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Showing 61 to 80 of 2098 Records
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2019 (2) TMI 2043
Income accrued in India - PE in India - As per CIT-A addition has been wrongly made - grievance of the Revenue is that the CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the PE of the assessee in India is a separate entity and interest paid by the Branch to its Head Office is liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee in India as income - HELD THAT:- This aspect of the matter has indeed been dealt with by the Tribunal vide its order [2014 (4) TMI 733 - ITAT MUMBAI] in favour of the assessee and since the order of the Tribunal continues to hold the field, as it has not been altered by any higher authority, the Ground raised by the Revenue is liable to be dismissed. We hold so.
Addition u/s 40(a)(i) - whether CIT(A) is correct in holding that the provisions of section 40(a)(i) do not apply without appreciating that the interest was chargeable to income? - HELD THAT:- It is not Sec. 40(a)(i) of the Act which has been invoked by the Assessing Officer in order to bring to tax the impugned interest income. Pertinently, in this year, the impugned interest income has been brought to tax on the ground that it accrues or arises in India on account of assessee’s PE in India. In contrast, in the earlier year, Sec. 40(a)(i) of the Act was invoked to disallow the expenditure represented by the interest paid by the Indian branch to the Head Office on the ground of non-deduction of tax at source, whereas in the instant year the said expenditure has been explicitly allowed by the AO after noticing that the requisite tax has been deducted at source. We are only trying to bring out the aforesaid to point out that the Ground of appeal has been raised by the Revenue without considering the relevant facts of the instant year. Be that as it may, the aforesaid Ground is liable to be dismissed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2042
TDS u/s 194A - interest on the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal - HELD THAT:- Pursuant to notice issued on the last date of hearing to the newly added respondent no. 4, i.e. the Department of Income Tax through its Commissioner, TDS Circle, Mumbai, Mr. Yogesh Putney, Advocate, puts in appearance and has supplied a copy of the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Rajbala and others [2018 (3) TMI 1972 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] wherein held in a case pertaining to interest on the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, no tax is payable on the interest up to Rs. 50,000/- and beyond Rs. 50,000/- the tax is to be deducted at source on the aggregate of the amount of such income paid during the financial year.
In view of the above, let notice of motion be also issued now to respondent no. 1, i.e. the claimant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, returnable on 06.9.2019.
In the meanwhile, operation of the impugned order to the extent that it directs the petitioner company to deposit the tax deducted at source shall remain stayed, till the next date of hearing.
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2019 (2) TMI 2041
Capital gain - Scope and legislative intent of Section 2(47)(ii), (v) and (vi) - JDA entered - essential ingredients for applicability of Section 53A of 1882 Act - Meaning to be assigned to the term “possession” - taxable capital gains arises from the transaction entered by the assessee - as decided by HC no possession had been given by the transferor to the transferee of the entire land in part performance of JDA so as to fall within the domain of Section 53A of 1882 Act - The possession delivered, if at all, was as a licencee for the development of the property and not in the capacity of a transferee - In the absence of registration of JDA having been executed after 24.09.2001, the agreement does not fall under Section 53A of 1882 Act and consequently Section 2(47)(v) of the Act does not apply.
HELD THAT:- SLP dismissed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2040
Clandestine removal - shortage/excess in the Annual Shortage and Surplus Report - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal has relied upon in the case of M/S. SAIL VERSUS COMMR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOLPUR [2018 (3) TMI 1684 - CESTAT KOLKATA] where it was held that The issue decided in appellant own case ROURKELA STEEL PLANT [SAIL] VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., BHUBANESWAR [2000 (7) TMI 726 - CEGAT, KOLKATA], where it was held that There is nothing on record to show that the appellants have been indulging into excess clearances without payment of duty. The appellants have satisfactorily explained the difference between the figures as reflected in annual financial account and those entered in RG-I for each and every item.
It is true that the circumstances of the case relied on by the Tribunal were similar to those at hand but what was the stock notionally determined and actually determined in the case at hand, how it was “adjusted” and “not being reflected in the Central Excise records” were not explained at all in the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal. So it might be said that the broad dispute in these two cases was similar. But that the facts were identical had to be established before applying the decision of the earlier case to the one at hand.
