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Showing 81 to 100 of 1324 Records
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2023 (4) TMI 1245 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Maintainability of appeal - appeal dismissed on the ground of delay - HELD THAT:- The appeal was from Annexure-1 order of assessment passed on 12.03.2022. The appellate order specifically noticed Section 107 of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 which permits an appeal to be filed within three months and also apply for delay condonation with satisfactory reasons within a further period of one month.
The Appellate Authority also took into account the saving of limitation granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION [2021 (11) TMI 387 - SC ORDER]. Therein, due to the pandemic situation limitation was saved between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. It was also directed that an appeal could be filed within ninety days from 01.03.2022. Hence, an appeal could have been filed on or before 29.05.2022, which provision was not availed by the petitioner herein. The appeal is said to have been filed only on 08.08.2022, with a delay of two months nineteen days from the date on which even the limitation period as stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, expired.
There are no reason to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, especially since it is not a measure to be employed where there are alternate remedies available and the assessee has not been diligent in availing such alternate remedies within the stipulated time - petition dismissed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1244 - ITAT RAIPUR
Penalty u/s 271B - default u/s 44AB - assessee has failed to get its accounts audited within the specified due date - what's reasonable cause of delay in terms of Section 273B? - HELD THAT:- As the statutory auditor has provided the audit certificate and audit report only on 22.08.2015 and thereafter the tax audit was conducted, completed and submitted. This being so, we are of the view that the assessee has sufficient and reasonable cause for delay in submitting the audit report. Since the auditor was appointed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, therefore, there is no delay on the part of the assessee.
Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that the penalty levied by the AO u/s.271B of the Act and confirmed by the ld. CIT(A) deserves to be deleted and we do so. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1243 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Geo Chem Laboratory is an accredited Laboratory or not - validity of report issued by such laboratory - option of provisional release - HELD THAT:- Without going into the question of competence of Laboratory considering the importance of the issue raised and the fact that what is involved is genetically modified substance having larger implications, the suggestions of learned ASG accepted, as it would be a further precaution in this regard.
Hearing of this petition is deferred to 7 June 2023. To be listed under the caption “For Directions”.
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2023 (4) TMI 1242 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Requirement to join Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change and the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee as party - HELD THAT:- It is directed that affidavit be filed by the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee specifically regarding the commodities at hand and their role in regulating import. Though the Petitioner has shown urgency in the matter and we understand the anxiety, considering the importance of the issue, we are not inclined to proceed without a specific stand of the Committee, which ought to have been placed on record.
Registry is directed to forthwith send a copy of this order to the Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change and to the Incharge of Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee to draw their attention to this state of affairs regarding the filing of this affidavit without instructions and the appearance.
Stand over to 26 April 2023 at 2.30 p.m.
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2023 (4) TMI 1241 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Levy of municipal taxes in relation to only one area of the PMC namely the "Kharghar Node" - challenge to property tax bills, issued by the PMC to the co-operative societies who are stated to be the members of petitioner No. 1.
Seeking for issuance of a writ of mandamus to cancel the bills and demand notices issued for levying retrospective tax since October, 2016 to 2021-2022 to individual members and societies of petitioner No. 1.
HELD THAT:- About 59 years back, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shivram Poddar Vs. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle II, Calcutta and Anr. [1963 (12) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] has held that resort to the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred and recognized by the Constitution in matters relating to assessment, levy and collection of tax (in such case, income-tax) may be permitted only when questions of infringement of fundamental rights arise, and where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess. In attempting to bypass the provisions of the statute by inviting the High Court to decide the questions which are primarily within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, the party approaching the Court has often to ask the Court to make assumptions of facts which remain to be investigated by the Revenue Authorities.
In another decision of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Income-Tax Officer, Lucknow Vs. M/s. S.B. Singar Singh & Sons & Anr. [1976 (8) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT], it was held that the High Court was not justified in deciding the matter primarily within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities by entertaining a writ petition.
