TMI Blog1960 (8) TMI 69X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , J.C. JUDGES JUDGMENT : Basudeva Prasad, M. K. Ramamurthi, K. N. Keshwa and R. Mahalingier, for the petitioner. Lal Narain Sinha, B. K. P. Sinha, L. S. Sinha and S. P. Varma, for the respondents. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. J. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the Attorney-General of India. 1960. August 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA C. J.-By this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner raises almost the same controversy as had been done in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958, which was heard and determined by this Court by its judgment dated December 12, 1958, and by Writ Petition No. 106 of 1959, which was heard by this Court on November 10, 11 and 12, 1959, but which did not reach the stage of judgment by this Court, inasmuch as the petitioner's Advocate requested the Court to permit him to withdraw the petition and the Court allowed the prayer and permitted the petitioner to withdraw the petition. In each of these petitions the petitioner, who is a journalist by profession and is functioning as the Editor of " the Searchlight ", an English daily news ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roceedings of those legislatures, except those of secret sessions, and bad only a limited privilege to prevent mala fide publication of garbled, unfaithful or expunged reports of the proceedings. He also held that the petitioner had the fundamental right to publish the report of the proceedings of the Legislature. In the result, this Court, in view of the judgment of the majority, dismissed the petition, but made no order as to costs. This Court further held that the Assembly of Bihar was entitled to take proceedings for breach of its privileges and it was for the House itself to determine whether there had in fact been any breach of any of its privileges. After Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958 had thus ended, the petitioner again moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. That case was registered as Writ Petition No. 106 of 1959. On January 5, 1959, the petitioner received a notice that the case of breach of privilege against him would be considered by the Committee of Privileges of the Assembly on February 3, 1959. That hearing was postponed from date to date, until in August, 1959, the petitioner filed his petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. He contended in that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y reason of prorogation of the House several times could be, legally revived and restored. On October 20, 1959, the Advocate General of Bihar attended the House and gave his opinion, which it is not relevant to' state here. The Writ Petition, 106 of 1959, was heard in part and allowed to be withdrawn, as indicated above, on November 12, 1959. On November 24, 1959, the petitioner received a fresh notice from the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, opposite party No. 3, calling upon the petitioner to show cause on or before December 1, 1959, why appropriate action should not be recommended against him for a breach of the privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly. The petitioner again instituted proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution complaining that the motion adopted by the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly at its meeting held on November 23, 1959, amounted to an abridgement of his fundamental right of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and was an illegal and mala fide threat to the petitioner's personal liberty in violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and that the Committee of Privileges, respon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Bihar Legislature and that the Legislature has no power to restrict or control the publication of its proceedings. The Government Advocate of Bihar, on behalf of the opposite party, has contended, in the first instance, that the present writ petition against the parties, namely, the Chairman and the Members of the Committee of Privileges, respondents 1 and 2, is barred by the principle of res judicata and, therefore, not maintainable. His contention also is that the writ cannot issue either against an individual member or against the House of the Legislature as a whole in respect of what has been done by it in exercise of its privilege of prohibiting or, at any rate, controlling the publication of its proceedings. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended by Mr. Basudeva Prasad that respondent No. 2, the, Committee of Privileges, has been reconstituted as aforesaid after the first decision of this Court which is sought to be availed of as res judicata and that therefore the rule of res judicata is inapplicable. In this connection it may be pointed out that in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958, Sri Krishna Sinha, Chief Minister of Bihar, was impleaded as opposite party No. 1 in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estion decided by this Court on the previous occasion was substantially a question affecting the whole Legislature of the State of Bihar and was of general importance and did not depend upon the particular constitution of the Committee of Privileges. It cannot, therefore, be said that the question decided by this Court on the previous occasion had not been fully debated and had not been decided after due deliberation. That there was difference of opinion and one of the Judges constituting the Court held another view only shows that there was room for difference of opinion. It was a judgment of this Court which binds the petitioner as also the Legislative Assembly of Bihar. For the application of the general principles of res judicata, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the previous decision was right or wrong. In our opinion, therefore, the questions determined by the previous decision of this Court cannot be reopened in the present case and must govern the rights and obligations of the parties which, as indicated above, are substantially the same. It is manifest, therefore, that the petitioner has no fundamental right which is being threatened to be infringed by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or not it was recent enough to be taken serious notice of, or whether any punishment in the event of the petitioner being found guilty is called for. These are matters with which this Court is in no way concerned. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, the Government Advocate of Bihar, who appeared on behalf of the respondents, informed the Court that the Legislature was interested more in the vindication of its constitutional rights than in inflicting any punishment on the petitioner. Hence, no more need be said on this aspect of the matter. It remains to consider one other point sought to be made on behalf of the petitioner that the Assembly had no power to proceed against the petitioner for breach of privilege in May, 1957 when we know as a fact that the Assembly was prorogued several times between May 31, 1957 and November 23, 1959. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention, for the simple reason that the prorogation of the Assembly does not mean its dissolution. The House remains the same; only its sessions are interrupted by prorogation of the House according to the exigencies of public demands on the time and attention of the members of the Assembly and the volume of busines ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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