|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 1976 Records
-
2018 (4) TMI 1820 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Amnesty Scheme - whether the owner of a property, which is brought to sale under the provisions of Revenue Recovery Act and bid on behalf of the Government, thus treating it as bought-in-land, can seek reconveyance of the same once the liability, against which revenue recovery action had been initiated, has been paid off subsequently either in full or under the terms of an Amnesty Scheme?
HELD THAT:- The power of restitution of this Court is edificed on the acme principles of justice, equity and fair play and wherever it becomes necessary, this Court would not refrain from passing orders to ensure that litigants, who are illegally and unfairly divested of their properties, are restituted appropriately so that the allegation of unjust enrichment is not perpetrated.
In the case at hand, once the orders of assessment had been set aside by Exhibit P1 order of the learned Tribunal, there was no justification for the State to hold on to the property even though such sale was confirmed in their favour by the Revenue Divisional Officer through Exhibit P2 order. The conduct of the authorities in rejecting the request made by the appellant for return of his property, on the ground that the Act does not provide for such a course is completely unfair and improper. There was no justification for the State to hold on to the property as bought-in-land and since they are refusing to return it, it would be enjoined on us, while acting under writ jurisdiction, to ensure restitution in favour of the appellant so as to obtain to him complete justice and equity.
This is more so because, when we pointedly asked the learned Government Pleader whether the value of the land was taken into account while the appellant was offered an opportunity to pay off the tax amounts assessed subsequent to the sale through the Amnesty Scheme, the learned Government answered in the negative and confirmed that the value of the land was not taken into account and that the appellant had paid all the liability under the Amnesty Scheme without the value of the property being set off against it.
The first respondent is directed to issue orders immediately and take action to return the property covered by Exhibit P2 order of the Revenue Divisional Officer to the appellant, after cancelling the sale and the orders of confirmation - appeal allowed.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1819 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
Clarification/direction to exclude the period of 55 days from CIRP period - Section 12(2) of the I & B Code 2016 - HELD THAT:- The period of 270 days which will expire on 19.04.2018 be extended by excluding 55 days to complete the CIRP.
The Bench having considered the entire facts and circumstances of the matter satisfied that the prayer of the applicant deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the Bench clarifies that 38 days time consumed in the litigation in deciding the MA No. 873/2018 filed by Suraksha ARC be excluded (Since on 22.01.2018 the MA was not listed and the Bench heard the MA on 09/02/2018 and orally directed the RP not to conduct any COC meeting till the date of final order on 19/03/2018) from the 90 days period in the order dated 24/01/2018.
Application allowed.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1818 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
Refrain from taking over the possession of the said land till the completion of corporate insolvency resolution process subject to the proviso u/s 14 (1) (d) of the Code - ex-parte ad-interim order directing the Respondent to continue the JDA - whether MHADA land falls within the ambit of clause 'd' of section 14(1) of the Code or not?
HELD THAT:- Even if it is assumed, the Corporate Debtor has been continuing with the possession of the property basing on the JDA, such possession cannot be called as possession recognised under law. It can't be either possession on lease, or possession on mortgage with possession, or adverse possession - this application has been filed by the Resolution Professional through Corporate Debtor to ascertain that he is entitled to the exclusive possession of the property despite no right has been accrued to this Corporate Debtor. When the documents disclose granting licence to this Corporate Debtor for joint development, it is evident on record that this right given to the Corporate Debtor is for joint development by the Corporate Debtor and tenants therein. If it is for joint development, then it is to be understood that it is a right given for joint development not for exclusive development by the Corporate Debtor. Therefore, either by law, or by factual matrix, the possession claimed by the corporate debtor is not recognised under law.