The relevant provisions of MMC Act read with the Rules, creates a robust statutory mechanism not only in respect of everything leading to the levy and collection of taxes but also providing for a specific statutory remedy of an appeal under Section 406 of the MMC Act of an appeal being provided, if a person is aggrieved by the fixation of a rateable value or capital value or 'tax fixed' or 'charged' under MMC Act, to be assailed in such appeal, which is to be filed before the Judge as defined under Section 2(29) of the MMC Act - as per provisions of sub-section (2A) of Section 406 of MMC Act, when such appeal is not filed in accordance with the provisions of clause (e) of sub-section (2), it shall be liable to be dismissed. It appears that for such reasons, it is not convenient for the member societies of petitioner no. 1 to take recourse to alternate statutory remedy as provided under Section 406 of the MMC Act to assail the bills in question.
A bare reading of Section 150A shows that it is a widely worded provision. It has an overriding effect over the other provisions of the Act and the Rules. It would not be a wrong reading of the said provision, if it is observed that such provision, would take within its ambit such situations whereby the municipal corporation could not levy taxes for a retrospective period. This would certainly include the situation as in the present case, namely, the difficulties such as in the present case, when municipal taxes are being imposed after some years of the formation of the municipal corporation as for finalizing the levy of taxes in relation to all the properties within the municipal corporation, is a long drawn process which cannot be overnight. Thus, in view of the clear provisions of Section 150A, the contention of the petitioners that there was no authority with the municipal corporation to levy taxes for the past period in respect of which the bills have been issues, is totally untenable.
The petition is neither maintainable as framed, nor the same can be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is accordingly dismissed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1240 - ITAT MUMBAI
Validity of order passed by the TPO u/s 92CA(3) - Period of limitation - HELD THAT:- After taking into consideration the material placed on record it is undisputed fact that transfer pricing officer has passed order u/s 92CA(3) on 30.01.2013 whereas the limitation for passing the said order u/s 92CA(3) expires on 29.01.2013. Therefore, taking into consideration the provision of the Act and decision of PFIZER HEALTHCARE INDIA (P.) LTD [2021 (2) TMI 1152 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] in the cases referred supra the order u/s 92CA(3) of the Act is time barred by 1 day.
The order of the TPO and draft assessment order are barred by limitation, therefore, resulting in assessee not being a eligible assessee u/s 144C(15)(b)(i) of the Act. Consequently, the final assessment was also bad in law - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2023 (4) TMI 1239 - ITAT RAIPUR
Penalty levied u/s 271B - assessee society had got its account audited u/s 44AB on 10.12.2014, i.e. after the due date laid down in the Act i.e. 30.09.2013 - As argued by assessee statutory auditor was not appointed timely by the Register of Cooperative Society which was not in the hands of the Appellant only after completion of Statutory Audit, Tax audit was done - HELD THAT:- Before us, Asessee has filed paper book containing the documents relating to the letter of Jila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Raipur dated 17.10.2014 appointing the Tax Auditor, audited accounts, tax audit report dated 14.02.2015 and copy of computation & acknowledgement.
It was also submitted explanation of the assessee has not been considered in the proceeding before the CIT(A). It is fairly admitted that the statutory auditor is appointed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and not by the assessee. This being so, we are of the view that the assessee has sufficient and reasonable cause for delay in obtaining the audit report.
Since the auditor was appointed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 17.10.2014, therefore, there is no delay on the part of the assessee. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that the penalty levied by the AO u/s.271B of the Act and confirmed by the ld. CIT(A) deserves to be deleted and we do so. Thus, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1238 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Continuation of proceedings u/s 138 of the NI Act, once moratorium declared - thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel rest on the contention that the scope of the protection accorded to individuals/firms under Section 96 of the IBC (interim moratorium) is wider than that of Section 14 of the IBC.
