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2025 (6) TMI 1290 - HC - CustomsDismissal of petition for discharge filed under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C. - offences u/s 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act 1962 - smuggling of foreign origin gold bars - reliability of statements - case of the petitioner canvassed in the discharge petition is that the prosecution mainly relied on the alleged confession made by the first accused and the second accused and if the said confession is kept aside no incriminating material is available to frame charge as against the second accused - HELD THAT - It is settled law that at the stage of framing charge the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. It is also settled law that while considering an application seeking discharge from a case the Court is not expected to go deep of the probative value of the material on record but on the other hand the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and for that purpose the Court cannot conduct a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it is a main trial. In the present case as already pointed out the main reason advanced is that the confession of the first accused available in the case on hand cannot be used against the petitioner and that the suspicion is only mere suspicion and there is not even strong suspicion available. As already pointed out the prosecution has examined 5 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.5 and exhibited 15 documents. According to the prosecution the petitioner herein has given two confession statements which came to be exhibited as Exs.P.9 and P.10 through P.W.3. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the first accused as well as the petitioner were summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act and after appearance they have given statements admitting their involvement in the alleged gold smuggling. It is settled law that a statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is a material piece evidence and can be used as a substantive evidence. As rightly contended by the learned Special Public Prosecutor such statement cannot be equated with the confession taken by the police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure - In the present case as rightly pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor and also by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate a cursory perusal of the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act from the accused including the petitioner the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5 and other billings and export documents produced this Court has no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has produced materials sufficient enough to frame charges against the petitioner and as such the impugned order dismissing the discharge petition cannot be found fault with. Conclusion - The dismissal of the discharge petition filed by the second accused upheld holding that the prosecution had produced sufficient prima facie evidence including the accused s own statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act corroborated by other material to frame charges under Sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act 1962. This Court concludes that the Criminal Revision case is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed - the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
1. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for discharge filed under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C. by the second accused, who contended that no prima facie case was made out against him. 2. The admissibility and evidentiary value of confessions and statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, particularly whether such statements can be used as substantive evidence against the accused. 3. The scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing charges or considering discharge petitions, specifically the extent to which the court may sift or weigh evidence at this preliminary stage. 4. The reliance on confession statements of co-accused persons and whether such confessions alone can form a sufficient basis for framing charges against another accused. Issue-wise detailed analysis: 1. Whether a prima facie case exists against the second accused warranting framing of charges and dismissal of discharge petition: The legal framework governing this issue is primarily Section 245(2) Cr.P.C., which allows the accused to seek discharge if the court finds no sufficient ground for proceeding against him. The Court referenced authoritative Supreme Court precedents, including the ruling in State of Inspector of Police, Chennai Vs. S.Selvi, which clarified that while the court may sift and weigh evidence to some extent at the charge framing stage, it should not conduct a full trial or deep probative evaluation. The court must determine whether grave suspicion exists against the accused based on the material on record, and if two views are possible, the accused should be discharged. The Court emphasized that the stage of framing charges requires only a prima facie satisfaction that the ingredients of the offence are present, not a conclusive determination of guilt. The prosecution's material must be taken at face value for this purpose. In the present case, the prosecution examined five witnesses and produced fifteen documents. The petitioner, as the second accused, filed a discharge petition arguing that apart from confessions by the first accused and himself, no incriminating evidence existed to frame charges. He contended that the confession of the co-accused cannot be the sole basis for framing charges and that the prosecution's case was based on mere suspicion. The respondent countered that the petitioner voluntarily gave statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act admitting his role as a carrier of smuggled gold, that these statements were substantive evidence, and that other corroborative evidence existed, including video footage and passenger profiling. The Court noted that the petitioner was identified by the first accused and that the prosecution had produced sufficient material to form a prima facie case. The Court applied the settled principle that the court must assume the prosecution's material to be true at this stage and found that the prosecution had produced enough evidence to proceed. The dismissal of the discharge petition was therefore upheld. 2. Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act: The Court examined the nature of statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, which allows customs officers to record statements from persons involved in customs offences. The Court distinguished such statements from confessions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, noting that Section 108 statements are admissible as substantive evidence and are not equivalent to confessions made to police officers under Cr.P.C. The petitioner argued that the confession statements were unreliable and insufficient. However, the Court relied on the Special Public Prosecutor's submissions and the trial court's observations that the petitioner voluntarily gave two statements under Section 108 admitting his involvement as a carrier of smuggled gold. These statements were exhibited as evidence and corroborated by other material, including identification by the first accused and documentary evidence. The Court held that such statements have significant evidentiary value and can be used to frame charges if they prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. 3. Reliance on confession of co-accused and its impact on framing charges: The petitioner contended that the confession of the first accused could not be used against him and that such confession alone cannot sustain framing charges. The Court acknowledged that while confessions of co-accused cannot be the sole basis for framing charges, they can be considered along with other evidence. In this case, the first accused's confession identified the petitioner as the person who handed over smuggled gold at the airport, and this was corroborated by video footage and passenger profiling. Additionally, the petitioner's own statements under Section 108 admitted his role. Thus, the Court found that the confessions, coupled with corroborative evidence, sufficed to frame charges. 4. Scope of judicial scrutiny at the discharge stage: The Court reiterated the settled legal position that at the discharge stage, the court cannot conduct a detailed inquiry into the evidence or weigh its credibility as in a trial. Instead, the court must form a prima facie opinion on whether the material on record discloses the ingredients of the offence and justifies proceeding against the accused. The Court relied on multiple Supreme Court authorities emphasizing that the court must assume the prosecution's evidence to be true and evaluate whether a ground exists for presuming the offence has been committed. The Court found that the trial court had correctly applied this principle in dismissing the discharge petition. Significant holdings and core principles established: "The Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused." "At the stage of considering an application for discharge, the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence and that what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out." "A statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is a material piece of evidence and can be used as substantive evidence. Such statement cannot be equated with the confession taken by the police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure." Final determinations: The Court upheld the dismissal of the discharge petition filed by the second accused, holding that the prosecution had produced sufficient prima facie evidence, including the accused's own statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, corroborated by other material, to frame charges under Sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the legal principles relating to framing charges and discharge petitions, and the revision petition lacked merit and was accordingly dismissed.
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