TMI Blog1977 (1) TMI 148X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... olding of agricultural land. One is 'person' and the other is 'family unit'. Where there is a family unit as defined in the Explanation to clauses (1) to section 4., it has to be taken as a unit for the purpose of determining whether land is held in excess of the ceiling area and for this purpose all land held by each member of the family unit, whether jointly or separately, is required to be aggregated and it is deemed to be held by the family unit. There, an individual member of the family unit is not regarded as a unit for the purposes of applying the limitation of ceiling area. The ceiling limit in such a case is applicable only to the family unit and not to an individual member of the family unit. It would not, therefore, be possible to say in the case of an individual member of the family unit that, when any land held by him under his personal cultivation is taken over by the State under the Act by reason of the land deemed to be held by the family unit being in excess of the ceiling limit applicable to the family unit, the acquisition is of any land "within the ceiling limit applicable to him" and hence in such a case there would be no question of any violation of the provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aterial for the purpose of the present appeals. Since these three amending Acts were enacted after the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, they were included in the Ninth Schedule along with certain other enactments by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976. The result was that the Principal Act, as amended by all the subsequent amending Acts including Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was protected against invalidation under Art. 31-B. The appellants are landholders in the State of Maharashtra and since the effect of the provisions of the Principal Act, as amended by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was to expropriate a part of the lands belonging to them, they preferred writ petitions in the High Court of Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of the Principal Act as amended by these amending Acts on various grounds. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present appeals to set out the different grounds on which the constitutional challenge was based, since none of these grounds has been pressed before us save one based on contravention of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng the distribution of agricultural land in a manner which would best subserve the common. good of the people. Section 2 contains various definitions of which only one is material, namely that contained in subsection (11A). That sub-section defines family unit to mean a family unit as explained in section 4. Section 3 imposes a prohibition on holding of land in excess of ceiling area and so far as material, it reads as follows: 3(1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter and Chapter III, no person or family unit shall, after the commencement date, hold land in excess of the ceiling area, as determined in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) All land held by a person, or as the case may be, a family. unit whether in this State or any other part of India in excess of the ceiling area, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or usage, be deemed to.be surplus land, and shall be dealt with in the manner hereinafter provided for surplus land. In determining surplus land from the holding of a person, or as the case may be, of a family unit, the fact that the person or any member of the family unit has died (on or after the commencemen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion (4) of section 21 provides that us soon as may be after the announcement of the declaration, the Collector shall take in the prescribed manner possession of the land which is delimited as surplus and the surplus land shall, with effect from the date on which possession is taken, be deemed to be acquired by the State Government for the purposes of the Act and shall accordingly vest, without further assurance and free from all encumbrances, in the State Government. Sections 21 to 26 provide for determination and payment of compensation for the surplus land acquired by the State Government. Then follow provisions in sections 27 to 29 in regard to distribution of surplus land. These provisions require the State Government to distribute the surplus land. in certain order of priority with a view. to carrying out the purposes of the legislation. Sections 30 to 36 lay down the procedure for holding inquiries under the Act and also provide for appeal mechanism. These are followed by certain miscellaneous provisions in sections 37 to 49 which are not material for the purpose of the present appeals. It will be seen from this brief resume of the relevant provisions of the Act that there ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the amendments made 'by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1976 almost fourteen years after the Principal Act was enacted and it is interesting to notice the reasons why it had to be done. The necessity for wide ranging radical land reforms in order to improve our rural economy was acutely realised when, on attaining independence, we became free to mould our destinies. With that end in view, immediately after independence, the legislatures of the country started enacting laws for bringing about agrarian reform as a part of the process of socio-economic reconstruction. The imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings was found necessary as a part of the scheme of agrarian reform because it was calculated to remove undue balance in society resulting from landless class on the one hand and concentration of land in the hands of a few on the' other. The concept of socio-economic justice embodied in the Constitution in fact rendered the imposition of ceiling inevitable, as this step was symbolic of new social ideas.