TMI Blog2004 (6) TMI 619X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be executed and completed by the Central Agency within such time as the High Powered Committee will determine. The Central and the Punjab Government should provide adequate security for the staff of the Central Agency. We conclude this chapter with a reminder to the State of Punjab that "Great states have a temper superior to that of private litigants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided for patriotism, the fraternity of the Union, and mutual consideration to bring it to an end" - ORIGINAL SUIT 6 OF 1996 - - - Dated:- 4-6-2004 - PAL, RUMA AND REDDI, P. VENKATARAMA, JJ. JUDGMENT: RUMA PAL, J. : Consequent of the creation of the State of Haryana from the erstwhile State of Punjab, the question of appointment of the river waters made available to the erstwhile State of Punjab between Haryana and Punjab arose. A notification was issued by the Union of India on 24th March, 1976 under Section 78 of Punjab Reorganisation Act. 1966, inter alia dividing the river waters between the two States. The Sultej-Yamuna Link Canal Project covering about 214 KMs. was to be constructed through the States of Punjab and Haryana. Out of the 214 KMs, 122 KMs we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for adjudication to a Tribunal to be presided over by a Supreme Court Judge. The decision of this Tribunal will be rendered within six months and would be binding on both parties. All legal and constitutional steps required in this respect be taken expeditiously. 9.3. The construction of SYL Canal shall continue. The canal shall be completed by 15.8.1986. In approval of the settlement and in terms of the first two clauses of clause 9 of the Settlement, Section 14 was added to the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 and issues relating to the usage, share and allocation of the Ravi-Beas waters were referred to the adjudication of the Waters Tribunal by the Union of India under Notification dated 2nd April 1986. The Tribunal submitted its report on 30th January 1987 inter alia allocating the Ravi-Beas Waters between Punjab and Haryana. An application was made by Punjab before the Waters Tribunal for review of its decision. That application is pending. However, Clause 9.3. of the Settlement which was kept distinct from the water disputes under Clauses 9.1. and 9.2. continued to operate. The State of Punjab completed about 90% of the construction of the canal, but about 10% ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the judgment. If within that period the canal was not completed by the State of Punjab, the Union Government was directed to get it done through its own agency as expeditiously as possible. The State of Punjab did not comply with this Court's decree and the canal remains incomplete. On 8th January 2002, it filed an application for review of the judgment and decree of this Court which we dismissed on 5th March 2002. On 22nd March 2002, a writ petition under Article 32 was filed by Bharatiya Kisan Union (W.P. No. 94 of 2004) claiming to be a registered association of Indian citizens and seeking to question the decree and purporting to raise issues relating to the availability of water of the Ravi-Beas for allocation to the State of Haryana. An interlocutory application was also filed for stay of the decree dated 15th January 2002. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 10th Februry 2004. On 18th December 2002, an application was filed by Haryana for implementation of the judgment and decree dated 15th January 2002. This application was registered and numbered as I.A. No. 1 of 2002 in Suit No. 6 of 1996. On 13th January 2003, the State of Punjab filed a sui ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction on the Union of India to carry out its obligation under the decree since the period of one year fixed by the decree had expired. This has been numbered as I.A. No 4 in OS 1 of 1996. In view of this last application of Haryana, I.A. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in O.S. No. 1 of 1996 were dismissed as infructuous on 17th December 2003. At this stage, the State of Punjab filed a Writ Petition No. 30/2004 for a declaration that Rule 6(a) of Order XXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 is ultra-vires the Constitution alternatively for a declaration that Rule 6(a) of Order XXIII cannot be invoked in suits filed under Article 131 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition was not entertained in view of the fact that the same issues had been raised by the State of Punjab in answer to the application of the State of Haryana under Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules. Therefore, out of this welter of litigation what survives for disposal is : (1) Haryana's application for enforcement of the decree dated 15th January 2002 (LA. No. 4 in O.S. 6/1996); (2) Punjab's suit inter alia challenging the decree dated 15th January 2002 (O.S. 1/2003); and (3) Haryana's appl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... les which allowed the rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-disclosure of a cause of action was ultra vires Article 131. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4 SCC 609, p. 690, 709 as well the decision in State of Karnataka v. State of A.P., [2000] 9 SCC 572 in support of this submission. The ground that Rule 6(a) suffers from over exclusive classification and was otherwise violative of Article 14 was however not pressed. It is further submitted that the judgment of this Court dated 15th January 2002 decided a water dispute and that the decision of this Court in dismissing the review application filed by the State of Punjab was wrong. As far as the question of res judicata is concerned, it is submitted that that is an issue to be decided in the suit and not by way of an application under Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Rules. Punjab has also submitted that Haryana's application for rejection of the plaint should be heard by the Bench of three Judges. It may be mentioned that by an Order dated 1st January 2004, Haryana's