit-III as a separate and distinct unit. The appeal of the assessee is hereby allowed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1895 - APPELLATE AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING, CHHATTISGARH
Classification of services - rate of GST - works contract - execution of project i.e. implementation of IPDS Scheme of Government of India - supply of goods and services fall within the scope and limits of Notification no. 24/2017 Central Tax (Rate) Dated 21 Sep 2017 or not - HELD THAT:- A bare reading of this Notification suggests that prime condition to avail the concessional rate of tax, is that services provided to the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory, a local authority or a governmental authority should predominantly for use other than for commerce, industry-', or any other business or profession. The Advance Ruling Authority in their decision have elaborated at length that the Case of Appellant does not fulfill the conditions laid down in Clause (a)of the said notification for availing concessional rate of tax. The Appellant in his application stated that AAR has grossly erred in passing their order on the sole ground that the services provided by the CSPDCL are commercial in nature as per their MoA. However, the rate of tax needs to be determined looking at the actual use of structure. They further stressed that the objective of the work done under question is to be looked into and not the objectives of the entity undertaking the work.
It is well settled position of law that statue or notification relating to concessional rate of tax should be strictly interpreted i.e. literal rule of interpretation should be followed. In notification no. 24/2017-Central Tax (Rate), dated 21st September, 2017 in clause (a), emphasis has been given on the words " meant for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business". The infrastructure intended to be provided by the Appellant under contract to CSPDCL will ultimately be used for distribution of electricity' and it is undeniable fact that CSPDCL collects charges as per the tariff decided for distribution of electricity which undisputedly falls within the ambit of 'Commerce' or 'business'. Therefore appellant's argument that nobody is bearing the cost of IPDS scheme does not hold water as there is no stipulation to this effect in the notification - It is also no body's case that the cost of IPDS will not be considered while fixing the tariff of electricity to be supplied in future.
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2018 (11) TMI 1894 - ITAT PUNE
Exemption u/s. 11 - charitable activity u/s 2(15) - HELD THAT:- It is evident that the Tribunal [2017 (6) TMI 1363 - ITAT PUNE] granted gave relief to the assessee on the similar issue of applicability of provisions of section 11 r.w.s. 13(1)(c) of the Act. It is undisputed fact that the Advertisement expenditure were always paid by the assessee to the said SBC. In the process, the Tribunal relied on its own order in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y. 2008-09 as extracted in Para No.5 of the order of Tribunal.
Considering the settled nature of the issue, we are of the opinion that the order of the CIT(A) is fair and reasonable and it does not call for any interference. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the Revenue are dismissed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1893 - ITAT MUMBAI
Addition u/s.68 and on account of commission - Bogus accommodation entries - HELD THAT:- In the case of Dy. CIT vs Rohini Builders [2001 (3) TMI 9 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] held that where loans were received by the assessee by account payee cheques and the repayment of loans have also been made by account payee cheques along with interest in relation to those loans and that the assessing officer having allowed the interest claimed/paid by the assessee in relation to the cash credits cannot treat the cash credits as not genuine.
The assessee had discharged the initial onus which lay on it in terms of Section 68 by proving the identity of the creditors by giving their complete addresses, PAN nos. and copies of assessment orders wherever readily available and that has also proved the capacity of the creditors by showing that the amounts were received by the assessee by account payee cheques drawn from the bank accounts of the creditors. It held that the assessee is not expected to prove the genuineness of the cash deposited in the bank accounts of those creditors because under law the assessee can be asked to prove the source of the credits in its books of accounts but not the source of the source.
After considering the various judicial pronouncements with reference to the factual matrix of the case the CIT(A) concluded that assessee has discharged the primary onus with respect to the identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the loan creditors. As brought to our notice that the loan so taken by the assessee has been repaid in the next assessment year 2010-11 by the account payee cheque. The confirmations filed by all the loan creditors are also placed on record acknowledging the repayment of loans.
AO had passed scrutiny assessment order in assessee’s case for the A.Y.2010-11 dated 25/03/2013, wherein there is no adverse observation with regard to the repayment of loan already taken by the assessee to the respective loan creditors.
CIT(A) has recorded categorical findings to the effect that the assessee has discharged the burden cast on him with regard to the identity of the loan creditors, genuineness of the transaction and creditworthiness of loan creditors. The detailed finding so recorded by CIT(A) are as per material on record which has not been controverted by learned DR by bringing any positive material on record. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere in the findings so recorded by CIT(A). - Decided against revenue.
