TMI Blog2003 (11) TMI 588X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e to the constitutional validity of this Act. Both the petitions have been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and respectively allege the Ordinance and the Act to be violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c) and 300A of the Constitution. Factual backdrop: In the year 1943, the Indian Council of World Affairs was formed by about 50 distinguished eminent public personalities as a non- official, non-political and non-profit organization. On March 31, 1945, the Association was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The principal object of the Society, as set out in the Memorandum of Association, was to promote the study of Indian and international questions so as to develop a body of informed opinion on world affairs and Indian relation thereto through study, research, discussion, lectures, exchange of ideas and information etc., with other bodies in India and abroad engaged in similar activities. The activities of the Society were housed in a building known as Sapru House. Sapru House has come up on a land of about 2 acres situated at No.1, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi, given on lease by the Government of India some time in the year ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to remain stayed. It seems that there was some controversy about the breach of the interim order granted by the High Court, which led to the filing of two contempt petitions in the High Court of Delhi, which are still pending. On September 1, 2000, the President of India promulgated Ordinance No.3 of 2000, the terms whereof were more or less similar and identical with those of the Ordinance of 1990. The constitutional validity of this Ordinance was challenged by filing C.W.P. No.5174 of 2000 in the High Court of Delhi. A Bill proposing to replace the Ordinance was moved in the Parliament which was passed by the Lok Sabha and was pending in the Rajya Sabha, but the Rajya Sabha was adjourned and, therefore, the Ordinance lapsed on December 31, 2000. On January 5, 2001, Ordinance No.1 of 2001 was promulgated seeking to revive Ordinance No.3 of 2000; however, this Ordinance too lapsed on April 3, 2001. On May 8, 2001, Ordinance No.3 of 2001 was promulgated and replaced by an Act of Parliament, which received the assent of the President of India on September 3, 2001. The facts stated hereinabove are almost undisputed. We say so because the chronology of events is not at all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ary. The image and reputation of the Institution drew adverse publicity in the Press. In the counter-affidavit several such instances have been highlighted under the title Glaring Instances of Maladministration as revealed in the Audit conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. These instances highlight irregular and incomplete maintenance of accounts, misuse and diversion of funds, and deficits and losses accumulating year by year on account of mismanagement and mal-administration. Photographs have been filed with the counter affidavit showing the state of disrepair of the building and its furniture. Serious irregularities were found to have been committed in the conduct of elections of the Executive Committee, resulting in the complete breakdown of the democratic functioning of the Institution. The electoral roll consisted of members who had discontinued their membership. Fruit and vegetable vendors were enrolled as members of the Indian Council of World Affairs, so as to pack the membership with defunct members only to ensure the continuance in office of a certain set of people. Membership fees of all such multiple members were being deposited by a single chequ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve recommended the taking over of Sapru House, lamenting the decline in the standard of the Institution. Earlier Ordinances are a matter of history and of mere academic relevance in view of the Parliament having ultimately enacted the Act. As to the impugned Act being in violation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers and in defiance of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the respondents have submitted that the decision of the learned single Judge was incorrect. It was put in issue by filing a letters patent appeal, which appeal was disposed of without any adjudication on merits due to the High Court having formed an opinion that the adjudication of the appeal was rendered academic in view of the Ordinance having lapsed. The respondents could not have pressed for decision of the letters patent appeal on merits nor could they have taken the matter further because the High Court or this Court would not have entered into the examination of an issue which was rendered of academic interest only. The Union of India has vehemently submitted that the Society has not been touched. It continues to survive as before and, therefore, the question of any fundamental right wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ollege, Delhi Vs. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) Anr., 1962 Supp.(1) SCC 156, that the doctrine of Colourable Legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of the competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all. We will, therefore, concentrate on the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the impugned legislation. If the Parliament has the requisite competence to enact the impugned Act, the enquiry into the motive which persuaded the Parliament into passing the Act would be of no use at all. Gist of the impugned Act The Preamble to the Act, that is, the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001 (Act No.29 of 2001) reads - An Act to declare the Indian Council of World Affairs to be an institution of national importance and to provide for its incorporation and matters connected therewith. Section 2 declares I.C.W.A. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Hindu University, the Aligarh Muslim University and the Delhi University; the University established in pursuance of Article 371-E; and any other institution declared by Parliament by law to be an institution of national importance. With this much of an introductory statement, we proceed to deal with the several grounds of attack urged by the petitioners. Impugned Act if violative of Article 19(1)(a) (c) Article 19(1)(a) and (c) and clauses (2) and (4) of Article 19, relevant for our purpose, provide as under :- 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. - (1) All citizens shall have the right.- (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) xxx xxx (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to (g) xxx xxx (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lation to be unconstitutional and void because it curtailed the fundamental right to form associations or unions and fell outside the limits of authorized restrictions under clause (4) of Article 19. Article 19(1) of the Constitution came up for the consideration of a Seven-Judges Bench of this Court in Smt. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India Anr. - (1978) 1 SCC 248. Dealing with the scope and purport of Article 19(1) the Bench held:- Even if a right is not specifically named in Article 19(1), it may still be a fundamental right covered by some clause of that Article if it is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as that fundamental right. It is not enough that a right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. Every activity which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended in that fundamental right nor can it be regarded as such merely because it may not be possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental rig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... India Bank Employees Association's case (supra), (five-Judges Bench), the following principles emerge : (i) a right to form associations or unions does not include within its ken as a fundamental right a right to form associations or unions for achieving a particular object or running a particular institution, the same being a concomitant or concomitant to a concomitant of a fundamental right, but not the fundamental right itself. The associations or unions of citizens cannot further claim as a fundamental right that it must also be able to achieve the purpose for which it has come into existence so that any interference with such achievement by law shall be unconstitutional, unless the same could be justified under Article 19(4) as being a restriction imposed in the interest of public order or morality; (ii) A right to form associations guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(c) does not imply the fulfillment of every object of an association as it would be contradictory to the scheme underlying the text and the frame of the several fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III and particularly by the scheme of the guarantees conferred by sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erty would be that guaranteed by sub- clause (f) and so on - each of these freedoms being subject to such restrictions as might properly be imposed by clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 as might be appropriate in the context. It is one thing to interpret each of the freedoms guaranteed by the several Articles in Part III in a fair and liberal sense; it is quite another to read each guaranteed right as involving or including concomitant rights necessary to achieve the object which might be supposed to underlie the grant of each of those rights. The Constitution Bench further held that the framing and structure of part III of the Constitution by the founding fathers calls for the guarantees embodied in it to be interpreted in a liberal way, so as to subserve the purpose for which the constitution-makers intended them, and not in any pedantic or narrow sense. This, however, does not imply that the Court is at liberty to give an unnatural and artificial meaning to the expressions used based on ideological considerations. A right to form unions guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) does not carry with it a fundamental right in the union so formed to achieve every object for which it was f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4) of Article 19 viz. bye laws which place restrictions based on either public order or morality. It was further urged that where the object of the association is lawful, the citizens, through that association, and the association itself, are entitled by virtue of the guaranteed right to freedom from legislative interference in the achievement of its object, except on grounds germane to public order or morality. In other words, the freedom guaranteed should be read as extending not merely to the formation of the association as such, but to the effective functioning of the association so as to enable it to achieve its lawful objectives. Unless Article 19(1)(c) were so read, the freedom guaranteed would be illusory and the Court should, in construing a freedom guaranteed to the citizen, give him an effective right. In short, the submission was that the right guaranteed under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 was not merely, as its text would indicate, the right to form an association, but would include the functioning of the association without any restraints not dictated by the need for preserving order or the interests of morality. The Constitution Bench discarded the argu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... business of individual citizens. In our opinion, the same principle as has been applied to companies and corporations would apply to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. In Azeez Basha Vs. Union of India - (1968) 1 SCR 833, this Court has held that Article 19(1)(c) does not give any right to any citizen to manage any particular educational institution and it only gives the right to a citizen to form associations or unions. In D.A.V. College, Jullundur etc., Vs. The State of Punjab and Ors., (1971) 2 SCC 269, the impugned legislation provided for compulsory affiliation of religious or linguistic minority institutions to the University. It was contended that the compulsory affiliation of the petitioners to the University affects their fundamental 'right of freedom of association' as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c). It