If section 18 is r/w section 25 of the Code, it is evident in section 18 (1) (f) that IRP is endowed with duty to "take control & custody of any assets over which Corporate Debtor has ownership right as recorded in the Balance Sheet of the Corporate Debtor or with information utility or the depository of securities or any other registry that records the ownership records, the ownership of assets of the Corporate Debtor which may or may not be in possession of the in the same section, an explanation has been given stating that assets shall not include the assets owned by third party in possession of the Corporate Debtor, held under Trust or under contractual arrangements including bailment. Assuming the agreement of licence is in force, then also the possession alleged to be lying with the Corporate Debtor cannot become an asset mentioned in section 18(1)(f) of the Code - It is a fact that this Corporate Debtor in spite of taking over from the banks and over ₹ 1,000crores collected from the free sale, this Corporate Debtor till date neither paid money to the bankers nor provided flats to either to the tenants or to MHADA as agreed in the agreement. This postponement has been continuing for the last nine years, no respite to the tenants, the rent has not been paid for the last several years, that due outstanding has itself been accrued to ₹ 35crores. This has been clearly recorded in the order passed by Hon'ble High Court on 20.03.2017 mentioning that flats have not been made ready to be given either to tenants or to MHADA. It is a public land and meant for public use, the corporate debtor is not expected to game the system without any development for the last nine years.
Even if termination of JDA by MHADA is not taken into consideration, we don't find any covenant in favour of the Corporate Debtor transferring possessory rights over the property of MHADA to the Corporate Debtor henceforth, this Bench hereby holds that possessory rights has not been transferred to the Corporate Debtor by virtue of the agreements entered in the year 2008 as well as in 2011.
It is also trite law that whenever any section is with overriding effect or prohibiting in nature, it has to be applied strictly to the ambit that has been mentioned under the section. It cannot be liberally used to apply to something that is not mentioned in the section. Therefore, when a party exercises its right of termination, it will not fall within the ambit of section 14(1)(a), here there is no scope to apply the object or purpose of Code or purpose of the section to extend the purview of this section - thus, the onerous duty is cast upon the Adjudicating Authority to examine into as to which issue is hit by section 238, which is not, if that discretion is not properly exercised, then it will jeopardise the rights of the parties. One must not get lost sight of the fact that the rights vested with the parties will not be extinguished by a statute much less by a court of law unless it has been legislated that a particular right vested with the parties has been held as extinguished by virtue of a legislation. In the backdrop of this, it is clear that there cannot be an omnibus application of section 238 to each and every issue related to corporate debtor.
Whether this Bench can ignore such situation saying that since it is Section 7 or 9 petition, it will pass an admission order thereafter to proceed with CIRP ignoring the fraud manipulated by the company through its management. There can be myriad situations such as above causing uncertainty to the rights of the parties, if section 238 is applied without taking the context involved in the case into consideration.
This Bench has not found any merit in the application moved by the Resolution Professional/Petitioner - Application dismissed.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1817 - ITAT BANGALORE
TP Adjustment - Comparable selection - HELD THAT:- Referring to Software development services and IT enabled services of assessee, thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee need to be deselected from final list.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1816 - ITAT MUMBAI
TP Adjustment - international transaction - TPO worked out Transfer Pricing adjustment at nil by applying the difference in PLI to the value of international transaction alone - HELD THAT:- As relying on TARA JEWELS EXPORTS PVT. LTD [2015 (12) TMI 1130 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] Adjustment to the transfer price should be restricted to the value of international transaction i.e. transactions entered into by the assessee with its AEs and not in relation to the transactions entered into by the assessee with third parties. Accordingly, we confirm the order of CIT(A) and this issue of Revenue's appeal is dismissed
-
2018 (4) TMI 1815 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, KOLKATA
Compounding of Offence - allegation against the offender/director are that he was the Director of more than twenty private limited companies till 31st March, 2015 - section 165(1) read with section 165(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- The offender/director was holding the post as a Director in more than 20 companies at once till 31 03 2015. He tendered his resignation as a Director by one of such companies on 19.122015. However, its intimation was sent to the Registrar in Form DIR-12 on 10 02 2016 Thus, there was a delay of 272 days in tendering resignation, meaning thereby the offender/director was the Director in more than 20 private limited companies for a period of 272 days - As per section 165(6) of the Act, punishment for violation of provisions of section 165(1) read with section 165(3) of the Companies Act is "fine which shall not be less than ₹ 5,000/- but which may extend to ₹ 25,000/- for every day after the first during which the contravention continues.
