RULE OF PRECEDENT

[Mr. M. GOVINDARAJAN]

                        ‘Rule of precedent’ is an important aspect of legal certainty in rule of law.  In ‘Prakash Amichand Shah V. State of Gujarat’ – AIR 1986 SC 468, the Constitution Bench has held that a decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the court while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently.   Hence while applying the decision to a later case, the Court which is dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the previous decision.   A decision often takes it color from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered.   The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation.

                        In ‘Union of India V. Dhanwanti Devi’ – 1996 -TMI - 66022 – (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) the Supreme Court held according to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-

• · Findings of material facts direct and inferential.   An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
• · Statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
• · Judgment based on the combined effect of the above.

The Supreme Court further held that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.   What is the essence is decision is its ratio and not every observation made in the judgment.   Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts provided, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.   It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein.   The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent.

                        In ‘Director of Settlements, A.P. V. M.R. Apparao,’ – AIR 2002 SC 1598 it has been that a judgment of the court has to be read in which the judgment was delivered.   An ‘obiter dictum’ as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by court on a legal question suggested in case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision.   Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight.   The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of points raised and decided by the court in a given case.   So far as constitutional matters are concerned, it is a practice of the court not to make any pronouncement on points not directly raised for its decision.   The decision of a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed on the ground that certain aspects were not considered or the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court.

                        Lord Denning said in respect of precedent that each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide the cases by matching the color of one case against the color of another.   To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.   Precedents should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but one must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else one will find himself lost in thickets and branches.  It is to keep path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.

                        In ‘State of Orissa V. Md. Illiyas’ – AIR 2006 SC 258 it has been held that reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible.  A decision is a precedent on its own facts.   Each case presents its own features.   It is not everything said by a judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent.   The only thing in a judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyze a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.  A decision is an authority for what it actually decides.   What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent.

                        In ‘Vishnu Dutt Sharma V. Manju Sharma’ Air 2009 SC 2254, the apex court held that a mere direction of the court without considering the legal position is not a precedent. 

                        From the above it is clear that a judgment has to be read in the context and discerning of factual background is necessary to understand the statement of principles laid down therein.  It is obligatory to ascertain the true principle laid down in the decision and it is inappropriate to expand the principle to include what has not been stated therein.   While dealing with the principle of precedent it is to be borne in mind that a judgment is neither to be read asEuclid’s theorem nor is to be read out context.   Mechanical application of a decision treating as a precedent without appreciating the underlying principle is not allowable.