was held that the Notification providing for compulsory affiliation of the educational institution with the University did not in any manner interfere or attempt to interfere with the petitioners' right to form an association under Article 19(1)(c). A Full Bench (five-Judges) decision by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Societies under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. The scheme of Article 19 shows that a group of rights are listed as clauses (a) to (g) and are recognized as fundamental rights conferred on citizens. All the rights do not stand on a common pedestal but have varying dimensions and underlying philosophies. This is clear from the drafting of clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. The framers of the Constitution could have made a common draft of restrictions which were permissible to be imposed on the operation of the fundamental rights listed in clause (1), but that has not been done. The common thread that runs throughout sub-clauses (2) to (6) is that the operation of any existing law or the enactment by the State of any law which imposes reasonable restrictions to achieve certain objects, is saved; however, the quality and content of such law would be different by reference to each of the sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 as can be tabulated hereunder : Article 19 Clause (1) Nature of Right Clauses (2) to (6) Permissible Restrictions By existing law or by law made by State imposing reasonable restrictions, in the interests of (a) Freedom of speech and exp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... doms may tend to become the synonyms of anarchy and disorder. The founding fathers of the Constitution, therefore, conditioned the enumerated rights and freedoms reasonably and such reasonable restrictions are found to be enumerated in clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 excepting for sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (6), the laws falling within which descriptions are immune from attack on the exercise of legislative power within their ambit (See: H.C. Narayanappa Ors. Vs. State of Mysore Ors., (1960) 3SCR 742). The Court, confronted with a challenge to the constitutional validity of any legislative enactment by reference to Article 19 of the Constitution, shall first ask what is the sweep of the fundamental right guaranteed by the relevant sub-clause out of sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1). If the right canvassed falls within the sweep and expanse of any of the sub-clauses of clause (1), then the next question to be asked would be, whether the impugned law imposes a reasonable restriction falling with the scope of clauses (2) to (6) respectively. However, if the right sought to be canvassed does not fall within the sweep of the fundamental rights but is a mere concomitan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Ordinance and the Act merely took over the Institute. Although, the name of the Society and of the Institute are the same, they were two different entities. The impugned legislations took over the Institute and not the Society. No restriction whatsoever was imposed on the functioning of the Society. The provisions of the Act referred to the Institute. The Institute constituted one of the activities of the Society. The petitioner-Society had constituted itself into an association in exercise of the fundamental right conferred by Article 19(1)(c). That right of that Society remains unimpaired and uninterfered with by the impugned Act and Ordinance. The Court further held that - There can be no doubt that the Institute has been taken over by the provisions of the Ordinance and the Act. It is true that with the taking over of the Institute, the Society lost its right of management and control of the Institute, but that is the consequence of all acquisitions. When a property is acquired, the owner loses all control, interest and ownership of the property. Similarly the Society, which was the owner of the Institute, has lost all control and ownership of the Institute. It may be equ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o and the Mother. The Society for its Auroville project received grants and subventions from UNESCO and also from the Government of India. However, after the death of the Mother, complaints started pouring in with the Central Government which, on enquiry, revealed mismanagement of the affairs of the Society, misuse of the funds thereof and diversion of the funds meant for Auroville to other purposes. There was in-fighting between the groups of members and the situation went out of control. The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1980, was promulgated followed by an Act, whereby the management of Auroville was taken over, though for a limited period. The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged on the ground that Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 and also Article 14 were infringed; and that the Parliament had no legislative competence to enact the said Act. Turning down the challenge on all the grounds, the Constitution Bench held, inter alia, that assuming but not holding that the Society or Auroville were a religious denomination, the impugned Act was not hit by Article 25 or 26. It does not curtail the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he society which was being conducted through the institution ICWA has been adversely affected and to that extent the validity of the legislation shall have to be tested by reference to sub-Clause (g) of Clause (1) of Article 19. The activity was of the society and the society cannot claim a fundamental right. Even otherwise the impugned legislation is a reasonable legislation enacted in the interest of the general public and to govern an institution of national importance. It is valid. Sarva Shri P.P. Rao and Ashok Nigam, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners have placed strong reliance on two decisions of this Court, namely, Smt. Damyanti Naranga Anr. Vs. The Union of India and Ors. Anr., 1971 (3) SCR 840 and Asom Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samiti, Hedayatpur-Gauhati-3 and Anr. Vs. State of Assam and Ors., 1989 (Supp.) SCR 