application was directed by the learned Chief Justice to be listed before a Bench of w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntext, acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in cause of action 1. Doubtless, a suit under Article 131 is not an 'ordinary' suit, and the phrase cause of action is conspicous by its absence in the Article. But the argument that by the use of the phrase in Order XXIII Rule 6(a), the burden and limitations created by judicial interpretation of the phrase in connection with 'ordinary' suits are necessarily introduced, shackling an otherwise exclusive jurisdiction, is unacceptable. The phrase, in our opinion, as occurring in Order X ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etitions before us. Although, we heard very full arguments on these preliminary objections, we did not even frame any issues which is done, under the provisions of Part III of the Rules of this Court, applicable to the exercise of the Original Jurisdiction of this Court, before we generally formally dismiss a suit. However, as the form in which we have already passed our orders, dismissing the suit and petitions, which was approved by us on April 29, 1977, has substantially the same effect as the rejection of the plaints for failure to disclose a triable cause of action . The majority view dismissed the suit under clause (a) of Rule 6 of Order XXIII. The phrase cause of action was considered with reference to Article 131 as meaning a dispute involving a question of fact or law on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. The Second decision relied upon by the State of Punjab in this context is the State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4 SCC 608. The decision followed within a few months of the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (supra). The subject matter of controversy was a notification issued by the Central Government constituting a Commis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edure by a Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Advisedly, the Constitution does not describe the proceeding which may be brought under Article 131 as a 'suit' and significantly, Article 131 uses words and phrases not commonly employed for determining the jurisdiction of a Court of first instance to entertain and try a suit. It does not speak of a 'cause of action', a expression of known and definite legal import in the world of witness actions. Instead, it employs the word 'dispute', which is no part of the elliptical jargon of law. But above all, Article 131 which in a manner of speaking is a self contained code on matters falling within its purview, provides expressly for the condition subject to which an action can lie under it. That condition is expressed by the clause : if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends . By the very terms of the article, therefore the sole condition which is required to be satisfied for invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court is that the dispute between the parties referred to in clauses (a) to (e) must involve a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er Disputes Act, 1956 and the change of success. In paragraph 8, the plaintiff has given the grounds for seeking discharge of the injunction granted on 15.1.2002. These pertain to the availability of water for appointment between the Punjab and Haryana. It is stated that there is no water available for transfer through the SYL Canal. The second ground is a decision of this Court in writ petition No. 512/2002 on 31.10.2002 by which it is claimed, this court had directed completion of the net working of the rivers. Among the projects identified by the Union of India was the Sharda-Yamuna Link, as a result of which, according to 2. See: D.Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman [1999] 3 SCC 267, 271. the plaintiff, Haryana would get more water and there was no question of burdening the deficit Ravi-Beas Basin. The third ground is that an issue had been raised in the complaint filed by the plaintiff under Section 3 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, as to the rights of Haryana and Rajasthan to the rivers waters as non riparian States. The next ground is that Haryana had declined to abide by the other terms of the Punjab settlement. The last ground is that water allocations w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ight under Article 131. As was said by Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (supra) : Now, plainly there are two limitations in regard to the dispute which can be brought before the Supreme Court under Article 131. One is in regard to parties and the other is in regard to the subject matter........................The (other) limitation as to subject matter flows from the words If and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends . These words clearly indicate that the dispute must be one affecting the existence or extent of a legal right and not a dispute on the political plane not involving a legal aspect. It was put by Chandrachud, J., very aptly in his judgment in the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (supra) when he said : Mere wrangles between Governments have no place under the scheme of that article.....:. It is only when a legal, as distinguished from a mere political, issue arises touching upon the existence or extent of a legal right that the article is attracted. Hence the suit in the present case would obviously not be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dant, Siegel, from using the building proposed to be constructed by him for garage purpose. The injunction was granted on the basis that the area was exclusively residential and that the-proposed business would give rise to gases and odour affecting the neighbourhood. Subsequent to the decree, Siegel applied for modification on the ground that he did not wish to operate the garage but merely wished to use the premises to park the 3. Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 364. Section 38. 