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1987 (6) TMI 193

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..... pendency of the Reference Application the Reference Applicant, Brij Kishore Maheswari died on 1-12-1987 and his wife Savitri Devi and son and two daughters, who are the legal representatives who are entitled to continue the proceedings, did not take out an application for getting them impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased with the result an application seeking condonation of delay in regard to the same was filed in C/COD/Ref/132/87. Customs Misc. Petition 133/87 is an application by the legal representatives of the deceased for impleading them as parties in the Reference proceedings instituted by deceased Brij Kishore Maheswari. 3. The deceased died on 1-2-1987 and the legal representatives referred to above filed an app .....

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..... ndone the delay of 4 days in respect of the filing of the Reference Application. 5. Shri Rajappa, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that notwithstanding the fact that there is a restriction on the power of the Tribunal in regard to condonation of delay by only 30 days, under the proviso to Section 130(1) of the Act such restriction cannot be construed to be an absolute restriction or a fetter on the power of the Tribunal. It was urged that to advance and subserve the cause of substantial justice the procedural provisions of the Act need not be regidly adhered to and by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 29(2), the Tribunal has power and jurisdiction to condone the delay. The learned counsel pl .....

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..... resent case, the admitted fact remains that the Reference Application has been filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days stipulated under the proviso to Section 130(1) of the Act. This question, in our opinion is no longer res integra and is covered by a number of authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P. and others, reported in A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court p. 2161, has clearly held that when a discretion on the Regional Transport Authority under Section 58(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has been vested to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to Sub-section (2) but not more th .....

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..... r renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. We may also refer to the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Sakhura v. Tanaji reported in 1985 (22) E.L.T. p. 327 (S.C.) where it is clearly held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in court and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunal or executive authorities notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain powers conferred on courts under Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The ruling of the Sup .....

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..... uld not have been in a position to decide as to whether the petition should be filed against that order and, if so, what grounds should be taken in the revision petition . In the present case the scope and applicability of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act for excluding the time taken in the grant of a certified copy of the impugned order does not arise at all. 7. Unlike courts of law, which possess inherent powers, the position of statutory bodies entrusted with defined powers is entirely different. The powers of such bodies are severely circumscribed and controlled by statute, which confers them powers. The statutory bodies cannot act outside the limits of statute which creates them. There is always a distinction between inherent pow .....

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