(1) The growth of monopolistic tendencies in land ownership had to be arrested, if the optimum area was to be made available to the largest number of people. The Panel on Land ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be rather high and it had, therefore, to be lowered by (1) India--Progress of Land Reforms 1955, p. 19. subsequent amendments. But until the enactment of Maharashtra Act 21 of 1976, ceiling was made applicable only to holding of agricultural at lands by individuals. However, it was felt that if the ceiling law was to be really effective, it was necessary to take the family as a unit for the purpose of applying the ceiling. There were two main reasons which inclined the legislature to this view. One was that, in the context of the social and cultural realities of Indian rural life, family is the real operative unit in land ownership as in land management and, therefore, in the fixing of the ceiling, the aggregate area held by all the numbers of the family should be taken into account (1) and the other was that taking the family as a unit and imposing ceiling on the aggregate land held by all the members of the family acted as a disincentive to effect mala fide transfers in the names of close relations such as wife, minor sons and unmarried daughters with a view to bringing the holdings within the ceiling and operated to nullify such transfers where they had been effected with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ny of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away of abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. The argument of the appellants was that on a true construction of the language of Article 31-B a post-Constitution enactment such as the Act, is protected from invalidation only when it rakes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III and not when it merely transgresses a restriction on legislative competence imposed by any provision of that part and is, therefore, inconsistent with any provision. The later ground of validation during curing generally any inconsistency with any provision of Part III is available only in case of pre Constitution legislation. What is, therefore, to be seen in the present case is whether any right is conferred by the second proviso to clause (1) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... second proviso to clause (1) of that ,article. But so far as Article 31-B is concerned, it is clear on its plain terms that it saves from invalidation an enactment specified in the Ninth Schedule even if it happens to be inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions, of Part III . It is immaterial whether such enactment is inconsistent with any provisions of Part III or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any such provisions, for both infirmities are cured. by Article 31-B. The words such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part in .Article 31-B are clearly an echo of the language of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 13 and they have obviously been employed because the enactment specified in the Ninth Schedule may be pre-Constitution as well as post Constitution laws. But it would not be right to introduce an artificial dichotomy in Article 31-B by correlating the first part of the expression, namely, is inconsistent with--any' provisions, of this Part and confining its applicability to pre-Constitution legislation and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ight to Property and they define and delimit the right to property guarantied under Part III of the Constitution. Article 31, clause (1) protects property against deprivation by executive action which is not supported by law. It is couched in negative language, but, as pointed out by S.R. Das, J., in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh([1952] S.C.R. 889 at 988)'' it confers a fundamental right in so far as it protects private property from State action. The only limitation put upon the State action is the requirement that the authority of law is pre-requisite for the exercise of its power to deprive a person of his property. This confers some protection on the owner, in that, he will not be deprived of his property save by authority of law and this protection is the measure of the fundamental right. It is to emphasise this immunity from State action as a fundamental right that' the clause has been worded in negative language .Article 31, clause (1) thus, by giving limited immunity from State action, confers a fundamental right. Clause (2) of Article 31 then proceeds to impose limitation on the exercise of legislative power by providing that no property shall be compulsor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law makes any provision for acquisition by the State. of any estate and thus falls within one of the categories specified in Article 31A, it would not qualify for immunity under me provisions of that article, if it seeks to acquire any portion of the land held by a person under his personal cultivation which is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force and such a law, in order to be valid, would have to provide for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value of the land sought to be acquired. This provision is also couched in negative language like clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31 and it imposes a fetter on the exercise of the legislative power of the State by providing that the State shall not be entitled to make a law authorising acquisition of land held' by a person under his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit applicable to him, unless the law provides for payment of compensation at a rate not less than the market value. This limitation on the legislative power of the State is the measure of the fundamental right conferred on the owner of the land. It is by imposing limitation on the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd therefore enacted the second proviso requiring that a law which permits acquisition of land within the ceiling limit must provide for compensation at a rate not less than the market value. The second