TMI Blog1998 (4) TMI 531X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rder, in the negative. The writ petition succeeds and is ordered accordingly. - Writ Petition (civil) 200 of 1995 - - - Dated:- 17-4-1998 - S.C.AGRAWAL G.N.RAY A.S.ANAND S.P.BHARUCHA AND S.RAJENDRA BABU, JJ. JUDGMENT: DR. ANAND. J. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, this Court found the Contemner, an advocate, guilty of committing criminal contempt of Court for having interfered with and obstructing the course of justice by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and threatening language , While awarding punishment, keeping in view the gravity of the contumacious conduct of the contemner, the Court said: The facts and circumstances of the Present Case justify our invoking the power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution to award to the contemner a suspended sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of his practice as and advocate in the manner directed herein. We accordingly sentence the contemner for his conviction for the offence of the criminal contempt as under: (a) The contemner Vinay Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to undergo simple imprisonm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Bench. The only question which we are called upon to decide in this petition is whether the punishment for established contempt of Court committed by an Advocate can include punishment to debar the concerned advocate from practice by suspending his licence (sanad) for a specified period, in exercise of its powers under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Dealing with this issue, the three judge Bench in vinay Chandra Mishra's case (Supra), opined: The question now is what punishment should be meted out to the contemner. We have already discussed the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. That jurisdiction is independent of the statutory law of contempt enacted by Parliament under Entry 77 of List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 129 is sui generis. The jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt as well as to award punishment for it being constitutional, it cannot be controlled by any statute. Neither, therefore, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 nor the Advocates Act, 1981 can be pressed into service to restrict the said jurisdiction. The Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Constitution, this Court can neither create a jurisdiction nor created a punishment not otherwise permitted by law and that since the power to punish an advocate (for professional misconduct ) by suspending his licence vests exclusively in a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act, this Court cannot assume that jurisdiction under Article 142 or 129 or even under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. To appreciate the submissions raised at the bar, let us first notice Article 129 of the Constitution, it reads: 129. Supreme Court to be a court of record.- The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the power of such a court including the power of punish for contempt of itself . The Article on its plain language vests this Court with all the powers of a court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The expression Court of Record has not been defined in the Constitution of India. Article 129 however, declares the Supreme Court to be a Court of Record, while Article 216 declares a High Court also to be a Court of Record. A court of record is a court, the records of which are admitted to be o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fective manner.' Such a power is not derived from statute nor truly from the common law but instead flows from the very concept of a court of law. All courts of record have an inherent jurisdiction to punish contempts committed in their face but the inherent power to punish contempts committed outside the court resides exclusively in superior courts of record. Superior Courts of records have an inherent superintendent jurisdiction to punish contempts committed in connection with proceedings before inferior courts. (emphasis ours) Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution provides for: Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before the supreme Court. Entry 14 III of the Seventh Schedule provides for legislation in respect of : Contempt of Court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court. The language of entry 77 of List I and entry 14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule demonstrate that the legislative power of the Parliament and of the State legislature extends to legislate with respect t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and this Court, therefore exercises the power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself by virtue of the powers vested in it under Articles 129 and 142(2) of the Constitution of India. The first legislation to deal with contempt of courts in this country was the contempt of courts Act, 1926. it was enacted with a view to define and limit the powers of certain courts for punishing contempts of court. The preamble to that Act stated: Whereas doubts have arisen as to the powers of a High Court of judicature to punish contempt of courts and whereas it is expedient to resolve these doubts and to define and limit the powers exercisable by High Courts and Chief Courts in punishing contempts of Court: It is hereby enacted as follows: Section 2 says :- Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the High Courts of Judicature established by Letters patent shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to them as they have and exercise in respect of contempts of themselves. Since, the Act was enacted with a view to 'remove doubts about ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to punish him for established contempt. The legislation itself prescribed the nature and type, as well as the extent of, punishment which could be imposed on a contemner by the High Courts or the Chief Courts. The second proviso to Section 4 of the 1952 Act (supra) expressly restricted the powers of the Courts not to impose any sentence in excess of what is specified in the section for any contempt either of itself or of a court subordinate to it. After the Constitution of India was promulgated in 1950, it appears that on 1st of April, 1960, a Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha 'to consolidate and amend the law relating to contempt of Court'. The Bill was examined by the Government which felt that law relating to contempt of courts was uncertain, undefined and unsatisfactory and that in the light of the constitutional changes which had taken place in the country, it was advisable to have to entire law on the subject scrutinised by a special committee to be set up for the purpose. Pursuant to that decision, the Ministry of Law on July 29, 1961 set up a Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri H.N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India. The Committee came t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iction, powers ad authority, in accordance jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Panel Code, 1860 (45 of 1860). The punishment for committing contempt of court is provided in Section 12 of the 1971 Act which reads:- 12. Punishment for contempt of court. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. Explanation.- An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding any t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... crutiny of sub-section (3) of Section 12 demonstrates that the legislature intended that in the case of civil contempt a sentence of fine alone should be imposed except where the court considers that the ends of justice make it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment also. Dealing with imposition of punishment under Section 12 (3) of the Act, in the case of Smt. Pushpaben and another vs. Narandas V. Badiani and another. (1979) 2 SCC 394, this Court opined: A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section (Section 12(3)) leaves no room for doubt that the legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment along is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule. Section 10 of the 1971 Act like Section 2 of the 1926 Act and Section 4 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... commensurate to the offence. Thus, where contempt is committed owing to a mistaken view of the rights of the offender, the punishment, where imprisonment is deemed necessary, should be for a definite period and should not be severe. Paras 99 and 100 to 105 of Halsbury's Laws deal with the other punishments which may be imposed for contempt of court. 99. Fines and security for good behavior. The Court may, as an alternative or in addition to committing a contemner, impose a fine or require security for good behavior. As in the case of imprisonment, there is no statutory limit to the amount of a fine which the court can impose. 100. Other remedies. As a further alternative to ordering committal, the court may, in its discretion, adopt the more lenient course of granting an injunction to restrain repetition of the act of contempt. The court may also penalise a party in contempt by ordering him to pay the costs of the application. 103. Fine. The court may, as an alternative to committal or sequestration, impose a fine for civil contempt. In assessing the amount of the fine, account should be taken of the seriousness of the contempt and damage done to the public ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt is concerned, which charge is required to be established like a criminal charge, it is punishable by (i) fine; or (ii) by fixed period of simple imprisonment or detention in a civil prison for a specified period; or (iii) both. In deciding whether a contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment, the court will take into account the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice and the culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act complained of is done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate. The nature and types of punishment which a court of record can impose, in a case of established contempt, under the common law have now been specifically incorporated in the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in so far as the High Courts are concerned and therefore to the extent the contempt of Courts Act 1971 identifies the nature of types of punishments which can be awarded in the case of established contempt, it does not impinge upon the inherent powers of the High Court under Article 215 either. No new type of punishment can be created or assumed. As already noticed, the parliament by virtue of E ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ofessional misconduct' of an advocate. While exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129, the only cause or matter before this Court is regarding commission of contempt of court. There is no cause of professional misconduct, properly so called, pending before the Court. This Court, therefore, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 129 cannot take over the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State or the Bar Council of India to punish an advocate by suspending his licence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of 'professional misconduct' is recorded in the manner prescribed under the Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder. When this Court is seized of a matter of contempt of court by an advocate, there is no case, cause or matter before the Supreme Court regarding his professional misconduct even though, in a given a case, the contempt committed by an advocate may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate by virtue of the licence to practice law but no issue relating to his suspension from practice is the subject matter of the case. The powers of this Court, under Artic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve power, which gives preference to equity over law but it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process contained in the Advocates Act 1961 by suspending his licence to practice in a summary manner, while dealing with a case of contempt of court. In Re: V.C. Mishra's case (supra), while imposing the punishment of suspended simple imprisonment, the Bench, as already noticed, punished the contemner also by suspending his licence to practice as an advocate for a specified period. The Bench dealing with that aspect opined: It is not disputed that suspension of the advocate from practice and his removal from the State roll of advocates are both punishments. There is no restriction or limitation on the nature of punishment that this Court may award while exercising its contempt jurisdiction and the said punishments can be the punishments the Court may impose while exercising the said jurisdiction. ( Emphasis supplied) In taking this view, the Bench relied upon Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution besides Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Bench observed: Secondly, it would also mean that for any act of contempt of