Appeal disposed off.
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2019 (2) TMI 2039
Contempt of Court - violation with the order of Court regarding refund of amount within eight weeks from 28.11.2018 - HELD THAT:- Though eight weeks had expired on 24.01.2019, Mr. Vikramjit Banerji, learned ASG appears and asks for more time. It is made clear that this refund will have to be made within a period of two weeks from today. No further extension shall be granted.
List after three weeks.
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2019 (2) TMI 2038
Matter relating to set off of Rs.112 crores is pending before the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai - HELD THAT:- The NCLT, Mumbai is directed to decide the aforesaid matter within a period of three weeks from today.
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2019 (2) TMI 2037
Seeking lifting of attachment - recovery of dues - priority over such dues - whether the charge created by the Customs Department would prevail over the charge created by the Bank in discharge of which the property in question was auctioned and purchased for valuable consideration by the petitioner? - Section 26E to the SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT:- The question of priority of charge was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of UTI Bank Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner Central Excise [2006 (12) TMI 2 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] setting out the scheme of priority in respect of collection of dues, where it was held that In the absence of such specific provision in the Central Excise Act as well as in Customs Act, we hold that the claim of secured creditor will prevail over Crown's debts.
The Section is unambiguous and provides that a charge created over a property to a secured creditor, being a financial institution, would prevail over all other charges created over the asset in question and is absolute in its obligation - In the present case, the charge created by the Bank is prior in time to the demand raised by the customs authorities. Moreover, the customs authorities have not even registered an encumbrance or created a charge but only written a letter to the Registrar not to entertain any transfer of the property in question. This cannot, in any way stand in the way of the Bank, as secured creditor, taking recourse under SARFAESI.
The respondent is directed to lift the attachment over the property in question within a period of two (2) weeks from date of receipt of a copy of this order - Petition allowed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2036
Prosecution and conviction for the offences punishable Under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - whether the two punishments awarded to the Appellant Under Section 279 and Section 304-A Indian Penal Code would run concurrently or consecutively? - HELD THAT:- It was necessary for the Magistrate to have ensured compliance of Section 31 of the Code when she convicted and sentenced the Appellant for two offences in a trial and inflicted two punishments for each offence, namely, Section 279 and Section 304-A Indian Penal Code - In such a situation, it was necessary for the Magistrate to have specified in the order by taking recourse to Section 31 of the Code as to whether the punishment of sentence of imprisonment so awarded by her for each offence would run concurrently or consecutively.
Indeed, it being a legal requirement contemplated Under Section 31 of the Code, the Magistrate erred in not ensuring its compliance while inflicting the two punishments to the Appellant.
The Appellant was convicted and accordingly punished with a sentence to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine amount of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine amount to further undergo one month simple imprisonment Under Section 304-A and 6 months rigorous imprisonment with a fine amount of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine amount to further undergo 15 days simple imprisonment Under Section 279 Indian Penal Code - having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the nature of controversy involved in the case, both the sentences awarded by the Magistrate to the Appellant would run "concurrently".
So far as the merits of the case is concerned, when three Courts have, on appreciation of evidence, found that the prosecution was able to make out a case against the Appellant, there are no good ground to interfere in such finding.
The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed in part.
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2019 (2) TMI 2035
Validity of re-opening of assessment under section 147 - AO received specific information from the DGIT (Inv.), Mumbai that purchases claimed to have been made from three parties are not genuine - HELD THAT:- AO had tangible material before him to form the belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. It is also seen from record that challenging the re–opening of assessment assessee had raised objections before the Assessing Officer. However, before completion of the assessment, the Assessing Officer has disposed off the objections of the assessee through a separate well reasoned order.
As regards the contention of the assessee that there being no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts relating to the assessment the re–opening of assessment after four years is invalid, we must observe, non–furnishing of accurate / correct details relating to purchases made tantamount to failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and correctly all material facts relating to his assessment. That being the case, the re–opening of assessment cannot be held to be invalid
The contention of the assessee that in spite of having information before him, the Assessing Officer did not make any addition on account of bogus purchase in the assessment completed under section 153C of the Act is irrelevant considering the fact that the intent and purpose of section 153C of the Act is different from section 148 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, I hold that the Assessing Officer has validly re–opened the assessment under section 147 of the Act. Accordingly, ground no.1 is dismissed.
