2025 (7) TMI 209 - HC - Indian Laws

Dishonour of Cheque - main ground of challenge is that at the Stage of Charge a broader view has to be taken while analysing the statements of witnesses - prima facie involvement if disclosed is sufficient for the purpose of framing of Charge or not - HELD THAT - The FSL establishes that the documents had the signatures of P. C. Minda but that itself is not sufficient as the Complainant himself has admitted his signatures on these documents. However the assertion is that the contents of the documents have been fabricated which can be ascertained only by evidence. In the present case the various documents relied upon by the Respondents to claim their innocence are all disputed documents and their authenticity can only be established by way of evidence and cannot be adjudicated at this stage of framing of Charge. The statement of the Complainant that it was blank Cheques and the Letterhead which had his signatures and which have been subsequently manipulated by the Respondents coupled with the attending circumstances do give rise to a prima facie case of theft against Respondent No. 1 Harish Bindal and under Sections 467/471/34 IPC against both the Respondents. The learned District and Sessions Judge fell in error in getting into the presumptions under Sections 139 and 118 of NI Act to practically adjudicate the cases under Section 138 NI Act which was beyond the scope of consideration whether Chargesheet and the documents disclosed are prima facie case against the Respondents. The impugned Order dated 02.08.2011 passed by learned District and Sessions Judge Rohini Courts Delhi is hereby set aside and the Order of the learned MM framing the charges against both the Respondents is upheld - application disposed off.

Summary

The core legal questions considered in this judgment include: (1) Whether the Complainant Company, represented by its Director, should be permitted to participate as a 'victim' in the criminal proceedings; (2) Whether the Respondents can be discharged at the stage of framing of charges under Sections 379, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506, and 34 IPC, particularly in light of the allegations of theft, forgery, and cheating involving blank signed cheques; (3) The applicability and scope of legal presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) at the charge framing stage; (4) The authenticity and evidentiary value of disputed documents including the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), covering letters, and cheques; and (5) The effect of procedural and evidentiary delays and contradictions on the prima facie case against the Respondents.

Regarding the first issue, the Court examined the legal framework defining 'victim' under criminal law, relying on the precedent that the term encompasses any person who has suffered loss or injury due to the accused's act or omission. The Court referenced a Supreme Court ruling which emphasized the right of the victim to participate in criminal proceedings even when the prosecution is conducted by the State. Applying this principle, the Court authorized Mr. Kunal Minda, the current Director, to represent the Complainant Company following the demise of the former Director, recognizing the Company as the actual victim entitled to be heard.

On the second and principal issue concerning discharge at the charge framing stage, the Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and the established judicial approach that at this stage, the court must take a broad and prima facie view of the evidence without delving into detailed scrutiny or weighing of evidence. The Court referred to authoritative precedents which hold that if the material on record discloses a strong suspicion or prima facie case that the accused committed the offence, charges must be framed and the accused should not be discharged prematurely.

The Court considered the factual matrix wherein the Complainant's bag containing blank signed cheques, passport, stamp papers, and other documents went missing. The Complainant initially presumed misplacement and registered a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) and issued public notices. The cheques in question were later presented for encashment by the Respondents, who are family members, leading to allegations of theft and forgery. The Respondents contended that the cheques were legitimately issued pursuant to an MoU and loan transactions, and that the Complainant's allegations were motivated by malice and were a counterblast to complaints filed against the Complainant under Section 138 NI Act.

The Court examined key evidence including the NCR, bank communications, forensic science laboratory (FSL) reports on handwriting, statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and the disputed documents such as the MoU and covering letters. The FSL report confirmed the Complainant's signatures on the documents but did not conclusively establish forgery of the contents. The Court noted that the authenticity of the MoU and covering letters was disputed, with attesting witnesses denying having seen the Complainant sign the MoU, raising prima facie doubts about its genuineness.

In applying the law to these facts, the Court emphasized that the disputed nature of documents and contradictory statements cannot be resolved at the charge framing stage, which is not a trial. The Court rejected the Respondents' reliance on presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act at this stage, observing that the learned Additional Sessions Judge erred in effectively deciding the merits of the case by invoking these presumptions prematurely. The Court held that the existence of a prima facie case of theft and forgery was established based on the Complainant's credible explanation of initially presuming misplacement, the subsequent discovery of encashment attempts, and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the issuance and presentation of the cheques.

The Court also addressed the Respondents' argument concerning the delay in reporting the loss and the issuance of advertisements, concluding that the delay was explicable given the initial belief of misplacement and the family relationship between the parties, which reasonably delayed suspicion of theft. The Court found no merit in the contention that the advertisements were fabricated or that the case was a mala fide attempt to counter the Section 138 NI Act complaints.

Regarding the MoU and related financial documents, the Court observed that while these documents appeared to support the Respondents' claim of legitimate transactions and consultancy arrangements, their authenticity and the precise nature of the transactions were disputed and required trial-level evidence. The Court noted that the Complainant denied the authenticity of the MoU and claimed it was fabricated using stolen blank stamp papers. The statements of attesting witnesses further raised doubts about the MoU's genuineness, which could not be resolved at the charge framing stage.

The Court also considered the Respondents' production of balance sheets and bank statements, holding that such documents cannot be accepted as conclusive evidence at this stage and must be tested during trial. The Court highlighted that the existence of loans and repayments was contested, and the Complainant's assertion of cash repayments raised additional questions requiring detailed examination.

In conclusion, the Court held that the impugned order of discharge was erroneous because it involved an impermissible weighing of evidence and premature application of legal presumptions. The Court reinstated the charges framed by the Magistrate under Sections 379 (theft), 467 (forgery of valuable security), 468 (forgery for purpose of cheating), 471 (using as genuine a forged document), and 34 (common intention) IPC against the Respondents. The Court directed the trial to proceed with recording of prosecution evidence, explicitly clarifying that its observations did not constitute a final determination on the merits.

Significant holdings include the following verbatim reasoning: "The learned District and Sessions Judge fell in error in getting into the presumptions under Sections 139 and 118 of NI Act to practically adjudicate the cases under Section 138 NI Act, which was beyond the scope of consideration whether Chargesheet and the documents disclosed are prima facie case against the Respondents." Further, the Court stated, "The statement of the Complainant that it was blank Cheques and the Letterhead which had his signatures and which have been subsequently manipulated by the Respondents coupled with the attending circumstances, do give rise to a prima facie case of theft against Respondent No. 1 Harish Bindal and under Sections 467/471/34 IPC against both the Respondents."

The principles established reaffirm that at the charge framing stage, the court must adopt a broad view, avoid detailed scrutiny or weighing of evidence, and proceed to trial if the material discloses a prima facie case. The Court underscored the limited role of presumptions under the NI Act at this stage and emphasized the necessity of trial for resolving disputed facts and document authenticity. The final determination set aside the discharge order and upheld the Magistrate's order framing charges, thereby ensuring the continuation of the criminal trial.