It is seen from the bare perusal of the facts that on 31.03.2015, the offender director vacated office of the directorship of the company I.e. Fabius Private Ltd. However, his resignation was forwarded to Registrar of Companies on 10.02.2016. It appears to us that the delay was caused in onward transmission of the resignation to ROC, this is a proper and adequate ground for us to consider prayer of leniency in directing to pay compounding fees.
Petition disposed off.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1814 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT
Violation of principles of natural justice - Validity of assessment order - impugned orders are challenged on the short ground that show cause notices as well as personal hearing in both these cases were granted by one Officer, but the impugned orders were passed by a different Officer - HELD THAT:- If a case is heard by one Bench in a Court of Law and the judgment is delivered by another Bench without any further hearing, the same would tantamount to a judgment being delivered without hearing. The very purpose of personal hearing is to enable the Assessing Officer to either get enlightened or to enlighten the Assessee about the nature of the claim made by them. It is actually a two way communication. It has been repeatedly held that wherever a request is made for personal hearing, but the same was not granted, the orders passed without the grant of personal hearing are in violation of the principles of justice. Therefore, there is no use in contending that someone else has already heard the case and passed on the information to the present incumbent.
The impugned orders are set aside and the Officer now holding the post is directed to give an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners. After granting the opportunity of personal hearing, the Assessing Officer shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law - Petition allowed.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1813 - ITAT MUMBAI
Disallowance of business promotion expenses u/s 37 - CIT(A) was of the view that an amount incurred in connection with installation of stall and participation fees are allowable and the remaining expenses was not allowable in view of the Explanation-1 of Section 37(1) - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) was of the view that these fees are for participation fees and installation of stall which was not prohibited by the Medical Council Act.
So far as the remaining claim of the assessee is in connection with the expenses is concerned, the claim of the assessee is that the said expenses is not required to be allowed on the basis of the Circular No.5 of 2012 dated 01.08.2012 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi vide F.No.225/142/20120-ITA-11which was prospective in nature. It is not in dispute that the present assessment year is for the A.Y. 201112 Circular No. 5 and of 2012 dated 01.08.2012 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi vide F.No.225/142/20120-ITA-11 and was applicable prospectively for the A.Y. 2013-14 onwards.
Order passed by the PT. VISHWANATH SHARMA [2008 (2) TMI 423 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] is only deals with the commission expenses whereas no such issue is in question in the present case.
Now, coming to the applicability of the circular dated 01.08.2012 is concerned, we are of the view that the same is not applicable retrospectively and in this regard we are also finding support in law settled in DCIT Vs. PHL Pharma (P.) [2017 (1) TMI 771 - ITAT MUMBAI]. Accordingly, we are of the view that the expenses are allowable, therefore, we decide this issue in favour of the assessee against the revenue.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1812 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Direction to call AGM - no interim relief was sought for by the petitioner in the petition, but later on after considering affidavit interim order passed by Tribunal, without deciding main case on merits - HELD THAT:- Parties have not disputed that the company petition has been filed with the prayer to direct the 1st Respondent to hold the Annual General Meeting for the Financial Year 2015-16 and the petition is pending for consideration before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has not deliberated on the issues on merit including the question as to which member is eligible or ineligible to take part in the AGM of The Madras Race Club (1st Respondent). Without deliberating on the issue aforesaid, based on the report submitted by an Hon’ble Retired Judge of the Madras High Court the impugned order has been passed without notice to the parties who will be affected - No objection was called by the Tribunal for by the Tribunal against the report of retired Hon’ble Judge about ineligibility of one or other person/member.