court, if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... misconduct in addition to imposing the punishment of suspended sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of court. The plenary powers of this court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers also exists independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power, exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation, and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due proces ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling. it is well recognised and established that this court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling. It is a problem solver in the nebulous areas . (See. K. Verraswami vs. Union of India (1991 (3) SCC 655) but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case, cannot be altogether ignored by this court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in statute dealing expressly with the subject. In Bonkya @ B.S. Mane Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (1995 (6) SCC 447) a bench of this court observed. The amplitude of powers available to this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is normally speaking not conditioned by any statutory provision but it cannot be lost sight of that this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 142 of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le from the case of K.M. Nanavati. (Emphasis ours) In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra's case (supra), the three the three judge Bench did notice the observations in Prem Chand Garg's case (supra) but opined: In view of the observations of the latter Constitution Bench on the point, the observations made by the majority in Prem Chand Garg's case (supra) are no longer a good law. This is also pointed out by this Court in the case of Mohammed Anis Vs. union of India Ors. (1994 (Supp.1) SCC 145) by referring to the decisions of Delhi judicial Services Vs. State of Gujarat (supra) and Union Carbide Corporation Vs. Union of India (supra) by observing that statutory provisions cannot override the constitutional provisions and Article 142(1) being a constitutional power it cannot be limited or conditioned by any statutory provision. The Court has then observed that it is, therefore, clear that the power of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution Cannot be diluted by statutory provisions and the said position in law is now well settled by the Constitution Bench decision in Union Carbide's case (supra). (Emphasis supplied) Commenting upon the observa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for doing complete justice in any 'cause' or 'matter' pending before it. The expression 'cause' or 'matter' would include any proceeding pending in court and it would cover almost every kind of proceeding in court including civil or criminal . The inherent power of this Court under Article 142 coupled with the plenary and residuary powers under Articles 32 and 136 embraces power to quash criminal proceedings pending before any court to do complete justice in the matter before this Court. Mr. Nariman urged that Article 142(1) does not contemplate any order contrary to statutory provisions. He placed reliance on the Courts observations in Prem Chand Garg Vs. Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad 91963 Supp. 1 SCR 885 at 889) and A.R. Anthulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and Anr. (1988 (2) SCC 602) where the Court observed that though the powers conferred on this Court under Article 142(1) are very wide, but in exercise of that power the court cannot make any order plainly inconsistent with the express statutory provisions of substantive law. It may be noticed that in prem Chand Garg's and Antulay's case (supra) observations with regard to the extent of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nferred on it by or under the Constitution. Article 142 is also not of much assistance. In the first place, the operative words in that article, again are in the exercise of its jurisdiction . The Supreme Court was hearing an appeal from the order of discharge and connected matters. There was no issue or controversy or discussion before it as to the comparative merits of a trial before a Special judge vis-a-vis one before the High Court. there was only an oral request said to have been made, admittedly, after the judgment was announced. Wide as the powers under Article 141 are, they do not in my view, envisage an order of the type presently in question. The Nanavati case, to which reference was made by Shri Jethmalani, involved a totally different type of situation. Secondly, it is one of the contentions of the appellant that an order of this type, far from being necessary for doing complete justice in the cause or matter pending before the court, has actually resulted in injustice, an aspect discussed a little later. Thirdly, however wide and plenary the language of the article, the directions given by the Court should not be inconsistent with, repugnant for in vio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that limitation on the powers under Article 1425 arising from 'inconsistency' with express statutory provisions of substantive law' must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression 'prohibition' is read in place of 'provision' that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of 'complete justice' of accuse of matter, the Apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of court may also be guilty of committing professional misconduct depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures. The power to punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests exclusively in the courts. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, exclusive power for punishing an advocate for professional misconduct has been conferred on the concerned state Bar Council and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains a detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking the licence of an advocate for his professional misconduct'. since, the suspension or revocation of licence of an advocate has not only civil consequence but also penal consequence, the punishment being in the nat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ttee of a state Bar Council. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Section 38 of the Act. Section 42(1) of the Act confers on the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council, powers of a civil court under the code of Civil procedure and section 4292) enacts that its proceedings shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding for the purpose mentioned therein. Section 49 of the Act lays down that the Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under the Act and in particular such Rules may prescribe inter-alia the standards of professional conduct to be observed by the advocates and the procedure to be followed by the Disciplinary Committees of the Bar Council while dealing with a case of professional misconduct of an advocate. The Bar Council of India has framed rules called 'The Bar Council of India Rules' (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) in exercise of its rule making power under the Advocate Act 1951. Part VII of the Rules deals with disciplinary proceedings against the advocates. In chapter I of the part VII provisions have been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch other documents mentioned in Rule 24 of this Chapter as the Chairman of the Committee may direct at least ten days before the date fixed for the enquiry. Rules 5, 6 and 7 deal with the manner of service of notice, summoning of witnesses and appearance of the parties before the disciplinary committee. At any stage of the proceedings, the disciplinary committee may appoint an advocate to appear as amicus curiae and in case either of the parties absent themselves, the committee may; proceed ex parte against the absenting party and decide the case. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 provides: This Disciplinary Committee shall hear the Attorney General or the Additional Solicitor General of India or the Advocate General, as the Case may be or their Advocate, and parties or their Advocates, if they desire to be heard, and determine the matter on documents and affidavits unless it is of the opinion that it should be in the interest of justice to permit cross examination of the deponents or to take oral evidence, in which case the procedure for the trial of civil suits shall as far as possible be followed. Rules 9 and 10 deal with the manner of recording evidence during the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... constituted by the Bar Council. The Bar Council is not the same body as its disciplinary committee. One of the principal functions of the Bar Council in regard to standards of professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is to receive complaints against advocates and if the Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. The Bar Councils of a State may also of its own motion if it has reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. It is apparent that a state Bar Council not only receives a complaint but is required to apply its mind to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct. The Bar Council has very important part to play, first in the reception of complaints, second, in forming reasonable belief of quilt of professional or other misconduct and finally in making reference of the case to its disciplinary committee. The initiation of the proceeding before the disciplinary co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words a person aggrieved may very according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one a person aggrieved . Against a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him, the meaning of the words a person aggrieved is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words persons aggrieved is sections 37 and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tes or imposed any other punishment as provided under the Act. The enquiry is a detailed and elaborate one and is not of a summary nature. It is therefore, not permissible for this court to punish an advocate for professional misconduct in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by convening itself as the statutory body exercising original jurisdiction . Indeed, if in a given case the concerned Bar Council on being apprised of the contumacious and blame worthy conduct of the advocate by the High Court or this Court does not take any action against the said advocate, this court may well have the jurisdiction in exercise of its appellate powers under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution to proceed suo moto and send for the records from the Bar Council and pass appropriate orders against the concerned advocate. in an appropriate case, this Court may consider the exercise of appellate jurisdiction even suo moto provided there is some cause pending before the concerned Bar Council, and the Bar Council does not act or fails to act, by sending for the record of that cause and pass appropriate orders. However, the exercise of powers under the contempt juri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in aid of the Supreme Court . The Bar Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the obligation to protect the dignity of the profession and maintain professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act in aid of the Supreme Court . It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner advocate. It must act in accordance with the prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by this Court to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the tendency to interfere with due administration of justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act and the rules framed thereunder. There is no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of the and prevent any interference in the administration of justice. Learned counsel for the parties present before us do not dispute a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to itself punish him by suspending his licence to practice also while imposing a suspending sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of court but while doing so this court vested itself with a jurisdiction where none exists. The position would, have been different had a reference been made to the Bar Council and the Bar Council did not take any action against the concerned advocate. In that event, as already observed, this court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, might have exercised suo moto powers and sent for the proceedings from the Bar Council and passed appropriate orders for punishing the contemner advocate for professional misconduct after putting him on notice as required by the proviso to Section 38 which reads thus:- Provided that no order of the disciplinary committed of the Bar Council of India shall be varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. but it could not have done so in the first instance. In V.C. Mishra's case, the Bench, relied upon its inheren ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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