HELD THAT:- As per the settled law, even in the wake of legal impediment under Section 14 of the IBC, natural persons mentioned in Section 141 of the NI Act, e.g. the petitioners in the instant case, would continue to be statutorily liable under Section 138 of the NI Act.
It is abundantly clear that when the provisions of Section 14 and 96 of the IBC are viewed in context of Corporate Debtors vis-a-vis individuals, as is the case in hand, the scope of Section 14 of the IBC comes across as being much wider than that of Section 96 of the IBC.
Adverting to the submissions made by learned counsel qua the petitioners not being vicariously liable in view of their status being that of ‘suspended Directors’, it would be pertinent to notice that the cheques in question had been issued on 15.09.2019 i.e. prior to the order dated 10.10.2019 passed by the NCLT, Chandigarh Branch, appointing Amit Gupta as IRP. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that on the date of issuance of the cheque in question, the petitioners were still in-charge of the management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor as it was a matter of record that they were its Managing Directors.
This Court does not find any merit in the instant petitions and they stand dismissed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1237 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Permission to operate the overdraft account - Respondents states that the Petitioner did not attend the hearing and therefore, this request could not be considered - HELD THAT:- Before proceeding to examine the larger challenge, hearing of this Petition is deferred to 21 April 2023, to be listed under the caption “For Directions” so that the Petitioner can attend the office of the concerned Commissioner as regards permission to operate the overdraft account.
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2023 (4) TMI 1236 - SC ORDER
Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - forbearing respondent from proceeding further on the ground that the respondent is acting beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - contravention of the provisions of FEMA.
After investigation, the Closure Report has been filed by the Investigating Officer before the competent court of jurisdiction.
HELD THAT:- It is informed that the matter is fixed for hearing before the learned Magistrate tomorrow i.e.on 11.04.2023. The parties are directed not to take adjournment in the matter so as to enable the Ld. Magistrate to decide the matter expeditiously.
List the matter in the third week of July, 2023.
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2023 (4) TMI 1235 - ITAT MUMBAI
Validity of order u/s. 143(3) r.w.s.144C(13) without quoting DIN - acceptability of manual final assessment order without DIN - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the order u/s. 143(3) r.w.s.144C(13), it is noted that the order neither contains the DIN in the body of the order, nor contains the fact in the specific format as stated that the communication is issued manually without a DIN after obtaining the necessary approvals. Therefore we are of considered view that the impugned order is not in conformity with CBDT circular.
The contention of the ld DR was that the failure to generate and allocate DIN in this case is a mistake or at best, a defect and/or an omission, which ought not to invalidate the assessment proceedings.
Though there is no specific provision under the Act which mandates quoting of DIN, the intention of the legislature is very clear from the stringent language used in the circular that for the purpose of audit trail DIN is mandatory and without DIN any communication is deemed to have never been issued except for the exceptions contained therein. We are therefore unable to agree with this contention of the revenue. Appeal of assessee allowed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1234 - SC ORDER
TDS u/s 195 - Royalty - taxability of software receipts - Whether constitutes as taxable income deemed to accrue in India u/s 9(1)(vi)? - income deemed to accrue or arise in India -
HELD THAT:- In view of the order passed in M/S MOL CORPORATION [2023 (5) TMI 1065 - SC ORDER] dismissing the similar Special Leave Petition wherein issue raised by the Revenue is covered against them vide judgment in the case of “Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited [2021 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT], the present Special Leave Petition also stands dismissed.
Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.
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2023 (4) TMI 1233 - ITAT HYDERABAD
TP Adjustment - selection of MAM of the distribution transaction - TNMM v/s RPM - DRP confirmed the findings of the learned TPO that TNMM is the most appropriate method - assessee contending that when once the ITAT concluded in the first round of litigation that the business of the assessee is merely that of a pure distributor, then it is, but natural to conclude that the Resale Price Method (RPM) is the most appropriate method - HELD THAT:- A copy of the order [2020 (12) TMI 458 - ITAT HYDERABAD] in assessee’s own case, considered the functional profile of the assessee in the light of the terms of distribution agreement and held that the assessee is a distributor and not a service provider and also that RPM is the MAM.