proviso in fact restores the right of property with added vigour in case of small holdings of land. it goes much further than Article 31, clause (2) and provides a larger protection, in that, clause (2) of Article 31. merely requires that a law authorising acquisition should fix an amount to be paid for the acquisition or specify the principles in accordance with which the amount may be determined and the manner in which it may. be given--and this may be very much less than the market value--while the second proviso insists that at the least, full market value must be paid for the acquisition. Thus, there can be no doubt that the second proviso confers a right--and this right is higher than the one under clause (2) of Article 31---on a person in respect of such portion of land under his personal cultivation as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him and if the Act, by creating an artificial concept of a family unit and fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such fam ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that Article 31-B is not intended to be construed as validating contravention of the second proviso to clause (1 ) of Article 31A. This contention, which seeks to treat the Explanation as illustrative in character, is clearly fallacious. It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to Clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention. It must be remembered that the legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain language and not on any a priori considerations. The Explanation does no more than provide that so far as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is concerned, if any acquisition is made under it in contravention of the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... protection afforded by the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A is undoubtedly against acquisition by the. State but this protection is secured by imposing limitation on exercise of legislative power and it is the law under the authority of which the acquisition is made which has to conform to the requirement of this proviso. If the law authorising acquisition does not conform with this requirement, it would be void and the acquisition made under it would be unlawful, but for Article 31-B. It is indeed difficult to see how the law authorising acquisition can be valid and yet acquisition mane under it can be void as offending the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court is plainly erroneous and must be rejected. We are, therefore, of the view that even if the Act, in so far as it introduces an artificial concept of a family unit and fixes ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such family unit, is violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A, it is protected by Article 31-B by reason of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. We may point out that the same view has been taken by this Court in a decision given in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wife or minor son or minor was married daughter and hence the Act, in so far as it adopted this device, falls foul of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A. But this argument ignores the scheme determination of ceiling area adopted in the Act. There are, as already pointed out by us, two units recognised by the Act for the purpose of fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land. One is 'person' and the other is 'family unit'. Where there is a family unit as defined in the Explanation to clauses (1) to section 4., it has to be taken as a unit for the purpose of determining whether land is held in excess of the ceiling area and for this purpose all land held by each member of the family unit, whether jointly or separately, is required to be aggregated and it is deemed to be held by the family unit. There, an individual member of the family unit is not regarded as a unit for the purposes of applying the limitation of ceiling area. The ceiling limit in such a case is applicable only to the family unit and not to an individual member of the family unit. It would not, therefore, be possible to. say in the case of an individual member of the family unit that, w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a batch of special leave petitions before us and since they raise only one question, namely that relating to the constitutional validity of the Act, they too must be rejected. C.A. 1307 of 1976. BHAGWATI, J. This appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh is directed against a judgment delivered bY a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad answering four questions referred to it for its opinion by a Single Judge of that High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 9257 of 1975. These four questions arise out of challenge to the constitutional validity of certain provisions of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1971 as amended by U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to. as the amended U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act) and they are in the following terms: 1. Whether the acquisition of land under personal cultivation as surplus after ignoring sale deed under section 5(6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act is violative of second Proviso to Article 31 -A( 1 ) of the Constitution ? 