5. Kerr on Injunctions 6th Edn. p.40. cars of his tenants. The lower Court modified the earlier decree. The adjacent landowners' appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal and said : There are many equitable proceedings that illustrate the general rule, such as specific performance, bills to reform instruments, and others. A final decree in such equitable proceeding is unchangeable, except possibly through gross mistake to be corrected by a bill of review, and not then if any intervening right has appeared since entering the decree. In all such proceedings the decree calls for definite action, and the law presumes much action to follow the order. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enting the defendants from maintaining a monopoly and entering into or continuing in combination in restraint of trade and commerce. There were further clauses which prevented the defendants from carrying out the specified type of activity severally and jointly. The decree closed with a provision whereby jurisdiction of the court was retained for the purpose of taking such other action or such other relief as may become necessary or appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement thereof, and for the purpose of entertaining at any time hereafter any application which the parties may make with reference thereto. An application was made before the lower Court by an intervenor for vacating the decree on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The operation of the decree was suspended by an interim order. On an appeal preferred by the Government and by the wholesale grocers, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the appeals. In the course of the judgment it was said : Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted, power there still would be by force of principles ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he railroad and railroad labour union from discriminating against them by reason of the plaintiffs' refusal to join or retain membership in any labour organisation. Here again, a decree was passed against the defendants perpetually preventing a course of action in the light of a statutory prohibition. There was a subsequent change in the statute. On the basis of this change, the union made an application for modification of the decree. The application was allowed and it was said. The source of the power to modify is of course, the fact that an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief. Firmness and stability must no doubt be attributed to continuing injunctive relief based on adjudicated facts and law, and neither the plaintiff nor the court should be subjected to the unnecessary burden of re-establishing what has once been decided. Nevertheless the court cannot be required to disregard significant changes in law or facts if it is satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through changing cir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted by the plaintiff is Surinder Kumar v. Ishwar Dayal, [1996] 3 SCC 103 also pertained to a right under a decree perpetually injuncting the defendant from constructing a window on a common wall. On the finding that a new wall was constructed, it was held that the injunction did not continue to operate. The final decision cited by the plaintiff is Municipal Board, Kishangarh v. Chand Mal, [1999] 9 SCC 198. In this case a lessee had filed a suit to restrain the Municipal Board from interfering with the construction on leasehold land. Subsequent to the suit, the lease was terminated and the land was included within the municipality. This Court was of the view that in such circumstances, the original decree permanently injuncting the Board from interfering with the construction to be made by the lessee could be considered. The principles that emerge from these decisions are that (a) There is a distinction between a final peremptory injunction and a final decree which requires a continuous course of action. (b) A decree granting a preventive injunction continuously operates to prevent a course of action and (c) Such a decree may be modified prospectively if the circumsta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the defendant-State of Punjab, then the Union Government should get it done through its own agencies as expeditiously as possible, so that the huge amount of money that has already been spent and that would yet be spent, will not be wasted and the plaintiff-State of Haryana would be able to draw the full quantity of water that has already been allotted to its share. The mandate in the decree was to carry out the obligations under agreement dated 31st December, 1981. It did not envisage a continuing process over which the equity court necessarily retains jurisdiction in order to do equity . Principle (b) relating to modification of decrees enunciated earlier is therefore absent. In any event there has been no change in the circumstances on the basis of which the decree was passed. Although there is a discussion on the various issues while rejecting the submissions made by Punjab, ultimately the reasons for issuing the injunction were two. The first was the agreement dated 31st December 1981 and the order of this Court permitting the withdrawal of the two cross suits filed by Haryana and Punjab (OS 1 of 1979 and OS 2 of 1979). This is apparent from the following passage : ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to as a piece of evidence that the parties had kept the construction of the canal distinct from the disputes relating to the sharing of river waters between the two States. If the other clauses in the Punjab settlement are allegedly not being complied with by Haryana that is not a change of circumstance or ground for modification of the decree passed on 15th January, 2002. The challenge to Section 14 of the Inter State Water Disputes Act, 1956 is also inapposite to the question of modification of the decree. The section related to and was in enforcement of paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the Punjab Settlement and relates to the resolution of the water disputes between the States by the Tribunal. Paragraph 9.3 which is related to the canal and referred to by the Court does not form part