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TMI Blog2008 (11) TMI 658X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... locus standi of the Plaintiff for filing the suit for permanent injunction restraining infringement of copyright, damages etc. 2. The precise legal status of Defendant No.2, M/s. Cineline Cinemas, is not known, as pleaded in the Plaint itself. It is debatable whether Defendant No.1, the Chief General Manager, M/s. Cineline Cinemas, can at all be impleaded; but we are not called upon to decide this question. Broadly stated, the ventilated grievance against the Defendants is that "Defendant No.1 is personally liable for his acts of encouraging and actively directing the infringing acts of Defendant No.2 by virtue of him having assured the Plaintiff of obtaining a license from the Plaintiff in respect of the Plaintiff's works being communicated to the public by Defendant No.2 and at Defendant No.2's premises'. So far as is relevant for the present purposes, the Defendants have underscored the fact that they own Cinema Halls only in Maharashtra and Mumbai and that the entire cause of action, as alleged in the Plaint, has arisen in Mumbai. In fairness to Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, it has been conceded before us that no part of the cause of action has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tiousness of taking the fight to the doorstep of the violating Defendant. The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 did not contain a provision akin to Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 enabling the Plaintiff to enjoy the convenience of filing a suit at the place where he resides or carries on business etc. The extant provisions are indeed salutary in purpose and effect, since otherwise the legal remedy available for a breach of copyright or an infringement of trademark often remains illusory. It appears to us that the Court would be acquiescing in an assault on a general principle of law prevalent at least in all common law systems if it were to allow a lis to continue at a place where neither has the cause of action arisen nor has the Defendant have a residence or place of business. This legal principle attempts to obviate the use of litigation as a device of harassment calculated to force an adversary into succumbing into a settlement for fear of fighting a lis at an inconvenient venue. Having made this observation, we see no impediment in extrapolating this impeccable reason onto an interpretation of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. -vs- Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 443. This is for the reason that with regard to the dispute before us the question of the place where the cause of action has incidentally or substantially arisen does not arise. The conundrum rather is whether the plaintiff is free to file a case at a place where the cause of action has not arisen despite the fact that it has its principal or subordinate place of business etc. at a place where the cause of action has arisen. Instead, the decision in M/s. Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay -vs- M/s. Prasad Trading Company, AIR 1992 SC 1514 is apposite, the ratio of which is that if a corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, litigation must be commenced at that place alone regardless of the apparently wider enabling provisions in Section 20 of the CPC. Their Lordships opined that - "it would be a great hardship if, inspite of the Corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place where the Corporation has its ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... place of suing is to ensure that litigation should be as best possible not a weapon of harassment. Since experience had exposed the reality that if a plaintiff in an action for infringement of copyright or trademark may not be able to enjoy the fruits thereof if he was compelled to file at the transgression's place of business, the amendment was brought about. It could not have been the intention of Parliament to enable the Plaintiff to choose the place of suing on the basis of what would be the inconvenience to the Defendant. 8. The learned Single Judge is unassailably correct in opining that "the plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at a branch office only if a cause of action has arisen in Delhi'. In doing so he has extracted and infused the rationale of Section 62 of the CPC into the Copyright Act. As we have already recorded above, it is the uncontrovered case of the parties that the cause of action has not arisen in Delhi. The neat question is whether a court of law is proscribed from introducing the aspect of cause of action merely because it has not been prescribed in the legislation. Alternatively, in the absence of an Explanation as is to be found in Section 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sible purpose of an „Explanation' cannot be doubted. 10. So far as Section 20 is concerned, the Explanation is clarificatory in nature. The problem that is presented is that Section 62 of the Copyright Act does not have any similar Explanation. Strictly speaking, an Explanation found in one statute cannot be read into another statute. The CPC, however, constitutes a grundnorm, the ethos and essence of which percolates through all other statutes. If any doubt persists in the context of the provisions of Copyright Act or the Trade Marks Act, we would not hesitate to dispel them with the aid of this Explanation found in the CPC. In Harshad S. Mehta -vs- State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 3774 it has been held that if two Acts are similar an external aid of statutory interpretation contained in one and omitted in another can be read into the latter. This course has also been favoured in Shri Narakesari Prakashan Ltd. -vs- Employees' State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 1916. 11. The intention of the legislature is evident, inter alia, in the non-obstante clause pertaining to the CPC. The word "notwithstanding' in ordinary parlance means „inspite of' or despite. (See Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... into Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, the law is made meaningful and expedient. This is the bounden duty of any Court which is called upon to interpret a provision of law. 12. We have already mentioned the landmark and oft-quoted judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Roadways and Oil & Natural Gas Commission. We must also refer to a more comparatively recent decision in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited -vs- Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 where it has been enunciated that if only a small part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, it is not bound to entertain the petition. It would be sufficiently empowered to refer the petition to the court where substantially the cause of action has arisen as it would be more convenient to adjudicate the matter in that court. Although it was Section 20 of the CPC which was in focus in all those cases, it is the legal rationale behind it that had compelled the court to render a purposive interpretation thereto. This approach is exactly what is called for even where the Court is to interpret other statutes such as the Copyright Act and the Trade Mar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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