Since there is nothing contrary on record, we find it difficult to take a different view for this year under consideration. We, therefore, accordingly set aside the impugned findings of the authorities below on this aspect and restore the issue to the file of AO/ TPO to consider the RPM as the MAM and take a view on the necessity of any adjustment towards ALP for distribution function, after hearing the assessee. Appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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2023 (4) TMI 1232 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of forfeiture order - power of forfeiture was exercised by the Authorized Officer in an arbitrary manner or not - HELD THAT:- Whenever a challenge is laid to an order of forfeiture made by an authorized officer Under Sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of the Rules by a bidder, who has failed to deposit the entire sale price within ninety days, the tribunals/courts ought to be extremely reluctant to interfere unless, of course, a very exceptional case for interference is set up. What would constitute a very exceptional case, however, must be determined by the tribunals/courts on the facts of each case and by recording cogent reasons for the conclusion reached. Insofar as challenge to an order of forfeiture that is made upon rejection of an application for extension of time prior to expiry of ninety days and within the stipulated period is concerned, the scrutiny could be a bit more intrusive for ascertaining whether any patent arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the decision- making process has had the effect of vitiating the order under challenge - In any event, the underlying principle of least intervention by tribunals/courts and the overarching objective of the SARFAESI Act duly complimented by the Rules, which are geared towards efficient and speedy recovery of debts, together with the interpretation of the relevant laws by this Court should not be lost sight of. Losing sight thereof may not be in the larger interest of the nation and susceptible to interference.
In the present case, undisputedly, payment of 25% of the sale price was made by the contesting Respondent on 15th September, 2017; hence Sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 stood complied with. The contesting Respondent was notified to deposit the balance 75% of the sale price by 29th September, 2017. Admittedly, he could not or did not so deposit till 27th September, 2017, whereupon he prayed for extension of time by 25 days by his request letter of even date, i.e., 27th September, 2017. The Authorized Officer responded favourably and extended the time for deposit by 25 days as prayed by the contesting Respondent, i.e., till 23rd October, 2017. Extension of time till 23rd October, 2017, therefore, was by mutual agreement - a course of action permitted by Sub-rule (4). On 20th October, 2017, the contesting Respondent made a further request for extension of time by 15 days citing pendency of proceedings at the instance of Stallion before the DRT - The contesting Respondent not having deposited the balance amount of sale price by 23rd October, 2018, the mutual agreement for extension of time, thus, lapsed with effect from 24th October, 2017. This resulted in the order of forfeiture being passed by the Authorized Officer in terms of Sub-rule (5).
The transaction fell through by reason of the default or failure of the contesting Respondent to deposit 75% of the sale price by 23rd October, 2017, as per the terms of Rule 9(4). On facts, it is found that the contesting Respondent was arranging for funds when he received the summons from the DRT on 10th October, 2017. It is, therefore, clear that at least till that date, the contesting Respondent was lacking in financial resources to make payment of the entire sale price. Although it is not always necessary for an auction purchaser to arrange for funds and be ready to pay the entire sale price within 15 days of confirmation of sale, since extension of time is contemplated in Rule 9, it is beyond our comprehension why the contesting Respondent while applying for an extension of time on 27th September, 2017 sought for only 25 days' time and not for more time, at least up to the entire period of ninety days, being the maximum time that he could have asked for and made available to him in terms of Rule 9(4). He had also moved the DRT for extension of time, which was not granted.