It is a settled law that the Court or the Tribunal cannot pass an interim order, which amounts to grant of final relief without deciding the main case on merit. In this case as the interim order dated 13th December, 2017 passed by Tribunal amounts to grant of final relief, the order is set aside - In the effect all consequential order(s) passed by Tribunal are declared illegal.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1811 - ITAT MUMBAI
TP Adjustment in relation to manning fees - as per the assessee, if the reimbursement of expenses is considered while determining the arm’s length price of the international transaction, then the rate charged by the assessee which is in excess of the arm’s length rate adopted by the TPO - As canvassed even if one has to go by the manner in which benchmarking has been carried out by the TPO, even then the transactions of the assessee are at an arm‟s length price taking into consideration the amount of expenses reimbursed by the associated enterprise over and above the fixed rate of payment - HELD THAT: Finding of the Assessing Officer clearly supports the assertion of the assessee to the effect that the said expenses have been incurred by it in the course of providing the manning service to the associate enterprise, and the same have been recovered from the associate enterprise as reimbursements. We are only trying to highlight the fact that the said expenses are in relation to the “tested transaction‟ and therefore there is no justification in not considering them while computing the arm‟s length price.
Plea of the Revenue before us, based on the observation of the CIT(A) that the expenses have not been shown in the Profit & Loss Account, and therefore, it cannot be taken into consideration, is to say the least, avoiding the obvious. Ostensibly, if such expenses were to be debited to the Profit & Loss Account, it would require simultaneous equivalent credit to the Profit & Loss Account on account of reimbursements. Ostensibly, if one is to determine the rate charged by the assessee from its associate enterprise per crew per month, it would entail taking into consideration the recoveries by way of reimbursements also; and, as the Tabulation reproduced by us earlier shows that once such recoveries are also factored into the rate charged from the associated enterprise, the rate comes to US$ 150.28 per crew per month and upon comparison with the rate of US$ 150 adopted by the TPO, the amount recovered by the assessee from the associate enterprise compares favourably, and, thus it would obviate the need for any further adjustment to the stated values in order to arrive at the arm‟s length price.
We delete the addition made on account of transfer pricing adjustment of manning services as made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the learned Commissioner (Appeals). The grounds raised are allowed to the extent indicated above.
Disallowance of unabsorbed depreciation and loss - As submitted that the related issue arising in assessment year 2004–05 is yet to be decided as the appeal for the said assessment year is still pending - HELD THAT:- We are inclined to restore this issue to the Assessing Officer for granting consequential relief depending upon the ultimate outcome of assessee’s appeal on the issue in assessment year 2004–05. This ground is allowed for statistical purposes.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1810 - ITAT CHENNAI
Deduction u/s 80IA - treatment to interest income and other income under the head ‘Other Sources’ OR 'income from business' - HELD THAT:- In assessee’s own case for the assessment year 2008-09 [2013 (9) TMI 1256 - ITAT CHENNAI] by following the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Elnet Technologies[2012 (11) TMI 671 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and directed the Assessing Officer to treat the interest income and other income under the head “income from other sources”, which cannot be allowed as deduction under section 80IA.
As assessee has not brought on record any higher Court decision having modified or reversed the above findings of the Tribunal. Under the above facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the ld. CIT(A) has rightly followed the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for earlier assessment years on this issue and sustained both the disallowances and thus, no interference is warranted. - Decided against assessee.
Deduction under section 80IA - lease rent income received from letting out modules of STP to various lessees - AO held that the provisions of section 80IA(4)(iii) of the Act are applicable only for the profits derived out of development and sale of built up space and not applicable for rented property - HELD THAT:- As in assessee’s own case for the assessment year 2008-09[2013 (9) TMI 1256 - ITAT CHENNAI] by following the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Elnet Technologies[2012 (11) TMI 671 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] the Coordinate Benches of the Tribunal held that the lease rent income from modules/built up space of the Industrial Park is assessable under the head ‘income from business’ and such income is eligible for deduction under section 80IA - DR could not controvert the above findings of the Tribunal and brought on record any higher Court decision having modified or reversed the above findings of the Tribunal as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court - Decided against revenue.
