2025 (6) TMI 1897 - HC - Companies Law

Invocation of jurisdiction of Court for quashing of complaint case - abuse of process warranting quashing at the pre-trial stage - applicability of Section 447 of the Companies Act 2013 - HELD THAT - Upon perusal of the order passed by this Court in Shri Ishtiaq Hussain Siddiqui 2024 (12) TMI 1589 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT it is found that the issue involved in these cases is similar to that case decided by this Court. Therefore there is no reason for taking a different view which had already been taken dealing with almost all issues raised in the present petition. The observation made by this Court on an earlier occasion held that it is clear that trying offence by the respondent under Section 447 applying the same retrospectively is apparently illegal and it can be considered to be a malicious prosecution. Conclusion - The provisions of Section 447 of the Companies Act 2013 cannot be applied retrospectively to transactions which occurred prior to its insertion in the Act. Petition allowed.

Summary

The core legal questions considered by the Court in these petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) pertain to the maintainability of the petitions seeking quashing of complaint cases registered under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 ("the Act of 2013"); the applicability and retrospective effect of Section 447 of the Act of 2013 to alleged offences committed prior to its enactment; the scope and interplay of Sections 185, 186, and 188 of the Act of 2013 vis-`a-vis Section 447; and whether the complaint cases constitute an abuse of process warranting quashing at the pre-trial stage.

First, the Court examined whether the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are maintainable, particularly in light of prior petitions involving similar facts and issues having been dismissed by this Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court. Second, the Court scrutinized whether Section 447 of the Act of 2013, which penalizes fraud, can be applied retrospectively to transactions occurring before its insertion in 2013. Third, the Court analyzed the legal framework governing loans and investments by companies under Sections 185, 186, and 188 of the Act of 2013, and whether the allegations fall within these provisions rather than Section 447. Fourth, the Court considered the nature of the alleged offences-whether they constitute a continuing offence justifying application of Section 447 over a period spanning pre- and post-2013. Lastly, the Court addressed whether the complaint cases are prima facie sustainable or constitute malicious prosecution warranting quashing under the inherent powers of the Court.

The Court relied heavily on precedents including the Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana & Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, which lays down the yardstick for quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court also referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in Anil Khadkiwala vs. State, which clarifies that dismissal of an earlier petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not bar filing a subsequent petition if new facts or grounds are presented. The Court further drew guidance from the Supreme Court's observations on the principle of non-retrospectivity of penal statutes as enshrined in Article 20(1) of the Constitution, and from the Karnataka High Court's ruling in Srividya C.G. vs. Serious Fraud Investigation Office, which held that offences committed prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be prosecuted under its provisions.

In interpreting the facts and law, the Court noted that the complaint cases allege that the petitioners, as directors of the company, granted loans at interest rates below prevailing market yields during the financial years 2006-2007 to 2013-2014 and beyond. The complaint invokes Section 447 of the Act of 2013, which prescribes punishment for fraud. However, the petitioners argued that the transactions fall under the ambit of Sections 185, 186, and 188 of the Act of 2013, which specifically regulate loans and investments by companies and related party transactions, and provide for penal consequences different from those under Section 447. The petitioners contended that Section 447 was introduced only in 2013 and cannot be applied retrospectively to transactions predating its insertion. They further submitted that the complaint is misconceived and an abuse of the process of law, as the proper provisions for penalizing such conduct are contained within Sections 185, 186, and 188.

The Court examined the scope of the relevant statutory provisions in detail. Section 185 prohibits companies from advancing loans to directors or related entities except under strict conditions, prescribing fines and imprisonment for contraventions. Section 186 governs loans and investments by companies, stipulating limits, disclosure requirements, and minimum interest rates, with penal provisions for violations. Section 188 regulates related party transactions, requiring board approval and prescribing penalties for unauthorized contracts or arrangements. Section 447, introduced by amendment in 2013, criminalizes fraud, defining it broadly to include acts or omissions intended to deceive or cause wrongful gain or loss.

The Court noted that the complaint's allegations include transactions dating back to 2000-2006, prior to the insertion of Section 447 in the Act of 2013. The Court applied the principle of lex prospicit non respicit, emphasizing that penal provisions cannot be applied retrospectively unless expressly provided by legislation. Citing the Karnataka High Court, the Court held that offences committed before the 2013 Act's enforcement must be prosecuted under the previous Companies Act, 1956, and not under Section 447. The Court also analyzed the nature of the alleged offence, finding that the transactions occurred in discrete financial years and did not constitute a continuing offence that would justify application of Section 447 across the entire period. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of continuing offence and held that each financial year's transactions must be treated separately.

Regarding maintainability, the Court rejected the respondent's contention that the petitions are barred by prior dismissals of similar petitions, noting that the present petitioners were not parties to earlier petitions and that new grounds and facts were raised. The Court cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Anil Khadkiwala and the decision in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Mohan Singh, which permit entertaining successive petitions under Section 482 when circumstances differ or new facts emerge. The Court held that the present petitions are maintainable.

On the question of whether the complaint cases disclose a prima facie offence under Section 447, the Court observed that the allegations, taken at face value, do not establish fraud as defined under Section 447 for the period prior to 2013. The Court found that the complaint primarily alleges contraventions of loan and investment provisions governed by Sections 185, 186, and 188, which provide a self-contained penal code for such violations. The Court held that invoking Section 447 in this context is inappropriate and constitutes an abuse of process. The Court further noted that the trial court is the appropriate forum to examine the factual matrix and determine applicability of the provisions, but at the pre-trial stage, the complaint does not disclose a cognizable offence under Section 447 for the pre-2013 transactions.

The Court also addressed the respondent's submission that the offence is continuous and extended beyond 2013, thereby justifying application of Section 447. The Court rejected this, holding that the transactions are discrete and not part of a single continuing offence. The Court emphasized that the principle of non-retrospectivity precludes applying Section 447 to transactions occurring before its insertion in the Act.

Finally, the Court applied the Bhajan Lal yardstick for quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., holding that the complaint cases do not disclose a prima facie offence under Section 447 and that the proceedings amount to malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Court concluded that the complaint cases are liable to be quashed.

In conclusion, the Court allowed the petitions and quashed the complaint cases registered under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 against the petitioners. The key holdings include:

"The provisions of Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be applied retrospectively to transactions which occurred prior to its insertion in the Act."

"The allegations made in the complaint, taken at their face value, do not prima facie constitute an offence under Section 447 for the period prior to 2013, but fall within the purview of Sections 185, 186, and 188 of the Act, which provide a self-contained penal code for such violations."

"A criminal proceeding can be quashed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. where the allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence or where the proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide or is an abuse of process of law."

"Dismissal of an earlier petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not bar filing of a subsequent petition if new facts or grounds are presented."

"The offence alleged is not a continuing offence across the period spanning pre- and post-2013, and each financial year's transactions are to be treated separately for the purpose of applicability of penal provisions."

"The trial court is the appropriate forum to determine the factual matrix and applicability of the provisions, but at the pre-trial stage, the complaint does not disclose a prima facie case under Section 447 for the pre-2013 transactions."

Accordingly, the complaint cases registered as Complaint Case Nos. SC/10/2021, SC/3/2021, and SC/12/2021 (renumbered SC/31/2024) are quashed in respect of the petitioners, and the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are allowed.