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2018 (11) TMI 1892 - ITAT DELHI
Revision u/s 263 by CIT - HELD THAT:- The present appeals filed by the appellant against the orders passed by the PCIT u/s 263 have, merely been rendered academic in nature.In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant seeks permission of the Hon’ble Tribunal to withdraw the captioned appeals.
Accordingly, the captioned appeals may kindly be dismissed as withdrawn.DR did not object if the appeals of the assessee are dismissed as withdrawn. Thus the appeals filed by the assessee are dismissed as withdrawn.
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2018 (11) TMI 1891 - ITAT DLEHI
Exemption u/s 11 - Proof of charitable activities u/s 2(15) - HELD THAT:- AO enumerated certain activities to say that they are not charitable in nature but only commercial ones, it is not established before us that these are activities that are undertaken by the assessee in the year under consideration only, but neither earlier nor subsequently. There is nothing contrary to the submission on behalf of the assessee that as a matter of fact, all these activities have been undertaken by the assessee right from the year 2007-08 [2016 (2) TMI 1259 - DELHI HIGH COURT] but merely because the AO has chosen to enumerate certain activities for certain years, does not render the binding precedence applicable to the facts of the case.
It is not open for us to take a different view in the absence of any compelling reasons to do so. Further, the decision in the case of Devki Devi Foundation vs DCIT [2015 (4) TMI 186 - ITAT DELHI] rendered by a coordinate bench of this Tribunal was in appeal before the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court [2016 (2) TMI 1259 - DELHI HIGH COURT] set aside the order and restores appeal to the Tribunal for fresh decision, according to law. So no reliance can be placed by the revenue on this decision, which is no longer in force. In these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the learned CIT(A) rightly followed the rule of consistency and allowed the claim of the assessee. We find no reason to interfere with the same. We accordingly uphold it. Appeal of the revenue being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. The appeal of the revenue is accordingly dismissed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1890 - ITAT SURAT
Maintainability of Revenue appeal in Tribunal - low tax effect - Disallowance of deduction u/s.54F deleted by CIT-A - HELD THAT:- Appeal of the Revenue is presented on 10/03/2017. On 11/07/2018 the CBDT has issued Instructions bearing No. 3 of 2018 under file No.F.No.279/Misc.142/2007-ITJ(Pt) prohibiting its subordinate authorities from filing of the appeal to the Tribunal against the order of the CIT(A) where the tax effect by virtue of the relief given by the CIT(A) is less than ₹ 20 lakhs. The instructions have been made applicable with retrospective effect, meaning thereby, these instructions are applicable on pending appeals also.
In the present case, “tax effect” on the total income assessed minus the tax that would have been chargeable had such total income been reduced by the amount of income in respect of the issue against which appeal is filed, is less than ₹ 20 lakhs. Further, the case of the Revenue does not fall within the ambit of exceptions provided in the Circular. Thus, keeping in view the above CBDT circular and provisions of section 268A of the Income Tax Act, we are of the view that the present appeal of the Revenue deserves to be dismissed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1889 - ITAT MUMBAI
Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) - Addition of commission as well as the expenses on an estimate basis which was further reduced by the Ld.CIT(A) - HELD THAT:- None of the authorities below have conclusively proved that there is neither concealment of income nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the assessee. It is only a mere disallowance of expenses on estimates on an adhoc basis. Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act is not attracted when there is an adhoc estimation of disallowance of expenses. Hence, we direct the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty levied U/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. This ground is allowed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1888 - ITAT PUNE
Addition of claim of sundry creditors - addition u/s 69A - Assessee has not maintained books of accounts - HELD THAT:- AO in the order has noted that assessee has not maintained the books of accounts and the case of the assessee is that he is assessed under presumptive tax u/s 44AE of the Act. The fact is that the turnover declared by the assessee has not been doubted or disturbed by the Revenue.
Co-ordinate Bench of Chandigarh Tribunal in the case of Nand Lal Popli [2016 (6) TMI 883 - ITAT CHANDIGARH] has held that where profits declared by the assessee under presumptive taxation was accepted, AO could not make separate addition by invoking provisions of Sec.69C of the Act.
