TMI Blog2009 (8) TMI 609X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 96Z0(3) for failure to pay the duty within the time stipulated under Rule 96Z0. 2. The appellants were engaged in the manufacture of non-alloy steel ingots which were classifiable under Chapter 72 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The appellants had opted for compounded levy scheme from September, 1997 to March, 2000 and therefore, opted to discharge the duty liability under Rule 96Z0(3) of the erstwhile Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with section 3A of Central Excise Act, 1944. 3. It is the case of the department that in the cause of scrutiny of RT 12 returns for the months of April, 1998 to March, 2000, it was noticed that the appellants had failed to discharge their duty liability to the time of Rs. 1,06,91 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... period from the date of cause of action. Besides Section 1 IA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which deals with the power of the authority to initiate action for recovery of duty clearly provides maximum period of 5 years and that too, in the circumstances specified thereunder. Being so, the excise duty which is payable under different provisions of the same statute, though provisions of Section 11A of the said Act would not be attracted, yet the principle thereunder would apply even in relation to the proceedings under Rule 96Z0(3), as it is settled law that when there is no specific period of limitation prescribed for taking particular action, the same has to be initiated within a reasonable period. Considering the maximum period of 5 yea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er Sales lax Act and Apex Court was dealing with the Sue relating to refund and power of Commissioner under Section 21(1) of the Punjab General Sales lax Act, and though such a power was bestowed upon the authority, there was no period of limitation pre scribed for exercise of such power, the Apex Court held that the revisionary jurisdiction should ordinarily be exercised within 3 years. The Apex Court also held that question that as to what would be reasonable period would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 7. In Raghuvar (India) Ltd. case, the Apex Court was dealing with the provisions under Section 11A of the said Act and in that regard held that any law or stipulation prescribing the period of limitation to do or not t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m taking proper action on the bar of limitation under the provision of Section 28(1) of the said Act. In that regard, reference was made to its earlier decisions of CC (Import) Mumbai v. Jagdish Cancer and Research Centre reported in 2001 (132) ELI. 257 (S.C.) = 2001 (6) SCC 483. In other words, in the absence of provision for limitation to initiate a action for violation of A statutory provision in a statute, It cannot be said that a provision relating to a period of limitation for an action against violation of some other provisions of law under the same statute would automatically apply. A provision of law which is made applicable iii specified situations mentioned there under cannot be applied to all other actions even under the same Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Rule 96Z0(3), and the same read as under: Provided also that where the manufacturer fails to pay the whole of the amount of duty payable for any month by the 15th day or last day of such month, as the case may be, he shall be liable to, (i) pay the outstanding amount of duty along with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum calculated for the period from the 16th day of such month or the first day of next month, as the case may be, till the date of actual payment of the outstanding amount; and (ii) a penalty equal to such outstanding amount of duty or Rs. 5.000/- whichever is greater: Provided further that if the manufacturer fails to pay the total amount of the duty payable for each of the months from September, 1997 to Marc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nvocable only upon being satisfied about the existence of the circumstances stipulated under Section 11A and such a provision being conspicuously absent in the entire scheme and the provision pertaining to the imposition of penalty under Rule 96Z0, it cannot be accepted that the principle behind Section 11A would automatically get attracted in case of the proceedings under Rule 96Z0. Besides, the Apex Court has clearly held that the proceeding under Rule 96Z0 are independent and distinct from those under the proviso to Section 11A. 13. In these circumstances, the contention on behalf of the appellants that applying principle behind Section 11A, the authority could not have invoked powers under Rule 96ZO after the expiry of the period of 5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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