of Section 14. It has not been averred that either of the two grounds which founded the decree have in any sense of the word ''changed''. Principle (c) is therefore unfulfilled. And finally Principle (d): the suit for modification of the decree dated 15th January, 2002 will not lie because the decree itself has been sought to be impeached. The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssue was conceded by the State of Maharashtra which had raised the issue. Over and above that, the Court was independently of the view (p. 640) that this Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit and answered issue 2 in the affirmative. Punjab's review petition was dismissed by us on the ground that the so- called vital question with regard to the interpretation of Article 131 and Article 262 has been answered in the Constitution Bench decision and we are bound by the same, In the impugned judgment, we merely applied the interpretation of the Constitution Bench of the provisions of Article 135 and 262 to the facts of the case. There was no further interpretation of Article 131 and 262 to be done in the case before us which required the decision of a bench of five Judges under Article 145(5). The objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of Article 262 was specifically negatived in the judgment dated 15th January 2002 when it was held : ...........the construction of SYL Canal has absolutely no connection with the sharing of water between the States and as such is not a ''water dispute within the meaning of Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ents pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis8. This opinion was followed in the matter of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, [1993] 1 SCC 96 (II) and applied to suits under Article 131. The factual background of that case was a dispute over the usage of the waters of the river Cauvery between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. The Union Government constituted the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal and referred the disputes between the two States to the Tribunal. The State of Tamil Nadu filed an application for interim relief. This was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it did not have the jurisdiction to grant any interim relief because that dispute had not been referred to it by the Central Government. Being aggrieved, the State of Tamil Nadu approached this Court under Article 136. The Special Leave Petitions were converted into Civil Appeals and disposed of by Order dated 26th April, 1991 by holding that the order of Reference showed that the Central Government had in fact referred the issu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... noticed the relevant provisions of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act. The Court after perusing the relevant provisions of the Act which were undoubtedly brought to its notice, has come to the conclusion that the Tribunal and jurisdiction to grant interim relief when the question of granting interim relief formed part of the Reference. There is further no violation of any of the principles of natural justice or of any provision of the Constitution. The decision also does not transgress the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision being inter partes operates as res judicata on the said point and it cannot be reopened. Since the doctrine of res judicata is an essential part of the rule of Law it follows that if the issues in the suit are barred by res judicata ex facie then this Court is required to reject the plaint in terms of Order XXIII Rule 6(b). There is no substance in the submission of Punjab that even when there is no dispute of fact the issue of res judicata should be left for consideration at the trial of the suit. The decision cited viz. Surayya v. Balagangadhar, AIR (1948) PC 5 is an authority for the proposition th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in respect of the same subject matter as the earlier withdrawn suit only if (i) the order of withdrawal imposed conditions and those conditions have been complied with; or (ii) the order of withdrawal granted leave to the plaintiff to bring such fresh suit. In the order allowing OS 2 of 1979 to be withdrawn no such conditions are present. Consequently a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter viz., the validity of section 78 of the 1966 Act does not lie. We leave open the question as to whether it is open to the State of Punjab to question the vires of the statute by which it was created. Similarly the challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be ejected at the threshold. The section reads : Constitution of Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Tribunal under this Act, to be known as the Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal for the verification and adjudication of the matters referred to in paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 respectively of the Punjab Settlement. (2) When a Tribunal has been consitute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction 11 applicable to this dispute. (E) To leave all other disputes relating to the Punjab settlement to be decided under the amended Act of 1958. This Court in the judgment dated 15th January 2002 considered the arguments of the parties relating to Section 14 and negatived Punjabs' submission as to the construction of section 14. Punjab could have challenged the constitutional validity of Section 14 in its written statement. It did not then. It cannot do so now being barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In this suit Punjab has claimed that the section is ultra vires because ''(i) the raison-d'etre for the introduction of Section 14 in the Act, 1956 was the assumption of the validity of Punjab Settlement i.e. Memorandum of Settlement dated 24.07.1985, which is incorrect as the said Settlement is not a valid or binding Agreement; (ii) The enactment of Section 14 is beyond the competence of Parliament since on the face of it, it is against the constitutional Scheme as set out in the Constitution under Article 262 