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2020 (2) TMI 1114 - AT - Central ExciseProcess amounting to manufacture - Packing of duty paid machine dipped match splints purchased from mechanized match units - Benefit of N/N. 4/2006-CE dated 1.3.2006 (Sl. No. 72 of the Table) denied - Department was of the view that the appellants are not eligible for the benefit of Notification since the match splints purchased by them have been manufactured using the aid of power - Board Circular No. 1/93-CX-4 dated 2.121993 - difference of opinion - matter referred to Third member. HELD THAT:- The scope and cause of reference to the Third Member is limited to the difference of opinion between the Members and therefore, as a Third Member, I cannot go beyond the reference to entertain the above application. However, I deem it proper to place the above application before the regular Bench for any order on the application. The Member (Judicial) has held that the appellants are eligible for the benefit of the Notification (supra) and has set aside the demand whereas, the Member (Technical) has held that the benefit of the exemption Notification (supra) is not available to the assessees and has accordingly confirmed the demand. The only question formulated by the Members on the Difference of Opinion is "whether the appellants are eligible for the exemption Notification No. 04/2006-C.E, dated 01,03.2006 as held by Member (Judicial) or they are not eligible for the exemption as held by Member (Technical)." In Union of India Vs. Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., [ 2001 (1) TMI 966 - SUPREME COURT ], the Hon'ble Apex Court formulated what it termed the cardinal principle of construction in the following words: "a statute is a command of the Legislature. The interpreter must, therefore, in interpreting and construing the statute, identify the intention of the Legislature; that in identifying the intention of the Legislature by the process of constructing, the Court will have to adopt both literal and purposive approaches. This would mean that the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by construing the meanings of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief of its remedy to which the enactment is directed. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Vijay Anand [ 1962 (3) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT ], the Hon'ble Apex Court inter alia when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act. When the meaning is plain and unambiguous, no process of construing or interpreting a statute can proceed beyond the literal or textual interpretation except if absurdity results as a consequence. In my considered opinion, the same principles apply to construing - Although courts have historically taken the assistance of common law principles in interpreting statutory law, there is very little common about the tax laws. There are a sui generis set of principles that apply to the interpretation of taxing statutes. It is the we]/ settled proposition that the subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words. Member (Judicial) rightly points out that the notification does not require that the processes listed therein are required to be carried out by a single/same manufacturer. However, for the reasons I have given above, the converse too is not true. That is, the absence of such a requirement does not automatically entitle the assessee to the exemption - The very heading of the Notification, i.e., GENERAL EXEMPTION NO,47 reads thus: "Exemption and effective rate of duty for SPECIFIED GOODS of chapters 25 to 49" and it applies. to exempt excisable goods of the description specified in column (3) of the table. So, the conditions upon which the exemption depends is relatable not to the assessee, not the manufacture and not even the manufacturer, but only to the goods specified. It is the case of the appellants that they have procured dipped match splints from other manufacturers who have removed such goods on payment of that this would not make any difference since the entitlement to exemption is to be determined separately in each assessee's case. The fact that duty has been paid on some intermediate/ semi-finished goods not themselves entitled to exemption is in no manner relevant to whether exemption is to be granted at a subsequent stage to the finished goods. In any event, the cascading effect is effectively mitigated by CENVAT credit. The exemption notification must be applied only to the goods .it seeks to cover. The appellants are not eligible for the benefit of exemption notification No.4 ibid and accordingly, I concur with the conclusions drawn by the Member (Technical) - Registry is directed to place the matter before the Division Bench for recording majority/Final Orders accordingly. Majority order recorded - Appeals dismissed.
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