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TMI Blog1967 (9) TMI 140X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... piece-goods. After the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Act XX of 1946) (hereinafter to be referred to, as the Standing Orders Act), came into force, the standing orders of the appellant's establishment were duly drawn up, and certified by the authorities. Those standing orders, among other things, related to the question of leave, to, be granted to the workmen. By its order, dated August 2, 1955, the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, for adjudication, an industrial dispute, raised by certain categories of workmen, of the appellant company. That reference was numbered as I.C. No. 11 of 1955. The dispute that was referred, was "Whether the Standing Orders filed by the Management and now certified by the certifying authority be modified as a modification to the existing Standing Orders as amended by the employees through their association in the light of the views and as indicated in the Annexure to this notification". The Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, made an award, Exhibit M-6, on September 25, 1956, whereby the Tribunal directed the addition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the question of privilege leave, casual leave, and sick leave, which are already provided for. in the Standing Orders, of the Management, Exhibit M-5. The first respondent has placed its demands, in respect of this question, before the Industrial Tribunal, and the Management have also placed their points of view, on these matters. It is not necessary to refer to the pleas made, either by the appellant ,or the first respondent, regarding the merits of the claim, which has not -been adjudicated, by the Industrial Tribunal. But the Management raised two preliminary objections, to the jurisdiction, of the Industrial Tribunal, to entertain and adjudicate upon the questions, referred by the State Government. Those two preliminary objections were to the effect: (i) The award, Exhibit M-6, dealing with leave and other facilities, not having been terminated by the first respondent, by issue of a notice, as contemplated under s. 19(6) of the Act, continues to be in force and, therefore, the question of leave cannot form the subject matter of adjudication. (ii) The question regarding leave facilities, having been provided for, in the Certified Standing Orders, framed by the company unde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e first objection, that the award, Exhibit M-6, has not been terminated by a written notice, under s. 19(6) of the Act, counsel urged that the views, expressed by both the Tribunal, and the High Court, that there could be a notice, given even orally terminating the award, is not correct. No doubt. the findings, in this regard, that there can be an oral notice, given under s. 19(6) of the Act, has been sought to be supported, by Mr. B. R. L.. Iyengar, learned counsel, appearing for the Union. In our opinion it was not really necessary either for the Tribunal or for the High Court, to embark upon, and express an opinion, on the question, as to whether the notice of termination of an award, under s. 19(6), of the Act, can be oral, because. so far as we can see, the Union has not raised any plea that the termination of the award, Exhibit M-6, in this case, has been brought about, by its giving an oral notice to the Management. On the other hand, the specific plea of the Union, on this aspect, was that the various representations, made by it, to the Management, as well as the presentation of the Charter of Demands. amounted to a notice of termination of the award. The various represent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e seen that this Court observes that no formal notice, as contemplated by s. 19(2), of the Act, has been given by the Union. But, this Court, ultimately, held that though no such formal notice was given, the letter of April 8, 1957, written by the Union, could itself be construed as notice, within the meaning of s. 19(2), and therefore the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim, as the reference was made, by the State Government, long after the expiry of two months, from April 8, 1957. It will therefore be seen, that this Court treated the letter, of April 8, 1957, written by the Union, as amounting to a notice of intention to terminate the settlement. But. in the instant case, we specifically desired Mr. lyengar, counsel for the Union, to state which was the particular letter, or representation, made by the Union, which could be considered to amount to a notice of termination of the award. Learned counsel stated that he relied upon the letter, dated June 26, 1961, written by the Union, to the Management, as amounting to a notice, given by his client, intimating its intention to terminate the award, Exhibit M-6. In view of this stand, taken by the counsel for the U ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ement. it is in between September 19, 1958, the date of the settlement M-3 and August 14, 1961, the date of the notice-W-3, terminating the settlement, that the letter, dated June 26, 1961, relied on by Mr. Iyengar, as amounting to a notice of termination of the award, %,as sent by the Union. No doubt, in this letter, the Union has, among other matters, claimed leave facilities. as stated therein. That claim related to privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave. Even this letter does not, as such, intimate the Management, of the Union's intention to terminate the award, Exhibit M-6. Mr. Iyengar. learned counsel, urged that the very fact that the Union has made claims, in this letter, regarding leave facilities which are inconsistent with the award , Exhibit M-6, will clearly show that the Union is not standing by the award. From the facts. mentioned above, it will be clearly seen that the parties have entered into a settlement, on September 19, 1958, and one part of the agreement is that the Union is withdrawing its claim regarding leave facilities and it has also agreed not to raise any disputes, regarding that matter, for a period of three years. This settlement is binding, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... garding leave. etc., are all to be found in those Standing Orders Exhibit M-5. The Standing Orders Act, as the various provisions therein will show, is a self- contained statute, imposing obligations on the Management and also conferring rights. on the parties concerned. for the framing of and ,,effecting modifications, in the Standing Orders. The manner in which the modification is to be sought, is also indicated, in the Act. In this connection, learned counsel referred us to the interpretation, placed upon item 5, in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act, by this Court, in The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Pathan ([1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697), that