Also, the terms of the auction notice made it clear that the auction sale would be conducted in terms of the provisions contained in the SARFAESI Act. All prospective bidders were, therefore, put on guard as to what could follow in case of a default or neglect. Notwithstanding the proceedings that were initiated before the DRT by Stallion of which the contesting Respondent became aware on 10th October, 2017, nothing prevented him from making full payment of the balance amount and have the sale certificate issued in his favour. It can be inferred from the facts and circumstances that the contesting Respondent was seeking to buy time - While dealing with a case covered by Rule 9 of the Rules, an order of forfeiture of sale price should not be lightly interfered. The contesting Respondent was not genuinely interested in proceeding with his part of his obligations and we see no arbitrariness in the action of the Authorized Officer in forfeiting Rs. 30,75,000/- being 25% of the sale price.
Whether the High Court was justified in its interference with the forfeiture order on the ground assigned in the impugned judgment and order? - HELD THAT:- The High Court to have committed an error of law in directing refund on the ground that the Bank "should not be permitted to enrich by forfeiting the amount from the writ Petitioner". It is not a question of the Bank's enrichment or deriving any undue advantage that the Court was really concerned with. It seems to have posed a wrong question for being answered.
When does an enrichment or unjust enrichment occur? - HELD THAT:- In SAHAKARI KHAND UDYOG MANDAL LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX. & CUS. [2005 (3) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT], this Court had the occasion to reiterate that unjust enrichment means retention of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequitable. Unjust enrichment occurs when a person retains money or benefit which in justice, equity and good conscience, belongs to someone else. The doctrine of unjust enrichment, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another. A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity.
Yet again, in INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS [2011 (7) TMI 1109 - SUPREME COURT], this Court held that a person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust.
The High Court failed to bear in mind the settled principle of law that the power of judicial review of a writ court will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes, unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. On the pleadings, this was not one such case where the High Court should have interfered.
The question under consideration can also be addressed from a different perspective. In the present case, the Authorized Officer had adhered to the statutory rules. If by such adherence any amount is required to be forfeited as a consequence, the same cannot be scrutinized wearing the glasses of misplaced sympathy. Law is well settled that a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil and that a court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statute must, of course, be given effect to whether a court likes the result or not - the second question answered by holding that the High Court was not justified in exercising writ jurisdiction and directing a refund of 25% of the sale price.
The order of the High Court stands set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1231 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reopening of assessment - Scope of new provision section 148A - Scope of amendment by the Finance Act, 2021 which has amended Income Tax Act by introducing new provisions i.e. sections 147 to 151 w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 - contention petitioner that the notice dated 02.06.2022 issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act, lost its efficacy after 03.06.2022 - HELD THAT:- As relying on Instruction No.1/2022 dated 11.05.2022 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) the extended reassessment notices are deemed to be show cause notices under clause (b) of section 148A of the Act in accordance with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court. [2022 (5) TMI 240 - SUPREME COURT] Therefore, all requirement of new law prior to that show cause notice shall be deemed to have been complied with.
Within 30 days i.e, by 2nd June 2022, the Assessing Officer shall provide to the assessees, in remaining cases, the information and material relied upon for issuance of extended reassessment notices.
The assessee has two weeks to reply as to why a notice under section 148 of the Act should not be issued, on the basis of information which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in his case for the relevant assessment year. The time period of two weeks shall be counted from the date of last communication of information and material by the Assessing Officer to the assessee.
If it is a fit case to issue a notice under section 148 of the Act, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice under section 148 after obtaining the approval of the specified authority under section 151 of the new law. The copy of the order passed under clause (d) of section 148A of the Act shall also be served with the notice u/s 148. If it is not a fit case to issue a notice under section 148 of the Act, the order passed under clause (d) of section 148A to that effect shall be served on the assessee.
The submission made by petitioner is that the absence of name and designation of the concerned officer, violates the provision of Section 282A of the Act is acceptable.
Having regard to the provisions of the said instruction, in our view, the notice issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act cannot be sustained. It is, accordingly, set aside.
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2023 (4) TMI 1230 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Exemption on substantial expansion of unit - recovery of erroneous refund - refund was granted on the basis of any approval, acceptance and assessment relating to the rate of duty - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- Respondent submits that this very issue stands raised before the Supreme Court of India as well as several High Courts and stands answered against the revenue. A compilation of the judgments on this issue has been placed before this Court. The same is taken on record.
