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2019 (2) TMI 149 - HC - CustomsClassification of imported goods - E-Rikshaws - petitioner disputes that the E-rickshaw parts can be considered as Motor Vehicles under Rule 126 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - whether the Customs Authorities are justified in withholding the consignment of parts of E-Rikshaws on account of non-production of a Type Certificate as required under Rule 126 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989? Held that:- Undoubtedly, the three parts (rear axle, motor and controller) imported by the petitioner are key essential parts for assembling an E-Rickshaw. The cumulative value of these three parts also constitutes a substantial value of an E-Rickshaw. However, it is not disputed that these three parts do not by themselves constitute the complete product (E-Rickshaw). There are, undisputedly, several other parts that are required to be assembled along with the three parts (rear axle, motor and controller) imported by the petitioner to produce an E-Rickshaw. In this view, it is difficult to accept that these parts imported by the petitioner could be construed as a motor vehicle for the purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or the Rules made thereunder. A motor vehicle is a contraption that can be used on roads. E-Rickshaw is clearly a motor vehicle; but the three parts in question, even though being substantial components of an E-Rickshaw, cannot be termed as motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 2 (28) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioner does not dispute that in view of the interpretation as per scope of Rule 2(a) of the Interpretative Rules, the components imported by it are required to bear the same duty as applicable to an E-Rickshaw. The legal fiction as enacted under Rule 2(a) of the Interpretative Rules – that is treating incomplete and unfinished articles as complete articles – is only for the purposes of interpretation of the First Schedule of the Custom Tariff Act, 1975. This legal fiction cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it was enacted. Plainly, by applying the legal fiction of Rule 2(a) of the Interpretative Rules, the components would not, by fiction, become complete motor vehicles for other purposes. The legal fiction enacted for purposes of interpreting the duties under the Custom Tariff Act, 1975 cannot be extended to treat the essential parts of a motor vehicle as a mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads. It is well settled that legal fictions created by a statute cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which they are so created. While Rule 2(a) of the Interpretative Rules can be applied for treating the import of goods as an import of a complete E-Rickshaw for the purposes of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, that is, for determining the applicable duties and tariffs, the said rule will have no application for treating the said goods as a complete E-Rickshaw under any other statute including the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. Clearly, there is no scope for the specified organizations to grant a type approval only on the essential parts of an E-Rickshaw - If the contention as advanced by the respondents is accepted, it would mean that no person other than a manufacturer of an E-Rickshaw can import the essential components/assemblies of an E-Rickshaw. This is unpersuasive and cannot be accepted. The respondents are directed to clear the goods in question on payment of the duties as applicable to import of an E-Rickshaw - the respondents cannot withhold the goods for want of a type approval under Rule 126 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - petition allowed.
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