it is open, to the authorities functioning under the Standing Orders Act, to make substantive provisions for the granting of leave and holidays, along with conditions in respect of them. Mr. Gokhale pointed out that the Standing Orders Act placed an obligation, on the management, to have the Standing Orders certified; it imposes a duty on the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority, to adjudicate upon the reasonableness and fairness of the Standing Orders-, a right has been given. both to the workmen, and the management, to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... trial dispute. raised by the Union, or the workmen, as a body, concerned, which will necessitate an adjudication, by the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act. In this connection, counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Act and the Standing Orders Act, were amended by a common Act-the Industrial Disputes (Amendment And Miscel- laneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act KXXVI of 1956). This Amending Act made provision for, adjudication, by the certifying authority and the appellate authority under the standing Orders Act, ,Upon the reasonableness and fairness of standing orders. It made :a provision, giving a right to a workman also to apply to the Certifying Officer, to have the standing orders modified. Section 13A, regarding reference being made to the Labour Court, by a workman or an employer, in respect of the application, or interpretation of a standing order, was also incorporated, by the Amending Act. Side by side with these amendments, made to the Standing Orders Act, various amendments were effected, in the Act also. Provisions regarding the constitution of the Labour Court, as well as the Industrial Tribunals, and matters over which they have jurisdiction, as enumerated in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecisions, which have been referred to, by Mr. Gokhale, in support of his contention that the observations made, therein, will show that after the amendment of the Standing Orders Act, in 1956, no industrial dispute can be raised, under the Act, in respect of the matters covered, by the Standing Orders Act, and that the remedy of the parties concerned, will only be, as laid down, therein. On a perusal of those decisions, we do not find that any such proposition, has been laid therein. On the other hand, we will presently show, that in the latest decision of this Court, the question, as to whether there can be an industrial dispute, raised, which can form the subject of an adjudication, under the Act, has been specifically left open. In Guest, Keen, Williams, Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling), the Management had framed standing orders which had been certified, under the Standing Orders Act. On the basis of those standing orders, certain workmen were voluntarily retired, at the age of 55 years, and the dispute, regarding this matter, was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act. The order of the Management was set aside, and reinstatement of some of the workers, was ordered. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n, this Court had to consider, again, the effect of the Standing Orders Act, prior to its amendment, in 1956. No doubt the amendments, effected in 1956, are also adverted to when considering the scheme of the Standing Orders Act. In particular, the scope of item 5, of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act, to the effect 'conditions of, procedure in applying for, and the authority which may grant. leave and holidays', came up for consideration. The contention, on behalf of the Management, appears to have been that the jurisdiction. conferred on a Certifying Authority, under this clause, does not empower the said Authority to deal with the substantive question of the extent and quantum of leave and holidays. It was further contended that the said clause only required the Standing Orders to provide for conditions, subject to which, leave and holidays could be granted, as well as the procedure, in respect thereof. In short, it was contended that the quantum of leave and holidays, to be granted to workmen, was outside the purview of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act and, as such, they could not be included by the Certifying Officer, or the Appellate Authority, in the Sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his Court, in Salem Electricity v. Employees ([1946] 2 S.C.R. 498). In that case, the appellant had framed standing orders and got them certified, in or about 1947. under the Standing Orders Act. In 1960, the appellant made an application, before the Certifying Officer, for amendment of certain standing orders. By virtue of the proposed amendment, the management wanted to have two sets of standing orders. to govern the relevant terms and conditions of its employees. Both the Certifying Officer, as well as the Appellate Authority, declined to modify the standing orders, as desired by the management. The question that arose for decision was it short one, as to whether the rejection of the application of the management, was justified or not. This Court, again, considered the scheme of the Standing Orders Act, both before and after its amendment in 1956, and held that in regard to the certification of the standing orders, the Standing Orders Act provided for a self-contained 'code, and ultimately held that the refusal of the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority, to modify the standing orders, was perfectly justified. Here, again, this Court had no occasion to consider th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Standing Orders Act, as interpreted, by this Court. gives jurisdiction to the authorities under that Act, to frame standing order,;. with reference not only to the procedure for -rant of leave and holidays, but also in respect of the quantum of leave, and allied matters. The Legislature, in item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Act, dealing with 'leave with wages and holidays', has conferred jurisdiction, In that regard, on the Industrial Tribunal. The Standing Orders Act which, has for its object, the defining, with sufficient precision, the conditions of employment, under the industrial establish- ments and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them, has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the workman, for the purpose of having a standing order modified, or for having any question relating to the application, or interpretation of a standing order, referred to a labour Court. But there is no warrant, in our opinion, for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a self-contained statute, with regarded to the matters mentioned therein, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act, to adjudicate upon the matters, covere ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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