Compilation of the judgments has been handed over to Mr. Jagpaal Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner who seeks time to examine the same and make submissions - On his request, adjourned.
List on 6th of June, 2019.
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2023 (4) TMI 1229 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Prayer for recording of voluntary statements of the Petitioner under Section 70 of the Maharashtra Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 under the presence of Advocate at visible but not audible distance during interrogation - HELD THAT:- The petitioner’s Advocate permitted to remain present at the time of recording of the petitioner’s statement at a visible, but not at an audible distance. The videography of the said petitioner’s statement also permitted, at the cost of the petitioner. A copy of the said videography shall be handed over to the petitioner after show cause notice is issued to the petitioner.
Petition allowed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1228 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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2023 (4) TMI 1227 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking permission for presence of the Advocate during the interrogation and recording of statements at visible but not audible distance and for video-graphing the interrogation - HELD THAT:- In the case of Vijay Sajnani vs. Union of India & Ors. [2012 (4) TMI 706 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court has directed that during the interrogation of the Petitioners therein, their counsel would be allowed to be present within visible distance but beyond hearing range. The Apex Court while disposing of the writ petition directed that in similar cases, in the event the person (s) summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, wish(es) for similar orders, he (they) may apply to the custom authorities concerned and a similar provision may be made for his/their interrogation in the present of the learned counse - Subsequent decisions of the Apex Court, on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, has permitted the presence of the Advocate during the interrogation of the Petitioner at visible but not audible distance.
The decisions of the other High Courts have taken a view that the presence of lawyer cannot be insisted as a matter of right. However, the decisions have a persuasive value and is not binding upon this Court.
The direction which has been sought by the Petitioners as regards the presence of the lawyer at visible but not audible distance is an aspect of fair investigation and we do not find any reason to take a different view from the view taken by the Coordinate Benches of this Court - it is not deemed fit to grant the relief of video-graphing.
The presence of the Petitioners’ advocate during the interrogation of the Petitioners is permitted at a visible but not audible distance - petition allowed.
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2023 (4) TMI 1226 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking grant of statutory/default bail - non-filing of the charge sheet/report within the prescribed period of 90 days - not permitting CBI for police interrogation - interim bail of the respondent-accused was cancelled on the ground that he did not appear before the Special Court despite specific directions and also did not cooperate with the CBI investigation - HELD THAT:- The facts in the present case are very glaring. Despite the fact that on 16.04.2021, the learned Special Judge allowed police custody of the respondent-accused for seven days i.e., up to 22.04.2021, the respondent-accused got himself admitted in the hospital during the period of police custody, i.e., on 18.04.2021 and obtained interim bail on 21.04.2021 which came to be extended till 08.12.2021 when his interim bail came to be cancelled by the learned Special Judge by observing that the accused has misused the liberty shown to him and during the interim bail he has not cooperated with the investigating agency. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that initial order of grant of seven days police custody attained finality. However, due to the aforesaid reasons of having got the accused himself hospitalised on 18.04.2021 and thereafter obtaining the interim bail on 21.04.2021, the CBI could not interrogate the accused in the police custody though having a valid order in its favour. Thus, the respondent-accused has successfully avoided the full operation of the order of police custody granted by the learned Special Judge. No accused can be permitted to play with the investigation and/or the court’s process.
No accused can be permitted to frustrate the judicial process by his conduct. It cannot be disputed that the right of custodial interrogation/investigation is also a very important right in favour of the investigating agency to unearth the truth, which the accused has purposely and successfully tried to frustrate. Therefore, by not permitting the CBI to have the police custody interrogation for the remainder period of seven days, it will be giving a premium to an accused who has been successful in frustrating the judicial process.
The appellant-CBI is permitted to have the police custody remand of the respondent for a period of four days - Appeal allowed.
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