Estimation of Income - Bogus purchases - As respectfully following the decision of the Co–ordinate Bench in assessee’s own case we direct the Assessing Officer to restrict the addition to 2% of the non–genuine purchases. This ground is partly allowed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2034
Deduction in respect of interest paid u/s 57(iii) - Interest expenditure on borrowings utilized for advancing loan to the partners not allowable u/s. 57(iii) - CIT-A assessing the interest received on loans as income from other sources thereby upholding the order of the Assessing Officer treating the same as part of project cost - HELD THAT:- As we observe that in this case there exists nexus between borrowings of money from the partner M/S Godrej Properties Ltd and lending out of that to two partners.
Therefore, in our opinion, while assessing interest income received on loans from two partners namely M/s. Repton landmarks LLP and Mr. Ramesh P. Bhatia as income from other sources, deduction has to be allowed in respect of interest payment on loan to M/s. Godrej Properties Ltd. to equal extent. In our opinion decision cited by learned CIT(A) in the case of Dr. V.P. Gopinathan [2001 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT] is clearly distinguishable on fact and not applicable in the present case. In our view, the assessee has proved direct nexus between borrowings and lending. Therefore we are not in agreement with the conclusion of learned CIT(A). Accordingly we set aside the order of learned CIT(A) and direct the Assessing Officer to allow deduction in respect of interest paid u/s 57(iii) of the Act while assessing interest income as income from other sources. Assessee appeal allowed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2033
Effect of subsequent vacation of injunction - how an injunction in personam restraining a person from proceeding with a foreign arbitral reference would impact the application for implementation of the foreign award when such award has been rendered at a time that the injunction was in subsistence, but the injunction has subsequently been vacated?
HELD THAT:- While it is impossible to imagine every possible ground that can be urged by a party to arrest the initiation or the continuation of a foreign arbitral reference even by inviting an injunction in personam, there can be certain broad categories in which such grounds may be placed. There could be classes of cases challenging the jurisdiction of the foreign arbitral tribunal on the ground of the very existence of the arbitration agreement or the efficacy of the arbitration agreement or the survival of the arbitration agreement or the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Likewise, an anti-arbitration injunction may be sought on the ground of the incapacity of the party seeking the injunction or grounds of overwhelming inconvenience to such party.
Another class of reasons invoked to seek an anti-arbitration injunction could be the egregious fraud committed by the party seeking to initiate or pursue the arbitral reference or of the arbitral reference being patently vexatious or unbearably oppressive. In every case, it is the duty of the court to exercise extreme caution and circumspection before issuing an anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunction and, as high authorities instruct, the injunction should be in personam and issued against a party amenable to the jurisdiction of the court issuing the injunction and not issued against a foreign court or a foreign arbitral tribunal.
Just as the legal trinity of justice, equity and good conscience casts a duty on a court to see that a party before it is not unfairly prejudiced, the principles of comity, the respect for the sovereignty of a friendly nation and the need for self-restraint should guide a court to issue an injunction of such nature only in the most extreme and gross situations and not for the mere asking. A court must be alive to the fact that even an injunction in personam in such a situation interferes with the functioning of a sovereign or a private forum which may not be subject to the writ of that court.
When an anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunction is issued by way of an ad interim or interim order without the relevant application being decided finally, its efficacy would never be established till the order has reached finality. And, if foreign proceedings (whether before a court or in course of an arbitration) are continued during the subsistence of an anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunction, the legality of the outcome of such foreign proceedings will depend on the final outcome of the application on which the injunction was issued, whether at the same level or in appeal or revision or the like. There is good reason for such an exception to be made - when a foreign decree or a foreign arbitral award is sought to be enforced and the only or primary ground to resist the same is that the decree or award was obtained by a party in derogation of an order of an injunction in personam against such party being in place by a court of the country where the enforcement is sought, the court in seisin of the petition for enforcement will take upon the adjudication of such ground if the injunction has attained finality.