2. Whether ignoring transfer made after 24th January, 1971, other than those excepted: under Proviso to section 5(6) of the both in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the present appeal but the correctness of the answers given to the first three questions is seriously assailed before us by the State. We will first deal with the third question since it is obvious that if the answer to that question is in favour of the State and it is held that Act. 31-B protects an enactment included in the Ninth Schedule even from attack on the ground of violation of the second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31A, it would become unnecessary to consider the first two questions which raise the issue whether section 5, subsection (6) of the amended U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act is violative of that proviso, for even if it is, it would be protected by Art. 31-B in view of the fact that U.P. Act No. 1 of 1971 as also. the two subsequent amending Acts, namely, U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975, are '.included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. Now, so far as the third question is concerned, we have already held, in a judgment delivered today in Civil Appeals 1132-1164 of 1976 arising under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961, that Art. 31-B affords complete immunity to an enactment inc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lso major sons and unmarried daughters, whereas 'Family' as defined here excludes major sons and unmarried daughters. Section 4, sub-section (1) provides that subject to the provisions of section 5, no person shall own or hold land as landowner or tenant or partly as landowner and partly as tenant in excess of the permissible area and sub-section (2) of that section lays down what shall be the permissible area in respect of different classes of land. There is proviso. (ii) to sub-section (2) of section 4 which says that where the number of members of a family exceeds five, the permissible area shah be increased by one-fifth of the permissible area for each member in excess of five, subject to the condition that additional land shall be allowed for not more than three such members. Sub-section 4 of Sec. 4 has two clauses which reads as follows: (a) Where a person is a member of a registered cooperative farming society, his share in the land held by such society together with his other land, if any, or if such person is a member of a family, together with the land held by every member of the family shall be taken into account for determining the permissible area; (b) w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mitation of ceiling area in reference to the aggregation of such lands are not violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A and even if they were, they are protected by Article 31-B. The reasoning which has prevailed with us for sustaining the validity of the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 must apply equally in the present cases arising under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 and we must hold that the impugned provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 are not in conflict with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A and in any event, they are protected from invalidation under Article 31-B. We may point out that the same view has been taken by this Court in regard to the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act (27 of 1961) in Hansmukhlal v. State of Gujarat.( [1977] 1 S.C.R. 103) The relevant provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 are almost the same as those of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act (27 of 1961) which were upheld as constitutionally valid in Hansmukhlal's case (supra). We accordingly negative the challenge to t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to defeat the sweep of its humanism. Once we grasp the dharma of the Constitution, the new orientation for the karma of adjudication becomes clear. Our rounding fathers, aware of our social realities and the inner workings of history and human relations, forged our fighting faith, integrating justice in its social, economic and political aspects. While contemplating the meaning of the Articles of the Organic law, the Supreme Court shall not disown Social Justice. We must realise the vital role in Indian economic independence that the land question plays before approaching the constitutional issues urged before us. The caste system and religious bigotry seek sanctuary in the land system. Social status syndrome, resisting the egalitarian recipe of the Constitution, is the result of the hierarchical agrarian organisation. The harijan serfdom or dalit proletarianism can never be dissolved without a radical redistribution of land ownership. Development strategies, income diffusion programmes and employment opportunities, why, even the full realisation of the social and economic potential of the 'green revolution' demand agrarian reform. Michael Cepede, Professor and Independent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s of the impact of land reforms, therefore, has to be attempted with an awareness of development in the total social situation. Further, countries in Asia exihibit many points of similarity as well as of divergence in respect of land reform programmes and their impact on socio-economic changes. (Studies in Asian Social Development--McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Ltd., p. 5). Small wonder that the framers of the Constitution were stirred by the proposition that freedom in village India become's 'free' only when the agrarian community comes into its own and this necessitates radically re-drawing the rural real estate map. A sensitied awareness of this background is essential while assessing the legal merit of the submissions made by Shri Tarkunde which has fatal potential vis-a-vis the three impugned legislations in question. We are directly concerned, in considering the crowd of appeals from the three High Courts, with Arts. 31A(1)* and 31-B which * In its present shape, it was recast by the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act. came into the Constitution shortly after and as the very First Amendment to the Constitution. The relevance of land reforms and thei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g for construction. The purpose of Art. 3lB is conferment of total immunity from challenge on the score of violation of Part III. The words used are as comprehensive as English language permits. And there is no justification. to narrow down the pervasive operation of the protection, once we agree that the legislation relates to agrarian reforms. I have, right at the outset, hammered home the strategic significance