Before us, Revenue has not placed any contrary binding decision in its support nor has pointed out as to how the decision in the case of Nand Lal Popli (supra) are not applicable to the present facts - therefore relying on the aforesaid decision of Nand Lal Popli (supra) hold that no addition can be made u/s 69A in the present case and therefore direct its deletion. Thus the ground of assessee is allowed
Addition being agricultural income - AO held that assessee has taken shelter of agricultural income to explain the unexplained investment in purchase of flat - HELD THAT:- Assessee had claimed agricultural income which was held to be “income from other sources” by the AO as according to him assessee could not prove the genuineness of claim - assessee had claimed agricultural income in AY 2009-10 and the claim of the assessee was accepted in the assessment framed u/s 143(3) of the Act. Before me, it is assessee’s contention that the area of land in the year under consideration has not reduced and assessee had also placed on record the copy of 7/12 extract to prove the ownership of land and sample sale patties. The aforesaid contention of the assessee has not been controverted by Revenue. In such a situation, when the Ld.CIT(A) has accepted the agricultural income at ₹ 1,08,000/- and against which Revenue is not in appeal then on such facts, the contention of the assessee cannot be discarded without there being any material on record to prove that the claim of assessee is wrong - therefore set aside the order of LD.CIT(A) to the extent of ₹ 70,110/- which has been disallowed by Ld.CIT(A). Thus, the ground of assessee is allowed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1887 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Smuggling - actual detention was made after a long lapse of time of about two years - no live-link to detain the detenu as he has not been involved in any case subsequent to the passing of Ext.P1 detention order - contradictions in the detention order - improper communication of the order of detention - violation of the first facet of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- The alleged transaction is not a business contract, which would be executed in accordance with a written agreement as per law, revealing the party's involvement in the smuggling activity. Smuggling of contraband is always done stealthily, without the real operators coming to the fore. They would always use gullible persons in impecunious condition to act as carriers for smuggling of Gold. There is absolutely no doubt that the person, who has been apprehended did not have any business, whatsoever, to fly frequently to UAE. It was only once that he was apprehended and his interrogation led to the involvement of the detenu indulging in abetting of smuggling Gold from UAE to India - The statements of all those witnesses would indicate the involvement of the detenu Faisal P.A. which has resulted in 113 KGs of Gold being smuggled into India not only by the detenu but also his brother Noushad P.A. based in Muvattupuzha, who was actively involved in recruiting persons as carriers of Gold. The said Noushad was involved in arranging the tickets for the carriers trough the aforementioned travel agency and was also proceeded against under COFEPOSA Act.
An adjudication under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 as well as under the COFEPOSA Act does not require the standard of proof, which is normally required for the conviction of a person who stands on trial before a criminal court for whatever offence he has been charge-sheeted against. Adjudicatory process in a preventive detention is only a fact finding process by which the authorities need to be satisfied subjectively, that the person against whom the adjudication is initiated has been involved in actual smuggling or abetting in the smuggling of contraband. No proof beyond reasonable doubt is essential for the passing of an order of detention - argument of the learned Senior Counsel that the statements recorded by the Investigating Officers would only have the effect of statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that an order of detention could not be made relying solely on such statements recorded by the investigating authorities as they are not substantive evidence and could only be used to contradict the witnesses in the course of trial cannot also be countenanced.
We cannot discern a snapping of the livelink here, especially since the accused was absconding despite repeated summons.
Petition dismissed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1886 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - Seeking exemption from surrendering and granting suspension of sentence during the pendency of the present revision petition - HELD THAT:- It is seen that it has become a habit to blame the earlier counsels without any basis, though the complaints against earlier counsels in some cases may be true but to substantiate such complaints, there should be some action or material from the side of the petitioner on the record. The petitioner No. 2 in this case has not complained against the earlier counsel to the Bar Council of Delhi or Bar Council of India in this regard at any point of time. The submissions made are required to be nipped in the bud. It is also not the case of the petitioner No. 2 that he had at any point of time asked his counsel about the suspension of the sentence. Even otherwise, this submission of the petitioner No. 2 has no bearing on the merits of the present application.
The Court cannot be helpless and allow the convict to make a mockery of the criminal system. The respondent No. 2, who filed the complaint against the petitioners under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on 8.5.2013, must be cursing the criminal system finding that neither he has received any money nor the petitioner No. 2 was arrested despite being convicted and has also not surrendered without any effective orders of suspension of substantive sentence at present from the High Court or any other Court.