Disallowance u/s 14A - CIT- A restricted addition to the extent of dividend income declared by the assessee - HELD THAT:- Assessing Officer is not justified in making excessive disallowance and the ld. CIT(A) rightly restricted the disallowance to the extent the dividend income declared by the assessee. The ld. DR could not controvert the above findings - Decided against revenue
-
2018 (4) TMI 1809 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, CHANDIGARH
Extension of time period for CIRP - Section 12(2) of I&B Code - HELD THAT:- In the instant case two of the promoter-directors of the suspended Board of Directors of the corporate debtor have challenged the vires of amendment made in the Code debarring the promoter-directors from submitting the resolution plan and the Hon'ble High Court has directed the Tribunal not to pass final order in the matter. After the expiry of maximum period permitted for resolution plan, if no resolution plan is submitted for approval the only consequence is to pass the liquidation order. If there is a stay order passed by the Hon'ble High Court on 21.12.2017 a question may also arise whether the period during which the stay continues to operate can be excluded from the period of 270 permitted days. That issue may, however, arise in case where application is filed for approval of resolution plan or in case where the liquidation order of the corporate debtor is to be passed.
The application filed by the Resolution Professional is accepted and it is directed that he shall continue with the resolution process till further orders of this Tribunal.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1808 - SC ORDER
TDS u/s 195 - Failure to deduct tax at source - assessee, a non-resident foreign company - another non-resident foreign company has engaged the assessee in the business of exploration/production of mineral oils, which did not deduct tax at source u/s 195 on payment to assessee - it as the duty of the non-resident foreign company to deduct the tax at source – assessee is not liable to pay interest u/s 234B for default on part of that foreign company (employer) in deducting TDS - HELD THAT:- At the request of Mr. K.Radhakrishnan, learned Senior counsel,
list these matters in July,2018.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1807 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Refusal to sanction of the 500 KVA electricity power connection to the firm - Liability of petitioner to make payment of dues, payable by the previous owner - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the subject property was purchased by the respondent-writ petitioner in a public auction conducted by Syndicate Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. It is not even the case of the appellant that, by the auction notice, the respondent-writ petitioner was made aware that they would be liable to pay electricity dues of the previous owner. While the appellants are entitled to recover the dues from the previous owner, they cannot refuse to grant a fresh power connection to the respondent-writ petitioner, as he has, admittedly, no connection with the previous owner and had purchased the subject property in a public auction conducted by Syndicate Bank.
Appeal dismissed.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1806 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL — CHENNAI BENCH
Maintainability of application - Jurisdiction to English Courts - default of the respondent as recognized by decree of the English courts - respondent who is the guarantor of loan for principal borrower, herein did not repay the amount - HELD THAT:- It is a well-settled law that the courts need not go beyond a decree made in favour of a party and in this case the decree made by the hon'ble High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, London. Since the respondent failed to defend its case before hon'ble High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, London, now it cannot contend that the said order is not on merits. The case laws relied by learned counsel for the petitioner is in support of the clarification to the queries raised by the respondent. In view of all the submissions made by the parties and the observations made, the Tribunal concludes that the petitioner/financial creditor has made out a prima facie case under the IB Code, 2016.
The petition is admitted as the petitioner has made out a prima facie case and also proved that there is a debt due payable by the principal borrower and there is a decree made against the respondent/guarantor. This Tribunal has no jurisdiction to enforce the foreign decree ; however there is no bar in it taking cognizance of the foreign decree - petition disposed off.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1805 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL — NEW DELHI BENCH
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor failed to make repayment of its dues - non-compliance with mandate of section 8 of the I and B Code - existence of debt and dispute or not - HELD THAT:- Proof of existence of a debt and a default in relation to such debt can be proved by documentary evidence as contemplated by section 9(3)(d) of the I and B Code. Section 8 does not prescribe any particular method of proof of occurrence of default - In the instant case it has been noticed by the Adjudicating Authority that the operational creditor had submitted a letter dated September 11, 2017 from ICICI Bank confirming that no amount had been received in the account of the operational creditor from any account of the corporate debtor since July 7, 2016. The existence of debt and default were satisfactorily established by the operational creditor. No pre-existing dispute was brought to the notice of the Adjudicating Authority to reject the application.