of land reforms in the planned development .of our resources, the restoration of the dignity and equality of the individual and the consolidation of our economic freedom. No land reforms, no social justice. And so, the framers of the Constitution, finding the fearful prospect of agrarian re-structuring being threatened by fundamental rights' archery, decided to armour such reform programmes with the sheath of invulnerability viz., the Ninth Schedule plus Art. 3lB. Once included in this Schedule, no land reform law shah be arrowed down by use of Part III. A complete protection was the object of the 1st Amendment, and to blunt the edge of this purpose by interpretative tinkering with legalistic skills is to cave in or assist unwittingly the slowing down of the proces ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctments is that they are all included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, although it must be stated that the Punjab Act, at the time the High Court decided the case, had not been so included. Since the three Acts enjoy the immunity ensured by Art. 31-B, the examination by this Court of the questions mooted has to be on that footing. That Chinese Wall of protection still leaves vulnerable chinks, according to Shri Tarkunde, and his major offensive is based on the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1). He derives from the proviso thereto a legislative incompetency if some mandated conditions implied therein are not fulfilled and the failure to comply with this requirement by all three Acts spells their invalidity. The broad-spectrum attack in the High Courts, based on many grounds, having been given up, we may focus first on the relevant portions of Arts. 31-A and 31-B and the Ninth schedule, before coming to the specific sections of the Acts which allegedly violate, with fatal impact, the constitutional prescriptions or prohibitions. Shri Tarkunde himself followed this line in his argument. Speaking generally, the gravamen of the charge, in all the three instances, is in crea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ghts accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or taken away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; Provided that where 'such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent: Provided further that where any law, makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Part III had been flouted but because the limitation on legislative competency written into the second proviso to Art. 31 A had been breached. Counsel fought shy of reading into the 2nd proviso to Art. 31A(1) a fundamental right conferred on persons holding lands below the ceiling limit in personal cultivation. This legalist dexterity became necessary because Art. 3lB, on its plain and plenary terms, was a sovereign remedy against all abridgement of or inconsistencies with fundamental rights under Part III. The sweep of this provision, the paramount purpose it was designed to serve and the. amplitude of its language versus the narrowness of the construction put, the desperate interpretative crevices created, frustrative of its main object, and the reliance on the structure of Art. 13 to understand the anatomy of Art. 31B--this was the gut issue on which most of the debate centred. Equally importantly, whether the prescription in the said 2nd proviso was a guaranteed fundamental right expressed in emphatic negative and as an exception to an exception or was it solely a limitation on legislative power without creating a corresponding right in any person--this too occupied the ce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y, such protean words which in their potent totality bang, bar and bolt the door against every possible invalidatory sally based on Part III. And Article 31A(1) being in Part III, Shri Tarkunde's '2nd proviso' bullet cannot hit the target. Nor are we impressed with the cute argument that the phraseology of Art. 3lB must be correlated to Art. 13 and read with a truncated connotation. Legal legerdemain is of no avail where larger constitutional interests are at stake. Shri Tarkunde concedes that if we read the 2nd proviso to Art. 31A(1) as conferring a fundamental right on every person in personal cultivation of land below the ceiling limit. Art. 3lB is an effective answer to his contention. And so he has striven to make the point that what the said proviso does is not to confer a right but to clamp down a limitation on legislative competence. The proviso, according to counsel, imposes an embargo. on the legislature against enacting for acquisition of lands below the ceiling limit without providing for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The fallacy of this submission lies in its being a half truth confounded for the wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s a creature of the 2nd proviso to Art. 31A(1). An independent provision may occasionally incarnate as a humble proviso. I am not, therefore, inclined to pursue Shri Tarkunde's trail in reading the rulings which set out the proper office of a proviso, although it is absolutely plain that in the context, setting and purpose of a provision, even a proviso may function as an independent clause. Likewise, the artificiality imputed to 'family unit' and 'family' in the two statutes and the anomalies and injustices which may possibly flow from them also do not arise for consideration since we have taken the scope of Art. 3lB to be Wider than contended for. Moreover, in any land reform measure, where the maximum surplus pool of land for social distribution is the aim, drastic interference with the existing rights and room for real individual grievances are inevitable. The new order claims a .high price from the old and pragmatic strategies to organise land reforms may involve definitional unorthodoxy if the target group is to be reached. Socio-economic legislation is social realism in action, not bookish perfection, as social scientists will attest. I hold that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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