TMI Blog1995 (4) TMI 249X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion, according to us, the amendment of 1952 would relate back to the Act as enacted. In any case the amendment would apply to the suit which was pending when the amendment had come into force. In view of this con-clusion of ours, the appeal shall to be dismissed, as a amendment has given benefit to the tenants, who are respondent in this appeal. 2. The facts which noted be need for the disposal of the appeal are that the appellants filed a suit on 25.4.1949 for possession of the land under the occupation of the defendants. The suit had come to be filed after the plaintiffs had issued a notice to defendants 1 and 2 on 19.10.1947 under section 7 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 terminating the tenancy and claiming that the land was required for personal cultivation. The possession was demanded by the notice on the expiry of 31st March, 1949. In the mean time, the Act came into force whose section 88 (1) (c) stated that the Act would not apply to any area within the limits, inter alia, of the municipal borough of Surat and within a distance of two miles of the limit of the borough. The suit land being admittedly situate within this periphery the Act did not apply, when enacted, to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ey continued to be protected tenants cannot be accepted in view of the Constitution Bench decision in S.N. Kamble v. Sholapur Borough Municipality, [1966] 1 SCR 618. That decision specifically disapproved what was held by a three-judge Bench of this Court in Sak-haram v. Manikchand Motichand Shah, [1962] 2 SCR 59. The Constitution Bench held that Sakharam's Bench, while holding that despite what has been stated in section 88 (1) (c) of the Act, the tenant who acquired the status of a protected tenant under the provisions of 1939 Act would continue to enjoy that status even for the areas covered by clause (c), was not correct, because that Bench somehow missed important words "save as expressly provided in this Act" as finding placed in Section 89 (1) (b) of the Act, reliance on which was placed by Sakharam's Bench to uphold the status of even those protected tenants residing in the area covered by clause (c) of section 88 (1). The Constitution Bench said that section 88(1) (c) was an express provision showing the contrary. 5. Despite what was held in Kamble's case, the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents-tenants is that because of what was held by this court in Mohan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The first is that even if the rights of the respondents were to be determined as per the in 1939 Tenancy Act, the mere fact of issuance of notice of termination is not enough to be bring to an end the jural relationship existing between the parties inasmuch as under section 7 of that Act the tenancy of a protected tenant could not be terminated merely by issuance of a notice; but the termination can be for the bonafide need of the landlord either for personal cultivation or for any non- agricultural purpose. Though the plaintiffs did state in the notice of termination that the need of the land is bonafide for personal cultivation, that has to be determined, and till this question is decided in favour of the landlord the tenancy cannot be come to an end. We find sufficient force in this contention. Another submission advanced by Shri Vakil is that by force of section 23, as inserted in the 1939 Act, the period of tenancy of the defendants got extended upto 11.1.1952 as the written lease was on 12.1.1942. As such, the tenancy was continuing when the suit was filed in 1949. As to this contention, we would observe that the Act, as enacted, having not saved any right of the protected t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tated that the settled principle of interpretation, where substantive law is amended, is that the same does not operate retrospectively unless it is either expressly provided or the same follows by necessary implication. Lest it be thought that a vested right cannot be taken away at all by retrospective legislation, reference may be made to Rafiguennessa v. Lal Bahadur, AIR (1964) SC 1511 where it was stated that even where vested rights are affected legislature is competent to take away the same by means of retrospective legislation; and retrospectively can be inferred even by necessary implication. In that case, the provisions of the Assam Non- agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act were made applicable to pending proceedings. 13. The change in law may apply, not only when the proceeding is pending in the court to the first instance, but during pendency of appeals as well, as pointed out in Lakshminarayana v. Niranjan, [1985] 2 SCR 202. In that case, some earlier decisions of this Court on this point were noted, one of which was in the case of Dayavati v. Inderjeet, [1966] 3 SCR 275, in which it was observed that if the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fication. If a notification taking away substantive rights of tenants can have retrospective operation, no objection can be taken, ac-cording to us, on principle, to a provision taking away substantive rights of landlords having retrospective operation. 17. When an argument was advanced on the basis of cancellation that the same could not take away the right which had accrued to the landlords as a result of the first notification, the Bench found no force in the argument and observed that if the landlords had obtained an effective decree and had succeeded in ejecting the tenants as a result of that decree, which might have become final between the parties, that decree might not have been reopened and the execution taken thereunder might not have refused. But the second notification had come to be issued during the pendency of the suit, because of which it was held that the court was bound to apply the law as it was found on the date of its judgment, because there was no question of taking away of any vested rights in the landlords. In the present case, the position is precisely what was found in the Mohanlal's case inasmuch as the amendment in question had come into force when th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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