TMI Blog1967 (2) TMI 93X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of the petitioner's liability in respect of the above period (1st April, 1950, to 31st October, 1952) by an assessment order dated 20th August, 1953. He held that out of the actual sales ascertained by him, sales worth Rs. 18,27,053-3-6 should be "disallowed" (thereby meaning as sales to a registered dealer) "as these sales did not appear to be genuine transactions". The petitioners filed an appeal against the above assessment order. Their main contention in the appeal was that in respect of the sales held to be not genuine particulars had not been disclosed to them. By a schedule appended to a letter dated 12th March, 1956, the appellate authority gave particulars of the sales which were liable to be disallowed as not genuine. Thereafter, in due course the appeal was disposed of by an order dated 12th April, 1956. The petitioners' case is that by the appellate order relief was given to the petitioners in respect of sales of the value of Rs. 6,25,247-11-3 to Keshavji Hirji. The submission was that the appellate authority held the sales of the petitioners to Keshavji Hirji to be genuine sales to a registered dealer and gave relief accordingly. The petitioners filed a revision appl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was 21 days. The petitioners submitted that the delay in filing the application should be condoned. By the impugned decision dated 24th September, 1965, in connection with the application for condonation of delay the Tribunal observed: "there is no power for the Tribunal to condone the delay..." The Tribunal further held that to the proceedings out of which the application for reference arose the 1946 Act applied. The prescribed period of limitation in respect of the application was 60 days. The application being barred by limitation was liable to be rejected. The application was accordingly rejected. In connection with the above findings of the Tribunal Mr. Shah for the petitioners has submitted that each one of the findings is contrary to the provisions in the Sales Tax Acts (i) 1946, (ii) 1953, and (iii) 1959. He has further submitted that under section 5 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to condone delay. The Tribunal has failed to exercise their jurisdiction. There were sufficient facts for condonation of delay in the making of the application, if 1946 Act was applicable. There was no delay if the subsequent Acts applied. The T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot necessary to quote here the provisions in sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of section 29. The application for reference was made under special law, i.e., the Sales Tax Act, 1946, or Sales Tax Act, 1953. The application was made after the Limitation Act of 1963 had come into force. The period of limitation of 60 days was prescribed by special law in connection with the making of an application for reference. The submission, therefore, was that to the petitioners' application for reference having regard to the provisions in sub-section (2) of section 29, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act applied. Thus the Tribunal was bound to consider all the relevant facts for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of the petitioners' application for reference. In connection with this question it requires to be noticed that by the 1963 Limitation Act the parallel provisions in section 5 and section 29 of the Limitation Act of 1908 have been substantially altered. On the question of condonation of delay under section 5 of the 1908 Act, it was necessary that the provisions of the section should have been made applicable by or under the relevant enactments. That n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... visions in section 29(2) of that Act. The argument of the counsel for the appellant was that for invoking sub-section (2) of section 29 the necessary condition was that the First Schedule of the Act should have prescribed the period of limitation for an appeal and that the special law (the Representation of the People Act) should have prescribed for the same type of appeal a different period of limitation. To an appeal against the order of an Election Tribunal sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Act was not applicable. The argument in reply on behalf of the respondents was in two alternatives, viz., (1) that the First Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribed a period of limitation for such an appeal, and (2) that sub-section (2) of section 29 was applicable even when the First Schedule to the Limitation Act did not prescribe any period of limitation for an appeal, and a special law prescribed a period of limitation for such an appeal. The Supreme Court accepted the contention made in reply on behalf of the respondents, as stated above. The finding of the Court thus was that Article 156 in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribed period of limitation in respect of an ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the lower court was an appeal which was not filed in any civil court but before a 'persona designata', the court observed: "Section 29(2)(a) speaks of suit, appeal or application. In their plain meaning the words 'suit or appeal' refer to any suit or any appeal, be it filed in a court or before a 'persona designata'." There are similar further observations in the judgment of the Court, which it is not necessary to quote here. We are unable to accept Mr. Joshi's contention that the provisions in section 29(2) and/or section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 were not attracted and could not be applied to the application for reference filed before the Tribunal by the petitioners. In connection with the facts relating to the application for condonation of delay, it requires to be observed that the question of liability to sales tax was in respect of the period from 1st April, 1950, to 31st October, 1952. Though the liability arose under the 1946 Act, the assessment order was passed on 20th August, 1953, after the 1946 Act had come to an end on 1st November, 1952. The above appeal and the revisional application were proceeded with after the 1953 Act had come into force. Different pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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