TMI Blog2005 (6) TMI 238X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of additional ground before this Bench, it was stated that the appeals were originally fixed for hearing from time to time and eventually the hearing was concluded by the Division Bench. Before the assessee could become aware about the difference of opinion between the members, the above referred additional ground was legally raised. It was further explained that when the case was taken up for hearing by the Hon'ble Vice President, acting as Third Member, the assessee drew his attention to the pendency of the additional ground, but the same was not admitted on the ground that his power was limited to the questions referred to him under section 255(4) of the Act. The ld. counsel for the assessee contended that he has raised a legal ground, which goes to the root of the dispute, and its adjudication is paramount for the disposal of the entire decision. He referred to the Third Member order passed in the case of Goodyear India Ltd. v. ITO [2000] 73 ITD 189 (Delhi) to contend that the additional ground can be raised at this stage. He commended us to various decisions including National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 229 ITR 383 (SC), Shilpa Associates v. ITO [2003] 263 ITR 317 ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of opinion by the majority view. This sub-section does not empower the Tribunal to consider any additional ground raised by any of the parties after the conclusion of I he original hearing. The scope of the present proceedings is limited and confined only to pass consequential order after considering the opinion expressed by the three members including the Third Member who heard the points of dispute and settled the same. 5. At this stage it would be apt to take note of the provisions of Chapter XXB of the I.T. Act, 1961, namely, the appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. Section 253 entitles both the assessee and the revenue, aggrieved by the specified orders, to appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the prescribed form and within the specified time. Section 254(1) deals with the passing of the orders. The provisions for passing rectification orders by the Tribunal are contained in section 254(2). Section 255(4) is enshrined to settle the difference arising between the members who heard the appeal. After expression of opinion by the Third Member, a consequential order is passed under section 255(4) to give effect to the majority view expressed by the members including tho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upon by the ld. A.R. are also found to have been rendered in the context of the provisions of section 254(1) of the Act. A common thread running through the relevant judicial pronouncements heavily relied upon by the ld. A.R. is that the additional ground can be raised before the Tribunal at the time of hearing under section 254. 6. On the contrary, the scope of the proceedings under section 255(4) is confined only to the giving effect to the majority view qua the items, which were the subject-matter of dispute between the members who originally heard the appeal. On all aspects other than such point(s) of difference, the original order passed by the Division Bench becomes conclusive. The jurisdiction under this section 255(4) cannot be stretched so far as to include in its sweep, the issues beyond the ambit of point(s) of difference between the members who originally heard the appeal. The learned A.R. has contended that he is entitled to raise this additional ground because the proceedings are continuing and final adjudication is yet to be done. His reliance on the Third Member decision in the case of Goodyear India Ltd. is misconceived. In that case, the ld. Third Member dealt w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... basic tenet of interpretation that if the language of the section is plain and unambiguous, there is no warrant for importing any words in the statute to give a different meaning. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Tarulata Shyam v. CIT [1977] 108 ITR 345 has laid down that even if there is a casus omissus, the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not the judicial interpretation. When there is no ambiguity in the language of law, it is only the literal interpretation of the section, which is required to be made. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce Industry v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2001] 247 ITR 36 has laid down that a taxing statute has to be strictly construed and nothing can be read into it. While holding so, the Hon'ble Court considered the classic judgment delivered in the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC [1921] 1 KB 64 in which it was held that "in a taxing Act, one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about any tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can look fairly at the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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