TMI Blog1965 (3) TMI 72X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... llants, Lala Shri Bhagwan and Shrimati Gopal Devi, on an agreement that they would pay a monthly rent of-' ₹ 58-4-0 and that the tenancy would commence from the Sudi 1 of each Hindi month and end on Badi 15 of the next month. The two appellants applied to the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer (hereafter called the Officer), under s. 3 of the Act for permission to file a suit in ejectment against the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents. The Officer granted permission by his order passed on September 1, 1951. The respondents then moved' the Additional District Magistrate, who had been authorised by the District Magistrate to hear appeals against the decision of the Officer. The appellate authority declined to confirm the permission granted to the appellants and remanded the case to the Officer for a fresh hearing. On re-hearing the matter, the Officer changed his view and rejected the appellants' application for permission on August 9, 1952. The appellants then moved the appellate authority again and prayed that the original order granting permission to them to sue the respondents should be restored. On December 9, 1952, the appellate authority ordered th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e appellants was valid. That, in fact, was the only issue which was raised before him. The other issues which had been found in favour of the appellants were not raised before the learned Judge. On the issue as to the validity of the sanction obtained by the appellants, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the said sanction was invalid inasmuch as the State Government in exercising its authority under s.7-F of the Act, had not given an opportunity to the respondents to be heard. He took the view that in exercising its authority under s. 7-F, the State Government was required to decide the matter in revision in a quasi-judicial manner and it was absolutely essential that the principles of natural justice should have been followed by the State Government before reaching its decision and an opportunity should have been given by it to the respondent to place their case before it. It appears that this question had been considered by Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court in the past and the consensus of judicial opinion appears to have been in favour of the, view that the revisional order which the State Government is authorised to pass under s. 7-F, is not a quasi-jud ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sider whether such an authority or body is a tribunal or not. It is well-known that even administrative bodies or authorities which are authorised to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner, are required to reach their decisions fairly and objectively; but in reaching their decisions, they would be justified taking into account considerations cf policy. Even so, administrative bodies may, in acting fairly and objectively, follow the principles of natural justice; but that does not make the administrative bodies tribunals and does not impose on them an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice. On the other hand, authorities or bodies which are given jurisdiction by statutory provisions to deal with the rights of citizens, may be required by the relevant statute to act judicially in dealing with matters entrusted to them. An obligation to act judicially may, in some cases, be inferred from the scheme of the relevant statute and its material provisions. In such a case, it is easy to hold that the authority or body must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its powers; but it is not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t similar Acts have been passed in all the States in India. Section 3 of the Act provides that subject to any order passed under sub-s. (3), no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds . Then follow seven clauses (a) to (g) which set out the grounds on which a landlord can seek to evict his tenant even without the permission of the District Magistrate The scheme of s. 3, therefore, is that in ,order to protect the tenants from eviction, the legislature has provided that the landlords could evict their tenants only if there was proof of the existence of one or the other of the seven grounds specified by clauses (a)to (g)in s. 3(1). Having made this general provision, s. 3(1) makes an exception and enables the landlord to seek to evict his tenant even though his case may not fall under any of the seven clauses of s. 3(1), provided he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate, In other words, if the District Magistrate grants permission to the landlord, he can sue to evict the tenant under the general provisions of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mmissioner to revise the said order within the limitation prescribed by sub-s. (2). That takes the proceedings before the Commissioner, and he exercises his revisional jurisdiction and reaches his own decision in the matter. Sub-section (4) provides that the revisional order passed by the Commissioner shall, subject to the order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F, be final. That takes us to s. 7-F. Section 7-F reads thus: The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in s. 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under s. 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under s. 7-A and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice. As we have already indicated, the question we have to decide in the present appeal is: what is the nature of the proceedings taken before the State Government under s. 7-F and what is the character of the jurisdiction and power conferred on the State Government by it; are the proceedings purely administrative, and can the State Government decide the question and exercise its j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enant are given an opportunity to place their versions before him, Therefore, we are satisfied that the jurisdiction conferred on the District Magistrate to deal with the rights of the parties is of such a character that principles of natural justice cannot be excluded from the proceedings before him. This conclusion is very much strengthened when we consider the provisions of s. 3(3). This clause specifically requires the Commissioner to hear the application made under sub-s. (2) within the specified period. This requirement positively enacts that the proceedings before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial. This clause further provides that the Commissioner has to be satisfied as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of the order under revision. He can also examine the question as to the regularity of the proceedings held before the District Magistrate. In our opinion, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that these provisions unambiguously suggest that the proceedings before the District Magistrate as well as before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial in character Further, the revisional power has to be exercised and a revisional order has to be passed by the Commissione ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in s.3. The provision also emphasises the importance attached by the Act to the protection of the tenants from eviction. The right conferred on the tenant no to be evicted, except on the specified grounds enumerated by clause (a) t,9 (g) of s. 3(1), is a statutory right of great significance and it is this statutory right of which the tenants would be deprived when the landlord obtains the sanction of the District Magistrate. That is why we think the Act must be taken to require that in exercising their respective powers under s. 3(2) and s. 3(3), the appropriate authorities have to consider the matter in a quasi-judicial manner. and are expected to follow the principles of natural justice before reaching their conclusions. We have already indicated that the Allahabad High Court had consistently taken the contrary view and held that the functions discharged by the appropriate authorities under s. 3(2) and s. 3(3) are administrative and an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice cannot be imposed on the said authorities vide Narettam Saran v. State of U.P.( A.I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y or even by necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court; indeed, the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he was persuaded to re-examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantially recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar's([1964] 1 S.C.R. 200) case. It is hardly necessary to emphasis that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is rounded on healthy principles of Judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned single Judge departed from this traditional wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