Assuming that there was a defect in the demand notice, the Adjudicating Authority was required to provide opportunity to the operational creditor to remove the same. The Adjudicating Authority appears to have overlooked the legal aspects. It also appears that the appellant had sent another demand notice which was received back as "refused". This is claimed to have been filed as an annexure with Form 5 filed by the operational creditor before the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority appears to have ignored the same, for no valid reason.
The case is remitted back to the Adjudicating Authority to admit the application in terms of provisions of section 9(5)(i) - appeal allowed by wya of remand.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1804 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Disallowance u/s 14A - assessee has earned exempt income u/s 10 from the investment in shares and mutual funds - CIT-A restricted the addition - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case [2015 (11) TMI 1668 - ITAT CHANDIGARH] no agreement with the proposition that the Rule 8D of the Rules being mandatory, disallowance as per Rule 8D has be made even in cases where no tax free income has ,ed or where tax free income earned is lesser than the nt computed as per Rule 8D of the Rules. Proposition laid down by various High Courts as mentioned hereinabove is applicable in the present case with full force. In view of this, we direct the Assessing Officer to limit the disallowance made under section 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D of the Rules to the amount of tax free income earned by the assessee - we direct the Assessing Officer to limit the disallowance to the amount of tax free income earned - Decided against revenue.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1803 - ITAT MUMBAI
Assessment u/s 153A - AO jurisdiction to make any addition towards returned income in absence of any incriminating material found as a result of search - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs Continental Warehousing Corporation (Nava Sheva) Ltd [2015 (5) TMI 656 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] has held that in the absence of any seized material found as a result of search, no addition can be made in respect of unabated / concluded assessments which have become final as on the date of search in the absence of any incriminating materials. This legal proposition is further supported by the decision in the case of CIT vs Murli Agro Products Ltd [2015 (5) TMI 656 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein it was held that no addition can be made in respect of unabated assessments which have become final if no incriminating material is found during search.
Additions made by the AO towards unsecured loans under Section 68 of the Act, cessation of liability under Section 41(1)(a), unexplained credit card expenditure under Section 69C, disallowance of interest expenses, consultancy expenses and denial of deduction claimed under Section 80C/80D are not based on any reference to the incriminating material found and seized as a result of search. - Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1802 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Enhancement of income - CIT(A) disallowed credit purchases - HELD THAT:- We have duly taken into account the fact that the assessee is a trader than manufacturer so as to arrive at the above disallowance percentage. We accordingly direct the Assessing Officer to restrict the impugned disallowance @15%. It is made clear that our instant adjudication shall not be treated as a precedent in any preceding or succeeding assessment year.
-
2018 (4) TMI 1801 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of complaint - commission of offences Under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - offence of defamation - HELD THAT:- The problem of identification and correlation of the acts referred to in an allegedly defamatory statement and those connected with the discharge of public functions/official duties by the holder of the public office is, by no means, an easy task. The sanction contemplated Under Section 199(4) Code of Criminal Procedure though in the opposite context i.e. to prosecute an offender for offences committed against a public servant may have to be understood by reference to the sanction contemplated by Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with sanction for prosecution of a public servant. There is a fair amount of similarity between the conditions precedent necessary for accord of sanction in both cases though the context may be different, indeed, the opposite.
The conviction of the Accused Appellant and the sentence imposed would not have any legs to stand. The very initiation of the prosecution has been found by us to be untenable in law. Merely because the trial is over and has ended in the conviction of the Appellant and the matter is presently pending before the High Court in appeal should not come in the way of our interdicting the same. The requirements of justice would demand that we carry our conclusions to its logical end by invoking our special and extraordinary jurisdiction Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
Appeal allowed.
............
|