Since the respondent's injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding the foreign arbitral reference has been vacated and the appellant's application for vacating such injunction has been allowed, such order, which has now attained finality since no appeal against the same has been preferred, will date back to the time of the institution of the respondent's application for injunction and the legal implication would be that the order of January 14, 2016 was never passed - Since none of the other grounds as sought to be canvassed by the respondent in course of the present appeal appear to have been taken before the court of the first instance and since such grounds, even if taken, had to be disregarded since the respondent did not challenge the arbitral award in the appropriate jurisdiction, the order impugned dated August 22, 2017 is set aside and the decks are cleared for the enforcement of the arbitral award dated January 21, 2016 by the appellant in accordance with law.
Appeal allowed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2032
CENVAT Credit - capital goods which have been used exclusively for manufacture of exempted goods when Rule 6(4) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - capital goods which are used exclusively for manufacture of exempted goods, in terms of provisions of Rule 6(6)(v) of Cenvat Credit Rules when the assessee has availed the benefit of exemption Notification No. 30/2004-C.E., dated 9-7-2004 as well as higher drawback available on such exported goods - capital goods which were used exclusively for manufacture of exempted goods which are exported claiming higher drawback under category ‘A’ as it will tantamount to allowing Cenvat credit on those capital goods which is not permissible in terms of Rule 6(4) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
The substantial questions of law as mentioned arise for consideration of this Court in the present appeal.
HELD THAT:- Issue Notice.
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2019 (2) TMI 2031
Seeking permission for presence of counsel at the time of interrogation - HELD THAT:- At this stage, the learned counsel for the DRI denies upon instructions, that the petitioner’s employees were subjected to any oppressive or coercive measures during interrogation. He submits that the petitioner had not been cooperating in the manner the Division Bench ordered on 25.01.2019, although he has joined investigations on 16.01.2019; that he did not appear on 28.01.2019 and 04.02.2019. However, it is submitted that the case was listed on 01.02.2019 and was adjourned for today.
The petitioner shall appear before the I.O. tomorrow at 12 o" clock and on all such dates when he is so required by the I.O. He shall have the benefit of the presence of a counsel who may watch the proceedings from a distance but beyond the audible range. It is expected that questioning will be carried out during office hours.
Petition disposed off.
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2019 (2) TMI 2030
Writ of habeas corpus - seeking quashing of detention order of detenue - it is contended that there is nothing on record to show that the detention order had some nexus with the objective sought to be achieved - the purpose of detention order in the present case is preventive or punitive in nature? - HELD THAT:- Learned counsel of Revenue have been heard, who however have not been able to show anything to the contrary to what has been stated by petitioner counsel. They have not been able to show anything contrary with regard to the law as cited, as has been placed before this Court by the counsel of petitioner.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, case for grant of indulgence is made out.
The petitioner who is detained in custody in pursuance of the detention order dated 08.07.2018 and subsequent orders by means of which the petitioner has been detained is hereby released from custody. He shall be released from custody forthwith until and unless wanted in some other case. The Detention Order dated 08.07.2018 and all subsequent orders are hereby quashed.
The habeas corpus writ petition is allowed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2029
Addition u/s 68 - assessee had filed fresh documentary evidence under Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 in lower appellate proceedings - CIT-A declined to admit assessee’s relevant additional evidence and affirmed the impugned addition - HELD THAT:- We see no reason to express my agreement with such a course of action. This tribunal’s decision in Shahrukh Khan’s case [2006 (7) TMI 532 - ITAT MUMBAI] holds that in case. The CIT(A) cannot refuse admission additional evidence after calling for Assessing Officer’s remand report, we therefore restore the instant lis back to the CIT(A) for afresh adjudication on merits as per law after admitting assessee’s additional evidence filed under Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules. It is made clear that assessee shall be afforded three effective opportunities of hearing in consequential proceedings. Assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes
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2019 (2) TMI 2028
Validity of G.O.Ms.No.57 Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme (SW 4-3) Department, dated 20.08.2018 - supply of eggs to all the noon meal centres - replacing the State level annual tender system to zone-wise tender system for six months - while some of the petitioners challenge the validity of G.O.Ms.No.57, a few of the petitioners also question the rejection of their technical bid to the tender notice dated 20.08.2018 floated pursuant to the said G.O. - main ground of attack made by the petitioners is that the impugned decision made in G.O.Ms.No.57 excluding the egg suppliers from participation in the tender called for the procurement of eggs to the beneficiaries in Tamil Nadu under Nutritious Meal Programme and Integrated Child Development Services Scheme, is violative of Articles 19(1)(g), 301, 303 and 304 of the Constitution.