160. In Smt. Damyanti Naranga's case (Supra) the Constitution Bench ruled that the right to form an association includes not only a right of forming an association to begin with, but also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the association. Once the citizens have formed any association voluntarily ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Samiti. On the peculiar facts of the case and the implications of the provisions contained in the impugned enactment the Court concluded that the right of association was virtually taken away and in the name of temporary control and management on the affairs of the society, what was done was a permanent deprivation. In response to a query raised by the Court it was stated by the State before the Court that the State had no desire to restore the Samiti. The impugned legislative provision was, therefore, struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Asom Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samiti's case (supra) is a three-Judge Bench decision and the only decision referred to therein is the case of Smt. Damyanti Naranga's case (supra). Though Article 14 has not been referred to in the judgment by specifically mentioning it, it is clear from the judgment that this Court has also formed an opinion that the action of the State was arbitrary and unreasonable, and so was liable to be struck down. Both the decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable and do not apply to the present case. It is well-settled that while deal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs of the Society of their freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). Scrutiny by reference to Article 300A It was submitted that the impugned legislation is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution inasmuch as it unreasonably deprives the petitioners of the property vesting in the society. In this context, a reference to a Constitution Bench decision of this Court would be apposite which deals with the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) (since repealed) though not on all the fours with the facts of this case. Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) Anr., 1962 Supp.(1) SCR 156, projects principles which would be relevant for our purpose. An individual founded a pharmaceutical institute known as 'Hindustani Dawakhana'. He also established a medical college known as 'The Tibbia College'. He then formed a society with a few members along with himself and registered the same under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society was known as the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, ('the Board' for short). The Boa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uiring property; it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being. It was held that the impugned legislation while creating the new Board has given it a corporate status, confining its powers and duties to the college, pharmaceutical institute and laboratory in Delhi. It fell within the purview of Entry 32 of List II. Dealing with the submission based on Article 31(2) of the Constitution (as it then stood), the Court held that the impugned legislation does not relate to nor does it provide for compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose. The impugned legislation provides for the transfer of the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, from the old Board to a new Board, and for that purpose the old Board was dissolved and a new Board was created with certain rights, powers and privileges to be applied for the exercise of powers and the performance of duties as laid down in the Act. Such legislation could not be tested under Article 31(2) or the tests emerging therefrom. Dealing with the submission made by reference to the repealed Article 19(1)(f), the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the impugned legislation. The protection of Article 300A is available to any person, including a legal or jurisdic person and is not confined only to a citizen. For more than one reason, we are not inclined to entertain this plea. Firstly, with the Forty-Fourth Amendment, w.e.f. June 20, 1979, Right to Property having ceased to be a fundamental right, we have grave doubts if the same can be sought to be enforced by a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Secondly, we find that a case of violation of Article 300A in the dimension in which it was sought to be canvassed is not taken up in the writ petition. The Union of India has taken over the institution by enacting a law which we have held to be within the legislative competence of the Parliament. Thirdly and lastly, the petition in that regard raises disputed questions of facts. The Union of India do not admit title of the petitioner either in the land or in the building or in any other property claimed to be owned by the petitioners. There is not one document of title produced by the petitioners in support of their claim to the property. Such highly disputed questions of fact which cannot be determined except on evide ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tal's case (supra). The contention there was that provisions in the Societies Registration Act were available to meet the situation in Auroville and that the law and order situation could be controlled by resorting to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Constitution Bench held - Whether the remedies provided under the Societies Registration Act were sufficient to meet the exigencies of the situation is not for the Court but for the Government to decide, and if the Government thought that the conditions prevailing in Auroville and the Society can be ameliorated not by resorting to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act but by a special enactment, that is an area of the exercise of the discretion of the Government and not of the Court. The Constitution Bench also observed that assuming the facts brought to the notice of the legislature were wrong, it will not be open to the Court to hold the Act to be bad on that account. It was then submitted that the institution ICWA was singled out and though there were several other institutions run by societies or other organizations which were in the grip of more serious mismanagement and mal-administration, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ave re-enacted the contents of the vitiated Ordinance into an Act of Parliament. It was forcefully submitted that such an enactment is violative of the doctrine of Separation of Powers and so is liable to be annulled on this very ground. The facts of this case are unusual. No precedent, parallel on facts, has been brought to our notice at the Bar though a host of decisions laying down constitutional principles were cited, some of which we shall refer to hereinafter. Let us first state a few general principles relevant for upholding validity of enactments. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. Anr. Vs. Broach Borough Municipality Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 283, the imposition of a tax was held to be invalid because the power to tax was wanting. A validation Act was passed and its constitutionality was put in issue once again. The Constitution Bench spoke a few words about validating statutes in general, as under:- When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important condit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al Jain Vs. State of Orissa Anr., (1977) 3 SCC 212. In Madan Mohan Pathak Anr. Vs. Union of India Ors., (1978) 2 SCC 50 too Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. case (supra) was cited and considered. The law laid down by the seven Judges Bench leads one to hold that if by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the constitutional validity of the subsequent legislation is not available to be decided on the basis of the previous judgment. The Constitution Bench in Union of India Anr. Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989) 2 SCC 754, observed that the range of judicial review recognized in the superior judiciary of India is perhaps the widest and the most extensive known to the world of law and then cautioned With the impressive expanse of judicial power vested in them it is only right that the superior courts in India should be conscious of their enormous responsibility . The Constitution Bench summed up the effect of declaring an Act of legislation in the case before us an Ordinance on the revival of such Act, by stating that where a statute is declared invalid in India it cannot be reinstated unless consti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it is violative of fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, such law would be void as provided under Article 13 of the Constitution. The legislature also cannot declare any decision of a court of law to be void or of no effect. In Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Shri Raj Narain Anr., 1975 (Supp.) SCC 1, Chandrachud, J., as His Lordship then was, cited with approval the opinion of Harold Laski that the separation of powers does not mean the equal balance of powers and observed that what cannot be sustained is the exercise by the legislature of what is purely and indubitably a judicial function. In our cooperative federalism there is no rigid distribution of powers; what is provided is a system of salutary checks and balances . With advantage, we may quote Justice Aharon Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel. In the context of a new statute having been enacted on the previous one having been annulled, the learned Chief Justice says Review of a new statute should focus not on the fact that it changes the previous ruling of the court, but on the fact that it undermines democracy. Moreover, everything is a question of degree. If the interpretati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also because it was too drastic and hence unreasonable. The High Court also went on to say that as compensation was not paid for the property acquired, the ordinance was arbitrary and discriminatory more so because it aimed only at a particular society. While making this observation the High Court overlooked the fact that the ordinance aimed at the Institution and not at the Society, though the nomenclature of the two was the same. The High Court nowhere recorded a finding that any property either belonged to the petitioners or was vested in them before it was taken away, and also did not consider the affect of repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution after which repeal the right to property had ceased to be a fundamental right and the newly engrafted Article 300A of the Constitution requires only authority of law for depriving any person or his property. That decision of the learned Single Judge was not left unchallenged. In fact, the correctness of the judgment of the learned single-Judge was put in issue by the Union of India by filing an intra- court appeal. Filing of an appeal destroys the finality of the judgment under appeal. The issues determined by the lear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bsequent Act would be liable to be annulled once again on finding that the High Court was right in taking the view of the illegality of the Ordinance, which it did. However, as we have already stated, this is not the position obtaining in the present case. The impugned Act is not liable to be annulled on the ground of violation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers. Impugned Act covered by Entries 62, 63 of List I of Schedule - 7 The challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned Act fails on all the grounds alleged. The legislation is clearly covered by Entries 62 and 63 of List I Schedule 7. Initially at one time, the institution was receiving financial aid from the Government of India. The institution ICWA has been declared to be an 'institution of national importance' by the Act of Parliament. There is no challenge to the validity of such declaration nor do we find any grounds to take a view different from the one taken in the declaration made by the Government of India. Once an institution is declared to be of national importance, the Parliament is competent to make any law governing the management, administration and affairs of such an institution. It i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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