read with entry 56 of 7th Schedule, List I. (iii) The special enactment has the effect of making a general legislation specific to Ravi-Be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to the constitutional validity of a statutory provisions is liable to be rejected in limine. The grounds given in support of Punjab's challenge to Article 14 are ex- fade no grounds in law and no cause of action' has been disclosed to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1986. Not only does the plaint filed by Punjab in OS 1 of 2003 not disclose any cause of action, but it is also evident from the statements in the plaint that the suit is barred by law. The plaint is accordingly rejected leaving open the other issues raised by Haryana in support of its application. Additionally and in the ultimate analysis, it is manifest that the suit has been filed only with a view to subvert the decision of this Court with all the disingenuousness of a private litigant to resist its execution. We have, in the circumstances, no compunction whatsoever in dismissing the suit under Order XLVII Rule 6 of the Rules. I.A. No. 1 of 2003 filed by the State of Haryana in O.S. 1 of 2003 is accordingly allowed. The plaint is rejected and Suit 1 of 2003 (State of Punjab v. State of Hary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecution was not maintainable, because Haryana had not applied for orders in terms of Clause 2(b) of the 1954 Order, that draft issues had been filed by Haryana and Punjab in Suit 1 of 2003 pursuant to an order passed by this Court dated 24.11.2003 in that suit, that water disputes were to be resolved on the basis of Punjab's complaint under Section 3 of the 1956 Act, that the Decree sought to be executed was liable to be modified under the changed circumstances, and that the Decree was a nullity. On the merits it is denied that nothing was done by the State of Punjab to continue or complete the portion of the canal within its territory and that the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) did not have the requisite experience for constructing SYL canal and finally that the Haryana's prayer for appointment of a High Power Committee showed that the Decree dated 15th January, 2002 is not executable in the ordinary course. The Union of India has also filed a counter affidavit in which it has stated that it has already taken steps to implement and comply with the Decree within the constitutional limitations . It has referred to several meetings held and also the correspondence exchan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ents and the construction of SYL canal would lead to drying up of 9 lakh hectares land in the Punjab; and (5) Suit No. 1 of 2003 had been filed. Incidentally, the fourth ground is almost a verbatim reproduction of Punjab's stand in the proceedings filed by it earlier. There was no stay granted by this Court at any stage of any of the various proceedings filed assailing the decree. Even when the final assault was made by the filing of Suit No. 1 of 2003 we did not grant any stay and it is basic law that the mere filing of proceedings does not operate as a stay. The correspondence and the record of minutes show that the Chief Minister as well as the Government officials named in the correspondence have arrogated themselves the power of sitting as a super-judicial body over this Court. The Constitution provides for an ordered polity within this country to promote integrity of the country. When disputes arise between States there are usually political underpinnings. The resolution of such a dispute in favour of one party will invariably have a political impact. Article 131 of the Constitution has therefore given this Court the exclusive jurisdiction to decide such a dispute s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed. The vague plea relating to the possible rise of militancy by the construction of the canal is not an acceptable defence at all. The fact that a letter of complaint has been filed under Section 3 of the 1956 Act is immaterial as that pertains to a water dispute within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act and we have already held that the construction of SYL canal is not a water dispute within the meaning of the 1956 Act read with Article 262 of the Constitution. We have already held that the decree cannot be said to be a nullity. In any event this is not a question which can be raised while opposing an application for execution. What remains of Punjab's opposition is its submission that the application of Haryana is not maintainable under the 1954 order. The 1954 Order has been issued by the President in exercise of powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. Punjab's objection to the maintainability of Haryana's application for execution because of alleged non-compliance with paragraph 2(d) of the 1954 Order is unsustainable. We quote paragraph 2 before giving our reasons in support of this conclusion : Notwithstanding anything contained in any ot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree - (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by the sale without attachment of any property; (c) by arrest and detention in prison for such period not exceeding the period specified in section 58, where arrest and detention is permissible under that section; (d) by appointing a receiver; or (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require. The residuary power under Section 5 l(e) allows a Court to pass orders for enforcing a decree in a manner which would give effect to it. The period specified in the decree for completion of the canal by Punjab is long since over. The Union of India has said that it had worked out a contingent action plan during this period. The contingency, in the form of expiry of the one year period in January 2003 has occurred. We have not been told whether the contingency plan has been put into operation. Although it appears that the Cabinet Committee on Project Appraisals had approved the proposal for completion of the SYL canal b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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