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TMI Blog1966 (9) TMI 133X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ee contracts were referred to the arbitration of Sir Rupen Mitter. The award of the arbitrator is dated September 2, 1959. The arbitrator found that the Company was entitled to be credited with the sum of Rs. 11,64,423/-on account of the price (inclusive of the price of steel) of the bedsteads supplied under the three contracts made up of (a) a sum of Rs. 4,12,848/- for the price of 17,202 bedsteads supplied under contract No. A.T. 3116 at Rs. 24/- per bedstead, (b) Rs. 7,05,000/- for the price of 30,000 bedsteads supplied under contract No. A.T. 767 at Rs. 23/8/- per bedstead and (c) Rs. 46,575/- for the price of 2,025 bedsteads supplied under contract No. A.T. 816. The appellant undertook to supply the requisite steel at basic rates and the price of steel so supplied was payable by the Company on presentation of material release orders called 'M.R.Os'. The arbitrator found that the Company was entitled to a credit for Rs. 3,42,737/- for payment on M.R.0s. for the price of steel and the appellant was entitled to credits for Rs. 29,188/- on account of railway freight and transport charges, for Rs. 9,71,030/- on account of payments made to the Company directly and for Rs. 4,95,060/ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g the 7000 bedsteads under A. T. 3116, A. T. 767 and 7000 bedsteads under A.T. 816 leaving no surplus. I also hold that the Company paid for the price of steel on the M.R.0s. Rs. 3,42,737/- and that the Government had deducted Rs. 3,57,500/- from bills. I hold that the Company did not supply any steel from its own stock." There were conflicting statements of the parties in the affidavits filed by them before Mallick, J. in connection with the application for setting aside the award. The affidavit filed by the appellant dated January 5, 1957 before the arbitrator suggests that at least part of the deductions were made from bills submitted by the Company in other contracts. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Bindra referred to the affidavits and the statements made before the arbitrator, but it is well-settled that the Court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on the record for the purpose of finding out whether or not the arbitrator has committed an error of law and that the award of the arbitrator can be set aside on the ground of error of law on the face of the award only when in the award or in a document in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the rules of the Association the respondents were entitled to reject without liability. It was held on appealby the Judicial Committee that the award could not be set aside and though the award recited that the contract was subject to the rules of the Bombay Cotton Trade Association, yet those rules were not so incorporated in the award as to entitle the Court to refer to them for ascertaining whether there was an error of law on the face of the award. Applying the principle to the present case, it is manifest that there is no error of law on the face of the award and the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case must fail. We next proceed to consider the argument of the appellant that the arbitrator had no authority to award interest from the date of the award dated September 2, 1959 to the date of the decree granted by Mallick, J. i.e., August 2, 1960. In support of this contention Counsel for the appellant relied upon the following observations of Bose, J. in Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. The Union of India(1). "It was suggested that at least interest from the date of 'suit' could be awarded on the analogy of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. But section 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he dispute. Though, in terms, s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitration proceedings, the principle of that section will be applied by the. arbitrator for awarding interest in cases where a court of law in, a suit having jurisdiction of the subject-matter covered by s. 34 could grant a decree for interest. In Edwards v. Great Western Ry.(1851) 11 C. B. 588.) one of the questions at issue was whether an arbitrator could or could not award interest in a case which was within s. 28 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833. It was held by the Court of Common Pleas that the arbitrator, under a submission of "all matters in difference", might award the plaintiff interest, notwithstanding the notice of action did not contain a demand of interest; and, further, that, assuming a notice of action to have been necessary,the want or insufficiency of such notice could not be taken advantage of, since the 5 & 6 Viet. C. 97, s. 3, unless pleaded specially. In the course of his judgment Jarvis C. J. observed "A further answer would be, that this is a submission, not only of the action, but of all matters in difference; and the interest would be a matter in difference, whether dema ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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