TMI Blog2000 (9) TMI 1001X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hem accuse each other for the course adopted by the other. This appeal is by special leave at the instance of the plaintiff. The subject matter of the litigation is a property bearing Door No.177 to 182 on the Big Street at Triplicane in Madras (now Chennai). At this stage and in this appeal it is unnecessary to narrate the facts pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint nor by the contesting first defendant in answer thereto regarding the right to the suit property. Suffice it to say that plaintiff claims to be a lessee under one S. Alagu (who is arrayed as 6th defendant in the suit) in respect of the property and on that strength he claimed to be in possession of the property. He alleged that the defendants 1 to 5 have been threatening to dispossess him. Appellant-plaintiff filed the suit on 25.6.1999 for a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos.1 to 5 from dispossessing him. Along with the institution of the suit he moved an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) to pass an ad interim injunction restraining respondents 1 to 5 or their men or agents, or their representatives or any person claiming through the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ffected party has to say about it. Such a course is impermissible under Order 39 Rule 3A of the Code, according to the learned single judge. He, therefore, set aside the injunction order for the clear transgression of the provisions of law and noted that this is the third suit filed in reference to the suit property and hence deprecated the grant of ex-parte injunction without notice. Though learned single judge further declined to go into the other allegations, he has chosen to make the following observations also: However, prima facie, I am satisfied that these materials are relevant for consideration before granting ad interim injunction. As per the plaint and affidavit averments admit that the first respondent is occupying a vacant portion of 1670 sq. ft. and running paper business and charcoal. But there is no document to show that the first respondent is actually in possession and running such a business except the lease deed. Hence the ex-parte order is unsustainable. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the order passed by the learned Judge is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. After holding thus learned Single Judge directed the trial court t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther orders or till the disposal of the suit. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be applicable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or to approach the same court which passed the ex parte order for any relief. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents then contended that an order granting injunction without complying with the requisites envisaged in Rule 3 of Order 39 be void. Rule 3 reads thus: The Court shall in cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: [Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant (a) to deliver to the opposite-party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he consequence, if any, on account of the Court failing to pass the final orders within thirty days as enjoined by Rule3-A. The aforesaid Rule casts a three-pronged protection to the party against whom the ex parte injunction order was passed. First is the legal obligation that the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application of injunction within the period of thirty days. Second is, the legal obligation that if for any valid reasons the Court could not finally dispose of the application within the aforesaid time the Court has to record the reasons thereof in writing. What would happen if a Court does not do either of the courses? We have to bear in mind that in such a case the Court would have by-passed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided for the safety of the person against whom the order was passed without affording him an opportunity to have a say in the matter. First is that the Court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. It is only by way of a very exceptional contingency that the Court is empowered to by-pass the said protective measure. Second is the statutory obligation cast on the Court to pass final o ..... 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