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TMI Blog1966 (3) TMI 52X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... off the defence or in the alternative for directing Jugal Kishore, a director of the appellant-company, to appear in court on December 14, 1964. On December 3, 1964, the court made an order therein directing the said Jugal Kishore to be present in court on December 14, 1964, to answer material questions relating to the suit. The appellant took a number of adjournments to produce the said Jugal Kishore on the ground that the latter was ill. On February 3, 1965, the court gave the appellant a final opportunity to produce the said Jugal Kishore. Even so, the appellant took two more adjournments to produce him, but did not do so on the ground that he was ill. Finally, on February 25, 1965, the court issued a notice to the 1st defendant, appellant herein, to show cause why his defence should not be struck off. On March 16, 1965, after hearing the arguments the court held that Jugal Kishore had failed to comply with the orders of the court and was persistent in his default in spite of chances given to him ; and on that rinding, it struck off the defence of the appellant. The High Court, on revision, held that Jugal Kishore did not appear in court in spite of orders to that effect and tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lly conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. It is also well recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code." This court again in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Raja Seth Hiralal [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 453, 461 ; AIR 196 SC 527, 533 considered the question whether a court had inherent power under section 151 of the Code to issue a temporary injunction restraining a party from proceeding with a suit in another State. In that context, Raghubar Dayal J., after quoting the passage cited above from his earlier judgment, interpreted the said observations thus : "These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Now let us look at the relevant provisions of the Code. Order XXIX, rule 1.-In suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case. "Rule 2.-Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served- (a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, or Rule 3.-The Court may, at any stage of the suit, require the personal appearance of the secretary or of any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, who may be able to answer material questions relating to the suit." The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the director mentioned in rule 3 is the director mentioned in rule 1 thereof. To put it in other words, the director who signs and verifies the pleadings can only be required to appear personally to answer material questions relating to the suit. Though this contention appears ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es the exercise of the inherent power of the court under section 151 of the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a case of default made by a director who failed to appear in court, when he was so required under Order XXIX, rule 3, of the Code, the court can make a suitable consequential order under section 151 of the Code as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. The next question is whether the court can, as it did in the present case, strike off the defence of the appellant for the default made by its director to appear in court. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that both the courts in effect found that the director was guilty of a recalcitrant attitude and that he had abused the process of the court and, therefore, the Subordinate Judge had rightly exercised his inherent power in striking off the defence of the appellant. We are satisfied, as the courts below were, that Jugal Kishore, the director of the appellant-company, purposely, for one reason or other, defied the orders of the court on the pretext of illness and had certainly abused the process of the Court. The learned Subordinate Judge would have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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