HELD THAT:- The policy decision of the Government can always be subjected to judicial review on the grounds of unreasonableness, discrimination, arbitrariness, perversity and mala fides. The impugned G.O.Ms.No.57 modifying the State-wise tender to that of a zone-wise tender does not contain any valid and acceptable reason necessitating/warranting modification of the earlier policy decision of G.O.Ms.No.264, by which, directions were given to float State-wise tenders. The impugned G.O.Ms.No.57 does not also contain any reason to come to the conclusion that zone-wise tenders will be more beneficial to the Government than State-wise tenders, as compared to G.O.Ms.No.264 especially when G.O.Ms.No.264 was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 25.04.2014 in W.A.Nos.574 and 776 of 2013 accepting the stand and reasoning put forth by the Government and the same was also affirmed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 13.04.2015 in SLP No.6375 of 2015. Further, the impugned G.O.Ms.No.57 has been issued within a short span of time i.e., within six working days and there is no nexus corresponding to the object sought to be achieved and the decision to introduce Zonal level tender and the exclusion of egg suppliers from participation cannot be termed to be fair, just and legally valid. That apart, the qualifying conditions for deciding the eligible tenderers and other stipulations mentioned in the consequential tender notification dated 20.08.2018 issued pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.57, are neither supportive of the alleged reasoning i.e., benefiting poultry farmers, nor have any nexus to the object of the Nutritious Meal Scheme i.e., ensuring uninterrupted supply of quality eggs at a competitive same price for the whole year to the children. The terms and conditions framed in the tender notification dated 20.08.2018 are violative and contrary to the relevant Act and Rules.
Issuance of G.O.Ms.No.57, ie., zone-wise tender and the terms of the subsequent Notification excluding the egg traders and suppliers like that of the petitioners, are colourable exercise of power and are unreasonable, arbitrary, irrational and discriminatory and also violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is nonetheless important to mention here that the public interest is paramount; there should not be any arbitrariness in the tender matters; all the participants in the tender process should be treated alike and there should not be any discrimination and unreasonableness.
The impugned G.O.Ms.No.57 and the consequential tender notice are quashed - Petition allowed.
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2019 (2) TMI 2027
Seeking a direction for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in respect of disputes which have arisen between the respondent and itself - notified claims or not - whether the claims lodged if not settled or withdrawn by the contractor are included in the final bill - Section 11(6) read with Section 11 (8)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - HELD THAT:- The following conclusions have been reached:
I) Where there is contestation or the decision rendered by the General Manager leaves scope for argument as to whether the claims lodged by a Contractor can be categorized as Notified Claims is best left to the Arbitral Tribunal. In other words, except for the situation where there is no doubt that the claims were not lodged with the Engineer and the Site Engineer as required under Clause 6.6.1.0[67] read with 6.6.3.0[68], the matter would have to be left for resolution by Arbitral Tribunal.
II) Aspects with regard to accord and satisfaction of the claims or where there is a dispute will also have to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. The position in law in this regard remains the same both pre and post amendment brought about in the 1996 Act after 23.10.2015.
III) After the insertion of Subsection (6A) in 11 of the 1996 Act the scope of inquiry by the Court in a Section 11 petition, (once it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction in the matter) is confined to ascertaining as to whether or not a binding arbitration agreement exists qua the parties before it which is relatable to the disputes at hand.