There are no merit or ground in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner No. 2 to allow the application and exempt the petitioner No. 2 from surrendering and grant suspension of the sentence during the pendency of the present revision petition at this stage - application dismissed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1885 - ITAT MUMBAI
Deduction claimed u/s 80IB(10) - AO disallowed the said deduction by holding that the assessee is merely an owner and not a developer and therefore not qualified for seeking deduction - HELD THAT:- Section 80IB(10) of the Act clearly speaks about the deduction “in the case of an undertaking developing and building housing project” and such a development of housing project is not possible without contribution of land and specified pre-approved sanction. In the present case the process of acquisition of land by the assessee, conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural, seeking statutory approvals by the assessee for the purpose of construction of dwelling units/houses for weaker sections from the Government of Maharasthra, appropriate plan sanctions, and finally the grant of bare permission and licence to the developer to enter upon the property for construction of the said building was also falls within the ambit of “undertaking of development and building housing projects‟. Therefore, in this way we are of the considered view that the assessee is entitled for seeking deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act. Therefore, in view of the above discussion we set aside the order of the CIT(A) holding that the assessee is not entitled for deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act.
Whether assessee is not entitled to deduction u/s. 80IB in view, inter alia of the provisions of Section 80AC wherein it is provided that the assessee is required to file return of income on or before the date specified in Section 139(1)? - As identical issue has already been decided in the case of Uma Developers ( [2016 (9) TMI 992 - ITAT MUMBAI] wherein it was categorically held that the claim of the assessee cannot be disallowed under section 80IB(10) of the Act only on the ground that the return of income was filed beyond the period stipulated under section 139(1) of the Act in view of the provisions of Section 80AC of the Act as the same is beyond the scope of Section 139(1) of the Act the submission of return within time as specified under sub section (4) of section 139 has to be taken as sufficient compliance for the provision of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as it was expounded that the sub section (1) and sub section (4) of section 139 have to be read together. Hence, it is the inevitable conclusion that the return of income filed within the time specified in sub-section (4) has to be considered as having been filed within the time prescribed in sub section (1) of Section 139 of the Act - See TRUSTEES OF TULSIDAS GOPALJI CHARITABLE AND CHALESHWAR TEMPLE TRUST VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX [1993 (9) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]
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2018 (11) TMI 1884 - ITAT KOLKATA
Estimation of assessee’s income @ 0.4% of its total turnover - CIT-DR vehemently contends during the course of hearing that CIT(A) has erred in law as well as on facts in estimating assessee’s income @ 0.4% of its total turnover - HELD THAT:- CIT-A fails to dispute the fact the CIT(A) has gone by his findings in earlier assessment years thereby adopting the judicial consistency. The said estimation in earlier assessment years has admittedly attained finality. There is no other material to dispute correctness thereof failed during the course of hearing. We therefore find no fault in CIT(A)’s action estimating the assessee’s income @ 0.4% of its turnover.
Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) - non-deduction of TDS - Revenue’s latter substantive ground seeking to revive u/s 40(a)(ia) (supra) that has no legs to stand since the relevant books forming foundation thereof already stand rejected. The Revenue fails in its both substantive grounds accordingly. Appeal of revenue dismissed.
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2018 (11) TMI 1883 - ITAT MUMBAI
Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) - interest received on term deposit from SBI - HELD THAT:- As assessee has claimed deduction on above said interest income u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act only and not u/s 80P(2)(d) claim is to be allowed as relying on the case of Shri Tatyasaheb Mohite Nagari Sahakari Patpedhi Ltd. [2018 (4) TMI 446 - ITAT MUMBAI] as stating that the amount which was invested in banks to earn interest was not an amount due to any members. It was not the liability. It was not shown as liability in their account. In fact this amount which is in the nature of profits and gains, was not immediately required by the assessee for lending money to the members, as there were no takers.
Therefore they had deposited the money in a bank so as to earn interest. The said interest income is attributable to carrying on the business of banking and therefore it is liable to be deducted in terms of Section 80P(1) of the Act. The order passed by the appellate authorities denying the benefit of deduction of the aforesaid amount is unsustainable in law. - Decided in favour of assessee.
Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) on commission income earned by the assessee from Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) - As relying on DRONAGIRI NAGRI SAHAKARI PATSANSTHA MARYADIT VERSUS THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-3, PANVEL [2018 (6) TMI 1576 - ITAT PUNE] we set aside the order passed by the learned CIT(A) and direct the Assessing Officer to allow deduction u/s. 80(P)(2)(a)(i) of the Act in respect of commission income also. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2018 (11) TMI 1882 - SC ORDER
Transfer of shares - existence of revenue stamp as fixed on the transfer certificates on the date of the issuance thereof - HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
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