IV) The space for correlating the dispute at hand with the arbitration agreement is very narrow. Thus, except for an open and shut case which throws up a circumstance indicative of the fact that a particular dispute does it not fall within the four corners of the arbitration agreement obtaining between the parties the matter would have to be resolved by an Arbitral Tribunal. In other words, if there is contestation on this score, the Court will allow the Arbitral Tribunal to reach a conclusion on way or another. This approach would be in
keeping with the doctrine of Kompetenz Kompetenz; a doctrine which has statutory recognition under Section 16 of the 1996 Act.
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2019 (2) TMI 2026
Interest on Refund claim - HELD THAT:- It is pointed out by the petitioner that interest has not been processed. To this, the Revenue urges that the decision in VIZIEN ORGANICS, M/S MUNSHI RAM RAM PARKASH, MANGLA ENTERPRISES, DHANJAL ENGG. WORKS, M/S GOEL OIL COMPANY, M/S ARUN ELECTRONICS, POWER INDUSTRIES PROPRIETO SH. TARUN BANSAL, M/S. LUDHIANA AUTO SUPPLY CO., VERSUS COMMISSIONER, TRADE & TAXES & ANR. [2017 (1) TMI 1168 - DELHI HIGH COURT] covers the issue but that the department ’s Special Leave Petition is pending and that an interim order staying the judgment enures and binds the parties.
The processing of the petitioner’s claim for interest shall take place; however, the disbursement of interest shall await the final outcome of the proceedings. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
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2019 (2) TMI 2025
Unexplained income - huge deposits in bank account - Surplus money arising on sale of agricultural land - CIT-A deleted the addition as AO had not been able to point to any other source of income apart from sale of agricultural land and therefore, the deposits in the bank accounts were to be treated as proceed of sale of agricultural land and therefore, exempt from taxation - HELD THAT:- Assessee filed documents before the Assessing Officer. If the Assessing Officer chooses not to cause any enquiry from the parties concerned, he cannot simply reject the sale consideration shown in the sale agreement.
In this case the sale deed has been registered at a value which is below the amount actually received by the assessee and deposited in the Bank account. There was no material whatsoever or any circumstance, which could have suggested that the impugned amount was received by the assessee from any other source. The deposition of the purchaser by way of an affidavit filed with the authorities had shown a higher value which was sufficient to discharge the burden, which the AO had doubted the source of deposit.
There was a sale agreement which was entered into by the assessee with the purchaser for sale of 11 acres of rubber plantation in Kokkayar Village, Idukki District at the rate of Rs.55,750/- per cent. This was also brought on record by the assessee vide letter dated 29/02/2016. The Assessing Officer in disbelieving the evidence had not given any reasons whatsoever to discard the evidence placed by the assessee so as to explain the deposit of sale consideration into various Bank accounts It is also brought to our notice that there was no assessment in respect of the payment of the said on-money in the hands of the purchaser by the Department.
These evidences led by the assessee cannot be discarded without any reasons. In view of this, we are inclined to hold that the deposits made by the assessee in the Bank accounts were duly explained by the assessee and it is to be accepted as genuine source of deposits as there was no counter evidence brought on record by the Assessing Officer. - Decided against revenue.
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2019 (2) TMI 2024
Unexplained cash credits u/s.68 - As explained by the Ld.AR that the assessee had not actually introduced cash but the assessee’s accountant had wrongly passed such entries in the books of accounts. It was further explained that assessee had brought in to his books of accounts his family jewellery, property received out of family settlement, vacant land purchased in Sri Ram Nagar and the land & building in Sri Ram Nagar which were all assets not acquired during the relevant assessment year - HELD THAT:- Since the cash credit standing in the books of accounts of the assessee relates to all the assets discussed herein above, we are of the considered view that the addition made by theLd.AO is erroneous and warranted. From the facts of the case it also appears that the Ld.CIT(A) has also not considered the issue in the correct prospective. Therefore we hereby direct the Ld.AO to delete the addition made in the hands of the assessee by invoking the provision of Section 68 of the Act because the assessee has not actually introduced cash in his books of accounts during the relevant assessment year but it relates to all the assets owned by the assessee explained hereinabove. Appeal of assessee allowed.
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